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This is a short paper about a very long topic. As often as the term 
“globalization” is used in our daily speech, there remains a considerable 
difference of opinion over its meaning and significance for our economic, 
social, political and legal development. 
In the words of one observer, 
“Everyone here is on all sides these days about globalization and 
its effects… the word is somewhat odd. It names both a process 
and a fait accompli. Globalization is at once something that has 
already happened and something that is happening now, perhaps 
with a distant horizon to its completion… Even the most insular 
and hermetically sealed nation has always been, to some degree, 
affected by international trade and by other influences coming 
from the outside, as in the ancient Muslim influence on China, not 
to speak of the importation of Buddhism into China. Nevertheless, 
everyone feels that the process of globalization has these days 
reached a hyperbolic stage. This justifies singling it out as a 
decisive factor in many realms of cultural, political and economic 
life.”1 
As an economic concept, “globalization” was probably first 
popularized by Klans Schwab and his World Economic Forum meeting in 
Davos some ten years ago.2 Fred Bergsten, writing in The Economist, 
simply defined globalization as “international economic integration”.3 
                   
1 J. Hillis Miller, “Effects of Globalization on Literary Study” in Kwok-kan Tam et al., 
Sights of Contestation: Localism, Globalism and Cultural Production in Asia and the 
Pacific (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2002) 311. 
2  B.D. Wood, “The Globalization Question” Encyclopedia Britannica online: 
http://search-eb.com/magazine/article?query=globalization&id=5&smode=3.  
3  C.F. Bergsten, “The Rationale for a Rosy View: What a Global Economy Will Look 
Like” The Economist (September 11, 1993). 
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There are three positions in the debate over the meaning of 
globalization, neatly summarized as radical, transformational and 
historical: 
“[T]heoretical approaches differ markedly as to whether the 
present-day phase of globalization is believed to articulate a 
radically new epoch in world history, a process of transformation 
or a restructuring of the global political economy, or a historically 
contingent phenomenon that is by no means unprecedented.”4 
Thomas Friedman is an example of the popular combination of the 
first and second of those views. He describes globalization as “a dynamic, 
ongoing process… the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and 
technologies to a degree never witnessed before.”5 Friedman argues that 
the marketplace and its “immovable passenger” capitalism drive the 
process of globalization with the result that “… globalization also has its 
own set of rules—rules that revolve around opening, deregulating and 
privatizing your economy, in order to make it more competitive and 
attractive to foreign investment.”6 
Joseph Nye and John Donahue argue a process along the lines of the 
third, historical position. They speak of “globalism as a phenomenon with 
ancient roots and of globalization as the process of increasing globalism”.7 
They focus on how thick or thin the process of globalization has been over 
time. The thickness of the process relates to the extensiveness, intensity, 
and impact of relationships created by globalism. The greater the intensity, 
the thicker the process of globalization. 
This paper follows Nye and Donahue along the third historical school 
of thought, but focuses on the more specific relationship between 
economics and law, assuming a definition that is less Western-focussed 
and less limited by time than Friedman’s globalization. In opposition to 
the popular belief that globalization is a recent phenomenon stretching 
                   
4  A.G. McGrew, “Global Legal Interaction and Present-Day Patterns of Globalization” 
in V. Gessner & A.C. Budak, eds., Emerging Legal Certainty: Empirical Studies on 
the Globalization of Law (Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing, 1998) 325 at 326. 
5  T.L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Farrar, Staus and Giroux, 2000) at 9. 
6  Ibid.  
7  J.S. Nye & J.D. Donahue, eds., Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000) at 7. 
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back some hundred years, I posit that globalization, as a method and 
process by which market-driven economies have shifted laws and customs 
to facilitate economic development, has existed with varying influence and 
force since the earliest days of regional and international trade. The 
present stage of globalization8 may be in our face, so to speak, but its 
antecedents in law and practice have been with us for centuries. 
My proposed approach is not meant to marginalize or minimize the 
sharp differences of opinion over the meaning and effect of globalization. 
For economist John Helliwell, globalization “seems as much hype as 
reality”, a conclusion which he admits “has an almost other-worldly air 
when juxtaposed with the debates and protests about globalization.”9 On 
one end of the spectrum, the globaphiles cannot see beyond the mantra of 
open universal markets and minimalist government as the key to higher 
living standards around the world. By comparison,10 the globophobes 
“regard globalization as the tool multinational corporations are 
using to rob the world’s poor by exploiting their labour, resources 
and environments; destroying their culture; and commanding their 
vassal governments to implement whatever laws and trade 
agreements would make these transfers easier to achieve.”11 
I do not plan here, to enter into another round of globalization trench 
warfare, however. Others have written and proselytized widely on the 
subject.12 Rather, I will focus on thinking through the range and diversity 
of law and commercial practice that have created over time an amazingly 
durable, yet flexible and ever-changing legal framework for transactions 
between highly interdependent states in our “global village”.13 
                   
8 Derided by some as “Coca-Colonization” or “McMarketization”. 
9  J.R. Helliwell, Globalization and Well-Being (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002) at 15-
17, 77-78. 
10  G. Burtless et al., Globaphobia: Confronting Fears About Open Trade (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998); P. Legrain, Open World: The Truth About 
Globalization (London: Abacus, 2002). 
11  Supra note 9 at 78. 
12  For example, see J.E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2002); F.J. Lechner & J. Boli, eds., The Globalization Reader (Malden: 
Blackwell, 2000). 
13  E. Carpenter & M. McLuhan, eds., Explorations in Communication (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1960) at xi. 
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I. CLASSIFYING TRANSBORDER LEGAL CHANGE WAVES 
While globalization may be a “contested concept”, if we think of the 
term in its meaning for the flow of capital, people, goods and services and 
information across national borders, “we would be hard-pressed to deny 
[its] historical antecedents.”14 The legal badges or indicia of globalization 
are located in three merging waves of legal change, namely, the 
unification, convergence and harmonization of national legislative 
frameworks. Their cumulative effect underscores the evolutionary thin to 
thick process of legal regionalism and legal globalism that continues to the 
present day in the legal ordering of the global economy. 
Unification happens when nation states approve a treaty or convention 
that invites the signatories to adopt unchanged the instrument as domestic 
law with full force and effect in their legal systems. The cumulative 
experience results in the acceptance of identical rules across the board. A 
relevant example would be the UNIDROIT Convention on the Uniform 
Law on the International Sale of Goods of 1964.15 Another example is the 
UNCITRAL 1985 Model Law for International Commercial Arbitration,16 
which establishes a uniform legal framework for arbitration proceedings17 
and, in addition, has had “a unifying effect on new arbitration legislation 
in countries which did not even adopt the model law, as for example, in 
the case of the English Arbitration Act of 1996”.18  
Convergence of laws, on the other hand, takes place when nation 
states, beginning from different legal entry points, bring their laws by 
coordinated efforts closer together in terms of coverage, impact and 
administration. Membership in regional trading groups19 and customs 
unions,20 in the case of national commercial legislation and administration, 
                   
14  P. Potter, “Introduction: Globalization and Social Cohesion in Local Context” (2003) 
at 2 [unpublished, on file with author]. 
15  R. Goode, Commercial Law, 2nd ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995) at 17-18. 
16  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 
http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm. 
17  F. von Schlabrendorff, “Resolving Cultural Differences in Arbitration Proceedings” 
(2002) March supp. International Financial L. Rev. 38. 
18  P. Sanders, “UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Conciliation,” (2002) 12 Int’l J of Dispute 
Settlement 1. 
19  NAFTA is one example. 
20  The European Union is an obvious example. 
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has accelerated the convergence of member states’ legislation. The result 
has advanced the emergence of hybrid or mixed systems of law that have 
challenged the classical schema of civil and common law legal systems, 
not to mention the socialist classification of legal systems in transitional 
economies from Vietnam and China to Russia and Hungary. The forces of 
economic regionalism and multilateralism have force-fed the pace of legal 
convergence, requiring new thinking in the classification of legal systems 
by comparative law scholars.21 
Harmonization of laws occurs when different nation states use the 
same templates or sets of precedents as a basic foundation to which local 
adaptations are crafted to accommodate domestic cultural, economic and 
social considerations. Earliest examples would include the assumption of 
Roman law in Europe in the Middle Ages.22 More recently, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) has been the major institution pushing the 
harmonization of national trade laws and administration through 
mandatory Uruguay Round side agreements on a range of matters.23 I will 
consider this most recent wave of legal globalization later in this paper. 
II. EARLY LEGAL REGIONALISM IN ROMAN EMPIRE TERMS 
My brief examination of early legal globalism begins with the 
Romans. The Roman legal regime was the first clearly secular legal 
system. Under the Roman Empire, diverse populations were brought under 
a common legal mantle. To make these laws “fit”, to have the laws be 
applicable and enforceable over a broad range of peoples and situations, it 
was necessary to craft a legal system that would safeguard Rome’s 
primary interests while recognizing local norms and customs that 
facilitated orderly community relations so long as they did not threaten 
Rome’s governing capacity. Rome practised, if you will, its own version 
of adaptable Empire Law which, at its zenith, given the state of 
communications and the regional boundaries of trading activity, was the 
“globalized” law of its day. 
                   
21  R. Peerenboom, “The X-Files: Past and Present Portrayals of China’s ‘Alien Legal 
System’” (2003) 2 Wash. U. Global Studies Rev. 37. 
22  J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) at 43-44. 
23  Generally, see J.S. Thomas & M.A. Meyer, The New Rules of Global Trade: A Guide 
to the World Trade Organization (Toronto: Carswell, 1997). 
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Roman law, for our purposes, is primarily the law of property and 
contracts. The earliest texts of import in this area are the Institutes of 
Emperor Gaius (circa 161 C.E.) and the Institutes of the Emperor Justinian 
(circa 533 C.E.). The latter is modeled mainly on the former but is more 
expansive. The Institutes dealt with privatum jus (private law) though it 
should be noted that property and contract law in their present day 
incarnations do not find their precise notional counterparts in either of the 
Institutes. 
Under the rule of Emperor Trajan (98-117 CE), the reach of Rome 
reached its territorial limits, supporting a commercial web that stretched 
through much of Europe into the edges of Asia and Africa. The legal 
system facilitating this commerce was practical, internally coherent and 
open to the flexible resolution of trade disputes.24 Originally, only Roman 
citizens could benefit from Roman law but Emperor Antoninus in 212 CE 
granted citizenship to all free subjects of the Roman Empire and 
complications that had plagued the dual foreign law/Roman law system 
were put to rest.  
Though the size of the Empire shrank during Justinian’s reign, his four 
part legal compilation, the Corpus (consisting of the Institutes, Digest, 
Codex, and Novels), contributed a classification and coherence to the 
science of lawmaking that would have far reaching effects. The overriding 
impression of this early period of prevailing legal norms is consistent with 
harmonization. 
Eight centuries later, legal scholars in Bologna refurbished the Corpus, 
handling the Corpus as a Gloss, following a centuries-old practice of 
annotating a text with marginal notes. Their efforts eventually produced a 
comprehensive and pertinent legal treatise that served as the foundation 
for Italian legal study, not only for the academic community, but also for 
administrators, judges, and advocates.25  
The “reinvented” Corpus began to be adopted and adapted by local 
regions as its benefits became evident. The Corpus was, unlike regional 
law, a well developed system that had been amassed to deal with a variety 
of eventualities. Its quality as a written text lent it an air of reliability and 
                   
24  F. Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science (London: Oxford University Press, 1946) 
at 67-68. 
25  A. Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law (Athens and London: University of 
Georgia Press, 1991) at 90. 
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made it available for study and teaching.26 This in turn meant that regions 
had the ability to focus on principles and structure so they could pick and 
choose how and what to apply to their own systems; in this way, “Roman 
law functioned as a kind of legal treasury for Europe”27, bringing together 
a relatively thick convergence of laws throughout many parts of Europe. 
III. THE LAW MERCHANT EVOLVES AND PROSPERS 
The Roman legal principles in time permeated the borders of today’s 
Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, France and beyond. However, the 
growth of the nation-state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries curbed 
the spread of reintroduced Roman law. Roman law applied only to the 
citizens of the new states, forcing out non-citizens to deal with each other 
using their local customary laws regardless of geographic location.  
Previous to the widespread establishment of the (modern) nation state 
and its propensity to legislate commercial norms and practices, traders and 
merchants largely governed themselves through the application of the Law 
Merchant (Lex Mercatoria) which formerly stood apart from the local law. 
While the law merchant is normally studied as a phenomenon of English 
law, its effect on and connection to foreign trade calls for specific 
comment. In the words of Roy Goode,28 “there have been few events more 
remarkable than the birth and development of the law merchant, which for 
hundreds of years subsisted as a distinct source of law, administered by its 
own mercantile courts.” 
A host of courts—maritime courts, the courts of the Fairs and 
Burroughs and the Staple Courts in company with other commercial courts 
of the Middle Ages, “determined disputes not by English domestic law but 
according to ‘the general law of nations’ based on mercantile codes and 
customs… and reflecting international maritime and commercial practice.” 
Little wonder, then, that these courts and their counterparts elsewhere 
in Europe became the adjudicators of choice not only for local merchants 
but foreign traders from all parts of the region, content to have their 
disputes resolved by tribunals which, though located in one jurisdiction, 
                   
26  J.J. Wolff, Roman Law: An Historical Introduction (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1951) at 191. 
27  Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 22 at 43. 
28 R. Goode, Commercial Law, 1st ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982) at 31-32. 
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were conversant with both foreign mercantile usage and the fundamentals 
of the nascent civil and common law systems. The merchant courts offered 
speedy adjudicative relief, a common sense attitude towards the proof of 
facts and had little patience for the technical rules of evidence. Most of all, 
they possessed an overriding understanding of the argument that the good 
faith customs of merchants should constitute the prevailing norms that 
should be interpreted in a broadly uniform fashion. Commercial expec-
tations were to be realized, not frustrated. 
The next phase of harmonization took root as more nation states 
embraced the principal features of the Lex Mercatoria through statutes,29 
codes,30 and the separate establishment of commercial courts31 (though 
some merchants still used the courts set up at the seasonal fairs, fearing 
local discrimination).32 In broad terms, this state formalization of the Law 
Merchant ranged between harmonization and convergence, depending on 
the degree and depth of nation-state adoption of and conformity to the 
customary commercial norms developed and recognized by the trading 
firms of their day. 
The Law Merchant also developed mechanisms for the safe financing 
of crossborder transactions. While instruments of exchange had existed for 
centuries, bills of credit, promissory notes, and bills of exchange were 
more easily and reliably employed once they were standardized across 
Europe in the fifteenth century.33 Besides facilitating trade, these docu-
ments introduced and normalized the concept of a paper transfer of an 
intangible.34 These documentary innovations eventually led to the accep-
tance of negotiable instruments, the backbone of international commerce.  
                   
29  Goode, supra note 15 at 4. 
30  H.J. Berman, Law and Revolution: the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) at 355. 
31  P. Stein, The Character and Influence of the Roman Civil Law: Historical Essays 
(London: Hambledon Press, 1988) at 218-219. 
32  L.E. Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law (Littleton: Fred 
B. Rothman, 1983) at 19. 
33  M.M. Postan, Medieval Trade and Finance (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1973) at 54. 
34  Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 22 at 47. 
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IV. TRANSPLANTING TRADE AND COMMERCE LAWS INTO THE 
COLONIES—PACIFIC GLIMPSES 
As Lex Mercatoria’s reach matured in both customary and statutory 
form, its formative influence on global trading law norms and practices 
fed into the transplantation of commercial laws and business norms into 
the far reaches of the colonial empires established by the English, the 
Dutch, the Spanish, the Portuguese and the French. The experience in 
South-East Asia illustrates the transplant phenomenon. 
Their imperial forays transplanted their trading and commercial laws 
and institutions into the colonies sometimes through the medium of state 
monopolies,35 often with the explicit goal of insulating the commercial 
interests of their citizens and business associates in the colony’s economy 
from local law or custom. 
France, for example, like other European colonial powers in Southeast 
Asia, created parallel legal systems in its Indochinese territories, including 
Vietnam, where 
“a civil law system like that of metropolitan France governed 
French citizens, Europeans, and others with a substantially similar 
national law, while the local [Imperial] Code and customary 
practice continued to govern the indigenous Vietnamese and 
Chinese.”36 
Similar nationality and (often) race-based economic legislation was 
developed and used by the Dutch in their Netherlands Indies (Indonesia) 
colony.37 The larger picture of colonial legal transplants (often most 
pronounced in commercial law) would include the experience in British 
India, Burma, Malaya, Ceylon, Hong Kong and the Philippines. 
In this connection, we might capture the flavouring of this era of 
exported law through the observations of Andrew Harding: 
                   
35  J. Keay, The Honourable Company: A History of the British East India Company 
(Hammersmith: Harper Collins, 1993). 
36  J. Gillespie, “Private Commercial Rights in Vietnam: A Comparative Analysis” 
(1994) 30 Stanford J. of Int’l L. 326 at 329. 
37  C. Coppel, “The Idonesian Chinese as ‘Foregin Oriental’ in the Netherlands Indies” in 
T. Lindsey, ed., Indonesia Law and Society (Sydney: Federation Press, 1998) 33. 
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“The English common law tradition, with a heavy dose of the great 
Anglo-Indian codes, was imposed in Burma and the Straits 
Settlements, and later in Malaya, Brunei, Sabah, and Sarawak, 
while its American cousin became a permanent legal influence 
throughout the twentieth century in the Philippines. The French 
civilian tradition was imposed in Indo-China and also, along with 
German, Swiss and Japanese models, influenced Thailand; and 
Dutch law was imposed in Indonesia. As a result, all the legal 
systems of Southeast Asia, even that of Thailand, which was not 
colonised, have a clearly European-style framework, and all 
modernised their legal systems and their criminal, civil and 
commercial laws with European-style codes just before or just 
after the turn of the twentieth century, or a little later.”38 
V. THE MIDDLE KINGDOM’S MODEST CONTRIBUTION TO LEGAL 
OUTREACH 
If we shift from our Eurocentric chronicling of the ebb and flow of 
commercial law and practice that facilitated trade and investment between 
fiefdoms, trade fairs, early nation states, and their colonies in South East 
Asia, can we identify similar evolutionary, accommodating trends in the 
case of China’s customary or formal economic laws? 
The answer is not for the lack of an empire. The last dynasty of the 
Chinese Empire, the Qing (1644-1911), produced and relied upon one of 
the great legal Codes of human history. The Qing Code applied to a 
territory and a population 
“that was as large or larger than that governed by Roman law, 
either when it was the law of the Roman Empire, or when it 
became the dominant law of medieval and modern Europe. In 
addition to governing China itself, China’s legal system formed the 
basis of the legal systems of those nations which were subject to its 
influence: Korea, Japan and Vietnam. It was only when Roman 
law spread out beyond Europe and the Mediterranean that it began 
to exceed Chinese law in importance.”39 
                   
38  A. Harding, “Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in Southeast Asia” (2002) 
51 Int’l and Comp. L. Qtly 35 at 43 (emphasis added). 
39  W.C. Jones, The Great Qing Code (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 1. 
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In the case of Roman law, as we have seen in our treatment of property 
and contract relations, law was always looked at from the point of view of 
the individual and its basic concerns arose from person-to-person 
relationships. For this reason, Roman Law spoke directly to commercial 
law which is primarily about the terms of business relations between 
private parties or “rights-bearers”.  
In imperial China, however, private rights and business law were 
“considered only when they directly affected the interests of the 
Emperor”.40 
This meant, for example, that the regulation of marriage would find 
expression only in the Code because the stability of marriage and family 
(the “cell” of society) was essential to social stability and the “cosmic 
harmony” that were required for the very security of the Empire. To 
choose a second example, the collection of taxes, the Code spelled out 
very specific rules (and punishments for breaches thereof), just as in our 
system today, because tax revenue was the only guarantor of the economic 
sustainability of the regime.  
Torts would be treated together with crimes but very little attention 
was paid to private matters, with almost no treatment of contracts. 
Contracts and the settlement of commercial disputes were seen as private 
questions which were best handled in the community by respected 
intermediaries, mercantile elders or extended family members. Early 
comparative law scholars refused to regard these facilitation methods as 
“law” or “legal rules”. As one commentator observed: culturally fixed 
“categories of Western law did not work”41 in studying the Qing Code. 
The export of Chinese law was most explicit in the case of Vietnam 
which provides the only example of a wholesale adoption of foreign law, 
in concept and substance in South-East Asia.42 Vietnam’s fifteenth century 
Lê Code mixed Ming Code law (1397) with local law and the later Gia-
Long Code (1812) is considered a replication of the Qing Code (1740). 
                   
40  Ibid. at 6. 
41  Ibid. at 8. 
42  M.B. Hooker, ed., The Laws of South-East Asia: The Pre-Modern Texts, vol. 1 
(Vancouver: Butterworths, 1986) 20. 
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The Vietnamese legal system would undergo another transformation under 
the colonial grasp of the French, between 1867 and 1954.43 
As in Europe, the Chinese mercantile and trade guilds were an 
important source of local rules that governed market entry, labour and 
product prices and quality standards. The guilds were organized by craft or 
by trade and place of origin for particular sets of merchants and trades. 
These largely self-governing entities developed their own organizational 
and dispute resolution tools because the Qing code was mainly silent on 
commercial matters. The guilds had highly formalized codes of trading 
practices that, in addition to fixing standards of weight and methods of 
payment, directed members to take their disputes to the guild leadership 
for settlement. These directives, as in the European case of the Law 
Merchant, were often accepted by local magistrates as equivalent to 
formal law on those rare occasions when the courts became involved in 
non-state economic disputes.44  
At the end of the day, the weak Chinese state never had any 
ideological interest in formalizing commercial custom into formal law.45 
Market regulation was only concerned with security and revenue issues. 
Villages, trading towns, guilds and extended family units were left to their 
own devices, in large part, to oversee and mentor the facilitation of 
business transactions. 
This era of formal legal apathy may be contrasted with the recent 
legislative frenzy undertaken by China in order to satisfy the legal 
harmonization conditions of WTO membership.46 
                   
43  M.B. Hooker, “Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Law” 
in French Civil Laws and the Laws of Indo-China (London: Oxford University Press, 
1975).  
44  Ibid. at 15-16. 
45  This account in no way seeks to minimalize the separate significance of pre-modern 
China as the centre of an Asian world economy for over five centuries, addressed by 
A.G. Frank in his masterful study, ReOrient: Gobal Economy in the Asian Age 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), unfortunately with little reference to 
contracting practices, operative dispute resolution mechanisms or the relevance of 
“legal” rules. See also A.G. Frank, “The World Economic System in Asia Before 
European Hegemony” (1994) 56 Historian 259. 
46  Over 850 specific legislative change commitments (with timetables for enactment and 
implementation) were given by China to the WTO. For a review of the more 
significant undertakings, see Baker & McKenzie, Guide to China and the WTO (Hong 
Kong: Asia Information Associates Ltd., 2002); the relative lack of transparency in 
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VI. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW CONVENTIONS AND LAW 
UNIFICATION ORGANIZATIONS—FORMAL 
MULTILATERALISM TAKES OVER 
First convened in 1893, the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law (HCPIL) redefined itself by 1955 as a multilateral drafting 
organization committed to “the progressive unification of the rules of 
private international law”.47 Through its negotiation and drafting efforts, 
the legal specialists of its member states successfully negotiated unified 
approaches to a range of matters affecting international commerce. 
Perhaps the most recent initiative is the Hague Securities Convention 
which attempts to resolve conflict of laws issues to ensure in advance the 
choice of governing law for international securities transactions.48  
The obvious rationale for the unification approach to legislated 
globalization is to increase the efficiency and predictability of transborder 
transactions by the application of uniform standards to commercial 
dealings. Perhaps one of the most successful instruments in this respect 
would be the UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of Goods. 
UNCITRAL, the “core legal body of the United Nations system in the 
field of international trade law”, was founded in 1966 and tasked by the 
General Assembly “to further the progressive harmonization and 
unification of the law of international trade.” 49  
Initially established under the League of Nations, UNIDROIT (the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law) was entrusted 
from the outset with an ongoing responsibility for “study[ing the] needs 
and methods for modernising, harmonising and co-ordinating private and 
in particular commercial law as between States and groups of States.”50 
 
China’s legal system and its relevance to ensuring China’s performance of its 
accession obligations are discussed in S. Biddulph, “Through a Glass Darkly: China, 
Transparency and the WTO” (2001) 3 Asian Law 59. 
47  http://www.hcch.net/e/event/events/html. 
48  Hague Convention on the Law applicable to Certain Rights in respect of Securities 
held with an Intermediary, December 13, 2002. 
49  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.  
50  International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, http://www.unidroit.org. 
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With its 59 current member states, UNIDROIT’s original unification 
of law objectives have been refashioned to legal convergence through the 
drafting and advocacy of model laws, commercial “best practices” and 
sector-specific legal guides. 
We might also cite the continuing role played by the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), headquartered in Paris. Founded in 1919 as 
a global association of corporations, trading interests and business 
organizations, the ICC now has members from some 130 countries. The 
ICC has initiated and promoted a number of sets of uniform rules or “best 
practices” that govern the conduct of transborder business. Interestingly, 
although these rules are voluntary, they have been widely accepted by 
banks and merchants, and by more than a few courts of law, thereby 
becoming recognized commercial norms.51 
VII. ENTER THE GATT/WTO AS THE GREAT LEGAL 
GLOBALIZER 
Support for the harmonization of commercial laws and practice also 
flows from the EEC treaty in Article 3 which commits the members of the 
Customs Union to a “common commercial policy… and the approxi-
mation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the 
functioning of the common market.”52 
In contrast to the Rome Treaty, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which serves as the basis for the WTO, fails to mention 
harmonization of national laws or domestic policies of its members as one 
of its objectives. Quite to the contrary, the GATT, according to its 
Preamble, was to contribute to “the substantial reduction of tariffs and 
other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international commerce.”53 
                   
51  International Chamber of Commerce, http://www.iccwbo.org. Braithwaite & Drahos, 
supra note 22 at 27-28: “The ICC is an important actor in the globalization of 
regulation because, in addition to having an interest-group strategy for shaping 
regulation, for 70 years it has had a private ordering strategy based on recording its 
members’ customary practices and releasing them in the form of model rules and 
agreements.”  
52  Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11, art. 3. See also at 47-49. 
53  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The 
World Trade Organization (WTO) was established, effective January 1994, by the 
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As a matter of principle, a GATT member state is free to adopt any 
domestic policy it deems fit so long as the law or policy applies to both 
domestic and foreign products alike without discriminating against foreign 
products based on their origin. 
How then did the GATT/WTO transform itself into a legal change 
agent in the past decade? Did it happen overnight or did it come about 
gradually and in specific steps, following the completion of the 1994 
Uruguay Round of negotiations? 
Take the case of antidumping and countervailing duties.54 
Antidumping and countervailing duties are an exception to the rule against 
imposing import duties in excess of a party’s bound tariff on a particular 
product. Abuses of this exceptional protectionist device were rampant in 
the 1960s, resulting in the negotiation of the 1967 Antidumping Code, 
then the 1979 Tokyo Round Antidumping Code and ultimately the current 
Antidumping Agreement55 during the 1994 Uruguay Round. The 1994 
Agreement (which all WTO members are obliged to follow) sets out some 
thirty pages of what is nothing less than highly detailed commitments and 
procedural provisions that leave little room for divergent or significantly 
dissimilar national regulation. The same inclusivity is evident in the 
countervailing duty section of the separate Subsidies Agreement.56 Not 
surprisingly, the WTO Antidumping Agreement has spawned remarkably 
similar, if not almost identical, antidumping and countervailing duty 
legislation in most WTO member states.57 
 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiszation, April 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement] The WTO’s 
legal framework includes the GATT and a number of mandatory and voluntary side-
agreements, including the mandatory Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which is discussed below. 
54  I am grateful to A. Reich, “The WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution” (2002) 
[unpublished, with author] for his insights into the legal harmonization influence of 
the 1994 Uruguay Round mandatory agreements. This is a draft paper kindly 
provided to me by the author. 
55  Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 [hereinafter 1994 
Antidumping Agreement], reprinted in The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations—The Legal Texts (Geneva: WTO, 1995) 168 
[hereinafter Results of the Uruguay Round]. 
56  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in ibid. 264 at 278. 
57  See J. Miranda, R.A. Torres & M. Ruiz, “The International Use of Antidumping: 
1987-1997” (1998) 32 World Trade 5. 
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The Agreement itself mandates that members’ laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures must conform with the provisions of the 
Antidumping Agreement.58 Many developing countries upon their joining 
the WTO have often just copied the provisions of the Antidumping and 
Subsidies Agreements and translated them into their own language and 
adopted them as national law.59 
In its first year (2002) as a WTO member, China’s lawmakers moved 
at a frenetic pace to set up a framework of laws and regulations at all 
levels of government to govern trade in goods and services according to 
the WTO principles of transparency and national treatment. An important 
number of trade-related laws and regulations were drafted or amended 
through the State Council (the cabinet) and the National People’s 
Congress. One of the very first measures passed was the first antidumping 
law and it was used quickly in disputes involving steel imports from 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and chemicals from South Korea, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. There is considerable evidence that developing 
country members of the WTO have now caught up to traditional leaders 
such as Canada, the US and Australia in their employment of WTO-
recognized antidumping protectionist legislation.60 
Within the realm of customs administration, a further example of 
legislative harmonization on the signatories’ laws and procedures may be 
seen in the Rules of Origin61 applying to imports. Rules of Origin criteria 
are used to define where a product is made and are probably the most 
important part of import administration given their legendary capacity, 
unless they are uniformly administered, to discriminate unfairly against 
imports, thereby frustrating the force of the GATT’s fundamental Most 
Favoured Nation rules. Under the terms of the preamble of the Rules of 
                   
58  1994 Antidumping Agreement, supra note 55, art. 3. 
59  For example, see “Vietnam to have antidumping ordinance”, Vietnam Business 
Forum, www.vnbizadmin@vietlinks.net (last modifie: September 15, 2003). 
60  “Unfair Protection” The Economist 349:8093 (November 7, 1998) 75: “Protec-
tionism is on the rise in a new guise: Anti-dumping cases are multiplying in America, 
Europe and around the world.” Also see Asian Wall Street Journal, Weekly Edition, 
November 22-28, 1999) 4, “‘Emerging markets are making use of anti-dumping 
rules’—explosion of cases in Asian region show US and E.U. that such actions can 
cut both ways.” India initiated the highest number of antidumping investigations in 
2002, followed by Thailand, Australia and the US: Far Eastern Economic Review 
(May 15, 2003) 25. 
61  Results of the Uruguay Round, supra note 55 at 241. 
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Origin Agreement whereby the members confirm their desire to 
“harmonize and clarify rules of origin”, considerable progress has been 
made in the development of uniform and compatible rules which, if 
successful, will harmonize this notoriously difficult area of trade legisla-
tion and administration.62 
VIII. THE WTO AND TRADE-RELATED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS (TRIPS)— UNIFICATION BY 
ANOTHER NAME? 
The first European, patent, trademark and copyright laws were simple 
and based on notions of territoriality, merely recognizing the creator’s 
rights. In the mid-nineteenth century, when copying foreign creations was 
a matter of course, the argument for protecting creators’ ‘rights’ started to 
be considered.63 IP became the subject of bilateral treaties which, in turn, 
set the foundations for two Conventions—the Paris Convention of 1883 
which created a union to protect industrial property and the Berne 
Convention of 1886 which protected literary and artistic works.64 The 
global implications of intellectual property rights eventually led to the 
founding of the World International Property Organization (WIPO) which 
today counts 179 nations as member states.65 This rather benign picture of 
low key international regulation of IPRs started to change after World War 
II when developing countries joined the Paris and Berne Conventions. For 
example, in the 1960s India redesigned its patent law to lower its 
prescription medicine prices. Instead of granting patents for chemical 
compounds, India granted patents for the process of creating the 
pharmaceutical.66 India also headed an initiative to allow developing 
countries greater access to copyright materials, a project that took form in 
the 1967 Stockholm Protocol. 
                   
62  Ironically, the rapid proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in the 
Asia Pacific region threatens to propel the harmonized Rules of Origin to almost 
absurd lengths as party states strive to keep non-member goods out of their preferred 
markets. The Rules of Origin provisions of the recent Japan-Singapore PTA account 
for 200 of the Agreement’s 360 pages: see J. Ravenhill, “The Move to Preferential 
Trade in the Western Pacific Rim” 69 Asia Pacific Issues (June 2003) 4. 
63  B. Sherman, “Remembering and Forgetting: The Birth of Modern Copyright Law” 
(1995) Intellectual Property J. 1 at 7-10. 
64  Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 22 at 59. 
65  WIPO, http://www.wipo.org/about-wipo/en/overview.html. 
66  Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 22 at 61. 
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U.S. reactions to these perceived impairments of their corporations’ 
IPRs took the form of a series of amendments to the 1974 Trade Act, 
including the development of the “301” sanctions to identify nations 
“abusing” their IPRs. The 301 process in turn put pressure on nations 
involved in bilateral trade agreements with the US to curb the production 
and distribution of counterfeit goods and misappropriated US patents. 
Conflict and negotiation ultimately resulted in the development of the 
TRIPs Agreement—the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, which was concluded as part of the Uruguay 
Round.67 
Strictly speaking, TRIPs is not concerned with international trade 
measures. It speaks directly to domestic laws and policies which under the 
TRIPs Agreement must comply with TRIPs’ mandated minimum stan-
dards of legal protection.68 The requirements are, in fact, more than 
minimal and invariably reflect the level of intellectual property protection 
prevailing in industrialized countries. The core of the TRIPs Agreement is 
the adoption of standards from existing intellectual property treaties that 
ironically, until recently, were not considered to be “trade-related”. 
TRIPs is not like the other examples of win-win trade liberalization 
initiatives tied to harmonized legislation and administration. Put shortly, 
the TRIPs Agreement does not necessarily benefit countries that are net 
importers of intellectual property. This applies, in large part, to developing 
countries.69 This was understood by the developing countries in 1994 
when they signed on to the TRIPs as part of a broader bargain inherent in 
such broad-based negotiations.70 
                   
67   Results of the Uruguay Round, supra note 55. 
68  Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, art. 1(1) 
[hereinafter TRIPs]. 
69  M.J. Trebilcock & and R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (London: 
Routledge, 1995) 253. 
70  According to Braithwaite & Drahos, Three tests of US trade policy on intellectual 
property rights, http://www.nthposition.com/politics_Drahos.html, developing coun-
tries had agreed to TRIPs “in the hope that the US would be content with its standards 
and the gains it brought to the US economy. It was a naïve hope and it turned out to 
be one in vain. TRIPs, as we will see, has turned out to be a floor without a ceiling”. 
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Perhaps the TRIPs Agreement “broke the faith” in the multilateral 
harmonization of national trade law, regulation and administration by its 
aggravation of the “North-South” divide.  
This conclusion arises from recent evidence which suggests that the 
WTO, in the TRIPs case, may have reached its high-water mark as the 
primary force for the globalization of economic law. It seems safe to 
predict that the legislative harmonizers in the short and middle term will 
be US regional and bilateral trade agreements71 and law reform templates 
drafted as the legal conditionalities of the IMF and World Bank financial 
support and other model legislation drafted by various overseas legal 
advisory programs heavily influenced by the “free markets” ideology of 
the “Washington Consensus”.72 
Why has TRIPs tripped up the WTO harmonization momentum? The 
story starts in late May 2003 when the World Health Organization’s 
Annual Assembly formally endorsed a resolution73 giving the WHO a 
central role in advising its 192 member governments on how to ensure that 
pharmaceutical patent protection policies do not harm public health. 
Initiated by Brazil, the empowering resolution was adopted by consensus 
after the US dropped an earlier resolution calling for a strengthening of 
patent protection to encourage drug innovation.  
The WHO resolution calls on its members to adapt their national 
intellectual property laws to make full use of the provisions in the WTO 
patent rules that allow countries to give priority to public health and 
nutrition. The argument that won the day was that, in too many cases, 
developing countries have adopted patent laws that are more restrictive 
than necessary to comply with TRIPs. The impetus for the resolution 
                   
71  Most obviously, the NAFTA precedent, which, inter alia, required Mexico in chapter 
15 to enact an antitrust law compatible with Canadian and US legislation; the recent 
US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement committed the Vietnamese to massive legal 
change which, in several instances, went beyond their forthcoming WTO legal 
obligations (Vietnam is not expected to join the WTO until 2005). Compare 
Ravenhill, on “The Move to Preferential Trade in the Western Pacific Rim”, supra 
note 62. 
72  W.A.W. Neilson, “The Rush to Law: IMF Legal Conditionalities Meet Indonesia’s 
Legal Realities” in Duncan & Lindsey, eds., Indonesia After Soeharto: Reformasi and 
Reaction (Victoria: Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, 1999) 4. See P. Hughes’s paper 
in this volume for a fulsome analysis of the “Washington Consensus” and its impact 
on legal change agendas in recipient states. 
73  For context, see WTO/WHO Joint Study, 2002. 
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undoubtedly came from the September 2002 report of the Independent 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights entitled “Integrating Intellec-
tual Property Rights and Development Policy.”74 The central message of 
the Commission’s report 
“is both clear and controversial: poor places should avoid 
committing themselves to rich-world systems of IPR protection 
unless such systems are beneficial to their needs. Nor should rich 
countries, which professed so much interest in ‘sustainable 
development’ at the recent Summit in Johannesburg, push for 
anything stronger.” 
The impact of IPR on poor nations has centred on the issue of access 
to expensive patent medicines produced by multinationals in the 
industrialized world. Developing country members of the WTO at the 
November 2002 Doha meetings75 presented the case for the primacy of 
public health over IPR, demanding that the world’s least-developed 
countries should be given at least until 2016 to introduce patent protection 
for pharmaceuticals. 
In May 2003, the “Cheap Medicine Agreement” was negotiated after 
frenetic bargaining amidst an openness that rarely attends WTO 
negotiations.76 The Agreement will permit WTO members facing public 
health crises such as HIV/AIDS, malaria or tuberculosis to import the 
needed medicines from other countries that authorized the manufacturing 
of generic drugs. To make the purchase, the soliciting country, with some 
exceptions, will be subject to oversight and approval by the WTO 
Secretariat and its Council on TRIPs.  
While there is much debate over whether the Cheap Medicine 
Agreement will really help less-developed countries import cheaper 
generic, life-saving drugs,77 one thing is clear: the generic drugs accord 
                   
74  “Intellectual Property: Patently Problematic” The Economist, 364:8290 (September 
14, 2002) 75; reported in wtoforum@yahoogroups.com, September 13, 2002 (Digest 
No. 96). 
75  C. Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health (Geneva: WHO, 2002). 
76  F. Fleck, “WTO Finally Agrees on Cheap Drug Deal” (2003) British Medical Journal 
517. 
77  For example, see R. Elliott, “Canada can carry much more” The Globe and Mail 
(September 23, 2003). 
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pierced the underbelly of the legal globalization juggernaut and presaged 
the political force of the developing member states to stymie or even 
reshape WTO uniform standards deemed to favour the corporate interests 
of developed member states. 
The failure of the recent WTO talks in Cancun underscored the 
growing limitations of the WTO as a force for trade liberalization (and its 
partner, legal globalization), especially when the 149 Member body 
attempts to deal “by consensus” with an issue as contentious as agri-
culture. 
The Cancun talks collapsed, in short, because a remarkably cohesive 
coordinated group of developing countries, including the African Carib-
bean and Pacific Group (ACP), the African Union, the Less Developed 
Countries Group (LDC), Brazil and Asian countries such as India and 
Malaysia, rejected the offer of mild cuts in EU, US and Japan subsidies 
and food import quotas.78 
IX. PARKING THE WTO’S “SINGAPORE ISSUES” 
Perhaps more important for our immediate purposes, the real reason 
why the Cancun meeting ended without an agreement on the Ministerial 
Text was that many developing countries would not agree to launch 
negotiations on the so-called “Singapore issues” which have been pushed 
by the European Union and the US (and sometimes Canada) for the past 
seven years.  
The Singapore issues referred to the development of common 
approaches (or even, hopefully, harmonized legislation) by WTO 
members to foreign investment rules, competition law, government 
procurement procedures and uniform trade facilitation measures. Although 
about 80 Developing Countries (DC) formally submitted their position 
that they would not want negotiations to start, the Conference Chairman 
(the Foreign Minister of Mexico) came out with a draft that called for 
negotiations in three of the four areas (procurement, trade facilitation and 
investment).79 
                   
78  S. Chase, “Impasse Scene Hurting WTO” The Globe and Mail (November 16, 2003) 
B3. 
79  The Developing Country perspective on the Singapore issues is graphically 
summarized by B. Lal Das, On the Status of Singapore Issues Post-Cancun (Third 
World Network, 2003). 
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This railroading did not sit well with the DC group. It could be said 
that the WTO at Cancun set itself up for failure. As late as August 2003, it 
was clear that major differences could not be resolved amongst groups of 
countries in a short period of time in areas of extreme importance such as 
agriculture and non-agriculture market access, and the fate of the so-called 
Singapore issues. The whole process and the preparations for Cancun 
forecasted defeat and collapse of the negotiations where Ministers could 
never be expected to make large compromises in five days on an 
extremely ambitious agenda when the Members themselves are nowhere 
near compromise or settlement. 
What are the immediate and short term repercussions of the collapse of 
the Cancun Ministerial Conference? For one thing, more pressure will be 
brought to bear to move the Singapore issues off the WTO agenda since, 
much like some aspects of TRIPs, they are not core trade issues and 
attempts by the EU at Cancun, in particular, to bring them into the WTO 
system only exacerbated long-standing acrimony and division. Whether 
the “democratic deficit” of WTO negotiations can or will be repaired, after 
the Seattle and Cancun debacles, is an open question.  
The Director-General of the WTO recently appointed a group of 
“sages” (APEC used to call them “Eminent Persons”) to advise him on 
issues affecting the future of the organization, including its governance 
structure and framework for negotiations. Unfortunately, it does not 
appear that “concerned members of the public will be able to share their 
views about these matters with this group, or participate in its 
deliberations”.80 
X. WERE THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS THE HIGH 
WATER MARK OF LEGAL GLOBALIZATION? 
The Uruguay Round Agreements undoubtedly provided the most 
legislative templates for the harmonization of national commercial and 
trade legislation in modern history. Membership in the WTO now stands 
at 148 nations. More legislative harmonization has occurred in the past ten 
years than in any other comparable period of time.  
                   
80  R. Howse, “Eminences grises” WTO Forum, Digest Number 351, September 18, 
2003. 
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However, we must remember that in the WTO, in contrast to the 
methods and outputs of organizations such as UNIDROIT and 
UNCITRAL, the reality of the “Single Undertaking” approach leaves 
many countries no choice  
“but to accept the package of agreements negotiated within a given 
round of the WTO. It is not surprising to find, therefore, much 
more sensitivity and resistance among many member countries, 
especially during the last few years following the experience of the 
Uruguay Round, toward the introduction of any new issue onto the 
negotiation agenda.”81 
Cancun marks the first time that a bloc of (developing) member states 
openly thwarted efforts by developed member states (led, in this case, but 
with varying levels of conviction and political expediency by the 
European Union, the United States and Japan) to bully them towards a 
“consensus” result (that is then expressed as a Single Undertaking). 
There is some similarity in the Cancun results and the demise of the 
OECD-backed Multilateral Investment Code (“MAI”) where a range of 
capital-importing developing states, by concerted effort, refused to take up 
the model legal framework proposed by the OECD (supported by the 
ICC).82 
Interestingly, some of the more contentious recommended MAI legal 
prescriptions favouring foreign investors turned up in several of the legal 
conditionalities imposed by the IMF in its financial support packages 
extended to Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea following the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis.83 Other, more expansive statements of foreign 
investor treatment have also appeared in recent bilateral trade agreements 
negotiated by the United States, for example, with Vietnam.84 
                   
81  Reich, supra note 54 at 33. 
82  OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (the MAI Negotiating Text, 24 
April 1998). For a Canadian perspective on the MAI text and its process of 
negotiations, see Smythe, 1998. 
83 Neilson, supra note 72.  
84  Agreement between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on Trade Relations, effective January 1, 2002. This Agreement is often 
described as a “WTO-Plus” agreement, given the significant concessions by Vietnam 
on a range of issues, including US investor national treatment issues, government 
procurement and limited transition time for reducing goods and services barriers. 
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There is every reason to believe that a majority of the so-called 
Singapore Issues will find legislative expression in the growing number of 
US free trade agreements just negotiated or under negotiation with Asian 
trading partners.85 The United States Trade Representative, after the 
failure of the Cancun talks, announced his government’s intention to 
pursue “zealously” regional and bilateral trade agreements with 
developing countries in Latin America and Asia86 who are seeking 
improved access to the US market. 
For commercial and economic legislation, this next round of trade 
agreements (which Canada is pursuing in its own right) may appear to be a 
downsizing of legal globalization—however, its cumulative effect may 
actually prove to be more pronounced and pervasive in pushing 
US/western legal templates into the legislative frameworks of the develo-
ping world. 
XI. ON SURVEYING THE THIN TO THICK EVOLUTIONARY 
PROCESS OF LEGAL GLOBALIZATION 
In this brief essay, I have obviously plotted only some of the ebbs and 
flows of legal change regulating and facilitating trade and commerce both 
regionally and globally over the centuries: the legal inclusivity of the 
Romans, the adaptability and pervasive impact of the Law Merchant, the 
largely insular legal experience of the Middle Kingdom, the influence of 
colonial legal transplants and the early state trading monopolies, taking us 
to the days of rationality and the search for unified law, largely centred in 
western Europe, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
We then considered the reorganization, indeed the revitalization, of 
international trading and financial relations that followed the Second 
World War, epitomized in the humble beginnings of the GATT and the 
ongoing influence of business organizations such as the ICC as an 
advocacy group promoting “best practices” conduct codes and model 
legislation. This took us to the recent WTO Cancun Ministerial 
Conference where the continuing after-effect of the Uruguay Round 
Master Agreements was stymied, if not buried, by the coordinated efforts 
of the less developed countries. Their efforts, we should note, were 
dedicated to changing global legal rules as opposed to not localizing them. 
                   
85  Ravenhill, supra note 62 at 4-5.  
86  Stratfor’s Global Intelligence Report, September 25, 2003. 
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Hopefully, this paper has helped to set the stage for the question of 
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We in Canada tend to be somewhat smug about the centrality of the rule 
of law to our legal and political identity. It is, after all, one of those 
identifying features that make us a liberal democracy. The phenomenon of 
globalization, however, may require us to take a far more critical look at how 
deeply rooted the rule of law in fact is in our constitutional structure and 
whether it will forced to adapt to developments transcending our domestic 
boundaries. Indeed, one might say that the issue is not “whether” but how our 
understanding of the rule of law will be required to adapt. As the guardians of 
the rule of law, the judiciary needs to be aware of challenges to the continued 
applicability of our rule of law and its capacity to support democratic values.  
In any system which claims to be based on laws—at least laws that fulfil 
certain prescriptions in form—rather than being governed by an all powerful 
sovereign, by the divine right of kings or by some other arrangement 
contingent on arbitrary decision-making by individuals, the rule of law will 
be a fundamental constitutional principle. The rule of law has been one of 
Canada’s most significant constitutional principles since the country’s 
inception, inherited by implication under the Preamble to the then British 
North America Act, 1867. It has been described as “a fundamental postulate 
of our constitutional structure.”1 Although it has since been explicitly 
acknowledged in the Preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,2 that recognition alone has given it neither any greater importance 
since 1982—its status rests predominantly in its role as an unwritten 
principle—nor has its meaning in the jurisprudence changed fundamentally 
since the Court first acknowledged its importance.3 The capacity of the rule 
                   
1  Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121 at 142. 
2  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.) 1982, c. 
11. The Preamble reads: “Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the 
supremacy of God and the rule of law.” 
3  There is a view that the principle has acquired a more powerful capacity to invalidate 
legislation since its explicit inclusion in the Constitution: P.J. Monahan, “Is the Pearson 
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of law to ground an independent basis for action is, however, currently at 
issue in the British Columbia tobacco litigation where the Philip Morris 
Company has argued that several components of a procedural rule of law 
have been contravened.4 
While the Supreme Court has emphasized different aspects of the 
principle, it has generally seen it as comprised of three elements: equality 
before the law; the existence of a system of positive laws; and the need to 
ground all government action in law. It has also articulated a clear and direct 
association between the rule of law and democracy. Thus while in many 
respects our Canadian version of the rule of law is hardly unique, it is one 
that is closely identified with the democratic form of government 
characterizing that cluster of countries of which Canada is a part, the “liberal-
democratic western democracies.” Finally, the Court’s opportunities to 
interpret and apply the principle in any detail have occurred in a domestic, as 
opposed to international, context. 
The question, then, for the rule of law as it has been defined in Canada is 
how it is likely to fare in its interaction with the current and future 
phenomenon of globalization. Canadian domestic courts increasingly rely on 
or at least consider international norms or rules in their jurisprudence. At the 
same time, the growth of international decision-making has in some respects 
displaced the domestic judicial system. Discussions about globalization have 
included consideration of the development of a more universal rule of law, 
one that could be accepted by countries—China is often mentioned here, but 
there are many possibilities—which currently do not abide by the same 
notion of the rule of law held by the western liberal democracies5 or which 
 
Airport Legislation Unconstitutional?: The Rule of Law as a Limit on Contract 
Repudiation by Government” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 411. 
4  These arguments are set out in D.R. Clark & C.A. Millar, “British Columbia Tobacco 
Litigation and the Rule of Law” in this volume. The position that the rule of law does not 
ground a distinct basis of action is developed in R. Elliott in his contribution under the 
same title. 
5  I would argue that there is a “liberal-democratic” form of the rule of law. Peerenboom 
suggests, however, that we should be wary of assuming that “rule of law discourse has 
evolved in a uniform way in Western countries,” citing France as a country where the 
development has been different from that in many other western countries. One reason he 
identifies for saying that France has developed differently is that constitutionalism has 
not taken root there largely because of the principle of legislative supremacy. For 
Canadians, this distinction is not of much import since it is only in the past twenty years 
that we have developed constitutional supremacy rather than legislative supremacy. 
Peerenboom appears to use the United States as the “model” or norm for the rule of law 
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are not enamoured of the virtues of democracy. Some observers have argued 
for a “global citizenship” which will transcend national citizenship. All these 
developments, related to the growth of globalization, have implications for 
the rule of law. What challenges do the ramifications of globalization pose to 
our courts in applying the rule of law and to our reliance on the rule of law as 
a major element in our constitutional framework?  
After exploring the meaning, scope and significance of the rule of law 
and more briefly, the meaning and ramifications of globalization, I will 
explore the issues raised above. 
I. SETTING THE PARAMETERS 
In order to consider the relationship between the rule of law and 
globalization, it is necessary to establish the parameters of the discussion: the 
assumptions on which the analysis is based and the meaning of and major 
issues arising from the rule of law and from globalization. With respect to the 
latter, globalization, I restrict my discussion to identifying which of the many 
aspects and consequences of globalization have particular relevance for the 
rule of law. 
A. The Rule of Law  
As a starting point, it is relatively simple to identify the components of 
the rule of law as understood by the Supreme Court of Canada. This will not 
exhaust the values associated with the principle, however, and these values 
have as much significance to this discussion as a bare assertion of the 
components has. 
In the Manitoba Language Reference, the Supreme Court identified two 
(non-exhaustive) aspects: “that the law is supreme over officials of the 
government as well as private individuals, and thereby preclusive of the 
influence of arbitrary power;” and that it “requires the creation and 
maintenance of an actual order of positive laws which preserves and 
 
in western countries. See R. Peerenboom, “Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction 
and Provisional Conclusion”, University of California, Los Angeles School of Law 
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 03-16): http://ssrn.com/abstract=445821 
[hereinafter “Varieties of Rule of Law”]. “Varieties of Rule of Law” is an introduction to 
Asian Discourses of Rule of Law, Routledge Curzon, January 2004. 
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embodies the more general principle of normative order.”6 Indeed, the 
principle is more than one constitutional principle among many; rather, it is  
“clearly implicit in the very nature of a Constitution. The 
Constitution, as the Supreme Law, must be understood as a purposive 
ordering of social relations providing a basis upon which an actual 
order of positive laws can be brought into existence. The founders of 
this nation must have intended, as one of the basic principles of 
nation building, that Canada be a society of legal order and normative 
structure: one governed by rule of law.”7 
In its more recent pronouncement on the subject, the Court identified 
three components of the rule of law which “[t]aken together... make up a 
principle of profound constitutional and political significance.”8 They are that 
“[t]here is... one law for all” and that there must be an actual system of 
positive laws, the elements set out in the Manitoba Language Reference; and 
that “the relationship between the state and the individual must be regulated 
by law,” that is, that the exercise of government power must be grounded in 
law.9  
In some respects, the Court’s consideration of the principle has not 
strayed far from the Diceyan articulation of the British principle in the late 
nineteenth century.10 For Dicey, the rule of law was a term which comprises 
three characteristics of the legal and political system: that no one is above the 
law which is enforced by the “ordinary courts;” that government must act 
according to law and not in an arbitrary or highly discretionary manner; and 
that citizens’ rights evolve through judicial decisions, that is, he championed 
the superiority of the unwritten or common law constitution.11 In fact, 
                   
6  Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 at paras. 59-60. 
7  Ibid. at para. 64. 
8  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at para. 71. 
9  Ibid. at para. 71. 
10  A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of Law of the Constitution (London: MacMillan, 
1885). 
11  Dicey’s view has been called “a rather minimalist conception of the Rule of Law” D. 
Rhéaume “Language Rights, Remedies, and the Rule of Law” (1988) 1 Can. J. of L. & 
Juris. 35 at 36. It should be noted that Dicey’s third component, the unwritten 
constitution, does not form part of the Supreme Court’s statements about the components 
of the rule of law in either the Manitoba Language Reference or the Quebec Secession 
Reference.  
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Dicey’s conception was not without its contemporary critics, given his 
opposition to administrative decision-making. In Canada today, the 
expansive nature of administrative law and since 1982, the existence of a 
primarily written constitution mean that Dicey’s articulation might be 
thought of little import except as part of the historical development of the 
principle in Canadian constitutional law.12 Yet it would, I believe, be 
incorrect to assume that Dicey’s views have not influenced the Supreme 
Court’s understanding of the concept which has remained relatively static. 
The basic principle of legal equality and the grounding of government action 
in law remain crucial characteristics of democratic systems governed by the 
rule of law. It is not that these are no longer important, for they decidedly are. 
The issue is whether they are sufficient to define the rule of law in a 
contemporary democracy; I will return later to this question. 
It should be obvious that the mere existence of laws is not sufficient to 
constitute the rule of law. It is worth emphasizing the distinction between 
“rule by law” and “rule of law.” The former contemplates that while laws 
govern, they do not necessarily govern government itself but rather aid in 
government’s exercise of power.13 Thus the rule of law may be used to 
strengthen the authority of the state or to establish limits on the state. The 
distinction is important as nations characterized as ruled by law seek to join 
global organizations such as the World Trade Organization. Epstein, writing 
in the mid-nineteen eighties, while adopting a Diceyan definition of the 
concept, captures both these apparently opposing functions in defining the 
rule of law as “a body of general and formal principles that public officials 
exercising sovereign authority can use both to resolve disputes between 
citizens and to justify the use of force.”14 Davis associates the rule of law 
with “constructing a dynamic venue for contestation” and not merely as a 
                   
12  On an example of Dicey’s more direct impact on the development of Canadian 
constitutional law, see D. Schneiderman’s discussion of Dicey’s opinion about Ontario 
legislation validating municipal contracts with the Hydro-Electric Power Commission in 
“Canadian Constitutionalism, the Rule of Law, and Economic Globalization” in this 
volume. 
13  T. Carothers, “The Rule of Law Revival” (1998) 77 Foreign Affairs: item 397349: 
http://80-web20.epnet.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca (June 12, 2003). Also see 
Peerenboom, supra note 5. 
14  R.A. Epstein, “Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure” 
(1987-88) 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 149 at 150-151. This article was taken from 
HeinOnLine. 
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way of limiting government.15 The difference between “rule by law” and 
“rule of law” is central to the difficulty of enabling the development of a 
satisfactory universal definition of the rule of law, as has been proposed as a 
concomitant of globalization. 
While the Supreme Court’s articulation of the meaning of the rule of law 
might be considered rather sparse, closer to the thin meaning than the thick, 
the Court has been clear about the significance of that narrowly defined 
postulate to our constitutional framework and practice. The Court’s treatment 
of the principle must be viewed in the context of how the Court develops the 
relationship between the rule of law and other unwritten principles, 
particularly democracy and judicial independence; in doing so, it surrounds 
its apparently meager core with a cushion of normative values. In the case of 
democracy, the rule of law is associated with civil liberties and the capacity 
of the population to participate in the system. Inherent in the notion of “law” 
is that they are enforceable, that is, effective. More controversially, it might 
be argued that the rule of law requires equal capacity to vindicate legal 
rights.16 Regardless, it is not realistic to talk about the rule of law without 
also talking about the role of the courts and why judicial independence is also 
an important—and interrelated—constitutional principle. Thus Michael 
Davis, in arguing for a liberal democratic Hong Kong, stresses the need for 
the rule of law, “notably judicial review of legislation under a constitution or 
basic law.”17 
Our Canadian understanding has generally stressed the benefit of the rule 
of law to citizens, seeing it as a restraint or check on government power. One 
might say that the rule of law is about “the compulsion of accountability.”18 
Accountability requires that it is possible to identify those who are to be 
accountable, whether individuals or institutions, and to whom they are to be 
                   
15  M.C. Davis, “Constitutionalism in Hong Kong: Politics versus Economics” (1997) 18 U. 
Pa. J. Int. 157 (HeinOnLine) 159. 
16  I explore this in P. Hughes, “A Constitutional Right to Civil Legal Aid” in Making the 
Case: The Right to Publicly-Funded Legal Representation in Canada (CBA, February 
2002). 
17  Davis, supra note 15 at 159. China made a commitment to the continuation of the rule of 
law in Hong Kong in the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong signed on 
December 19, 1984: ibid. at 157. 
18  M.O. Chibundu, “Globalizing the Rule of Law: Some Thoughts at and on the Periphery” 
(1999) 7 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 79 at 81, 84 [http://www.lexis.com]. 
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accountable. In our system, accountability under the rule of law lies with the 
courts. 
It will be recalled that for Dicey the centrality of the courts is crucial to 
the operation of the rule of law, a position perhaps outdated even then. The 
greater bureaucratization of society since then has required us to recognize 
that administrative tribunals are part of the legal order, although generally, 
we limit their autonomy by ensuring some form of judicial review by the 
“ordinary courts,” to use Dicey’s phrase. As far as tribunals are concerned, 
the important principle which safeguards the judges in fulfilling their role in 
upholding the rule of law, judicial independence, does not apply.19 A greater 
threat in some ways to the role of courts is the significant increase in the use 
of extrajudicial forms of dispute resolution which privatize the settlement of 
disputes, taking them out of the courts and thereby often out of the law. This 
is the case even though judges have become involved in these forms of 
dispute resolution and even though private settlements may eventually be 
enforced by the courts. Usually, these disputes arise under law and the legal 
rules govern their resolution to some (varying) extent.  
At the heart of the ramifications of the process of globalization for the 
rule of law is whether it is primarily a functional concept or a normative 
                   
19  Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and 
Licensing Branch), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781, [2001] S.C.J. No. 17, online: QL (SJ), 2001 
SCC 52. McLachlin C.J., for the Court, distinguished between courts and tribunals at 
paras. 22-24:  
“Courts engaged in judicial review of administrative decisions must defer to the 
legislator’s intention in assessing the degree of independence required of the tribunal 
in question... This principle reflects the fundamental distinction between 
administrative tribunals and courts. Superior courts, by virtue of their role as courts of 
inherent jurisdiction, are constitutionally required to possess objective guarantees of 
both individual and institutional independence. The same constitutional imperative 
applies to the provincial courts... Administrative tribunals, by contrast, lack this 
constitutional distinction from the executive. They are in fact created precisely for the 
purpose of implementing government policy. Implementation of that policy may 
require them to make quasi-judicial decisions. They thus may be seen as spanning the 
constitutional divide between the executive and judicial branches of government. 
However, given their primary policy-making function, it is properly the role and 
responsibility of Parliament and the legislatures to determine the composition and 
structure required by a tribunal to discharge the responsibilities bestowed upon it. 
While tribunals may sometimes attract Charter requirements of independence, as a 
general rule they do not. Thus, the degree of independence required of a particular 
tribunal is a matter of discerning the intention of Parliament or the legislature and, 
absent constitutional constraints, this choice must be respected.” [Citations omitted.]  
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framework, the thin and thick version to which I referred earlier. A “thin” 
theory of the rule of law emphasises procedural characteristics: laws must be 
“general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being followed, 
stable and enforced.”20 A “thick” theory adds or “incorporate[s] elements of 
political morality such as particular economic arrangements..., forms of 
government ... or conceptions of human rights.”21 Bouloukos and Dakin point 
out that “[w]hat began as a narrow, positivist conception has broadened into a 
more expansive view that incorporates notions of good governance, 
democracy, and even human rights in the rule of law.”22  
Scheuerman states that he “follow[s] intellectual convention by defining 
the rule of law as requiring that state action rests on legal norms (1) general 
in character, (2) relatively clear, (3) public, (4) prospective, and (5) stable... 
[O]nly laws of this type can help provide legal equality, assure fair notice, 
and guarantee the accountability of powerholders.”23 Carothers defines the 
rule of law “as a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in 
meaning, and apply equally to everyone” and uphold universal human rights 
and the right of accused to a fair, prompt hearing and the presumption of 
innocence; the courts and other elements of the legal system “are reasonably 
fair, competent, and efficient” and “[j]udges are impartial and independent.” 
He argues that “[p]erhaps most important, the government is embedded in a 
comprehensive legal framework, its officials accept that the law will be 
applied to their own conduct, and the government seeks to be law-abiding.”24 
The International Commission of Jurists in 1959 viewed the concept as 
divided into its substantive content, referring to “the conception of society 
which inspires it,” and the “procedural machinery” necessary to give it 
                   
20  For one articulation of this commonly used way of differentiating a functional and a 
normative view of the rule of law, see R. Peerenboom, “Social Networks, Civil Society, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law: A New Conceptual Framework”, Research Paper No. 
03-1 (The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract_id=372680), 17 [hereinafter “Social Networks”]. 
21  Ibid. at 18. 
22  A.C. Bouloukos & B. Dakin, “Toward a Universal Declaration of the Rule of Law: 
Implications for Criminal Justice and Sustainable Development” (2001) 42 Intern’l J. of 
Comp. Sociology (Brill): item 4646586: http://80-web20.epnet.com. ezproxy.lib. 
ucalagry.ca (June 12, 2003). 
23  W.E. Scheuerman, “Economic Globalization and the Rule of Law” (1999) 6 
Constellations 3, 4. 
24  Carothers, supra note 13. 
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reality.25 The rule of law, the Commission said, is “based on the values of a 
free society, by which is understood a society providing an ordered 
framework within which the free spirit of all its individual members may find 
fullest expression.” In this sense, then, the rule of law may be said to 
combine an emphasis on individual rights such as “freedom of worship, 
speech and assembly” to be exercized free from interference by government 
and “access to the minimum material means” necessary to enjoy the first type 
of right.26 In short, it captures the tension of modern liberalism. 
These propositions are not without controversy. Even the most apparently 
obvious characteristics—such as generality, clarity, no retroactivity or 
stability—may be more complicated than they first seem.27 Uncritical lip 
service to the postulates which govern us may make us complacent about 
other implications. For example, the principle that everyone is equally subject 
to the law addresses the fact that the powerful and the rich—and specifically 
the sovereign—were above the law; it was meant to ensure that the sovereign 
would be as equally subject to the law as the “ordinary person” and it 
referred to the power of the courts to govern the sovereign. It does not apply 
as easily to the notion that the same law may disadvantage those who are 
poor or otherwise “out of step” with the norm on which the law is based. 
Thus one might ask whether the rule of law requires us to recognize that law 
affects different communities differently.  
The more complex its scope becomes, the more the content of the rule of 
law will be almost certainly inferred from a country’s legal culture, 
respecting the rights which are “part of the backbone of the legal culture, part 
of its fundamental traditions.”28 In that sense, the values of the political 
system are implicit in the rule of law, which will assume different forms in 
different countries. On one view, they do not, however, necessarily become 
part of the principle itself which, it is argued, is best left as a procedural 
principle. To require it to carry substantive content is to require too much, on 
this view. One must look elsewhere for the substantive elements of the legal 
                   
25  International Commission of Jurists; The Rule of Law in a Free Society: A Report on the 
International Congress of Jurists, New Delhi, India (Geneva, 1959) 191 (italics in 
original).  
26  Ibid. at 193. 
27  A. Marmor, “The Rule of Law and its Limits” USC Public Policy Research Paper No. 
03-16: Social Science Research Network: http://ssrn.com/abstract=424613, 11ff. 
28  J. Raz, “The Politics of the Rule of Law” (1990) 3 Ratio Juris 331 at 337. 
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order. Epstein, for example, says that the rule of law is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for a just social state and that the “justice” must be found 
in “the foundations of political theory and modern constitutionalism.29 The 
objective of this process or formal rule of law is that law-making and 
enforcement are carried out in a manner which permits citizens to organize 
their lives without running afoul of the law and to seek redress for perceived 
grievances.30 Thus “[a] commitment to the rule of law ... requires knowable 
and known law, applied retrospectively and consistently, and promulgated 
and reviewed by individuals other than those charged with applying it.”31 
The characteristics identified by the formalists are not insignificant 
requirements and the application of the same law to everyone, the placing of 
the governed on the same plain as the governors, was a crucial step in the 
development of modern forms of democracy. The question, however, is not 
whether these should be characteristics of a regime of law—they should be—
but whether alone they provide an adequate measure for whether government 
has complied with law. Is process, important as it is, sufficient to constitute 
legitimacy? 
                   
29  Epstein, supra note 14 at 154. 
30  Lon Fuller, for example, argued that the internal morality of law requires that it be 
general, publicly promulgated, clear, not retroactive, consistent over time, capable of 
being followed and that there be a congruence between official action and the rule stated 
in the law: The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964). Joseph Raz 
added to these the independence of the judiciary, judicial review and easy accessibility to 
the courts: “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue” in The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1979). See also L.B. Solum, “Equity and the Rule of Law” in I. Shapiro, ed., The 
Rule of Law (New York: New York University Press, 1994) 120 at 122. A number of 
definitions are summarized by S.J. Burton in “Particularism, Discretion, and the Rule of 
Law” in Shapiro, ibid. 178 at 180. 
31  K.D. Hine, “The Rule of Law is Dead, Long Live the Rule: An Essay on Legal Rules, 
Equitable Standards, and the Debate over Judicial Discretion” (1997) 50 SMU Law Rev. 
1769, 1772. Hine’s argument is that equity has displaced law, but that the rule of law is 
necessary “to ensure the continued integrity and efficacy of our system of justice.” 
Accordingly, the best approach is a positivist/formalist law approach permitting 
occasional excursions into moralist/realist equity, in a sense a return to a system of law 
mellowed by equity. 
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The fact of law is not the same as the fact—or at least the objective—of 
fair or just law. Nor is it the fact that the authorities abide by the law or 
respect the form of the law. It is notorious that the National Socialists carried 
out their genocide, white South African governments their apartheid, the 
Canadian government the oppression of native peoples and the American and 
Canadian governments the internment of Japanese citizens during World War 
II according to law. A purely formal rule of law has nothing to say about 
these actions; a Diceyan interpretation which includes a bow in the direction 
of civil liberties could raise its voice; but only a rule of law which entertains 
the legitimacy of only certain kinds of moral precepts has the substance to 
challenge them. For the incorporation of any kind of normative content—and 
not only certain kinds—is equivalent to the incorporation of none. On the 
other hand, a rule of law aligned with democracy of necessity must 
acknowledge particular moral or political values. 
Nor is a “formal” rule of law neutral in its application, as some would 
have it. To be devoid of explicit content or substance is not to be devoid of 
any substance.32 The veiling of the substance has its own dangers. Even with 
respect to the very core of the principle—that rule not be arbitrary—Beehler 
has argued that the procedural rule of law (or rule by due process) conveys a 
different understanding of arbitrary rule from that of a substantive rule of law 
(or rule by right reason):33 with a procedural rule of law, arbitrary rule is 
merely unregulated rule, while on a substantive rule of law conception, 
arbitrary rule is non-legitimated rule.34 Radin views the formalist version 
                   
32  R.S. Summers, “A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law” (1993) 6 Ratio Juris 127 at 128. 
Summers maintains that the formal approach is preferable because it is more “focused” 
and can lead to a fuller realization of the principle if it is not hampered by substantive 
content; because it is “more or less politically neutral”, its components are less 
controversial and more likely to obtain support from disparate groups: ibid. at 136. 
Ernest Weinrib cautions that treating the rule of law as if it is by definition ideological 
“implies not only that law is an instrument available for exploitation by hierarchically 
entrenched groups, but that it can be nothing else”: E.J. Weinrib, “The Intelligibility of 
The Rule of Law” in A.C. Hutchinson & P. Monahan, eds., The Rule of Law: Ideal or 
Ideology (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 59 at 61. But ideology does not have to be supportive 
of hierarchically entrenched groups, it can also be supportive of egalitarianism. The point 
is, it cannot be neutral or without consequence for the ordering of society and the 
treatment of its citizens. The real questions concern who decides what the consequences 
are, the nature of the consequences, the reconciling of apparently antagonistic 
consequences and the limits of adverse consequences. 
33  R. Beehler, “Waiting for the Rule of Law” (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 298 at 298. 
34  Ibid. at 300. 
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(“instrumentalist” in her nomenclature) as “a model of government by rules 
to achieve the government's ends,” while the substantive version is “a model 
of government by rules to achieve the goals of the social contract: liberty and 
justice.”35 
In this respect, although the Supreme Court’s definition of the concept 
may seem narrow, it satisfies the indicia of rule of law rather than rule by 
law. It might be considered at least a “quasi-thick” definition given the 
Court’s view of the close association of the rule of law and democratic 
government. (It is not a “thick” definition because the Court does not find 
these values in the rule of law itself, but in the importance of the rule of law 
for the realization of other principles.)  
“The consent of the governed is a value that is basic to our 
understanding of a free and democratic society. Yet democracy in any 
real sense of the word cannot exist without the rule of law. It is the 
law that creates the framework within which the sovereign will is to 
be ascertained and implemented. To be accorded legitimacy, 
democratic institutions must rest, ultimately, on a legal foundation. 
That is, they must allow for the participation of, and accountability to, 
the people, through public institutions created under the Constitution. 
Equally, however, a system of government cannot survive through 
adherence to the law alone. A political system must also possess 
legitimacy, and in our political culture, that requires an interaction 
between the rule of law and the democratic principle. The system 
must be capable of reflecting the aspirations of the people. But there 
is more. Our law's claim to legitimacy also rests on an appeal to 
moral values, many of which are imbedded in our constitutional 
structure. It would be a grave mistake to equate legitimacy with the 
sovereign will or majority rule alone, to the exclusion of other 
constitutional values.”36 
                   
35  M.J. Radin, “Reconsidering the Rule of Law” (1989) 69 Boston U. L. Rev. 781 at 792. In 
another typology, the formalists would also conform to the “legal process type”: R.H. 
Fallon, Jr., “‘The Rule of Law’ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse” (1997) 97 Col. 
L. Rev. 1, 18-21. Also see A.C. Hutchinson & P. Monahan, “Democracy and the Rule of 
Law” in Hutchinson & Monahan, eds., supra note 32 at 97, on the question of the non-
neutrality of a formalist rule of law. 
36  Reference re Quebec Secession, supra note 8 at para. 67. 
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In the end, then, it is not as easy as it might have seemed to provide a 
simple statement about the meaning of the rule of law. Even that ostensibly 
useful dichotomy between a “thin” and “thick” version is less useful in 
practice than it should be.  
Once we move beyond identifying the component elements of the 
Canadian rule of law, we generally accept three propositions about the 
purposes of or functions fulfilled by the rule of law. One is that it is necessary 
for justice and for the realization of the civil liberties which mark our 
understanding of democracy. The second is that the rule of law aids in 
establishing the legitimacy of law, that is, the acceptance of law, because part 
of its meaning is that no one is above the law, all are supposed to be treated 
equally under the law. Legal equality is a sine qua non of a regime purporting 
to operate in accordance with the rule of law. The third function (not one we 
often see in the jurisprudence) is that it is necessary for a functioning 
economy, that a viable economic system relies on an ordered system of rules. 
Davis considers the rule of law a necessary condition for a “world city” (by 
which he means Hong Kong) which “may have a global role in bringing 
information and financing to an entire region and beyond.”37 From this 
perspective, the rule of law provides the freedom to realize the potential of 
economic circumstances. Peerenboom comments that the “[r]ule of law, with 
its fundamental tenet that government officials obey generally applicable 
laws, promised the predictability and certainty required to do business ...”38  
What does it mean to say that political action or judicial decision-making 
is legitimate because it has complied with the rule of law? In essence: what 
are the indicia of legitimate law? Equally, it is likely that globally there can 
be greater agreement reached on a formalistic understanding of the rule of 
law than on the substantive content. The rule of law has evolved; it has been 
static neither in time nor place.39 Yet it is almost certain that globally there 
can be greater agreement reached on a formalist understanding of the rule of 
law than on any substantive content and only if one steers clear of normative 
judgements about particular systems of government. The formalist 
conception is an important beginning, but is it really enough and more 
                   
37  Davis, supra note 15 at 191. 
38  Peerenboom, “Social Networks” supra note 20 at 19. 
39  F. Neumann, The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society 
(Leamington Spa: Berg, 1986); H.W. Arndt, “Origins of Dicey’s Concept of the Rule of 
Law” (1957-58) 31 Australian L. J. 117.  
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importantly, does it pose a threat to the thicker version which helps sustain 
and advance other aspects of Canadian constitutionalism and the relations 
between government and citizen? Yet as Peerenboom indicates, concurrence 
even in the West on the components of a “thick” rule of law is difficult to 
achieve “in this age of postmodern, postmetaphysical multiculturalism and 
identity politics.”40 How much more difficult to reach agreement on an 
“enriched” rule of law at the global level.  
B. Globalization 
To understand the rule of law in the context of globalization requires that 
we establish what we mean by “globalization” and identify some of its 
ramifications. I do not intend to debate the issues associated with globali-
zation, but merely to explain how I see it as a background to the discussion of 
the rule of law. 
Firstly, it has now become trite—but nonetheless necessary—to point out 
that globalization is not new. Indeed, Canada itself is in some ways the result 
of an earlier stage of globalization, not only because of the impact of British 
and French colonization, but also because of the migration of those whom 
domestic economies could not adequately absorb. Yet even that occurred 
rather late in the globalization process. It is the speed which differentiates 
earlier experiences with globalization from our experience today,41 so much 
so that speed may be sufficient to make today’s globalization a distinct 
phenomenon, one qualitatively different from apparently similar 
developments in the past. The Internet is not merely a faster telegraph or fax 
machine, it is fundamentally different and revolutionary. Secondly, 
globalization encom-passes the movement of people, capital, goods and 
information across borders and certainly in our own time, the use of high 
speed technology to move capital and information, as well as faster 
transportation of goods, across borders. Together these major indicia of 
globalization distinguish the breadth and unintended impact of globalization 
compared to more primitive and earlier versions and suggest the difficulty in 
                   
40  Peerenboom, “Social Networks” supra note 20 at 26. 
41  A concise history of “globalization” since the sixteenth century can be found in M.R. 
Brawley, The Politics of Globalization: Gaining Perspective, Assessing Consequences 
(Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2003), ch. 8. Also see D. Held, “The 
Transformation of Political Community: Rethinking Democracy in the Context of 
Globalization” in N. Dower & J. Williams, eds., Global Citizenship: A Critical 
Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2002) 92 at 94-95. 
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a nation’s extricating itself from the integrated web of contemporary and 
likely future globalization. Although globalization today seems to have its 
own momentum, however, it is neither neutral nor abstract nor without 
dominant actors or agents which influence its direction.  
Globalization is generally associated with economic developments or 
financial transactions. Thus Scheuerman identifies globalization with  
“(1) internationalization of capital and financial markets, (2) 
increases in the volume of trade in semi-manufactured and 
manufactured goods between the industrialized economies, (3) 
growing importance of MNCs [multinational corporations] in the 
world economy ... (4) near universal movement towards regional 
economic and political blocs (NAFTA [North American Free Trade 
Agreement], ASEAN [Associ-ation of Southeast Asian Nations], EU 
[European Community]) [and] (5) the acceptance by almost all states 
that they should ‘do all they possibly can to attract and support both 
national and international capital,’ a development which has been 
called the ‘new prag-matism.’”42  
Scheuerman points out, however, that while multinational corporations do 
business across the globe and appear to have a transnational character, they 
are based in certain countries;43 on the other hand, “many MNCs possess 
economic muscle far superior to that of small and medium-sized states” and 
it is tempting in some circles to consider granting them legal autonomy 
within the meaning of international law.44 In short, globalization as we now 
think of it is less characterized by the movement of people, information, 
goods and capital than by the speed with which these can occur, particularly 
capital and information and, at least on paper, goods and by the size and 
corresponding impact of corporations.  
Brawley discusses a range of definitions of globalization developed in 
different disciplines, but a number of different economic criteria stand out: 
these include the interdependence of markets and production in different 
countries, the volume of international trade and the nature of the goods being 
                   
42  Scheuerman, supra note 23 at 5. The phrase “new pragmatism” is cited by Scheuerman 
from J. Stopford & S. Strange, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market 
Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 5. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Ibid. at 10. 
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traded, the mobility of production and greater integration of financial 
markets.45 While there is a great emphasis on economic changes, and on the 
political decisions that interact with (but may neither determine nor be 
unaffected by) economic changes, there are also psychological and socio-
logical implications or characteristics of globalization. Thus the processes of 
globalization have changed the way many people think about their place in 
the world. It has compressed space and time.46 Furthermore, while we may 
talk about the decline of the nation-state, the role of cities may be 
increasing;47 in Canada, for example, a debate has begun about 
constitutionalizing the status of the city. The technological transfer of capital 
and information is difficult to track should those transferring it wish that to 
be the case and as a result high speed crime is as much a characteristic of 
globalization as is information transfer.  
Globalization is a complex subject, mixing “territorial diffusion of things, 
people and ideas” with interdependence,48 with apparently conflicting 
consequences, including the contemporaneous decline in the efficacy of the 
nation-state with the rise in importance of local and regional bodies.  
It is common to name the decline of domestic sovereignty as one of the 
consequences of globalization, along with the dominance of stronger coun-
tries, the growth of international norms transcending or incorporated into 
domestic laws and practices and the rise in the authority of transnational 
corporations, even to the extent of supplanting political authorities. Because 
of our proximity to the United States and the relative sizes of our populations, 
Canada has long been experienced in the impact strong external forces—
economic, political and cultural—may have. Issues of sovereignty and 
cultural nationalism are far from new issues for us. Even so, these effects 
were (and are) more obvious and unidimensional than are the effects of 
globalization. Globalization today transcends or moves above the modern 
                   
45  Brawley, supra note 41 at 13-16; see citations therein. 
46  Ibid. at 17. On “ways of thinking,” see E. Kofman & G. Youngs, “Introduction: 
Globalization—the Second Wave” in E. Kofman & G. Youngs, eds., Globalization: 
Theory and Practice, 117, cited in Brawley, ibid. 
47  Ibid. at 18, citing A. Harding & P. Le Galè, “Globalization, Urban Change and Urban 
Politics in Britain and France” in A. Harding & P. Le Galè, eds., The Limits of 
Globalization: Cases and Arguments (Londong: Routledge, 1977) 189-192. 
48  H. Teune & Z. Mlinar, “The Development Logic of Globalization” in J.V. Ciprut, ed., 
The Art of the Feud (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000) 106, cited in Brawley, ibid. at 18. 
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creation of the state and makes location of activity less significant, yet 
location has been fundamental in enforcing law. This has enormous 
ramifications for public domestic law enforcement bodies such as courts and 
for the increase in centres of rule-making authority. Others will discuss this 
kind of thing at greater length but I want to raise these topics because they 
have great importance for the future of the rule of law. This phenomenon 
may be attributed to an impersonal “market” as in, “[t]he market is a more 
preferred institution for organizing and regulating economic transactions,”49 
but the market requires actors; the reference to the market really means that 
the economic actors which comprise the market have an autonomy greater 
than in the immediate past, although the political autonomy of the British 
East India Company or the Hudson’s Bay Company should not be forgotten 
when we talk about the impact of corporations today. It also means, however, 
that the elements of the market are sufficiently interrelated to transcend a 
single state.50 
The modern state is characterized by a single centre of authority; this is 
the case even in a federal state, where power is divided. As has been 
observed, “the development of internal sovereignty allowed the state to 
clearly distinguish itself from both civil society and the market.”51 In one 
way, globalization sees a return to the pre-modern state when there were 
different loci of competing authority (for example, religious authority and 
secular authority both competing for control of what we would now identify 
as matters within the authority of the state). David Held suggests that 
globalization has had the following impact on “the evolving character of the 
democratic political community:”  
“... [T]he locus of effective power can no longer be assumed to be 
national governments—effective power is shared, bartered and 
struggled over by divers forces and agencies at national, regional and 
international levels... [T]he idea of a political community of fate—of 
a self-determining collectivity—can no longer meaningfully be 
                   
49  Chibundu, supra note 18. 
50  While they may transcend a single state, they are subject to the laws of each state in 
which they operate. But the decision to operate in a particular state may be influenced by 
how friendly the laws there would be to this industry or that and the benefit of attracting 
an industry may be sufficient to affect what the law will be.  
51  K. Jayasuriya, “Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law: From Political to 
Economic Constitutionalism?” (2001) 8 Constellations 442 at 449. 
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located within the boundaries of a single nation-state alone... [T]here 
is a growing set of disjunctures between the formal authority of the 
state—that is, the formal domain of political authority that states 
claim for themselves—and the actual practices and structures of the 
state and economic system at the regional and global levels.”52 
 There is an important difference in the fact that today “trans-
governmental networks of regulatory agencies ... rather than supranational 
institutions, are increasingly preferred as a form of governance of the global 
political economy.”53 “Governance” is a term which applies not only to 
traditional government structures, but also to non-governmental or extra-
governmental bodies. Some of these bodies gain authority because of the 
agreement of the member states (such as the World Trade Organization) and 
some of which do not possess formal authority, that is “a variety of emerging 
international decision making structures whose relationship to the formal 
authority of existing nation-states remains ambivalent.”54  
In summary, the characteristics and consequences of globalization of 
particular relevance to its relationship to the rule of law, especially for 
Canada and Canadian courts, are the following: the transnational political 
significance of major economic actors; non-judicial—privatized—decision-
making; and the domestic implementation of international norms.  
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RULE OF LAW AND 
GLOBALIZATION  
Two basic questions help frame an exploration of the relationship 
between the rule of law and globalization: is globalization likely to be 
accompanied by a “thinning” of currently “thicker” version of the rule of law 
or by a shift in its constitutional function? Indeed, does globalization have the 
potential to make the rule of law obsolete? Even if such a dramatic 
development is unlikely, if only for instrumentalist reasons, to what extent 
does globalization diminish the domestic (here Canadian) understanding of 
the rule of law and its compatriot principles of democracy and judicial 
independence?  
                   
52  Held, supra note 41 at 97. 
53  Jayasuriya, supra note 51 at 450, citing A.-M. Slaughter, “The Real New World Order” 
(1997) 76 Foreign Affairs 183 at 196. 
54  Scheuerman, supra note 23 at 5. 
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Globalization has the effect of “unsettling the settled boundaries between 
domestic and international domains.”55 In other words, it unsettles the 
sovereign order. We may view the concept of sovereignty for this purpose 
both in the usual sense of national sovereignty and in a somewhat different 
but related sense of institutional sovereignty: to what extent do our decision-
making institutions have the authority we believe them or intended them to 
have? This is obviously related to the more common question about the 
impact of globalization—the shifting scope of the economy—on territorial 
sovereignty. Thus just as Canada has been coming to terms with a new 
constitutional order, one premised on constitutional supremacy or 
sovereignty rather than legislative supremacy or sovereignty, more than one 
observer has pointed to a “transition from political constitutionalism to a kind 
of economic constitutionalism ... that gives a juridical cast to economic 
institutions, placing these institutions beyond politics.”56 A global economic 
constitutionalism may well conflict with a domestic political 
constitutionalism and how this conflict plays out will be significantly affected 
by the degree of authority remaining with the domestic government and 
judiciary. 
One might add that the issue is not just the changing nature of economic 
institutions in this sense, but the location of these institutions and, at least 
equally significantly, the character of economic transactions. Traditionally, or 
at least since the development of liberal institutions, the focus has been on 
identifying the place where sovereignty resides. In Canada, this has meant in 
part determining whether federal or provincial institutions have authority or 
sovereignty over particular matters, although we have tended not to use the 
term “sovereignty” in this context; it is more commonly employed with 
respect to Canada’s sovereignty vis-à-vis other nations, whether that relates 
to sovereign claims over northern waters, a legal matter, or the political 
ability, and not only the legal capacity, to make the decision whether to enter 
the war in Iraq. Neverthless, it is a form of international autonomy or 
sovereignty. In brief, the question is which government makes the decision to 
engage in particular kinds of activity. But this modern notion of sovereignty 
as residing in government (or in the source of government) fails to take into 
account the “fragmentation” of “powers of governance” and their “diffus[ion] 
                   
55  Jayasuriya, supra note 51 at 442. 
56  Ibid. at 443. By “economic constitutionalism”, Jayasuriya means “the attempt to treat the 
market as a constitutional order with its own rules, procedures, and institutions that 
operate to protect the market order from political interference.” ibid. at 452. 
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with the market and civil society.”57 Again, this may be briefly stated as 
determining whose decisions matter, whether they have been given legal or 
political authority. The behaviour of economic institutions and processes may 
undermine the duly constituted authority of elected governments or may have 
a considerable impact on how those duly elected governments make 
decisions within their authority.  
A. The Impact of International Law on Domestic Decision-Making 
It is only recently that international law has widely been recognized as a 
form of law, yet today international norms and regulatory law in the trade 
area play a major role in domestic law; similarly, domestic labour, 
environmental law and human rights may be affected by transnational rules, 
all areas which were the subject of discussion at the conference of which this 
volume constitutes the proceedings. Most significantly, perhaps, this is an 
ongoing process. The rule of law has meaning only when there are 
mechanisms for its enforcement and therefore when some body at some level 
has the accepted or recognized capacity to enforce it. In the domestic context, 
this is a condition of an effective rule of law. The subject of the international 
rule of law may be the state or the individual. Under the dualist model, 
“[v]alid and binding international norms, while universal, are at the same 
time barred from trans-gressing the rigid border of a sovereign state and 
affecting individuals within that state, unless transformed into the domestic 
legal system through the legislative instrumentality of the state.”58 
Under monism, the relationship between international law and the 
individual is direct without the intermediary of the state and thus 
“international law will be automatically incorporated and available as a 
domestic law instrument before domestic courts.”59 
Hainsworth suggests that there is a third model in which the state is “a 
full-fledged participant in an integrated international community, ‘both 
forming and complying with law.’”60 Increasingly, the approach to 
international norms which sees them in effect as the subject of continual 
                   
57  Ibid. at 445. 
58  S. Hainsworth, “Sovereignty, Economic Integration, and the World Trade Organization” 
(1995) 33 Oh.L.J. 583. 
59  Ibid. at para. 15. 
60  Ibid.at para. 16. 
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negotiation is being replaced by a “rule-oriented” approach which have been 
most developed in the trade area.  
All these international rules and norms may restrict the domestic capacity 
to act in accordance with existing domestic expectations, a point which has 
significance for government and judiciary. These international rules have all 
the indicia of positive law: for example, they are set out, knowable and 
enforceable. In fact, under the international rule of law, formal equality 
applies. Thus as one national leader said, the World Trade Organization 
“enshrin[ed] the rule of law in international economic and trade relations” 
with the result that “[r]egardless of the size of our economies, from now on 
we shall all enjoy the same rights and be subject to the same obligations.”61 
The rule of law evens the playing field and contains the power of those who 
are bigger and stronger, as was meant to be the case on the smaller playing 
field of the nation-state. Unlike domestic rule of law, however, these 
international rules apply only to those who have agreed to have them apply to 
themselves. In the domestic context, those who do not abide by the rules are 
outlaws; in the international context, they may be the player who refuses to 
play but still is able to dictate the rules of the game. Like the domestic 
context, even when the “big guys play,” does formal equality rebound in 
practice to the disadvantage of smaller, less powerful countries? In his paper 
in this volume, William Neilson points out that at the recent WTO 
negotiations in Cancun, the developing nations resisted the pressure of the 
dominant western nations; even so, it is far too early to conclude that the 
western nations cannot exert considerable impact on future developments. 
From another angle, however, to what extent do we demand the presence 
of the rule of law before we engage in economic or political relations with 
other countries? And making the question more difficult to answer is whether 
we export our understanding of the rule of law to other countries, making 
their acceptance of it a condition of our engaging with them. Do we apply the 
rule of law to other standards or measures which are not themselves “law” or 
“rules” but norms and moral expectations which may well be reflected in our 
own law but not in the law of others? For example, it could be argued that a 
formalist rule of law would permit conduct which we would define as human 
rights abuses and thus be incompatible with a domestic thick rule of law. Is 
globalization likely to transform the rule by law into rule of law; or it is more 
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likely to diminish the thick or quasi-thick version to accord with one more 
globally acceptable or convenient?  
Developments in the scope, meaning and role or function of the rule of 
law have significance for Canadian jurisprudence because of the importance 
of the concept in the Canadian constitutional framework. The Supreme Court 
of Canada’s conception of the rule of law is, of course, a domestic conception 
used in a domestic context. Is it vulnerable to a narrowing of its scope—a 
neutralizing—in order to reflect the development of a global functional or 
managerial rule of law? Will it be necessary to apply two visions of the rule 
of law: one quasi-thick for domestic consumption and one—thin—in order to 
be able to play in global markets and enforce international norms. Which 
applies when international norms have been incorporated into domestic 
legislation? If the domestic version is no longer “privileged,” will there be a 
menu of “rules of law,” one suitable for international trade, one for human 
rights, one for criminal law?  
For judicial decision-makers, this has enormous impact. Domestic 
decision-makers, including judges, may consider international norms in their 
decisions and international conventions may be incorporated into domestic 
law; France Houle, for example, will consider this question in relation to 
human rights law. As one observer has pointed out, one consequence of these 
developments—at the global level—has been “the tremendous growth of 
private international authority” and “the increasingly important role played 
by domestic regulatory agencies such as independent central banks that 
operate relatively autonomously from the structures of political 
accountability.”62 For a country like Canada, with, comparatively speaking, a 
highly, albeit decrea-singly, regulated economic system, the issue is the 
effectiveness of regulatory regimes in the face of de facto governance by 
non-regulated global economic institutions and transactions. This question of 
international or global restraint on state authority is addressed by Gilles 
Trudeau in the labour law context in his paper in this volume.  
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B. Private and International Adjudicative Bodies 
A more direct challenge to domestic sovereignty is that to domestic 
judicial systems which are being displaced by private decision-makers, that 
is, non-state actors, acting outside the realm of publicly enforceable decision-
making, a development to which Jonnette Watson Hamilton’s paper on 
international commercial arbitration speaks. In some ways, this resort to 
private decision-making echoes the Law Merchant which developed to 
adjudicate mercantile disputes early in the development of international 
trade.63 But to what extent does the rule of law encompass international 
private decision-making based on privately developed norms or rules which 
have not necessarily received approbation by the state? Scheuerman 
describes international business arbitration as “highly discretionary and 
probably ad hoc in character ... [and] resembl[ing] a system of private self-
regulation.”64 It is worth noting, perhaps, that one might describe labour 
arbitration—in place for a half century or so—in only slightly less extreme 
terms. This raises the question of the significance of a court system to our 
understanding of the rule of law. For Dicey, the existence of the “ordinary 
courts” was vital to a regime based on the rule of law; this principle has been 
broadened—or compromised—in Canada even in the domestic sphere with 
the growth of administrative tribunals. Yet for some theorists the place of the 
courts is less imperative for the very reason that “both judicial and 
enforcement mechanisms remain notoriously underdeveloped in international 
private and public law.”65 Scheuerman believes that weak enforcement 
mechanisms are irrelevant to whether an institution has a “legal character,” 
but one might argue that the significance of an independent judicary to the 
concept of the rule of law goes beyond providing a “legal character.”  
From another perspective transnational decision-making bodies, public 
rather than private institutions, may have an effect on states and state actors, 
but only as long as the states accept their authority. An example is the 
International Criminal Court, also the subject of a presentation in this 
conference, by Hélène Dumont. Interestingly, Scheuerman compares the lack 
of enforcement mechanisms for international institutions to the lack of the 
                   
63  See W.A.W. Neilson, “Some Legal Badges of Economic Globalization from Rome to the 
WTO and Regional Trade Agreements” in this volume. 
64  Scheuerman, supra note 23 at 7. 
65  Ibid.at 4. 
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enforcement mechanisms of the United Nations: it is correct that the United 
Nations continues to exist as a legal body; the question is its effectiveness 
and its ability to control powerful states arguably intent on ignoring the rule 
of law in the international context. The comparison breaks down because the 
lack of these enforcement mechanisms among global economic forces does 
not prevent their having a significant impact. The lack of adherence to the 
rule of law does not pose a challenge to the effectiveness of these global 
institutions, but rather the success of these institutions poses a challenge to 
the continued significance of the rule of law.  
C. A Universal Rule of Law 
Even in the relatively homogenous western nations, there is not 
agreement on the meaning or scope of the rule of law, particularly between a 
procedural and normative model. In practice, however, the Canadian version, 
while sounding like a “thin” version is so closely tied with democratic values 
that it can be considered at least a quasi-thick version. The same debate 
occurs at the international level. Some commentators believe that the exact 
meaning of the rule of law is not particularly important, as long as some basic 
elements are recognized and applied, primarily for the purpose of 
establishing stability (the functional view) or of protecting citizens from 
overarching government (the normative view). Similarly, for some observers, 
the rule of law can co-exist with different forms of government, while for 
others, it is more compatible with democracy than with any other form and 
except in the narrowest sense (more Carothers’ rule by law than rule of law) 
is incompatible with authoritarian forms. Rule by law characterizes many 
economically emerging countries which want to encourage trade but the 
governments of which are not prepared to subordinate their power to that of 
the law (Carothers suggests that Malaysia, Taiwan, South Korea and “even 
China” fit into this category, to a greater or lesser degree, as well as many 
states of the former Soviet Union and the sub-Saharan African countries). We 
should not assume, however, that the rule of law plays the same role—or lack 
of role—in all economically emerging countries or in all countries which 
may lay claim to a particular philosophical heritage.66 
                   
66  Peerenboom briefly outlines the role of the rule of law in many states reflecting “Asian 
values” or, preferably, “values in Asia,” such as Vietnam (in a category of its own), 
China, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong (as one group) and the Philippines, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and India (a second group) in “Varieties of Rule of 
Law” supra note 5 at 15-31. 
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Despite the obvious difficulties, Bouloukos and Dakin argue, however, 
that it is desirable to develop an “Universal Declaration of the Rule of Law,” 
in part because the notion of universal human rights has been divisive and 
because a common meaning is necessary to its international application.67 
They maintain that there has not been a similar division around the notion of 
the rule of law; however, this is likely because its meaning has been flexible, 
not only as between emerging nations and western nations, but even within 
western nations. As we have seen, there is no single or overriding or 
predominant definition of the “rule of law,” particularly once one moves 
beyond minimal procedural requirements and does not ascribe a normative 
value to the content of laws. Since the concept is culturally specific in many 
ways, it may be difficult to develop a universally accepted meaning. 
Whatever the difficulties within a nation-state, the challenge to develop a 
thick version of the rule of law at the international level is far greater and far 
more significant for the overlay of a global rule of law over the domestic 
version. Peerenboom, for example, suggests that “[a] thin theory ... facilitates 
focused and productive discussion of certain legal issues among persons of 
different political persuasions” and “cross-cultural dialogue,” since 
“criticisms are more likely to be taken serious and result in actual change 
given a shared understanding of rule of law”68 and suggests that while “[r]ule 
of law is a protean concept, and rule of law discourses in Asia and elsewhere 
encompass multiple strands ... the requirements of a thin rule of law are 
widely shared and provide a certain degree of universalism.”69 In the global 
context, there are two dominant concepts of the rule of law. One view aligns 
it with democratic systems, the other sees it as a management tool, to ensure 
economic.70 The latter understanding is more or less neutral as to type of 
government, the former is obviously not. The latter addresses the ordered 
system of rules which must exist if the economy is to be advanced. How can 
corporations do business in the emerging capitalist economies if they do not 
have confidence in the rules governing contract and property law, for 
example? But it does not require, at least at a sophisticated level, a twinning 
                   
67  Bouloukos & Dakin, supra note 22. 
68  Peerenboom, “Varieties of Rule of Law” supra note 5 at 7-8. 
69  Ibid.at 45. 
70  The veneer of the rule of law may also serve to legitimate one version of history over 
another through fault-finding for national wrongs: D.M. Paciocco, “Defending Rwandans 
Before the ICTR: A Venture Full of Pitfalls and Lessons for International Criminal Law” 
in A.-M. Boisvert & H. Dumont, eds., “La voie canadienne vers la Cour pénale 
internationale: tous les chemins mènent à Rome” (Montreal: Éditions Thémis, 2004) 97. 
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with a particular form of government. As long as they know that they will not 
be thrown into prison or worse at the arbitrary whim of the authorities, those 
doing business in an autocratic state need only to be satisfied that those with 
whom they do business will be compelled to abide by their agreements. To 
the extent that autocratic governments might be more vulnerable in these 
days of capitalist triumph and Internet export of western culture and 
expectations, democracy might seem a more stable form of government and 
in that sense, it is instrumental rather than normative. And, of course, 
individuals and corporations might have some degree of commitment to 
human rights and other values which make working in autocracies less 
appealing, a commitment which is perhaps reinforced by domestic 
expectations or a global NGO movement. In these cases, corporations will 
accord with the systems they find in the countries in which they do business, 
even while attempting to satisfy the values of their countries of origin.71 
The impetus for the development of the rule of law may affect whether it 
serves only a regulatory function or whether it is intended to advance or 
reflect other interests and values. One example illustrates this point. The 
early capitalists in post-perestroika Russia benefitted from the breakdown of 
the existing legal system, not only to engage in clever economic 
manoeuvering, but also to bolster their positions with criminal activity, the 
very situation which made it difficult for foreign businesses to do business; 
now, however, these new capitalists are interested in consolidating their gains 
and protecting their economic position. Thus Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 
estimated to have a fortune of $7.2 billion (U.S.), acquired from early and 
continued involvement in the Russian privatization process, is said to have 
established his fortune in a typically Russian manner; he is now quoted as 
saying that “[t]ransparency and good corporate governance are the rules of 
the game now ... The more developed our market, the stricter those rules need 
to be.”72  
                   
71  John McWilliams provided some examples in his discussion of how Nexen, among other 
corporations, do business in developing countries in his presentation to the CIAJ 
Conference in Banff. 
72  C. Wheeler, “Is Russian oil tycoon stepping on the toes of President Putin?” The Globe 
and Mail (July 9, 2003), A9. Khodorkovsky was later arrested and charged with fraud, 
tax evasion and forgery; on one interpretation, his arrest was Putin’s response to 
Khodorkovsky’s engagement with the political process and on another interpretation, it 
was a clear statement of Putin’s determination to push through his economic reforms: J. 
Strauss, “Billionaire’s arrest raises fears about fate of Russian reforms” The Globe and 
Mail (November 1, 2003) A9. 
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Some commentators find the linking of the rule of law with economic 
development counterintuitive. Owen Fiss, for example, suggests that this 
association “would deny the autonomy of law and ignore the fact that [the] 
end of law is justice, not economic growth.”73 Yet in some ways the rule of 
law has always been associated with economic order: the need for rules upon 
which merchants could rely. Indeed, it has been suggested that there is less 
need for the rule of law—in the sense of a positive system of rules—in the 
international context than was the case in the past. Rules were intended to 
ensure some level of stability between the making of a contract and the 
fulfillment of the contract which could take months or even longer in a world 
of slow boats and no electronic communication.74 In contrast to the view that 
the rule of law may be less necessary today, however, at least in the 
economic arena, the more general view is that it is more necessary than ever. 
Thus “economic gobalization is feeding the rule-of-law imperative by putting 
pressure on governments to offer the stability, transparency, and 
accountability that international investors demand.”75 
As Fiss observes, “neoliberalism” or the emphasis on the market as the 
main mechanism for ordering economic relations—either a characteristic or 
consequence of globalization—has been accompanied by an increase in laws 
in places such as Latin America. Property law and contract law, for example, 
are necessary to successful or efficient economic relations. This “narrow 
instrumentalization” of law ignores, Fiss argues, the status of law as “an 
autonomous institution that serves a rich panoply of values, a good number of 
which, such as political freedom, individual conscience, and substantive 
                   
73  O.M. Fiss, “The Autonomy of Law” (2001) 26 Yale J. Int’l L. 517 [HeinOnLine] at 517. 
74  Scheuerman, supra note 23 at 17:  
“Legal security is clearly a time-bound concept: legal security is primarily a demand 
that relevant features of the future remain relatively predictable and thus manageable... 
When economic transactions can take place across continents at a dazzling pace, the 
perception of the role of legal security and stability is transformed. Of course, 
capitalism always necessarily requires an indispensable minimum of secure legal 
institutions (most obviously, certain legal guarantees of private property). But beyond 
that minimum, the compression of time and space probably reduces the economic 
actor’s sense of dependence on an extensive set of relatively stable general legal 
norms.” 
 Indeed, less stability, that is, greater discretionary decision-making, may be desirable 
“[i]n a world in which economic success requires speedy reactions to complex, ever-
changing movements of vast quantities of goods and services” ibid. at 18. 
75  Carothers, supra note 13. 
58  THE NEW RULE OF LAW / LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
equality, are unrelated to the efficient operation of the market or to economic 
growth.”76 The issue is whether law as an autonomous institution reflecting 
these values is a consequence of the rule of law or part of the meaning of the 
rule of law. Again, is the rule of law a procedural or substantive concept; are 
we confusing rule by law and rule of law? Does it, for example, merely 
allocate power among government institutions or bodies or does it, in 
addition, have something to say about the kinds of laws that need to be 
enacted and implemented, laws that may not be compatible with market 
efficiency but which advance values which Fiss identifies as “social justice” 
values?77 
Some observers have gone so far as to suggest that globalization requires 
something less than even a functional rule of law, that the rule of law might 
be incompatible with globalization. Scheuerman argues that “a careful 
examination of novel forms of legal decision-making most closely connected 
to economic globalization shows that they exhibit few of the virtues typically 
associated with the traditional ideal of the rule of law.” In contrast to the rule 
of law criteria, “[e]conomic globalization relies overwhelmingly on ad hoc, 
discretionary, closed, and non-transparent legal forms fundamentally 
inconsistent with a minimally defensible conception of the rule of law.”78  
Chibundu frames the issue as “whether the consequences of globalization 
have created an international community that can be subjected to 
standardized rules,” given that legitimacy relies on community acceptance 
flowing from shared norms and expectations.79 He concludes that what he 
calls the “‘two spaces of globalization’” appear in the rule of law: one arises 
from “technocratic elitism” and the other is manifested in “weakened States” 
replaced by an active civil society comprised not only of state actors but of 
non-state actors, “notably human rights and charitable groups, that respond to 
crises without regard to national frontiers.”80 The ease of information flow 
suggests, he says, that “we are all going through the same experiences. In this 
atmosphere, it is tempting to see law, particularly the rule of law, as simply 
                   
76  Fiss, supra note 73 at 519. 
77  Ibid. at 520. 
78  Scheuerman, supra note 23 at 3. 
79  Chibundu, supra note 18 at 107-108. Also see Peerenboom, “Social Networks” supra 
note 20. 
80  Chibundu, ibid. at 114-115. 
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another commodity easily manufactured according to well-delineated 
specifications and readily sold across borders and cultures.”81 This is a 
merely a higher level debate of that which concerns the substantive nature of 
the rule of law at the domestic level. 
D. Global Citizenship 
While there may be much talk about the universalizing of the rule of law, 
having it apply in countries not predominantly governed by it (these countries 
may be highly regulated as a way of the authorities’ maintaining power, but 
they are not subject to a rule of law that contains authority), the rule of law is 
heavily determined by national norms and values. Its operationalization, 
beyond the first level of process, in the Canadian context, relies on a 
governmental capacity to provide the conditions under which the rule of law 
can flourish. In Canada, the rule of law is viewed as interrelated with 
democracy, citizen autonomy and vindication of legal rights through 
meaningful access, if not to courts, at least to legitimate decision-making 
bodies the decisions of which can be enforced. Rapid and intensified 
globalization has raised questions about the government’s capacity—and 
will—to maintain these conditions and “to promote outcomes more beneficial 
for society as a whole” than are likely to be achieved by market forces.82 
Enforceability of rules becomes more difficult when external players are 
involved and extrajurisdictional issues come into play. Thus globalization 
may diminish the individual state’s capacity to protect its citizens, on the one 
hand, while the growth of international standards invokes the notion of 
shared “rights” or “claims,” on the other hand. For some commentators, these 
phenomena converge in the notion of global citizenship. 
One of the questions raised by global citizenship and the changing nature 
of international law (to establish standards to which citizens can lay claim) is 
the relationship between the citizen and the state. It has been suggested that 
“[t]hese moves towards global normative governance seem like a dramatic 
encroachment on the sort of sovereignty that allowed the state to dominate 
the political and moral imagination of individuals and their political 
communities, lending such powerful credibility to the Westphalian 
                   
81  Ibid. at 115. 
82  Brawley, supra note 41 at 61. Brawley argues that corporations might prefer a regulated 
state because such a state is more likely to protect their investment: ibid. at 62-63.  
60  THE NEW RULE OF LAW / LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
architecture of a statist system of world order.”83 The state, after all, not only 
asserts authority against other states, but also claims a particular relationship 
with its citizens based on duties and claims on both state and citizen. The 
growth of international bodies, including multinational corporations, compels 
us to examine another component of the rule of law: the relationship between 
the individual and the state. Recall that one component of the domestic rule 
of law is that it governs the relationship between the individual and the state. 
One answer to what may be an ever-growing distance between individual and 
decision-maker is the notion of global citizenship, a concept which can be 
defined either as referring to the universalization of human rights or as 
involving “new structures [that] may allow, or require, individuals to see 
themselves not only as citizens of their ‘own’ state, but as global citizens 
whose obligations stretch to all fellow human beings.”84  
As Axtmann points out, “[t]he success of the nation state in the last two 
hundred years or so, as well as its universality and legitimacy, were premised 
on its claim to be able to guarantee the economic well-being, the physical 
security and the cultural identity of the people who constitute its citizens.”85 
In fact, not all nations do provide or intend to provide economic well-being 
or physical security for their populations, and to the extent that other nations 
interact with them, are nevertheless considered legitimate. But Axtmann’s 
general point is correct. Equally valid is his point that even for states that 
either do or purport to accomplish these goals, it is becoming more difficult 
for them to do so. Because of transcendent organizations and the diffusion of 
sovereignty, the identification both of “the people” and the entity which can 
be held accountable will become problematic.86 Fiss argues that without 
some grounding in the support of the population, tribunals intended to 
support human rights are inconsistent with democracy, thus reflecting what 
may be a conflict between democracy and justice. At the international level 
the rule of law does not have that grounding.87 Equally interesting is how 
                   
83  R. Falk, “An Emergent Matrix of Citizenship: Complex, Uneven, and Fluid” in Dower & 
Williams, ed., supra note 41 at 15, 17-18. 
84  O. O’Neill, “Foreward” in Dower & Williams, eds., supra note 41 at xi-xii. Also see C. 
van den Anker, “Global Justice, Global Institutions and Global Citizenship” in Dower & 
Williams, ibid. at 158, 167. 
85  R. Axtmann, “What’s Wrong with Cosmopolitan Democracy?” in Dower & Williams, 
eds., ibid. at 101. 
86  Ibid. at 102. 
87  Fiss, supra note 73 at 523ff. 
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compatible a rule of law developed with the approval of a relatively 
homogeneous population in a nation-state will be with a rule of law 
developed from a widely heterogenous global population. 
Under the Westphalian system, states were subjects and individuals 
objects of international law. “Transnational redress radically reconfigures our 
conception of the state [which is] stripped of its sovereign pretension to be 
above the law and of its insistence that an individual had neither rights nor 
duties on the international level since all authority derived from the nation-
state.”88 States still decide the indicia of citizenship, including benefits and 
duties, as well as the process by which non-citizens are entitled to citizenship 
and the differences that exist between citizens and non-citizens (and between 
persons born to citizenship and naturalized citizens). Nevertheless, the 
growth of a more direct relationship between individuals and international 
norms requires us to think about the rule of law as it applies to Canada as part 
of an international system and not merely as a sovereign state. It also requires 
consideration of the role of “citizen groups” in determining the appropriate 
interpretation of relevant international norms, an issue which Jennifer 
Koshan’s contribution to this volume addresses. 
Held argues that while national sovereignty has not been “wholly 
subverted,” “there are significant areas and regions marked by criss-crossing 
loyalties, conflicting interpretations of rights and duties, interconnected legal 
and authority structures and so on, which displace notions of sovereignty as 
an illimitable, indivisible and exclusive form of public power;” thus “new 
types of ‘boundary problem[s]’ will arise.”89 For Held, the solution is to 
develop democratic systems and processes which transcend nation-state 
boundaries, as well as recognizing local authority with corresponding 
multiple citizenships.90 At the least citizenship involves duties and 
responsibilities, “loyalty” by citizens to the state of which they are citizens 
and protection of the citizens by the state. Citizens are granted formal rights 
but a broader understanding of “citizen” helps to determine the extent to 
which fundamental principles apply to any given individual. Thus the rule of 
law applies to everyone, whether legally citizens or not. If our understanding 
of “citizen” extend to the global citizen, what is the impact on the rule of 
law? 
                   
88  Falk, supra note 83 at 18. 
89  Held, supra note 41 at 98 
90  Ibid. at 100. 
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How might a different understanding of our obligations to citizens or 
residents affect the application of the rule of law to issues arising from 
immigration and refugee status cases? How would a “global” understanding 
of the rule of law be incorporated into our constitutional interpretation of this 
foundational principle? As Scheuerman points out, globalization has resulted 
in the massive movement of peoples across borders to which countries have 
responded by enacting “repressive” and discretionary immigration codes and 
in the growth of international crime which has resulted in the “weakening 
[of] the legal integrity of criminal codes.”91 Are the subjects of these codes 
local citizens, subject to a rule of law enriched by association with 
democratic values, or global citizens, subject to a managerial rule of law 
weak enough to gain consensus from the least democratic nations? 
CONCLUSION 
That most fundamental of Canadian constitutional principles, the rule of 
law, faces challenge from the development of a parallel transnational rule of 
law, the form of which will emerge from potentially competing interests, 
economic development and advancement of human rights. Is it possible to 
universalize the rule of law and still maintain Canada’s domestic under-
standing of the concept (or even maintain the ongoing debate about the 
evolution of the principle to include more substantive measures)? Or will it 
be necessary to dilute the stronger concepts to accommodate countries with 
less willingness to accept anything other than the minimum process criteria? 
These developments may ultimately compel the judiciary to choose between 
competing rules of law, particularly when applying international norms or 
standards, one “home-grown” and the other developed in conjunction with 
the international norms or standards at issue. As for the principle itself, its 
continued dominance and significance in Canada’s constitutional order may 
                   
91  Scheuerman, supra note 23 at 15. In this regard, the globalization of terrorism has led to 
restrictions of civil liberties which have been considered a fundamental element of the 
rule of law. 
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be weakened as decision-making moves offshore, thus reducing even further 
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We are in the midst of a new rights revolution, it is claimed.1 After the 
fall of the wall in Berlin, and the collapse of the Soviet empire, new and old 
nation states are emerging out of the yoke of totalitarianism, apartheid, or 
state socialism and rearranging their constitutional systems to embrace 
human rights and freedoms. The Canadian legal system is viewed as an 
example for many of these countries, having adopted a model of rights less 
steeped in tradition and in the rigidities of categorical thinking associated 
with the United States Constitution.2  
At the very same time, there has emerged a corresponding push for the 
free movement of goods, services, and capital across national frontiers. The 
World Trade Organization helps to oversee the operation of 
non-discriminatory markets. International financial institutions, such as the 
World Bank and IMF, use their economic influence to advocate the 
downsizing of government and deficit reduction through tax concessions 
and the selling off of public enterprise. Democratic self-government is 
viewed as untrustworthy in this new environment. Limitations on 
government action through legally-enforceable mechanisms, such as 
NAFTA’s investor rights, 3  are viewed as a preferable means of 
safeguarding the gains made towards global free markets in the 
post-communist era.  
                   
1  See, for instance, M. Ignatieff, The Rights Revolution (Toronto: Anansi, 2000) and C.R. 
Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative 
Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
2  See L. Weinrib, “Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism” in 
V.C. Jackson & M. Tushnet, eds., Defining the Field of Comparative Constitutional 
Law (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002) 3. 
3  See D. Schneiderman, “NAFTA’s Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes 
to Canada” (1996) 46 UTLJ 499. 
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We then are compelled to ask: is the correspondence between a nascent 
global human rights regime and a strengthening of the rules and institutions 
of economic globalization mere coincidence? In my view, there is a 
connection between the general tendency towards open markets and limited 
government. In a world where the market rules, where structural adjustment 
programs mandate legal reform that privilege economic interests, states 
increasingly are under pressure to adopt constitutional regimes that 
replicate the model upon which economic success is more likely to be 
secured.  
This relationship between individual rights and markets was noticed in 
earlier times. James Madison famously admitted that US constitutional 
design was intended to safeguard the interests of the propertied from 
dispossessed factions.4 Even constitutionalism in the United Kingdom has 
been portrayed as a vehicle for preserving vested interests and as 
prophylactic to class rule,5 a view that has been associated with Oxford 
Vinerian Professor of Law, Albert Venn Dicey.6 Dicey’s idea of the ‘rule of 
law’ has taken on a life of its own, being conscripted by proponents of both 
human rights and market freedoms.7  
A Canadian version of this tendency is represented in the recent work of 
Patrick Monahan. Monahan argues that the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees the “rule of law”—expressly mentioned only in the 
Preamble to the Charter, together with a reference to the “supremacy of 
God”- -and that this functions as a limitation on governmental power 
similar to other Charter rights and freedoms.8 The rule of law, Monahan 
insists, specifically prohibits the arbitrary treatment of citizens by 
                   
4  A. Hamilton, J. Madison & J. Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. by C. Rossiter (New 
York: Mentor Books, 1961) at 78-79. 
5  See references infra note 27. 
6  See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. 
(N.Y.: St.Martin’s Press, 1960) [hereinafter “Law of the Constitution”] and A.V. Dicey, 
Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the 
Nineteenth Century (London: Macmillan, 1920). 
7  I explore this phenomenon in D. Schneiderman, “Investment Rules and the Rule of 
Law” (2001) 8 Constellations 521.  
8  P.J. Monahan, “Is the Pearson Airport Legislation Unconstitutional?: The Rule of Law 
as a Limit on Contract Repudiation by Government” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 411 and P.J. Monahan, Constitutional Law (Concord: Irwin Law, 1997) at 
84-85, 128-130. 
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“expropriating contractual rights”, though there is no prohibition on 
impairing contractual obligations as in the US Constitution.9 His argument 
was precipitated by the Government of Canada’s decision to cancel 
contracts to privatize Terminal 2 at Toronto’s Pearson Airport. A decision 
to privatize was finalized during the brief tenure of Prime Minister Kim 
Campbell and the reversal of this decision was one of the first acts of the 
new Liberal government under Prime Minister Jean Chretien in 1992. The 
Government limited recourse to the courts and capped damages arising 
from the cancellation of the contracts. Monahan, along with several other 
leading constitutional lawyers appearing before a Senate Committee, 
maintained that the federal government offended limiting principles they 
associated with the rule of law: a limitation on government implied by the 
Constitution of Canada. A version of this rule of law principle appears to 
have been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec 
Secession Reference. In one passage, the Court indicated that the unwritten 
constitutional principles it had identified including those of 
“constitutionalism and the rule of law”- -could “in certain circumstances 
give rise to substantive legal obligations... which constitute substantive 
limitations upon government action.”10 
This penchant for expanding constitutional limitations beyond what is 
fairly implied by constitutional text is, in my view, a dangerous trend11 
which complements well the global movement towards limited state action 
in regard to market matters. The rules and institutions we associate with 
economic globalization have precisely the objective of isolating markets 
from politics by limiting, through legal means, the capacity of 
self-governing communities to take measures for the common weal. I argue 
in this paper that this does not sit well with an understanding of Canadian 
constitutionalism that is premised on the idea of “pluralism”. Much work on 
legal pluralism concerns the multiplicity of legal orders at work in any 
single legal system, though they may not be recognized as such by the 
“official” legal system.12 I draw here on certain normative suppositions of 
                   
9  Monahan (1995), ibid. at 415. 
10  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at para. 54. 
11  See also J. Leclair, “Canada’s Unfathomable Unwritten Constitutional Principles” 
(2002) 27 Queen’s L.J. 389. 
12  See M.-M. Kleinhans & R.A. Macdonald, “What is Critical Legal Pluralism” (1997) 12 
Canadian Journal of Law and Society 25; J. Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism” (1986) 
24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1; H.W. Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative 
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legal pluralist thought, namely, that self-governing communities should 
have the capacity to construct their own legal orders and that any theory of 
constitutionalism should accommodate these differing expressions of 
self-government. I want to suggest that Canada’s constitutional order gives 
expression to this version of pluralism, not just as regards linguistic or 
cultural differences, but as regards the relationship between states and 
markets. Canada’s constitutional order traditionally has tolerated a range of 
ideological approaches to this relationship so that, rather than foreclosing 
options to state-market problems, Canadian constitutionalism has enabled 
the imagination of what Taylor calls “alternative futures”.13 
In the first part of the paper, I examine some of the text, structure, and 
jurisprudence of the Constitution in order to suggest that Canadian 
constitutional law traditionally has been one that enables rather than 
disables government action in the realm of the economy. In this way, the 
constitution facilitates pluralism in state-market relations. It does so despite 
pressures from economic actors abroad, as I show in an early 
twentieth-century dispute over the capacity of the Ontario legislature to 
make laws that took public control of hydro-electricity development in the 
province. This tendency should not have been thwarted by the arrival of the 
Charter in 1982. Rather, this pluralistic view, I argue, complements the 
Charter reasonably well. In the second half of the paper, I turn to some 
contemporary Supreme Court of Canada decisions that signal a worrisome 
departure from the premises of pluralism. In my view, the Court has, on 
occasion, gone too far in tilting constitutional interpretation in ways 
consonant with the values of economic globalization by limiting 
unreasonably legislative power over economic subjects.  
I want to argue that the contemporary promotion of individual rights 
through constitutional means working in conjunction with the values 
associated with economic globalization may combine to threaten important 
Canadian constitutional values. In my view, we are at a critical juncture in 
the history of Canadian constitutional law. The Canadian judiciary is being 
drawn into this struggle over the future of rights, economy, and democracy 
 
Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1985). 
13  C. Taylor, “Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation in Late Twentieth 
Century Canada” in A. Cairns & C. Williams, eds., Constitutionalism, Citizenship and 
Society in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 183. 
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in Canada. I suggest here a judicial path both that resists this connection and 
that remains faithful to the Canadian constitutional value of pluralism. 
I. ENERGETIC CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM  
Viscount James Bryce, a colleague of Dicey’s at Oxford, subtitled his 
little book on Canada: “an actual democracy.” 14  Written in the early 
twentieth century, Bryce described Canada’s constitutional regime as more 
democratic than in the United States. This was because legislative power in 
Canada was “legally boundless”. “Were there any revolutionary spirit,” 
Bryce wrote, changes could swiftly be brought about by Parliamentary 
legislation.15 Bryce grossly exaggerated federal power, but the observation 
captures an important aspect of Canada’s constitutional design in 1867. 
Though divided, legislative power is complete as between the two levels of 
government.16 In contrast to the style of constitutional limitation in the 
US—limits which disable legislative action over a variety of economic 
subjects (by guaranteeing property and contract rights, for instance) 
—Canada’s constitutional regime of federalism largely is unbounded. It 
would have been apparent to Bryce that Canadian legislative authority was 
“absolutely sovereign”—that, in Dicey’s famous words, it virtually “could 
make or unmake any law whatever.”17 
There were, to be sure, sources of limitations exercised early on in 
Canada’s post-confederation history. W.P.M. Kennedy shows us that 
federal authority to disallow provincial legislation was exercised in ways 
that replicated protections found in the US Bill of Rights.18 John Willis 
similarly describes the common law presumptions of statutory interpre- 
tation as performing constitution-like functions. These presumptions, such 
as the requirement, absent clear and plain language, of compensation in the 
event of an expropriation, acted as an “ideal constitution” for England and 
                   
14  J. Bryce, Canada: An Actual Democracy (Toronto: Macmillan, 1921). This appears to 
be a reprint of the chapter on Canada originally published in J. Bryce, Modern 
Democracies (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921) at 455. 
15  Bryce, Canada, ibid. at 17, 41. 
16  A.H.F. Lefroy, Canada’s Federal System (Toronto: Carswell, 1913) at 64-67. 
17  Dicey, Law of the Constitution, supra note 6 at 39-40. 
18  W.P.M. Kennedy, “The Nature of Canadian Federalism” in Kennedy, Essays in 
Constitutional Law (London: Oxford University Press) 27 at 49. 
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Canada.19 These kinds of impediments either fell into disuse (in the case of 
the power of disallowance) or proved only to delay, and not to prevent, 
legislative interventions in the marketplace.  
The point was proven by Dicey himself in a little known episode in 
early twentieth-century Ontario history.20 The Ontario government, led by 
Minister without portfolio Adam Beck, was proceeding with a program for 
public hydro-electric power in Ontario. Beck’s Hydro-Electric Power 
Commission entered into a series of contracts with southern Ontario 
municipalities for the provision of electric power drawn primarily from the 
Niagara River. As required by provincial municipal law, municipalities in 
the province secured the approval of ratepayers to by-laws stipulating the 
contractual terms under which the municipality would pay the Commission 
for electric power.21 The financial terms of these contracts, however, varied 
from those which had been approved by local electorates and therefore 
Beck rushed into passage legislation in 1908 empowering mayors to 
approve the contracts though different from the terms approved by 
ratepayers.22 After suits were launched challenging the validity of these 
contracts23 and fearing yet another year of delay, Beck pushed through a 
second statute in 1909 validating the contracts, staying all pending 
litigation, and declaring that municipal contracts should “not be open to 
question and shall not be called into question on any ground whatever in 
any court but shall be held and adjudged to be valid and binding.”24  
                   
19  J. Willis, “Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell” (1938) 16 Canadian Bar Review 1 at 21. 
20  Much of this history is drawn form C. Armstrong, The Politics of Federalism: 
Ontario’s Relations with the Federal Government 1867-1942 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1981) at 55-64. 
21  Beardmore v. Toronto, (1909) O.W.R. 1262 at 1263 [hereinafter Beardomore]. 
22  An Act to validate certain By-laws Passed and Contracts made pursuant to “An Act to 
Provide for the Transmission of Electrical Power to Municipalities” S.O., 8 Edw. VII., 
c. 22. 
23  See In Re By-Law No. 904 of the Town of Galt; Scott v. Patterson (1908), 17 O.L.R. 
270 (Sup. Ct.); Horrigan v. Port Arthur (1909), 14 O.W.R. 973, aff’d (1909). 14 
O.W.R. 1087 (Div. Ct.); Abbott v. Trenton (1909). 14 O.W.R. 1101 (Ex.D.).  
24  An Act to Amend an Act Passed in the 7th year of His Majesty’s Reign, Chapter 19, 
intituled “An Act to Provide for the Transmission of Electrical Power to 
Municipalities,” to validate certain contracts entered into with the Hydro-Electric 
Power Commission of Ontario, and for other purposes, S.O., 9 Edw. VII., c. 19, ss. 4, 
8; Armstrong, supra note 20 at 57-58; “Sir James Whitney’s Invasion of the Rights of 
Municipalities” (1909) 45 Canada Law Journal 258. 
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According to W.E. O’Brien, the legislation interfered with “vested 
rights in order to carry out some object of supposed public utility.”25 
O’Brien and others insisted that such measures were beyond the 
constitutional capacity of the provincial legislatures and, in any event, 
should be disallowed by the federal Minister of Justice. It appears to have 
been the editor of the Toronto Sun who secured the opinion of Professor 
Dicey.26 Subsequently published in the Canada Law Journal, Dicey called 
the provincial measures “unjust and impolitic.” However, there was nothing 
in the BNA Act, Dicey wrote, “which provides that a law passed by a 
provincial legislature shall not be palpably unjust,” for the “obvious 
unfairness of a law can hardly affect its validity if the law falls within the 
terms of the BNA Act.”27 The only remedy available, opined Dicey, was to 
petition the Governor General for disallowance (he could hardly “conceive 
a stronger case”) or seek an amendment to the BNA Act from the Imperial 
Parliament “limiting the power of legislatures to interfere with acquired 
rights and with the validity of contracts” (though such an amendment would 
“hardly be obtained ... unless it were obviously desirable by the people of 
Canada”). 28  Despite concerns expressed by British financial opinion 
(Finance Minister Fielding was warned that failure to intervene would 
make it difficult to borrow from London financial houses 29 ) and the 
sympathy of Prime Minster Laurier to their pleadings (Laurier described the 
provincial measures as “highly improper and prejudicial”30), the power of 
disallowance would not be exercised in these circumstances. The Ontario 
government could proceed with its plan for public power. 
                   
25  W.E. O’Brien, “What Are the Functions of a Provincial Legislature?—The Distinction 
Between Public and Private Purposes” (1909) 45 Canada Law Journal 137 at 137. See 
also C.B. Labatt, “The Scope of the Power of the Dominion Government to Disallow 
Provincial Statutes” (1909) 45 Canada Law Journal 296. 
26  Professor Dicey, “Unjust and Impolitic Provincial Legislation and its Disallowance by 
the Governor-General” (1909) 45 Canada Law Journal 457 at 458. 
27  Ibid. at 459, 461. 
28  Ibid. at 462. 
29  Armstrong, supra note 20 at 58. 
30  Ibid. at 61. 
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Dicey’s opinion seems correct in light of his understanding of 
federalism and the rule of law, in addition to contemporaneous 
understandings of Canadian constitutional law.31 Federalism, for Dicey, 
acted as a prophylactic to rash legislative action. “Federalism, as it defines, 
and therefore limits, the powers of each department of the administration,” 
Dicey wrote, “is unfavourable to the interference or the activity of 
government.” Federalism meant “weak government” and “conservatism”.32 
Under a federal regime, each level of government was no more than a 
subordinate law-making body and excesses of legislative authority would 
result in findings of ultra vires, just as would any railway authority or 
municipality that exceeded its jurisdiction. Where, however, a subordinate 
legislative body acted within its assigned jurisdiction, no question of ultra 
vires could arise.  
The rule of law, for Dicey, performed similar limiting functions. 
Though Parliament could make or unmake any law, this dogma was “not 
worth the stress here laid upon it”,33 for courts always could supervise 
legislative activity in the exercise of their judicial review functions. It was 
at this stage that his “kindred conceptions” of the rule of law—that 
governments operate through regular law; that no one is above the law and 
all are amenable to the jurisdiction of courts; and that the general rights of 
the Constitution arise out of particular cases34—would have their intended 
effect. Judicial review, under Dicey’s conception of the rule of law, could 
help stem the majoritarian excesses that so worried Dicey and others of his 
generation.35 Dicey’s legal opinion confirmed that provincial measures 
                   
31  See my discussion of Dicey on the subject of federalism in D. Schneiderman, “A.V. 
Dicey, Lord Watson, and the Law of the Canadian Constitution in the Late Nineteenth 
Century” (1998) 16 Law and History Review 495 at 501-510 [hereinafter “A.V. 
Dicey…”]. For contemporaneous understandings, see Smith v. City of London (1909), 
14 O.W.R. 1248 (Div. Ct.) [hereinafter Smith]; Beardmore, supra note 21 and Lefroy, 
supra note 16 at 38-39, 82-85. On the question of whether a municipality could 
compete with private industry, Justice Boyd in Beardmore referred approvingly to 
Thompson Houston Electric Co. v. City of Newton 42 F. 723 (1890).  
32  See Dicey, Law of the Constitution, supra note 6 at 173, 171. 
33  Ibid. at 71. 
34  Ibid. at 188-203. 
35  See Schneiderman, “A.V. Dicey…” supra note 31; B.J. Hibbits, “‘The Politics of 
Principle’ Albert Venn Dicey and the Rule of Law” (1994) 23 Anglo-American Law 
Review 18; D. Sugarman, “The Legal Boundaries of Liberty: Dicey, Liberalism and 
Legal Science” (1983) 46 Modern Law Review 102. 
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within the boundaries of their legislative authority, denying access to courts 
by clear and plain language, could not be preempted by the “rule of law.”36 
The province of Ontario would be free, then, to experiment with a 
provincially-owned and operated hydro-electric utility. 
The constitutional limitations associated with divided jurisdiction, so 
valued by Dicey, have made social and economic legal change “difficult”37 
but not impossible. According to contemporary accounts, divided authority 
does not so much bar governments from acting, as much as it delays the 
taking of swift government action.38 In their study of intergovernmental 
cooperation, Fletcher and Wallace conclude that “governments have found 
ways and means to accomplish many, perhaps most, of their objectives.” 
Rather than barring social policy development, the experience under 
Canadian federalism “has been more one of delay and frustration than of 
paralysis... the system rarely frustrates the popular will.”39  Indeed, the 
almost unanimous response of governments in Canada to the challenges 
posed by economic globalization—spending reductions, retreat from 
national standards, privatization, and the withdrawal of the state from 
welfare state functions—suggests that federalism is not an impediment to 
coordinated action. The problem of divided authority does not seem to have 
posed so much of a problem, once a consensus around a set of national 
goals is identified. The pluralism undergirding Canadian constitutional law, 
in other words, can be overcome through the coordinated action of national 
and subnational units. It is the potential competitive normativism of 
federalism, giving rise to the exigency of cooperation, which remains a 
dominant feature of Canada’s constitutional order.40  
                   
36  This was the essential finding of Boyd, C. of the Divisional Court in Smith, supra note 
31. 
37  J.A. Corry, “The Difficulties of Divided Jurisdiction” (A Study prepared for the Royal 
Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations) (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1939). 
38  K. Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1982) at 68. 
39  F.J. Fletcher & D.C. Wallace. “Federal-Provincial Relations and the making of Public 
Policy in Canada: A Review of Case Studies” in R. Simeon, ed., Division of Powers 
and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 132. 
40  I rely here on R.A. Macdonald, “Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes, 
and Legal Pluralism” (1998) 15 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 
68 at 80, though Macdonald is more disparaging of the normative opportunities offered 
by territorial federalism than that of non-state normative legal orders. But see A. 
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One reasonably might think that this pluralist view of the 
constitution—as enabling rather than disabling of public authority—will 
have altered with the arrival on the scene of the Charter. Things, however, 
should not have changed all that dramatically. An examination of the 
structure and text of the Charter reveals that there remains a significant 
degree of legislative room to maneuver, particularly as regards socio- 
economic subjects. Property rights, of course, were left out of the Charter 
at the behest of the provincial premiers.41 Other, so-called, “pure” economic 
rights, such as an inability to interfere with the obligation of contracts, also 
are absent from the Charter. What remains is a residue of what may be 
called “indirect” economic rights, such as freedom of expression and 
mobility rights, and both of these are discussed in subsequent parts of the 
paper. Even in those cases where indirect rights are implicated, 
governments can supercede rights guarantees in those cases where they can 
demonstrate that a limitation is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable. In 
more drastic cases, governments may override certain Charter rights and 
freedoms under the notwithstanding clause (section 33), though it may now 
be that its invocation is considered illegitimate.42  
Taken together, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the Charter fits 
well the logic of the pluralist constitutional design I have described. My 
concern is that the Supreme Court of Canada has not been faithful to this 
logic. By way of illustration, I turn first to a discussion of the guarantee of 
freedom of expression and then to the mobility rights guarantee. 
 
Breton, “The Theory of Competitive Federalism” in G. Stevenson, ed., Federalism in 
Canada (Toronto: McCllelland and Stewart 1989) 457 at 460. 
41  A. Alvaro, “Why Property Rights Were Excluded From the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms” (1991) 24 Canadian Journal of Political Science 309 at 319-321; S. 
Choudhry, “The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism” (2004) 2 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 at 16-27. 
42  Cf. K. Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001).  
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II. FREE SPEECH RIGHTS43 
Certainly, not only economic interests have been well served by the 
Charter. That they have benefited from the Charter, however, is 
indisputable. This is a conclusion the Supreme Court of Canada appears to 
want to resist. In the Pepsi-Cola case,44 Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice 
LeBel, writing for the Court, distinguished between “fundamental Canadian 
value[s]”, like freedom of expression, and those diverse interests served by 
the common law and “not engaged by the Charter. Salient among these are 
the life of the economy and individual economic interests.”45 Note the 
distinction the Court purports to make, which fits well Canada’s 
constitutional design I outlined above. The Court, however, has not always 
been faithful to these presuppositions.  
The record of success for business interests has been mixed, but there is 
little doubt that gains continue to be secured in the guise of making 
constitutional law. As Gregory Hein shows, “corporate interests” are 
actively engaging in Charter litigation.46 Business firms have had some 
success in conscripting the Charter in order to resist government regulation. 
According to Richard Bauman, constitutional challenges “have become an 
important strategic device for businesses.”47 
                   
43  This section draws on D. Schneiderman “Exchanging Constitutions: Constitutional 
Bricolage in Canada” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 401 [hereinafter 
“Exchanging Constitutions”]. In my presentation at the Banff conference, I also made 
reference to some of the Court’s federalism cases. Though I have omitted that 
discussion from this paper, the cases are discussed in “Exchanging Constitutions”. 
44  RWDSU, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] SCC 8 
[hereinafter Pepsi-Cola]. 
45  Ibid. at para. 21. 
46  G. Hein, “Interest Group Litigation and Canadian Democracy” in P. Howe & P.H. 
Russell, eds., Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2001) 214. 
47  R.W. Bauman, “Business, Economic Rights, and the Charter” in D. Schneiderman & 
K. Sutherland, eds., Charting the Consequences: The Impact of Charter Rights on 
Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 58. This is a 
phenomenon which, curiously, escapes the attention of F.L. Morton & R. Knopff, The 
Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000). 
See D. Schnedierman, “The Old and New Constitutionalism” in J. Brodie & L. 
Trimble, eds., Reinventing Canada: Politics of the 21st Century (Toronto: Prentice 
Hall, 2003) 243-258 at 248-250. 
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Nowhere is this success more apparent than in the field of commercial 
speech. From its modest doctrinal beginnings in Ford 48  to its robust 
articulation in RJR-MacDonald, 49  commercial expression under the 
Charter has proven to be a valuable resource for promoting the economic 
interests of corporate actors. Once it is accepted that “all expressions of the 
heart and mind” together with all “human activity” which “conveys or 
attempts to convey a meaning” fall within the scope of constitutionally 
protected expression,50 then it comes as little surprise to find that the 
promotion of commercial products will find safe harbour in the Charter. 
In so doing, the Court has appeared to be agnostic about the capacity of 
states to regulate markets. The constitutionalization of commercial speech 
rights, after all, need not lead necessarily to the constitutionalization of 
“free enterprise.” Instead, the Canadian Supreme Court appears to have 
been more attracted to protecting the consumer’s interest in receiving 
commercial information.51 For the Court, constitutionalizing commercial 
speech has the advantage of enabling individuals to make informed 
economic choices, which is “an important aspect of individual self- 
fulfillment and personal autonomy.” 52  In the interests of informing 
consumers, the Court even has been prepared to enter the realm of labour 
relations—a domain which the Court mostly has shielded from Charter 
review. The Court has identified a public interest in receiving important 
messages about labour disputes, either through consumer pamphleting at 
retail outlets53 or via secondary picketing.54 The juridical thrust of these 
cases is to value consumer interests, and this is equated with a public 
interest in the free flow of commercial information.55 By constitutionalizing 
                   
48  Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [hereinafter Ford]. 
49  RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [hereinafter 
RJR-MacDonald]. 
50  Attorney General of Quebec v. Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 968-969. 
51  Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 at 247; 
RJR-MacDonald, supra note 49 at 347.  
52  Ford, supra note 48 at 767. 
53  United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 1518 (U.F.C.W.) v. KMart Canada Ltd., 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083 at 1105. 
54  Pepsi-Cola, supra note 44 at paras. 34-35. 
55  By endowing commercial speech with constitutional protection, the Court has helped 
to promote what Leslie Sklair calls the “culture-ideology of consumerism”: a “set of 
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, THE RULE OF LAW, AND ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 79 
 
the interests of consumers, the Court also enhances the constitutional 
position of producers, though this relationship often is obscured. 
The Court was more frank about this relationship in R. v. Guignard.56 
There, the Court invalidated a Saint-Hyacinthe municipal bylaw prohibiting 
advertising outside designated “industrial areas.” Mr. Guignard erected a 
sign on one of his commercial properties complaining about his insurance 
company’s delay in indemnifying him for repairs done several months 
earlier. 57  Justice LeBel, for the Court, embarked on his section 2(b) 
discussion by acknowledging the great value placed on commercial speech 
by the Court in previous decisions:58 
“The need for such expression derives from the very nature of our 
economic system, which is based on the existence of a free market. 
The orderly operation of that market depends on businesses and 
consumers having access to abundant and diverse information... The 
decisions of this Court accordingly recognize that commercial 
enterprises have a constitutional right to engage in activities to 
inform and promote, by advertising.” 
The interests of commercial enterprise now are considered equivalent to 
those of consumers. Perhaps this represents only a slight shift in direction. 
Yet it goes some distance in revealing the direction the Court has taken: that 
commercial speech doctrine is predicated upon the constitutional rights of 
producers to bring products to market through advertising.59 
 
practices, attitudes and values, based on advertising... that encourages ever-expanding 
consumption of consumer goods.” See L. Sklair, “The Culture-Ideology of 
Consumerism in Urban China: Some Findings From a Survey in Shanghai” in C.J. 
Schultz, II, R.W. Belk & G. Ger, eds., Research in Consumer Behavior, vol. 7: 
Consumption and Marketizing Economies (Greenwich: Jai Press, 1994) 260. 
56  R. v. Guignard, [2002] SCC 14.  
57  Ibid. at para. 3. 
58  Ibid. at paras. 21, 23. 
59  This conclusion was embraced readily by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Vann Niagara 
Ltd. v. Oakville (Town of) (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.). The case concerned a by-law 
of the municipality of Oakville which prohibited commercial billboard signs in certain 
designated areas. According to Justice Borins, for the majority of the Court of Appeal, 
commercial expression is “a key component to our economic system and therefore 
merits Charter protection” (at para. 17). The majority held the by-law was not a 
reasonable limitation on commercial speech rights. The Supreme Court of Canada 
reversed the finding under s.1 of the Charter but agreed that the billboard restriction 
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Though the Court rightly struck down this by-law, recognizing that 
consumers will have constitutional rights to engage in “counter- 
advertising”, it is disquieting to see how far the Court has gone down the 
path of constitutionalizing the social relations of the market. This precisely 
is the objective being promoted by the rules and structures of economic 
globalization. 
III.  MOBILITY RIGHTS  
Individual mobility rights have, of course, a more direct relation to 
economic freedom. Though the Trudeau project of a Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms was not primarily one about economic rights,60 the 
mobility rights come closest to embracing the idea that attached to 
Canadian citizenship is the idea of limited government in the realm of 
markets. The Charter’s section 6 guarantees to citizens and permanent 
residents the right, subject to certain limitations, to move and take up 
residence in any province and to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any 
province (the latter right is of most concern here). The significance of the 
mobility guarantees is underscored by the fact that these rights are not 
subject to the override clause in section 33. Complementing the Charter’s 
mobility rights is a joint federal-provincial commitment in section 36(1) to 
“promote equal opportunity for the well-being of Canadians”. These 
constitutional provisions are supplemented by instruments of intergovern- 
mental cooperation, like the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) and 
measures to enhance mobility rights in the Social Union Framework 
Agreement (SUFA).61 The Constitution and its related instruments thus give 
voice to a conception of citizenship that has come to be understood as the 
primary vehicle for the attainment of wealth and happiness in the modern 
world, premised upon the idea of equality of economic opportunity. 
 
infringed s. 2(b). See Corporation of the Town of Oakville v. Vann Niagara Ltd., 
[2003] S.C.J. No. 71, online: QL (SCJ) 2003 SCC 65. 
60  On Trudeau’s constitutional project see S. Clarkson & C. McCall, Trudeau and Our 
Times, Volume 1: The Magnificent Obsession (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1990). 
61  “A Framework to Improve the Social Union for Canadians” (February 4, 1999), section 
2, reproduced with commentaries in (1999) 10:4 Constitutional Forum 133.  
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The cases indicate that economic discrimination based upon provincial 
boundaries will be scrutinized closely by the courts. The threshold for 
review under the right to “pursue a livelihood in any province”, for 
instance, is not high. Though the section does not guarantee a “right to 
work”, according to Justice Estey in the Skapinker case, there need only be 
some potential mobility aspect that is circumscribed to trigger Charter 
review.62 There need not even be an element of physical movement or the 
taking up of a residence in another province. All there need be is a simple 
desire to carry on economic activity in some other province than in the 
province of residence. This helps to explain the result in Black v. the Law 
Society of Alberta.63 In Black, the law society benchers sought to prohibit 
the establishment of national law firms. Justice LaForest, for the majority 
of the Court, traced the importance of interprovincial economic mobility to 
the original confederation project. While economic concerns, LaForest J. 
acknowledged, “undoubtedly” played a part in the constitutional entren- 
chment of mobility rights, section 6 also “defines the relationship of 
citizens to their country.” This is reflected in the language of section 6 itself, 
which addresses not the structural elements of federalism but the rights of 
permanent residents and citizens.64  
Viewed in this light, the rule prohibiting interprovincial law firms 
clearly violated Charter mobility rights in section 6(2)(b), even if there was 
no physical “movement” being frustrated. According to the Court, “the 
mobility element need not be a regular or prominent component”, rather, 
there need only be some “contact” with the discriminating province.65 It 
only remained for the Court to consider whether the limitation on national 
partnerships was justifiable in a free and democratic society. Here we might 
have expected a measure of deference accorded to the legislature. After all, 
only three years earlier in Edwards Books the Court indicated that in 
matters of socio-economic policy “a Legislature must be given reasonable 
room to manoeuvre.” 66  The Law Society’s objectives admittedly were 
important: they were concerned about practice by non-members, the need 
for local competence and expertise in matters pertaining to Alberta law, 
                   
62  Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker (1984), 9 D.L.R. (4th) 161 at 181 (S.C.C.). 
63  Black v. Law Society of Alberta (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 317 (S.C.C.). 
64  Ibid. at 336. 
65  Ibid. at 338, 340. 
66  Edwards Books and Art Ltd. v. The Queen (1986) 35 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 67. 
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increased liability and concerns about discipline. But these were 
disproportionate to the objectives sought and therefore unjustifiable. 67 
According to this construction of the Charter’s mobility rights, the Charter 
gives expression to the objectives of the Canadian economic union and a 
conception of Canadian citizenship in which persons are free not only to 
move physically, but to contract and invest, in order to pursue economic 
gain. 
There are a number of interesting connections between the reasoning in 
Black and the phenomenon of economic globalization. First, as Katherine 
Swinton has observed, since the claim concerned a right to equal treatment 
for out-of-province residents to invest in provincial law firms, the right to 
economic mobility in section 6 is analogous to the international investment 
rule of “national treatment” (requiring that non-residents be treated the 
same as residents). 68  Second, by removing the protective barriers that 
barred national law firms, the Court facilitated the generation of large 
regional and supra-national professional law firms determined to reach 
beyond local markets in order to keep pace with international business 
trends.69 
The majority of the Court parted ways with Justice La Forest’s legacy in 
Canadian Egg Marketing v. Richardson.70 The Court recharacterized the 
mobility rights guarantee as serving human rights objectives rather than 
promoting economic citizenship. The case concerned Canada’s national 
marketing scheme for the production and distribution of eggs. Quotas are 
allotted to egg producers in each of the provinces across Canada. 
Historically, egg production did not originate from Canada’s Northwest 
Territories (NWT); consequently, no permits were ever allotted to NWT 
producers. Richardson, who wished to break into the egg market but was 
not permitted to do so under the current scheme, challenged the authority of 
the federal Canadian Egg Marketing Agency to bar his entry into the 
                   
67  P. Blache, “Mobility Rights” in G.-A. Beaudoin & E. Mendes, The Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) 352. 
68  K.E. Swinton, “Courting Our Way to Economic Integration” (1995) 25 Canadian 
Business Law Journal 280. 
69  H.W. Arthurs & R. Kreklewich, “Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in 
the New Economy” (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1 at 51.  
70  Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 [hereinafter 
Richardson]. 
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market. As the Court had held in Black, the Court in Richardson declared 
that the right to “pursue the gaining of a livelihood” in any province did not 
require any “physical movement” whatever. All that was required was that 
there be “any attempt to create wealth.”71 Though mobility rights appeared 
to have been infringed, the majority of the Court proceeded to read down 
the scope of section 6, limiting the purpose of these provisions to furthering 
the “human rights objective” of non-discrimination.72 A denial of “human 
dignity,” which has emerged as the touchstone for judicial findings of 
discrimination under the Charter’s equality rights provisions, now was 
prerequisite to a finding that mobility rights also had been infringed.73 
Though egg producers in the NWT were barred permanently from 
participating in the interprovincial marketing scheme, the egg quota system 
was not primarily one that discriminated on the basis of residence. Rather, 
this was a scheme constructed around historical patterns of egg production. 
The purpose of the scheme, then, was not to denigrate the human dignity of 
egg producers because of their residency—it really was nothing personal. 
Nor was the scheme discriminatory in its effect, the Court concluded. 
Weighing in with a very formalistic equality analysis, the majority 
compared producers in the NWT with egg producers without quotas in 
other provinces (rather than as compared to egg producers with quotas) and 
concluded that they were in no worse a position.  
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) in dissent was more faithful to the 
La Forest legacy, characterizing section 6 as promoting both the Canadian 
economic union and a fundamental incident of citizenship, namely, equality 
of opportunity without discrimination based on province of residence.74 She 
would have found the scheme discriminatory and unjustifiably so: an 
absolute bar on new entrants from the NWT based on historical patterns of 
production did not further any justifiable pressing and substantial 
objective.75  
                   
71  Ibid. at paras. 71, 72. 
72  Ibid. at para. 66. 
73  On this, see the opinions of Justices Iacobucci and L’Heuruex-Dubé in Law v. Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497. 
74  Richardson, supra note 70 at para. 161. 
75  Ibid. at paras. 157, 178. 
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The majority justices, perhaps, were more faithful to the Constitution’s 
overall objectives of enabling legislative activity than was the dissenting 
opinion. But in applying a formalistic equality rights analysis with an inap- 
propriate comparator group, they probably were not faithful to the 
constitutional tenor of the mobility rights clause. It is interesting, however, 
that both the majority and minority justices agreed that non-tariff barriers to 
the mobility of capital, goods, and services that unreasonably discriminate 
against persons and business associations, primarily upon provincial lines76 
are constitutionally prohibited. This is a startling result in light of the fact 
that reform of section 121 of the Canadian Constitution along just these 
lines was expressly rejected in the 1980s and 1990s.  
CONCLUSION 
One of the defining characteristics of Canadian constitutional law has 
been its pluralism. The Constitution has enabled governments to give 
expression to a wide variety of legislative initiatives. This in turn, has 
enabled a diversity of ideological commitments to be given expression 
through social and economic legislation. In this sense, Viscount Bryce was 
correct. Canadian constitutional design is more democratic than its Ameri- 
can counterpart as it accommodates political protest and keeps open a range 
of achievable political goals. Openness to political possibility, as political 
scientist Adam Przweworski argues, makes electoral competition mea- 
ningful for all interests: though losers today, we could be winners 
tomorrow.77 This is precisely not the idea of democracy promoted by the 
rules and institutions of economic globalization. Democracy is considered 
untrustworthy, politics merely about self-interestedness. Constitutionalism 
is about shielding the market from political authority. To the extent that the 
current trends which I have identified continue, it will have the effect of 
foreclosing political alternatives, checking further our capacity for 
self-government.  
                   
76  This right is subject to laws that provide “reasonable residency requirements as a 
qualification for the receipt of publicly provided social services” (s. 6(3)(b)). 
77  A. Przeworski, Democracy and Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 33. Also 
see S.N. Eistentadt, Paradoxes of Democracy: Fragility, Continuity, and Change 
(Washington and Baltimore: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999).  
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Our pluralism is under threat. Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect the 
judiciary to be the vanguard in resisting or even reversing these tendencies. 
Perhaps the most we can expect is that the judiciary remain faithful to the 
constitutional values of the past that will have contemporary resonance as 
governments move to counteract the deleterious effects of economic 
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« La justice pénale internationale peut n’être ni 
pénale ni internationale sans toutefois se trahir. 
Une fois amputée de deux adjectifs, elle ne 
subsiste que comme projet : rendre justice à des 
crimes de masse qui regardent toute la 
communauté internationale en raison de leur 
monstruosité. Ces crimes sont monstrueux non 
seulement parce qu’ils nous font découvrir une 
atteinte inédite à ce qu’il y a d’humain dans 
l’homme, mais aussi parce qu’ils défient les 
capacités de l’ordre juridique. La justice pénale, 
qui est rodée pour réprimer les comportements 
asociaux, les transgressions privées, est prise au 
dépourvu lorsqu’on lui demande de juger des 
crimes commis par le pouvoir en exécution d’une 
politique, le plus souvent avec la collaboration 
de toute une société, et la complicité d’un droit 
délinquant. Comment juger alors ces crimes qui 
brouillent les frontières entre droit, morale et 
politique. »  
Antoine Garapon, Des crimes qu’on ne peut ni 
punir ni pardonner. Pour une justice interna-
tionale, p. 12, Paris, 349 pages. 
 
Au moment d’écrire ce texte, nous nous sommes sentis comme des 
jongleurs inexpérimentés qui avaient entre les mains plus de balles qu’ils 
ne pouvaient lancer sans risquer de toutes les laisser tomber. Ces balles, 
trop nombreuses pour notre dextérité, nous étaient imposées, d’abord par 
les éléments du titre du Colloque : justice et participation dans une 
économie globale, la nouvelle règle de droit, ensuite par le thème du 
panel : la gouvernance mondiale, et finalement par les exemples concrets 
de mécanismes de cette gouvernance mondiale : la Cour pénale 
internationale (CPI) et les pratiques commerciales d’arbitrage privé. En 
traitant du seul sujet qui nous a été confié, la Cour pénale internationale, 
sans égard aux autres dimensions thématiques de cette conférence, nous 
pourrions certes montrer plus d’habileté en jouant avec notre thème 
comme avec un seul gros ballon familier. Nous avons tout de même choisi 
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la corde raide même si nous risquons de faire les pitres avec nos 
maladresses en lançant toutes les balles que nous offre cette conférence. 
Jongler avec quelques idées reçues concernant le développement du droit 
pénal international et la création de la CPI : c’est là notre façon de vous 
présenter une certaine image de la justice pénale internationale et de son 
institution qui veut la mettre en œuvre, la nouvelle Cour pénale 
internationale. Voici donc quelques jongleries en guise de réflexions sur 
l’établissement d’une Cour pénale internationale dans l’ordre juridique 
mondial que nous exprimons sous la forme de paradoxes quand tous les 
thèmes du Colloque sont lancés ensemble dans les airs comme les balles 
d’un jongleur.  
I.  PREMIER PARADOXE : LA COUR PÉNALE INTERNATIONALE 
A UNE COMPÉTENCE RÉELLE MAIS RESTREINTE DE METTRE 
FIN À L’IMPUNITÉ 
La Cour pénale internationale est une institution judiciaire inter-
étatique créée par le Traité de Rome dont l’entrée en opération, le 
1er juillet 2002, dépendait de la ratification de soixante (60) pays. À ce 
jour, quatre vingt douze (92) pays1, dont le Canada, sur les cent quatre 
vingt onze (191) pays de la planète ont ratifié le Traité de Rome, mais 
plusieurs superpuissances, notamment les USA, la Russie, le Japon, l’Inde, 
Israël et la Chine, n’y ont pas adhéré. Ainsi, plus de la moitié de 
l’humanité ne s’estime pas encore concernée par un traité qui parle 
pourtant en son nom collectif. Toutefois, on est généralement d’avis qu’il 
s’agit d’un geste sans précédent dans l’histoire du droit international car 
les pays signataires auraient renoncé à une partie de leur souveraineté 
étatique en partageant l’exercice du pouvoir répressif considéré l’apanage 
exclusif d’un État souverain. La CPI tirerait sa légitimité au plan 
international du fait que, par voie conventionnelle, des États souverains 
ont ensemble décidé de confier à une cour supranationale une compétence 
sur des individus qu’ils peuvent exercer respectivement et séparément à 
l’échelle locale et qui les autorise à juger des criminels, ressortissants ou 
étrangers, dirigeants ou exécutants, soupçonnés d’avoir commis les plus 
                   
1  Au 5 septembre 2003, le nombre des pays ayant ratifié le Statut de Rome de la Cour 
Pénale Internationale est de 92. Parmi eux, 22 sont des pays africains, 23 sont des 
pays européens (ne faisant pas partie de l’UE), 18 sont des pays d’Amérique latine et 
des Caraïbes, 15 sont des États membres de l’UE, 12 sont de la région Asie et 
Pacifique, 1 est d’Amérique du Nord et 1 du Moyen-Orient. Voir à cet égard, le site 
de la CPI : http://www.icc-cpi.int (dernière visite : le 10 février 2004). 
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graves violations des droits de la personne à un quelconque endroit dans le 
monde. En contrepartie, les pays non parties au Traité, en particulier les 
plus puissants, seraient montrés du doigt car ils apparaîtraient, tels des 
monarques suprêmes, ne pouvoir mal faire selon la maxime the King can 
do no wrong2. Par conséquent, pour ces derniers, il n’y aurait pas lieu 
d’établir un forum international qui pourrait éventuellement les juger; au 
mieux, accepteraient-ils parfois de créer des tribunaux ad hoc pour juger 
autrui.  
Selon cette première idée reçue, le monde est divisé en deux 
camps depuis l’établissement de la CPI : ceux qui veulent mettre fin à 
l’impunité de tous les responsables de crimes internationaux les plus 
graves et qui se sont dotés d’un mécanisme international pour y arriver3 et 
les autres. À première vue, il nous paraît un peu simpliste de prétendre que 
seuls les pays parties au Traité se sont engagés à mettre fin à l’impunité 
des génocidaires du monde entier et que les autres États non signataires, 
par chefs d’État interposés, sont prêts à fournir un asile sécuritaire et 
judiciaire aux criminels de cet acabit ou bien se considèrent à l’abri de 
telles poursuites en se retranchant derrière la protection d’un droit pénal 
territorial amical d’une part ou derrière la souveraineté des États et des 
immunités de fonction d’autre part.  
A. Compétence matérielle de la CPI et crimes universels 
La Cour pénale internationale exerce sa compétence sur le crime de 
génocide, les crimes de guerre, les crimes contre l’humanité4. Le Statut 
criminalise les violations des droits de la personne réputées les plus 
graves, et communément appelées le « noyau dur » des crimes dits 
                   
2  André BRAËN, « La responsabilité du Monarque : Du nid de poule à Walkerton », 
(2002) 32 R.G.D. 617, 620. André Braën rappelle qu’à « l’origine et en droit anglo-
saxon, le monarque était considéré comme étant assujetti au droit ainsi qu’aux 
tribunaux ordinaires de qui relève l’application du droit. Aussi, la maxime The King 
can do no wrong signifiait que le monarque ne jouit d’aucune prérogative lui 
permettant de commettre des actes illégaux. Mais on le sait, c’est tout différemment 
que cette maxime sera interprétée pour signifier finalement que le monarque ne peut 
commettre de faute et pour lui reconnaître, au moyen de diverses immunités, un statut 
d’irresponsabilité ». 
3  Dans le préambule du Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale, « les États 
parties affirment être déterminés à mettre fin à l’impunité des auteurs de ces crimes et 
à concourir ainsi à la prévention de nouveaux crimes ». 
4  Statut de Rome, A/CONF. 183/9 du 17 juillet 1998, entré en vigueur le 1er juillet 
2002, art. 5. 
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internationaux parce qu’ils portent atteinte à la paix, la sécurité et le bien-
être mondial, mettent en péril la communauté humaine dans son essence et 
existence5 et constituent aussi selon une conception occidentale dominante 
de l’être humain, un affront à la « morale internationale »6. 
Aujourd’hui, l’internationalisation des droits de la personne est un 
phénomène incontestable. Cela donne lieu à la manifestation d’une 
« conscience commune » qui s’exprime tantôt par de bons sentiments de la 
part de certains gouvernants, tantôt par des protestations publiques de la 
société civile. Cette lente maturation d’une pensée politique commune 
autour des droits de la personne a en quelque sorte reçu sa consécration 
officielle et s’est vue conférée cette portée élargie à l’humanité entière par 
la Déclaration universelle de 19487. L’intégration de cette conception dans 
le discours politico juridique international à compter de cette date s’est 
peu à peu imposée en même temps que s’est construite l’adéquation de la 
notion « d’État de droit » et celle de « démocratie respectueuse des droits 
de la personne ». Cette philosophie a par ailleurs fait naître l’idée d’un 
espace de liberté pour tous les individus dans lequel l’État ne pouvait 
s’immiscer arbitrairement et qui leur conférait également un pouvoir 
personnel opposable à l’État par la médiation du droit et le contrôle d’un 
pouvoir judiciaire national. Aujourd’hui, cette conscience commune 
                   
5  Préambule et article 1 du Statut de Rome :  
« Les États parties au présent Statut, Conscients que tous les peuples sont unis par 
des liens étroits et que leurs cultures forment un patrimoine commun et soucieux 
du fait que cette mosaïque délicate puisse être brisée à tout moment, Ayant à 
l’esprit qu’au cours de ce siècle, des millions d’enfants, de femmes et d’hommes 
ont été victimes d’atrocités qui défient l’imagination et heurtent profondément la 
conscience humaine, Reconnaissant que des crimes d’une telle gravité menacent la 
paix, la sécurité et le bien-être du monde, Affirmant que les crimes les plus graves 
qui touchent l’ensemble de la communauté internationale ne sauraient rester 
impunis et que leur répression doit être effectivement assurée par des mesures 
prises dans le cadre national et par le renforcement de la coopération internationale, 
Déterminés à mettre un terme à l’impunité des auteurs de ces crimes et à concourir 
ainsi à la protection de nouveaux crimes […] Il est créé une Cour pénale 
internationale […] ». 
6  Danièle LOCHAK, Les droits de l’homme, Paris, La Découverte, 2002. 
7  Ibid., p. 3-17. Voir aussi la Proclamation de Téhéran du 13 mai 1968 qui évoque 
l’indivisibilité des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales, au paragraphe 13; 
N.U. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 (1968) p. 3; la Déclaration et le Programme d’action de 
la Conférence de Vienne de 1993 qui réaffirment le caractère indivisible et 
l’interdépendance des droits humains, Doc. N.U. A/CONF.157/23. 
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pousse plus loin sa réflexion et elle est porteuse d’un jugement sur la 
légitimité des États qui sont, et c’est là un paradoxe, à l’origine des plus 
nombreuses violations des droits de la personne en même temps que leurs 
principaux protecteurs8.  
Lorsqu’un État s’engage par Traité à respecter les droits de la 
personne, ce qu’ont déjà fait plusieurs États en adhérant à la Déclaration 
universelle et à d’autres instruments internationaux ou régionaux 
semblables9, la réciprocité des avantages que des États se confèrent 
mutuellement dans leurs ententes bilatérales ou multilatérales de type 
classique n’existe pas. À l’inverse des obligations que les États acceptent 
dans le champ économique, celles dans le champ de droits humains ne 
sont généralement ni réciproques, ni soumises à un contrôle international. 
Ces principes qui garantissent une certaine effectivité aux règles du 
commerce international, sont l’exception en matière de droits humains. En 
cas de violation par un État, les autres États peuvent dénoncer les 
violations commises, mais ils ne disposent généralement d’aucune base 
légale pour contrôler leur respect, ils ne peuvent prendre aucune mesure de 
représailles ou intervenir matériellement dans cet État. De plus, toujours 
contrairement à ce qui se passe dans le champ économique, il n’existe pas 
d’institutions internationales chargées de veiller globalement au respect 
des droits humains. Les États peuvent donc s’engager à harmoniser leur 
                   
8  Pierre-Henri IMBERT, « L’apparente simplicité des droits de l’homme, réflexions sur 
l’universalité des droits de l’homme », (1989) 1 R.U.D.H. 7. 
9  Karen I. LEE, « Les États-Unis d’Amérique et le Canada », dans Antonio CASSESE 
et Mireille DELMAS-MARTY (dir.), Juridictions nationales et crimes interna-
tionaux, Paris, PUF, 2002, p. 61 :  
« Les traités et les conventions forment les sources premières des obligations en 
droit international. Les principes fondamentaux sur l’application des traités sont 
définis par la Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traités, entrée en 
vigueur le 27 janvier 1980. Au Canada, la ratification des conventions se fait sans 
l’approbation du pouvoir législatif. Néanmoins, lorsque la convention en question 
est d’une importance particulière, le gouvernement canadien peut demander 
l’approbation. Il est important de faire la distinction entre d’une part la capacité à 
devenir partie à un traité et d’autre part le pouvoir du pays signataire d’appliquer ce 
traité à ses ressortissants. Aux États-Unis comme au Canada, seul le droit national 
peut imposer aux citoyens des obligations que l’État a contractées en devenant 
partie à une convention. Au Canada, alors que le gouvernement est libre de devenir 
partie à un traité, le pouvoir législatif n’est pas contraint de voter une loi intégrant 
le traité au droit national. Un problème similaire peut être observé aux États-Unis, 
lorsqu’une majorité des deux tiers du Sénat est nécessaire à la ratification et à 
l’entrée en vigueur d’un traité, donnant donc à celui-ci force de loi ». 
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législation de façon à respecter ou à promouvoir les droits humains, mais 
ces engagements ne sont qu’exceptionnellement soumis à des mécanismes 
de contrôle.  
De tels engagements internationaux, très souvent sans véritables 
conséquences juridiques internationales, peuvent cependant devenir la 
cause de plusieurs ennuis. Cela permet par exemple à des pays ou à leur 
société civile de critiquer ce qu’un État fait à ses citoyens, cela oblige un 
État à promettre de respecter les droits de la personne pour obtenir de 
l’aide extérieure de pays donateurs10, cela peut porter atteinte à la 
respectabilité politique d’un pays fautif et parfois même à sa légitimité. 
Alors quand un État signe de tels engagements internationaux, au moins 
symboliquement, sa souveraine impunité peut devenir l’objet d’un regard 
réprobateur de la communauté internationale s’il est pris en défaut à ce 
chapitre11 et ce regard contribue à saper le caractère sacré du principe de 
non ingérence dans les affaires internes d’un État.  
Ce nouveau caractère dérangeant des droits de la personne, faut-il le 
souligner, ne semble pas avoir le même effet si on est le Rwanda ou les 
États-Unis. Mais d’ores et déjà, cet inconvénient du regard accusateur 
suffit pour que des États, même défenseurs des droits de la personne sur 
leur propre sol, manifestent de la méfiance voire de la défiance à l’égard 
de tout engagement général et international de respecter les droits de la 
personne de peur qu’on s’immisce dans leurs affaires internes et les rende 
un jour redevables sur la scène juridique internationale. Plusieurs de ces 
États prudents et frileux sont tout autant des démocraties que des 
dictatures stables ou instables et ils craignent de la même façon que l’on 
institue un mécanisme extérieur et international de contrôle de leur 
                   
10  Ainsi, les bailleurs de fonds multiplient les conditionnalités et les références aux 
droits humains, sans pour autant accepter que leurs propres institutions soient 
soumises à un tel respect. Stephen J. TOOPE, « Human Rights and Social Change », 
IDRC Lecture, 11 mars 2003, p. 2 :  
« Dans les sociétés occidentales, il faut prouver, semble-t-il, le bien fondé des 
droits de la personne, comme n’importe quelle autre valeur, avant de pouvoir les 
défendre et leur consacrer nos ressources sociales. C’est pourquoi on tente de 
démontrer en quoi les droits de la personne sont importants, que ce soit en termes 
de soutien à la démocratie, de gage de bonne gouvernance ou même de 
contribution au soulagement de la pauvreté. Toutes ces revendications reposent sur 
l’hypothèse de base selon laquelle la société changera en profondeur si les droits de 
la personne sont mieux protégées. » 
11  Human Rights Watch porte bien son nom. P.H. IMBERT, loc. cit., note 8. 
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inconduite en matière des violations des droits de la personne les plus 
graves et qui aurait une force juridique coercitive sur eux, ce que n’a pas 
le seul regard actuel, fut-il inquisiteur, de la communauté internationale12. 
À cet égard, les États-Unis ont été particulièrement vigilants de ne pas 
ratifier plusieurs des Conventions en matière de droits de l’Homme13 ou 
les ont intégrées à leur droit interne avec de nombreuses réserves et 
clauses d’interprétation; ils n’ont donc pas pris la chance de se rallier aux 
vœux pieux dont ces traités sont souvent seulement porteurs, faute de 
mécanismes juridiques de sanction à l’échelle mondiale. Le Parlement 
européen a, quant à lui, un certain passé de méfiance en la matière; il a 
déjà adopté plusieurs résolutions sur les droits de la personne pour des 
régions en dehors de l’Union européenne mais fort peu au sujet de ses 
États membres14. Quant au Canada, il n’a toujours pas ratifié la 
Convention interaméricaine des droits de l’homme15. 
Pourtant en proclamant l’universalité des droits de l’Homme au 
lendemain de la Deuxième guerre mondiale, logiquement on aurait pu 
s’attendre au développement d’une vision commune des États sur la 
                   
12  La Chine, les États-Unis, l’Inde, la Russie et Israël entretiennent le même genre de 
méfiance. 
13  Par exemple les États-Unis n’ont pas ratifié les conventions suivantes : Pacte sur les 
droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, Convention sur l’élimination de toutes les 
formes de discrimination à l’égard des femmes, Convention sur les droits de l’enfant. 
Ils ont intégré les conventions suivantes avec plusieurs réserves : Pacte sur les droits 
civils et politiques, Convention internationale sur toutes les formes de discrimination 
raciale, Convention contre la torture et autres peines et traitements cruels, inhumains 
et dégradants. Ils ont ratifié la Convention contre le génocide mais en l’intégrant dans 
le droit interne, ils ont fait deux réserves et cinq clauses d’interprétation : voir à cet 
égard Karen I. LEE, loc. cit., note 9, 462. Les informations sur l’état des ratifications, 
réserves et déclarations peuvent être obtenues sur le site Internet du Haut-
Commissariat aux Nation-Unies pour les droits de l’homme, à l’adresse suivante : 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treatylgen.htm (dernière visite : le 24 janvier 
2004). 
14  Voir à cet égard le Rapport de Karel de Gucht, A2.0329/88 cité dans P.H. IMBERT, 
loc. cit., note 8, 13. 
15  Convention américaine relative aux droits de l’Homme, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entrée en vigueur le 18 juillet 1978, après que onze États l’aient 
ratifiée). Argentine, Barbade, Bolivie, Brésil, Chili, Colombie, Costa Rica, 
Dominique, Équateur, El Salvador, Grenade, Guatemala, Haïti, Honduras, Jamaïque, 
Mexique, Nicaragua Panama, Paraguay, Pérou, République dominicaine, Surinam, 
Uruguay, Venezuela. (Au 31 mai 2000 – Les dix-huit États en italique sont ceux ayant 
reconnu la compétence de la Cour).  
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question des violations les plus graves à ces droits universels et à la 
reconnaissance d’un droit de regard mutuel pouvant donner lieu à des 
sanctions dans l’ordre juridique mondial. Qu’en est-il au juste? 
B. La CPI : Un droit de regard mutuel et une vision commune des 
plus graves violations des droits de la personne par les États 
parties 
1. Le droit de regard mutuel et ses conséquences juridiques 
Ce droit de regard mutuel sur des violations les plus graves aux droits 
de la personne que sont le génocide, les crimes de guerre et contre 
l’humanité : quatre-vingt-douze (92) États ont décidé de se le conférer en 
établissant la CPI. Il convient cependant de souligner les limites de ce 
droit de regard.  
Tout d’abord, la Cour ne s’occupe que des crimes qui surviennent 
après sa mise en œuvre16. Les États peuvent néanmoins reconnaître, par 
une déclaration, la compétence de la Cour pour des crimes précis commis 
sur leur territoire ou par leurs ressortissants. Ils disposent aussi de la 
possibilité de consentir, toujours par une déclaration, à l’exercice de la 
compétence de la Cour sur une situation passée17. Par ailleurs, la 
compétence rationae personae de la Cour est restreinte. La CPI n’a 
compétence qu’à l’égard des ressortissants de la nationalité d’un pays 
signataire et à l’encontre des crimes commis sur le territoire d’un pays 
signataire18. Ainsi elle ne prend pas la charge des crimes internationaux 
commis par des ressortissants des pays et dans les pays qui ne sont pas 
parties au Traité19 Enfin, si le Conseil de sécurité peut se prévaloir du 
chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations unies pour soumettre une situation 
                   
16  Statut de Rome, précité, note 4, art. 11(1). 
17  Id., art. 12(3) : « Si l’acceptation de la compétence de la Cour par un État qui n’est 
pas partie au présent Statut est nécessaire aux fins du paragraphe 2, cet État peut par 
déclaration déposée auprès du greffier, consentir à ce que la Cour exerce sa 
compétence à l’égard du crime dont il s’agit. L’État ayant accepté la compétence de la 
Cour coopère avec celle-ci sans retard et sans exception conformément au 
chapitre IX ». 
18  Id., art. 12(2). 
19  Id., art. 11(2) : « Si un État devient partie au présent Statut après l’entrée en vigueur 
de celui-ci, la Cour ne peut exercer sa compétence qu’à l’égard des crimes commis 
après l’entrée en vigueur du Statut pour cet État, sauf si ledit État fait la déclaration 
prévue à l’article 12, paragraphe 3 ». 
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dans laquelle des violations graves du droit humanitaire ont été commises 
dans n’importe quel État du monde, il peut tout aussi bien suspendre 
l’activité de la Cour20.  
Ainsi, sous réserve de la saisine de la Cour par le Conseil de Sécurité, 
la compétence de la CPI sur un inculpé ne peut donc être exercée sans 
avoir établi préalablement un lien de rattachement entre le prévenu et un 
État signataire. En bref, le crime doit avoir été commis dans un État 
signataire par qui que ce soit ou l’auteur doit avoir la nationalité d’un État 
partie. On ne peut manquer de souligner ici la stratégie agressive des 
États-Unis depuis l’entrée en vigueur du Statut de Rome de forcer des 
ententes bilatérales21, notamment avec des pays parties, pour leur faire 
promettre de ne pas acheminer vers la CPI des ressortissants américains se 
trouvant sur leur territoire. À ce jour, une cinquantaine de pays de par le 
monde auraient conclu un accord d’immunité en faveur des citoyens 
américains pouvant se trouver sur leur sol en vertu d’une loi dite de 
protection des personnels militaires22. Les États-Unis auraient entrepris 
cent quatre vingt (180) démarches de ce genre. Il va sans dire que les 
pressions exercées sur les pays pour les faire signer ces accords 
« d’impunité », aux dires de plusieurs, sont importantes et s’expriment en 
termes économiques, militaires et politiques. Trente cinq (35) États dont 
                   
20  Id., art. 16. 
21  Les accords bilatéraux d’impunité sont libellés comme suit :  
« 2. Les ressortissants d’une Partie au Traité présents sur le territoire de l’autre État 
partie, ne doivent pas, en l’absence du consentement exprès de la première Partie : 
a) être transférés à la CPI; b) être transférés à une autre entité ou à un pays tiers, 
dans le but d’être transférés devant la CPI. 3. Lorsque les États-Unis extradent, 
remettent ou transfèrent une personne ressortissant de l’autre Partie à l’accord vers 
un pays tiers, les États-Unis s’engagent à ne pas accepter la remise ou le transfert 
de cette personne à la Cour pénale internationale par le pays tiers, sauf en cas de 
consentement exprès du Gouvernement de X. 4. Lorsque le Gouvernement de X 
extrade, remet ou transfère un personne ressortissant des États-Unis d’Amérique 
vers un pays tiers, le Gouvernement de X s’engage à ne pas accepter la remise ou 
le transfert de cette personne à la Cour pénale internationale par un pays tiers, sauf 
en cas de consentement exprès du Gouvernement des États-Unis. Ces accords 
bilatéraux contiennent une clause additionnelle lorsque le pays n’est pas partie au 
Statut de Rome et c’est la suivante : Chaque Partie accepte, sous réserve de ses 
obligations juridiques internationales, de ne pas délibérément faciliter, consentir à 
ou coopérer aux efforts de toute Partie ou tout État tiers d’extrader, remettre ou 
transférer une personne ressortissant de l’autre Partie à l’accord à la Cour pénale 
internationale. » 
22  HR4775, « American Service Members’ Protection Act » (ASPA). 
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dix (10) pays de l’Afrique et quatorze(14) de l’Amérique centrale et du 
Sud voient leur aide militaire et économique réduite ou suspendue parce 
qu’ils n’ont pas signé d’accord d’immunité. Il en est également ainsi pour 
neuf (9) pays européens de l’Est et deux (2) pays de la région Asie-
Pacifique23. Tout récemment, le Conseil de l’Europe s’est indigné de ces 
pressions américaines sur les pays européens de l’Est et les a priés de 
résister à ce chantage éhonté en dépit des sanctions économiques 
américaines à leur égard 24.  
Les parties au Traité de Rome ont, faut-il le rappeler, promis de 
coopérer avec la CPI dans les enquêtes et faciliter la mise en accusation 
des criminels internationaux25. Lorsqu’ils signent un accord d’immunité 
avec les États-Unis, ils se trouvent donc placés dans une situation de 
conflits d’obligations internationales26. Les États-Unis sont si convaincus 
du caractère politique des poursuites éventuelles devant la CPI et du 
caractère hostile du monde entier à leur endroit qu’ils disent ne pas vouloir 
exposer leurs nationaux à de fausses accusations et, le cas échéant, qu’ils 
veulent être les seuls juges des crimes internationaux commis par leurs 
ressortissants. La CPI est tout de même un tribunal légitime né de la 
volonté politique d’un très grand nombre d’États souverains qui affirment 
au surplus la préséance de la compétence des tribunaux nationaux sur les 
poursuites criminelles relatives aux plus graves violations des droits de la 
personne. Cette limpidité juridique n’a pas l’heur de rassurer les États-
Unis. Bien entendu, un peu de réalisme politique doit nous persuader que 
l’établissement de la CPI dans l’ordre juridique mondial cause beaucoup 
                   
23  Communiqué de la FIDH, CPI : « Les États-Unis passent à l’acte » : 
http://www.fidh.org (dernière visite : le 13 février 2004).  
24  Corine LESNES, « Les États-Unis durcissent leur campagne contre la CPI », Le 
Monde, 3 juillet 2003 et Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe, Résolution 
1300 (2002), Risques pour l’intégrité du Statut de la Cour pénale internationale, 
point 10. 
25  Cf. chapitre IX du Statut de la Cour pénale internationale, « Coopération 
internationale et assistance judiciaire ». L’article 86 dispose : « Conformément aux 
dispositions du présent statut, les États parties coopèrent pleinement avec la Cour 
dans les enquêtes et poursuites qu’elle mène pour les crimes relevant de sa 
compétence ». 
26  L’Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe considère que ces « accord 
d’immunités ne sont pas acceptables en vertu du droit international régissant les 
traités ». Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe, Résolution 1300 (2002), 
point 10, précitée, note 24.  
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de tensions et de tumultes dans les relations diplomatiques internationales. 
Vu sous l’angle politique, le phénomène des accords bilatéraux autour de 
la CPI et l’agressivité américaine au sujet du Traité de Rome peuvent être 
envisagés comme une partie de bras de fer entre le pouvoir style « Far 
West » et la loi du plus fort à l’américaine d’une part et une oligarchie 
d’États plus faibles se ralliant aux « bien pensants » de l’Occident d’autre 
part.  
2. La vision commune au sujet des crimes et les nouvelles règles de 
droit international pénal 
L’on peut faire une autre observation au sujet de la compétence 
matérielle de la Cour pénale internationale. Le Statut de la CPI prend ses 
distances avec le droit coutumier international en choisissant de 
circonscrire les crimes dans une définition précise ayant la plupart des 
caractéristiques attendues d’un texte de loi27. Cette façon de faire est tout à 
fait louable car elle contribue à mettre fin aux critiques relevant les 
accrocs au principe de légalité qui collent à la peau du droit international 
pénal depuis Nuremberg. En effet, pour les pénalistes, laisser la 
configuration des infractions internationales les plus graves dans le 
mystère du nébuleux droit coutumier international reste tout à fait 
critiquable. Affirmer de plus que le droit conventionnel des Traités, 
élaboré par et pour des États souverains, aurait également créé des crimes 
imputables à des individus en les rendant punissables de peines non 
déterminées par ces mêmes Traités et qui sont disparates en raison de la 
variété répressive des droits pénaux nationaux, cela heurte toujours toutes 
nos cordes sensibles de juristes de droit pénal28. Les États parties au Traité 
de Rome ont donc fait des efforts en conférant à leurs textes d’infractions 
et de peines plus de prévisibilité et de précision pour leurs destinataires et 
le principe de légalité des délits et des peines se présente sous de meilleurs 
auspices avec le Statut de la CPI. 
                   
27  Il est à noter que le droit international coutumier reste source d’interprétation des 
infractions et que certaines imprécisions de rédaction peuvent faire l’objet de 
critiques. Voir Hélène DUMONT, « Quand l’international fait une alliance avec le 
pénal, assiste-t-on à la naissance d’un droit pénal international génétiquement 
modifiée? », (2003) 33 R.D.G. 133, 135-137. 
28  Marc HENZELIN, « Droit international pénal et droits pénaux étatiques. Le choc des 
cultures », dans Marc HENZELIN et Robert ROTH, Le droit à l’épreuve de 
l’internationalisation, Paris, L.G.D.J., 2002, p. 70. 
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Bien entendu, dans la mesure où les tribunaux nationaux et des 
tribunaux internationaux ad hoc continueront de liquider les atrocités du 
passé avec le droit international pénal réputé existé au moment où elles ont 
été commises, les règles d’attribution de la responsabilité pénale 
internationale n’ont pas fini de se créer dans le flou total. Celles-ci 
risquent d’être à géométrie variable selon les tribunaux qui les 
découvriront, nous révéleront à quoi elles ressemblaient au moment des 
massacres, puis les appliqueront ex post facto à quelques responsables 
pour leur donner une valeur d’éternité. À cet égard, le droit international 
pénal qui s’élaborera à la CPI est tout à fait bienvenu parce qu’il 
commence d’un bien meilleur pied au plan juridique.  
Les nouvelles règles de droit pénal international résultant du Statut de 
Rome n’ont pas été conçues, il est vrai, par un législateur mondial qui 
n’existe pas; mais celles-ci ont été acceptées et voulues communes à 
quatre-vingt-douze (92) États souverains partenaires du Statut de Rome et 
elles peuvent devenir le droit éventuellement applicable à tous les États 
qui y adhéreront par la suite. Leur légitimité est, à notre avis, fort 
respectable; peut-on vraiment trouver répréhensible que, pour le futur, des 
États transfèrent à un forum supranational leur compétence territoriale 
réciproque sur des crimes précis et rendent leurs citoyens redevables 
devant la CPI selon des règles de droit substantif et de droit procédural 
qu’ils ont élaborées ensemble? Il est enfin difficile de reprocher à ce 
tribunal le défaut du TMI de Nuremberg d’être un « tribunal des 
vainqueurs » puisqu’il s’applique aux pays qui consentent à sa mise en 
oeuvre. En tout état de cause, si le droit de Nuremberg a été conçu dans 
l’illégalité, aujourd’hui, la communauté internationale ne remet plus en 
question la justice de son résultat et accepte volontiers la légitimité de la 
création de ses crimes contre l’humanité, une catégorie de crimes qu’a bel 
et bien adoptée et nommée le Statut de Rome.  
De plus, les pays parties ont tous promis d’harmoniser leur droit pénal 
local à ces nouvelles règles de droit international pénal. C’est ce que le 
Canada a fait d’ailleurs en adoptant sa Loi sur les crimes de guerre et 
contre l’humanité29. Même une harmonisation législative et 
constitutionnelle tardive de la part des États parties au Statut de Rome, qui 
n’ont pas toutes les mêmes difficultés d’intégration des règles 
internationales dans leur droit interne, ne prive pas leurs juges nationaux 
                   
29  Loi sur les crimes de guerre et les crimes contre l’humanité, L.C., 2000, c. 19. 
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d’interpréter leur droit pénal local de façon évolutive et compatible avec le 
nouveau droit du Traité de Rome que leur État a par ailleurs ratifié30.  
On a souvent manifesté de la méfiance à l’égard du fonctionnement de 
la CPI et du futur travail d’interprétation des règles de droit international 
par les juges de la CPI. Souvent les critiques ont été véhémentes de la part 
des common lawyers qui ne peuvent concevoir qu’un système judiciaire 
soit crédible au plan de la justice s’il est différent du leur au plan 
procédural. Pourtant les injustices de l’apartheid en Afrique du Sud n’ont 
sûrement pas eu le rempart de la common law et de la procédure 
adversaire pour être réparées ou dénoncées. D’ordinaire, les injustices ne 
connaissent pas d’obstacles juridiques quand il n’y a aucune volonté 
politique de sévir ou de réparer. Si la communauté humaine a une 
excellente connaissance fondée sur l’intuition, l’histoire et l’expérience 
des atrocités et injustices laissées impunies, qui peut prétendre savoir 
comment on peut y mettre fin avec le droit pénal, qui peut affirmer que 
son système juridique soit d’emblée le meilleur pour mettre fin à 
l’impunité plutôt que celui que l’on a élaboré à plusieurs dans l’espoir d’y 
arriver? 
Les juges de la CPI, quant à eux, recèlent dans leurs origines toute la 
diversité des cultures et des traditions juridiques. L’interprétation des 
nouvelles règles par la CPI sera issue de l’expression de cette diversité et 
il ne faut pas oublier la loyauté des juges internationaux à leur serment qui 
les oblige à servir le bien commun et toute la communauté inter-
nationale31. Ce sont là, en tout réalisme, de fort bonnes qualités 
                   
30  Dans les pays monistes, la ratification d’un traité suppose la réception immédiate du 
droit international dans le droit interne tandis que les pays dualistes comme le Canada 
doivent faire une démarche législative d’intégrer le droit international dans le droit 
interne pour qu’il fasse partie du droit interne. Il faut toutefois observer que même les 
pays monistes se comportent comme des pays dualistes en matière pénale et ils 
refusent souvent d’appliquer le droit international dans des affaires criminelles s’il 
n’y pas eu de déclaration législative interne. Voir à ce sujet l’excellent article de 
M. HENZELIN, loc. cit., note 28. Voir aussi : La Cour pénale internationale, Manuel 
de ratification et de mise en œuvre du Statut de Rome, 2e éd., mars 2003, Projet 
conjoint du Centre de Droit et Démocratie et du Centre international pour la réforme 
du droit criminel et la politique en matière de justice pénale.  
31  On notera toutefois que les règles présidant à la présentation des candidats demeurent 
du ressort de chaque État. La Commission nationale consultative des droits de 
l’homme française s’est ainsi à plusieurs reprises inquiétée de l’absence de règles 
claires à cet égard. Cf. notamment, CNCDH, Avis sur la mise en oeuvre du Statut de 
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professionnelles et conditions situationnelles d’impartialité pour construire 
le droit international pénal. Constatant que les juges de la CPI ont une 
qualité d’indépendance à l’échelle internationale que plusieurs n’auraient 
pas à l’échelle locale sur la matière spéciale à juger, ces juges présentent 
l’espoir d’une bien meilleure mouture pour le droit international pénal que 
le smorgasbord issu de cinquante ans de pratique sporadique devant 
quelques tribunaux nationaux et juridictions internationales ad hoc.  
Les signataires du Statut de Rome se donnent également sept (7) ans 
pour s’entendre sur une définition du crime d’agression qui soit acceptable 
à la majorité des deux tiers des États parties et pour fixer les conditions 
d’exercice de la compétence de la Cour sur celui-ci32. N’oublions pas que 
la guerre d’agression, un crime contre la paix, constituait l’infraction 
centrale du procès Nuremberg. Le Statut proclame l’existence juridique de 
ce crime contre la paix. Même s’il n’est pas défini à l’heure actuelle, 
certains essaient avec force de mots et artifices de rhétorique d’oublier ce 
crime emblématique de Nuremberg tellement il recèle un potentiel 
juridique de rendre injustifiables toutes les guerres. Comment comprendre 
autrement l’acharnement des États-Unis à qualifier leur guerre à l’Irak à 
partir d’une nouvelle notion juridique de « guerre préventive » aux fins de 
la rendre légalement juste; seraient-ils hantés par le spectre de se voir 
accuser un jour du crime majeur du procès Nuremberg? Comment 
comprendre la décision de garder à Guantanamo et hors de leur territoire 
démocratique des Talibans afghans et celle de refuser de les considérer 
comme des prisonniers de guerre (POW)? Ces prisonniers sont plutôt 
affublés de l’étiquette de criminels terroristes par l’État de droit américain 
mais ils n’ont pas de procès, pas de forum civil pour les juger et pas de 
 
la Cour pénale internationale, adopté le 19 décembre 2002. http://www.commission-
droits-homme.fr/ (dernière visite : le 10 février 2004). 
32  Statut de Rome, précité, note 4, art. 5(2) : « La Cour exercera sa compétence à l’égard 
du crime d’agression quand une disposition aura été adoptée conformément aux 
articles 121 et 123, qui définira ce crime et fixera les conditions de l’exercice de la 
compétence de la Cour à son égard. Cette disposition devra être compatible avec les 
dispositions pertinentes de la Charte des Nations-Unies ». Il faut noter que le crime 
d’agression constituait le crime central des infractions reprochées aux accusés du 
procès Nuremberg. Le crime était libellé ainsi : art. 6(a) Crimes against peace: 
namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. 
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présomption d’innocence33. Et quand ces Talibans ont quelques liens avec 
le monde extérieur, ce serait avec des espions! 
Décidément, le vocabulaire de la guerre et celui du droit pénal sont 
entremêlés et interchangeables à souhait; on fait la lutte au crime de 
terrorisme avec des guerres à l’axe du mal ou l’on crée le droit 
humanitaire et pénal qui convient pour faire la guerre qu’on veut. Robert 
Charvin dans un article intitulé : Éthique, Cité et Mondialisation34 dit : 
« Plus que jamais les mots sont délibérément utilisés sans rigueur par ceux 
qui ont les moyens de les imposer à la société » et il cite A. de Tocqueville 
qui soulignait déjà à son époque : « Ce qui jette le plus de confusion dans 
l’esprit, c’est l’emploi qu’on fait des mots… Tant qu’on n’arrivera pas à 
les définir clairement et à s’entendre sur la définition, on vivra dans une 
confusion inextricable, au grand avantage des démagogues et des 
despotes ».  
Qui possède l’objectivité suffisante et l’autorité légitime pour définir 
un crime contre la paix pour la communauté internationale et qui offrirait 
pour le XXIe siècle toute la puissance symbolique du procès Nuremberg 
après la deuxième guerre mondiale qui a tout de même fait naître le droit 
pénal international? Quatre vingt douze États ont, en tout cas, fait un pas 
dans la bonne direction en ratifiant le Traité de Rome qui reconnaît 
l’existence du crime d’agression et qui promet de le définir pour s’en 
prendre bientôt aux criminels qui menacent toujours impunément la paix 
et la sécurité mondiale par leurs guerres d’agression.  
Enfin, le Statut énonce une règle que l’on assimile à un grand pas dans 
la lutte contre l’impunité : en effet, les chefs d’État et autres autorités 
politiques des pays partenaires au Traité qui commettent des atrocités ne 
pourront plus invoquer l’immunité de fonction ou leur qualité officielle 
pour échapper aux poursuites de génocide, de crimes de guerre ou contre 
l’humanité devant la CPI35. Ainsi, il est désormais possible, au moins sur 
le plan formel, qu’un chef d’État d’un pays signataire responsable de 
                   
33  Olivier AUDEOUD, « Prisonniers sans droits de Guantanamo », Le Monde 
Diplomatique, avril 2002, 16.  
34  Robert CHARVIN, « Éthique, Cité et Mondialisation », dans CRMC, Éthique et 
Politique, Marrakech, 27-28.01.200, p. 2. Il cite à la p. 8, Marx qui ironisait : « Nul ne 
combat la liberté, on combat tout au plus celle des autres ». Charvin ironise à son 
tour : « Nul ne combat la morale, on combat tout au plus celle des autres ». 
35  Statut de Rome, précité, note 4, art. 27. 
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massacres soit remis à la CPI par son propre État36. Enfin, comme les 
États signataires ont promis de coopérer avec la CPI, celle-ci peut 
réclamer un chef en fonction ou déchu et l’État partie qui le détient ou le 
reçoit, doit procéder à sa remise. On soulignera ici, que si la demande de 
la Cour concerne un dirigeant d’un État partie, cela ne soulève pas trop de 
problème37. La situation est en revanche complètement différente si cette 
demande concerne un dirigeant d’un État non-partie, mais qui aurait 
commis ou serait responsable de crimes sur le territoire d’un État partie. 
L’État doit-il se conformer à ses obligations internationales ou bilatérales 
en matière d’immunités ou se conformer à la demande de la Cour38? 
L’objet de cette présentation n’est pas de rentrer dans le détail de cette 
question fort complexe mais il convient toutefois de mettre en lumière 
qu’elle n’est pas encore tranchée et qu’elle ne manquera pas de soulever 
d’importants débats39.  
Rappelons pour mémoire que l’immunité des chefs d’État est 
étroitement liée à la notion de souveraineté étatique et qu’elle est justifiée 
par la nécessité de la fonction40. De plus, entre égaux, les États souverains 
ne se jugent pas mutuellement et réciproquement. À chacun sa 
                   
36  Id., art. 58 et 59. Rappelons toutefois que la Cour n’est que complémentaire des 
juridictions nationales. Elle ne pourra exercer sa compétence qu’après avoir conclu à 
l’incapacité ou à l’absence de volonté de l’État. Ces critères ne sont pas encore 
définis.  
37  Micaela FRULLI, « Le droit international et les obstacles à la mise en œuvre de la 
responsabilité pénale pour crimes internationaux », dans A. CASSESE et 
M. DELMAS-MARTY (dir.), op. cit., note 9, p. 215. 
38  C’est ici que se pose toute la question de la validité des accords bilatéraux conclus par 
les États-Unis en vertu des dispositions de l’article 98 du statut.  
39  Cf. Stephen WIRTH, « Immunities, related problems, and article 98 of the Rome 
Statute », (2001) 12 Criminal Law Forum 429; Gennady M. DANILENKO, « ICC 
Statute and Third States », p. 1871-1897, dans CASSESE, GAETA et JONES, The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, vol. 2, Oxford University Press, 
2002; Paola GAETA, « Official Capacity and Immunities » dans CASSESE, GAETA 
et JONES, « The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A commentary », 
vol. 1, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 975. 
40  « State immunity serves two purposes. The first is the protection of the ability of a 
state to carry out its functions without external interference. The second—less 
important—purpose of state immunity is to protect a state’s dignity, which may suffer 
if the sovereign state has to comply with another state’s order. It is evident that the 
more important object of protection, the ability of a state to function, is especially 
endangered in the case of mala fide procedures. » S. WIRTH, id., 431. 
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souveraineté, pourrait-on dire. L’histoire fournit cependant de nombreux 
exemples pour affirmer que cette immunité nécessaire a été synonyme 
d’impunité pour des atrocités sans nom. L’idée de la levée de l’immunité 
des chefs d’État responsables de crimes internationaux s’est construite 
juridiquement de deux façons au cours du XXe siècle : d’abord dans les 
instruments internationaux, le Traité de Versailles après la Première guerre 
mondiale, la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de 
génocide, puis dans les statuts des tribunaux internationaux, la Charte du 
tribunal de Nuremberg et celui de Tokyo, les statuts du TPIY 
(Yougoslavie) et du TPIR (Rwanda). Le TPIY a ainsi estimé que « les 
individus sont personnellement responsables, quelles que soient leurs 
fonctions officielles, fussent-ils chefs d’État ou ministres »41. L’article 27 
confirme dorénavant la règle qu’un chef d’État ne peut se soustraire à sa 
responsabilité en alléguant qu’il a agi au nom d’un État. En commettant 
des crimes visés par le Statut, il outrepasse les pouvoirs que lui reconnaît 
le droit international : sa souveraineté est criminelle aux yeux du droit 
international. L’on pourrait même avancer la thèse que le génocide, les 
crimes de guerre et contre l’humanité constitueraient aussi des actes de 
trahison à l’échelle du droit national42. 
                   
41  Le procureur c. Anto Furundzija, jugement du 10 décembre 1998, par.140 : 
« Les règles du droit international conventionnel et coutumier évoquées plus haut 
font peser des obligations sur les États et d’autres entités dans les conflits armés, 
mais elles visent au premier chef les actes des individus, notamment les agents de 
l’État ou, plus généralement, les responsables officiels d’une Partie au conflit ou 
encore les individus agissant à l’instigation ou avec le consentement exprès ou 
tacite d’une Partie au conflit. Tant les règles du droit coutumier que les dispositions 
des traités applicables en période de conflit armé interdisent tout acte de torture et 
précisent que ceux qui s’y livrent en sont comptables personnellement devant les 
juridictions pénales. Comme le Tribunal militaire international de Nuremberg l’a 
fait observer en termes généraux, « [L]es infractions en droit international sont 
commises par des hommes et non par des entités abstraites. Ce n’est qu’en 
punissant les auteurs de ces infractions que l’on peut donner effet aux dispositions 
du droit international ». Les individus sont personnellement responsables, quelles 
que soient leurs fonctions officielles, fussent-ils chefs d’État ou ministres. L’article 
7(2) du Statut et l’article 6(2) du Statut du Tribunal pénal international pour le 
Rwanda (« TPIR ») sont indiscutablement du droit international coutumier ».  
42  Cette thèse pourrait être développée pour mettre fin à l’immunité du chef d’État en 
fonction devant les tribunaux nationaux de son propre pays. Michel Cosnard estime 
qu’« [o]n pourrait toujours avancer que le flou des incriminations contenues dans 
certaines constitutions – prévoyant les cas de haute trahison – pourraient être 
interprétées comme incluant les crimes graves de droit international ». Il précise 
toutefois que « seul l’article 26 de la Loi fondamentale de la R.F.A., prévoyant la 
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L’article 27 du Traité constitue un des points d’achoppement les plus 
important entre les États parties et les États non-parties. Selon Gennady 
M. Danilenko43, la possibilité que les États puissent, en vertu du Statut de 
Rome, lever les immunités personnelles accordées au chef d’État est l’une 
des principales préoccupations des États non-parties. Un commentateur 
mentionnait devant le Sénat américain : « Our main concern from the US 
perspective is not that the prosecutor will indict the occasional US soldier 
who violates our own values and laws and his or her military training and 
doctrine by allegedly committing a war crime. Our main concern should 
be for the President, the cabinet officers on the National Security Council, 
and other senior leaders responsible for our defence and foreign policy »44. 
En résumé, au strict plan de sa compétence sur les personnes ayant 
commis les crimes internationaux les plus graves, l’établissement de CPI 
prévoit un mécanisme réel mais limité de mettre fin à l’impunité dans 
l’ordre juridique international. 
II.  DEUXIÈME PARADOXE : PRÉSÉANCE DE LA JUSTICE NATIONALE SUR 
LA JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE ET SI C’ÉTAIT LE CONTRAIRE? 
La petite histoire raconte que l’on n’aurait pas réussi à avoir le nombre 
suffisant de signatures si le Traité de Rome confiait une compétence 
première à la CPI comme on l’a fait pour les tribunaux ad hoc (TPIY) 
(TPIR)45. Les États parties au Traité de Rome ont par conséquent convenu 
que la compétence de la CPI serait complémentaire à la leur46.  
 
responsabilité pénale pour des actes susceptibles de troubler la coexistence pacifique, 
peut se prêter à une telle interprétation ». Michel COSNARD, « Les immunités du 
chef d’État », S.F.D.I. « Colloque de Clermont-Ferrand – Le Chef d’État et le droit 
international », Pedone, 2002, p. 202-203. 
43  Loc. cit., note 39, aux pages 1884 et 1885. 
44  Voir Hearing on the Creation of an International Criminal Court before the 
Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
US Senate, 105th Congress, at 30 (statement of J. Bolton), cité par G.M. 
DANILENKO, loc. cit., note 39. 
45  Philippe KIRSCH, « Les enjeux et les défis de la mise en œuvre de la Cour pénale 
internationale permanente », dans Les Journées Maximilien-Caron 2003, La voie vers 
la Cour pénale internationale : tous les chemins mènent à Rome, Montréal, Éditions 
Thémis, 2004. 
46  Statut de Rome, précité, note 4, art. 1 : « Il est créé une Cour pénale internationale en 
tant qu’institution permanente, qui peut exercer sa compétence à l’égard des 
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A.  La complémentarité : la CPI peut-être première plus souvent 
qu’on ne le pense 
En fait, la Cour offre une alternative à l’exercice de la juridiction 
nationale et entre en opération seulement si un État partie n’a ni la volonté, 
ni la capacité de mener des poursuites à terme47 ou dénature l’exercice de 
sa compétence nationale en la matière en octroyant aux génocidaires et 
autres criminels du genre, de façon factice, partiale ou sans examen, des 
acquittements, peines injustifiées, classements sans suite ou amnisties en 
autant que ces situations ne mettent en cause la règle non bis ibidem. La 
Cour prend aussi la relève si le système pénal du pays compétent est 
effondré au point de ne pouvoir mener à bien les procédures48.  
 
personnes pour les crimes les plus graves ayant une portée internationale, au sens du 
présent Statut. Elle est complémentaire des juridictions pénales nationales.[…] ». 
47  Id., art. 17(1) : « Eu égard au dixième alinéa du préambule et à l’article premier, une 
affaire est jugée irrecevable par la Cour lorsque : a) L’affaire fait l’objet d’une 
enquête ou de poursuites de la part d’un État ayant la compétence en l’espèce, à 
moins que cette décision ne soit l’effet du manque de volonté ou de l’incapacité de 
l’État de mener à bien l’enquête ou les poursuites; b) L’affaire a fait l’objet d’une 
enquête de la part d’un État ayant compétence en l’espèce et que cet État a décidé de 
ne pas poursuivre la personne concernée, à moins que cette décision ne soit l’effet du 
manque de volonté ou de l’incapacité de l’État de mener véritablement à bien des 
poursuites; c) La personne concernée a déjà été jugée pour le comportement faisant 
l’objet d’une plainte, et qu’elle ne peut être jugée par la Cour en vertu de l’article 20, 
paragraphe 3 (non bis ibidem); d) L’affaire n’est pas suffisamment grave pour que la 
Cour y donne suite ». 
48  Id., art. 17(2) : Pour déterminer s’il y a manque de volonté de l’État dans un cas 
d’espèce, la Cour considère l’existence, eu égard aux garanties d’un procès équitable 
reconnues par le droit international, de l’une ou plusieurs des circonstances 
suivantes : a) La procédure a été engagée ou est engagée ou la décision de l’État a été 
prise dans le dessein de soustraire la personne concernée à sa responsabilité pénale 
pour les crimes relevant de la compétence de la Cour visée à l’article 5; b) La 
procédure a subi un retard injustifié qui, dans les circonstances, est incompatible avec 
l’intention de traduire en justice la personne concernée; c) La procédure n’a pas été ou 
n’est pas menée de manière indépendante ou impartiale mais d’une manière qui, dans 
les circonstances, est incompatible avec l’intention de traduire en justice la personne 
concernée. 3) Pour déterminer s’il y a incapacité de l’État dans un cas d’espèce, la 
Cour considère si l’État est incapable, en raison de l’effondrement de la totalité ou 
d’une partie substantielle de son propre appareil judiciaire ou de l’indisponibilité de 
celui-ci, de se saisir de l’accusé, de réunir les éléments de preuve et les témoignages 
nécessaires ou de mener autrement à bien la procédure. 
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« Pour qu’un État soit dans l’incapacité de mener véritablement à 
bien l’enquête ou les poursuites, il est nécessaire de démontrer 
« l’effondrement de la totalité ou d’une partie substantielle de son 
propre appareil judiciaire ». On distingue trois situations où il sera 
estimé qu’un État n’a pas la volonté de mener à bien les 
poursuites : lorsque la procédure a été engagée dans le dessein de 
soustraire la personne concernée à sa responsabilité pénale; lorsque 
la poursuite a subi un retard injustifié; ou lorsque la procédure n’a 
pas été ou n’est pas menée de manière indépendante et 
impartiale ».49 
1. Bilan au sujet de l’exercice de la compétence des tribunaux nationaux 
sur les crimes internationaux 
 Mais la CPI sera-t-elle en chômage puisque les cours nationales ont 
préséance sur elle pour juger le génocide, les crimes de guerre et contre 
l’humanité? Avec la CPI, a-t-on un nouveau gendarme pour la planète ou 
un héros d’opérette? Examinons la compétence des tribunaux nationaux en 
la matière et l’exercice qu’ils en ont fait jusqu’à maintenant. 
Rien n’empêche un État, qu’il soit signataire ou non du Traité de 
Rome, de poursuivre devant ses propres tribunaux un criminel qui a 
commis un génocide, des crimes de guerre ou contre l’humanité en 
agissant, selon le cas, en vertu de la territorialité du crime (compétence 
territoriale), de la nationalité de l’auteur ou de la victime (compétence 
personnelle active ou passive). Par exemple, le juge espagnol Garzon a 
institué plusieurs poursuites contre des Chiliens et des Argentins pour des 
crimes contre l’humanité et pour des génocides qui avaient pour victimes 
des Espagnols50. La Belgique a ouvert plusieurs dossiers d’instruction 
concernant le massacre de plusieurs ressortissants belges lors du génocide 
rwandais51 et la Cour d’Assises de Bruxelles a d’ailleurs condamné quatre 
Rwandais pour de tels crimes52.  
                   
49  K.I. LEE, loc. cit., note 9, à la page 467. 
50  Richard J. WILSON, « Prosecuting Pinochet: International Crimes in Spanish 
Domestic Law », (1999) 21 Hum.Rts.Q. 946. 
51  Damien VANDERMEERSCH, « Compétence universelle et immunités en droit 
international humanitaire – la situation belge », dans M. HENZELIN et R. ROTH, op. 
cit., note 28. 
52  Ministère public c. Ntezimana, Cour d’Assises, Bruxelles, juin 2001. 
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Bien avant l’établissement de la CPI, des États, signataires ou non 
signataires du Traité de Rome, ont aussi assujetti devant leurs tribunaux 
des criminels accusés de crimes de guerre et contre l’humanité les plus 
graves à un quelconque endroit dans le monde en se fondant sur la 
prétendue compétence universelle de leurs cours nationales53 et en 
l’exerçant sur des crimes commis à l’étranger, par des étrangers, sur des 
étrangers. Comme le suggèrent S. Williams et J. Castel54, il serait de 
l’essence d’un crime de droit international de relever de la compétence de 
tous les États. Sur ce point précis, le droit international nous offre le 
dilemme de la poule et de l’œuf : lequel vient en premier? La compétence 
universelle des tribunaux nationaux ou le crime international. Quoiqu’il en 
soit, Israël a poursuivi Eichmann55, les États-Unis ont entendu la cause 
Demjanjuk56, l’Australie celle de Polyukhovich57 et les tribunaux 
canadiens se sont considérés compétents dans l’affaire Finta58, la Grande 
Bretagne a fait état de la compétence universelle de ses tribunaux dans 
                   
53  André HUET et Renée KOERING-JOULIN, Droit pénal international, PUF, 1993, 
p. 190 et 191 : « La juridiction universelle est un système donnant vocation aux 
tribunaux de tout État sur le territoire duquel se trouve l’auteur d’une infraction pour 
connaître de cette dernière et ce, quels que soient le lieu de perpétration de 
l’infraction et la nationalité de l’auteur ou de la victime. » 
54  Sharon A. WILLIAMS et J.G. CASTEL, Canadian criminal Law: International and 
Transnational aspects, Toronto, Butterworths, 1981, p. 137 et suiv. 
55  Attorney General of the Government of Israel c. Eichmann, 36 ILR 1962 (Cour 
suprême d’Israël), 300 : « Not only do all crimes attributed to the appellant bear an 
international character, but their harmful and murderous effects were so embracing 
and widespread as to shake the international community to its very foundations. The 
State of Israel therefore was entitled, pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction 
and in the capacity of a guardian of international law and an agent for its enforcement, 
to try the appellant. That being the case, no importance attaches to the fact that the 
State of Israel did not exist when the offences were committed. » 
56  Demjanjuk c. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (US Court of Appeal, 6th cir.), 31 octobre 
1985, A.J.I.L., vol. 80, 1986, 571: « Some crimes are so universally condemned that 
the perpetrators are the enemies of all people. Therefore, any nation which has 
custody of the perpetrators may punish them according to its law. » 
57  Polyukhovich c. The Commonwealth of Australia and another, (1991) 172 C.L.R. 501 
(FCA 91/26), par. 659 : « Universal jurisdiction permits jurisdiction to be exercised 
over a limited category of offences on the basis that the offender is in the custody of 
the prosecuting state. The jurisdiction is based on the notion that certain acts are so 
universally condemned that regardless of the situs of the offence and the nationality 
of the offender or the victim, each state has jurisdiction to deal with perpetrators of 
those acts ». 
58  R. c. Finta, [1994] R.C.S. 701. 
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l’affaire Pinochet59. Le droit international reconnaît la compétence 
universelle des tribunaux nationaux en matière de génocide, de crimes de 
guerre, et de crimes contre l’humanité les plus graves et explique qu’elle 
serait tantôt le résultat de la coutume internationale (jus cogens), tantôt 
affirmée dans des conventions auxquelles tout le monde adhère, et souvent 
reconnue par voie législative par un très grand nombre d’États 
souverains60 . Le Canada a d’ailleurs reconnu dans sa Loi sur les crimes de 
guerre et contre l’humanité qu’il avait en cette matière une compétence 
territoriale, une compétence personnelle active et passive et qu’il se 
reconnaissait aussi une compétence universelle sur le génocide, les crimes 
de guerre et contre l’humanité61. La seule condition généralement admise 
pour l’exercice de cette compétence universelle des tribunaux canadiens 
serait la présence du criminel sur le territoire pour tenir le procès 62, mais 
le Canada pourrait ouvrir une enquête sans que le suspect ne soit sur son 
territoire63. Par contre, quand il s’agit de vérifier si le droit pénal interne 
d’un État donné fait siennes les règles internationales en matière de 
compétence universelle pour ses propres tribunaux, la réponse varie selon 
le pays concerné; elle dépend à la fois de sa méthode d’intégration du droit 
international et des réserves faites à son endroit dans le droit interne et elle 
varie en fonction de la plus ou moins grande réceptivité de la coutume et 
des traités dans les schèmes juridiques de références des juges locaux. 
                   
59  R. c. Evans and Another and the Commissionner of Police for the Metropolis and 
Others Ex Parte Pinochet, 24 mars 1999, 38 ILM 581 (1999). 
60  Éric DAVID, « Une règle à valeur de symbole » dans La Belgique, justicier de ce 
monde?, p. 12. À la page 13, l’auteur cite une étude d’Amnistie Internationale dans 
laquelle on affirme que 125 États ont légiféré et se reconnaissent une compétence 
universelle.  
61  L.C., 2000, c. 24, art. 6-8. 
62  La compétence universelle dont s’est dotée la Belgique a fait couler beaucoup d’encre 
parce qu’elle n’exigeait pas la présence du suspect sur le territoire pour ouvrir une 
instruction. La loi belge présentait deux autres caractéristiques particulières, celle de 
pouvoir ouvrir une enquête par la plainte de victimes et celle de pouvoir juger par 
contumace. C’est ce qui explique l’ouverture d’une instruction contre le Premier 
ministre d’Israël Sharon pour le massacre de Sabra et Shatila, les plaignants se 
trouvant des héritiers de victimes civiles. La Belgique a cependant récemment revu sa 
loi et atténué la portée universelle de sa loi nationale. Voir à cet effet Rachel 
Crivellaro, « Le Sénat enterre la justice universelle », La Libre Belgique, 
1er août 2003, sur le site du journal : http://www.lalibre.be/article.phtml?id=10& 
subid=90&art_id=127314, (dernière visite : le 5 mars 2004).  
63  L.C. 2000, c. 24, art. 9(1). 
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À première vue, il demeure que compétence des tribunaux nationaux 
sur les crimes internationaux paraît plus étendue que la compétence de la 
CPI qui un exige lien de rattachement de l’accusé avec un pays signataire. 
Les cours étatiques peuvent en effet se saisir de ressortissants de pays qui 
ne sont pas parties au Statut qui auraient commis des crimes interna-
tionaux les plus graves à un quelconque endroit dans le monde avant ou 
après l’entrée en opération de la CPI64. En reconnaissant la priorité des 
tribunaux nationaux de juger les crimes internationaux qui constituent une 
atteinte grave à toute l’humanité, le Statut ne modifie pas leur compétence 
territoriale, personnelle ou universelle en la matière, il ne fait que 
circonscrire et préciser les conditions d’exercice de sa propre compétence.  
Au XXe siècle, faut-il le préciser, des millions de civils sont morts par 
suite de guerres horribles produisant autant de génocides, de crimes de 
guerre et contre l’humanité que de victimes innocentes et on s’accorde 
pour dire que presque tous les responsables de ces atrocités ont bénéficié 
de l’impunité. Les États souverains ne se seraient donc jamais bousculés 
au portillon pour exercer de façon régulière et continue leur compétence 
universelle en la matière65. Peu d’États s’estiment l’ange gardien de 
l’ordre juridique international. L’affaire Pinochet est à cet égard 
exemplaire par le nombre de tribunaux nationaux en mesure de le juger et 
pourtant, il n’y a pas eu de procès. Un tribunal anglais sur le territoire 
duquel se trouvait Pinochet pour obtenir des soins médicaux, a estimé que 
Pinochet pouvait être extradé vers l’Espagne qui le réclamait pour des 
actes de torture contre des victimes espagnoles mortes au Chili et a décidé 
qu’il ne pouvait réclamer l’immunité de chef d’État puisqu’il n’était plus 
en fonction66. Pinochet a cependant été renvoyé au Chili par suite de l’avis 
ministériel anglais qu’il était devenu inapte à subir un procès pour cause 
                   
64  Marc HENZELIN, Le principe de l’universalité en droit pénal international – Droit 
et obligation pour les États de poursuivre et juger selon le principe de l’universalité, 
Facultés de droit de Genève, Bale, Munich, Helbing et Lichtenhahn, Bruxelles, 
Bruylant, 2000. 
65  Comme le rappelle M. PENROSE, « the practice of states—including the United 
States, Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom and, now, 
Senegal—suggests that despite the clear language, compliance is rare ». Margaret 
PENROSE, « It’s Good to be the King!: Prosecuting Heads of State and Former Head 
of State Under international Law », 39 Colum. J. Transnat’L. 193, 217.  
66  R. c. Evans and Another and the Commissionner of Police for the Metropolis and 
Others Ex Parte Pinochet, précité, note 59. Voir aussi pour la chronologie des 
événements, The Pinochet case: Timeline, Tuesday, 25 July, 17:12 CMT 18; 12 UK. 
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de démence. Pinochet pouvait donc reprendre la route du bercail sans être 
extradé vers l’Espagne. Les autorités chiliennes ont par la suite examiné la 
question de poursuivre l’ex dictateur pour des actes de torture contre ses 
concitoyens devant un forum national, le plus naturel pour le juger67, mais 
les procédures n’ont jamais été entamées contre ce tortionnaire devenu 
sénile prétendument.  
Sans traiter de la très grande controverse politique autour de l’affaire 
Pinochet, disons que celle-ci pouvait donner du fil à retordre à tout juge 
national saisi du problème. En effet, dans une affaire semblable, il était 
difficile de reconnaître le droit international et national applicable, compte 
tenu de l’enchevêtrement des compétences nationales en cause : la 
compétence universelle du tribunal anglais, la compétence personnelle 
passive des juridictions espagnoles et la compétence territoriale des 
tribunaux chiliens et la compétence tous azimuts de la Belgique qui s’est 
immiscée dans le débat judiciaire à un moment donné. De plus, on avait 
les difficultés suivantes : des règles d’extradition mêlant le politique et le 
juridique, l’absence de précédents, le caractère imprécis et obscur du droit 
international applicable, de très grandes variations étatiques de son 
intégration en droit interne, un débat sur l’immunité de chef d’État 
réclamée par un Pinochet à la retraite pour ne pas être soumis à une 
juridiction étrangère, et beaucoup de Chiliens préférant l’oubli, …bref, ce 
n’était donc pas simple de juger Pinochet devant le bon tribunal national 
selon les bons principes et les bonnes règles. C’eût été plus facile, aurait-
on pour autant trouver un État prêt à le juger? Enfin, il y a eu si peu de 
procès semblables dans les annales judiciaires de la dernière moitié du 
XXe siècle que les systèmes de droit pénal étatique n’ont même jamais eu 
à élaborer des principes pour résoudre les conflits de loi en cette matière 
comme le droit international privé le fait depuis fort longtemps. 
Par ailleurs, les tribunaux nationaux se sont adonnés encore plus 
rarement à l’exercice de juger leurs concitoyens responsables de crimes de 
guerre et contre l’humanité dans des cas où leur compétence territoriale ou 
personnelle ne faisait pas l’ombre d’un doute. L’on comprend aisément 
pourquoi : les génocidaires restent au pouvoir, les juges sont complè-
tement inféodés au pouvoir en place, les tribunaux sont dysfonctionnels, la 
                   
67  Cesare BECCARIA estimait que « le lieu du châtiment ne peut être que le lieu du 
délit, attendu que c’est là et non ailleurs qu’existe l’obligation de sévir contre un 
particulier pour défendre le bien public » Voir à cet effet : Des délits et des peines, 
Genève, Droz 1965, Chap. XXIX, p. 55. 
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justice pénale inexistante ou corrompue, le peuple partage les justifications 
disculpatoires du pouvoir officiel au sujet des crimes commis ou préfère 
tout simplement les oublier. Bien des génocidaires et des tortionnaires de 
ce monde, comme Pinochet, malgré l’avènement de la CPI, seront encore 
capables de mourir bien au chaud dans leur lit, s’ils proviennent et restent 
dans un pays non parties au Traité de Rome. La CPI ne peut s’en saisir en 
droit et le forum autochtone ne peut le faire en fait68. Au mieux, les a-t-on 
peut-être condamnés à ne plus voyager. 
La souveraineté et l’égalité des États et le principe corollaire de non 
ingérence dans les affaires internes d’un autre État69 sont généralement 
allégués pour expliquer le non exercice de la compétence universelle des 
cours nationales et la pénurie de cas d’espèce. Mais d’autres raisons, plus 
importantes peut-être, expliquent également le non usage de la compé-
tence universelle des tribunaux nationaux. Ces raisons sont les suivantes : 
1° le manque d’intérêt d’un État souverain de réprimer les atteintes à un 
ordre public qui n’est pas le sien70, 2° la réticence des procureurs 
d’engager le budget national des poursuites publiques à des poursuites 
externes fussent-elles internationales et communes à toute l’humanité, 3° 
l’existence de régimes opportunistes de poursuites criminelles dans la 
plupart des États souverains qui endossent très rarement l’idée d’une 
obligation de poursuivre dans leur ordre juridique interne malgré la 
signature de certains traités à l’effet contraire71 et 4° le contexte très 
politisé des crimes internationaux qui risque de perturber les relations 
diplomatiques du pays qui s’engage à poursuivre des hauts responsables 
d’un État étranger ayant violé le droit pénal international. Ces 
considérations risquent de prévaloir encore malgré l’existence d’une Cour 
pénale internationale d’une part, et en dépit de la confirmation législative 
                   
68  Le Conseil de sécurité, bien entendu, pourrait faire ce qu’il a fait pour l’ex-
Yougoslavie et le Rwanda. 
69  Joe VERHOEVEN, « Vers un ordre répressif universel? Quelques observations », 
Annuaire français de droit international, XLV-1999-CRNS Éditions, Paris, p. 65 : 
« On dit classiquement que la souveraineté répugne à toute punition ». 
70  Ibid., p. 67. 
71  Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 et leur Premier protocole additionnel, art. 
49/I, 50/II, 146/IV, Protocole I, art. 85; Convention contre la torture et autres peines 
ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, Doc. ONU A/Rés./ 39/46, art. 5, 
par. 2. 
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de la compétence universelle des tribunaux internes de plusieurs États 
souverains d’autre part72.  
À d’autres égards, il existe peut-être une certaine sagesse, d’autres 
diront de la flagornerie, de la part d’un État souverain qui ne ferait rien 
devant ses tribunaux internes pour s’en prendre aux génocidaires de la 
planète. Peut-t-on par exemple reprocher au Canada de préférer s’associer 
à l’indignation de sa société civile au sujet des injustices innommables 
laissées impunies dans le monde d’aujourd’hui mais de ne rien faire au 
plan judiciaire? Des décisions du Canada de poursuivre dans quelques 
affaires particulières risquent-elles d’enterrer des scandales de l’impunité 
avec un non-lieu judiciaire officiel résultant de l’impossibilité réelle de 
recueillir la preuve des accusations devant ses instances locales73?  
Voilà donc un ensemble de raisons constituant de véritables empê-
chements au fonctionnement des cours nationales en matière de crimes 
internationaux les plus graves qui ont néanmoins une compétence 
universelle reconnue pour les prendre en charge. Hélas, toutes ces 
explications montrent également une absence de solidarité mondiale entre 
les États souverains et un manque d’entraide mutuelle pour s’en prendre 
efficacement à des crimes qui portent pourtant atteinte à toute la 
communauté internationale. Sans contredit, cela illustre aussi la primauté 
de la poursuite égoïste des intérêts individuels des États souverains au 
détriment du bien commun de toute l’humanité. Pourtant, dans des 
sociétés solidaires, prendre en charge les problèmes d’autrui, cela a 
toujours été considéré dans l’intérêt commun. Par ailleurs, le dévelop-
pement du droit pénal international est, au moins en partie, une leçon du 
constat que les crimes internationaux, concernent l’ensemble de 
l’humanité. C’est tout de même troublant que la société mondiale que l’on 
veut construire parte du principe que la satisfaction des intérêts individuels 
contradictoires produit inéluctablement le bien commun. Ce principe de 
l’économie mondiale a de quoi faire tourner dans sa tombe Durkheim, le 
père de la sociologie moderne, qui a montré que le tout était plus que la 
somme de ses parties. Même John Nash, le mathématicien mieux connu 
par le film « A Beautiful Mind » et Prix Nobel d’Économie, a fait une 
                   
72  Pour le Canada, voir la Loi sur les crimes de guerre et les crimes contre l’humanité, 
précitée, note 29. 
73  « Un délit d’Immodestie? » Entretien avec Benoît de Jemeppe, procureur du Roi de 
Bruxelles, propos recueillis par Annemie Schaus et Pascale Vielle publié dans La 
Belgique, justicier de ce monde? 
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démonstration fascinante selon laquelle les principes de coopération 
produisent, selon des modèles mathématiques appliqués aux groupes, de 
meilleurs résultats que des principes de compétition.  
Convenons enfin si l’on veut mettre fin à l’impunité des principaux 
responsables de génocide, de crimes de guerre et de crimes contre 
l’humanité qu’il faut absolument s’en prendre aux têtes dirigeantes des 
États à l’origine des massacres les plus horribles de l’histoire de 
l’humanité. Jusqu’à ce jour, ce sont des fora internationaux seulement qui 
ont réussi à le faire. Que l’on pense d’abord à Nuremberg, ensuite au 
TPIY qui juge Milosevic en ce moment. Entre ces deux moments de 
l’histoire où le statut international en cause exclut explicitement la défense 
d’immunité de fonction, il n’y a pour ainsi dire jamais eu74 de tribunal 
national qui a condamné un chef d’État en fonction pour des génocides, 
crimes de guerre et contre l’humanité. La France n’a pas réussi avec une 
poursuite contre Khadafi75 accusé de complicité suite à l’attentat perpétré 
contre un appareil DC 10 de la Compagnie UTA qui a causé la mort de 
cent soixante dix personnes au-dessus du Niger. La Cour de Cassation 
s’est ainsi prononcée : « Attendu qu’en l’état du droit international, le 
crime dénoncé, quelle qu’en fut la gravité, ne relève pas des exceptions au 
principe de l’immunité de juridiction des chefs d’État étranger en 
exercice ». Dans un commentaire de l’arrêt, J.-F. Roulot émet l’opinion 
suivante : S’il y avait matière à répression criminelle, par respect de la 
souveraineté libyenne qui confère à son chef d’État une immunité de 
fonction, cette accusation ne pouvait se matérialiser que de deux manières, 
soit devant un tribunal libyen (une option tout à fait improbable) ou devant 
une cour internationale (qui n’existait pas)76. Une autre affaire mettant en 
cause la Libye, celle de la Pan Am à Lockerbie, a par ailleurs illustré que 
la poursuite de certains criminels devant des juridictions nationales, 
soupçonnées de partialité, se heurtaient à de nombreux obstacles et 
pouvaient même susciter des différends entre États et donner lieu à 
                   
74  À notre connaissance, le seul cas où des poursuites par un État ont été à l’encontre des 
dirigeants en exercice étrangers fut le procès yougoslave à l’encontre des dirigeants 
des pays de l’OTAN pour les bombardements de 1999 en ex-Yougoslavie. Voir 
l’article de M. PENROSE, loc. cit., note 65, 217. 
75  Arrêt Kadhafi, arrêt no 1414 du 13 mars 2001, Cour de cassation-Chambre criminelle. 
76  Voir pour plus de développement : J.-F. ROULOT, « La coutume du droit 
international pénal et l’affaire Khadafi », Recueil Dalloz 2001, p. 2631. 
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l’imposition de sanctions par le Conseil de sécurité77. La Libye vient tout 
récemment de se remettre au mieux avec la communauté internationale 
depuis que la Fondation caritative Kadhafi a fait des dédommagements 
aux héritiers des victimes de ces deux attentats terroristes sans que par 
ailleurs le colonel Kadhafi n’admette une quelconque responsabilité78.  
On peut faire état d’autres poursuites nationales désastreuses au 
chapitre de la fin de l’impunité comme au chapitre des relations diplo-
matiques. Une autre affaire, celle intentée au Sénégal contre Hissène 
Habré, ancien dictateur du Tchad déchu depuis 1990, a donné lieu à 
l’annulation des procédures d’inculpation. Quelques ONG avaient déposé 
une plainte pénale contre lui avec constitution de partie civile et il fut 
accusé pour des crimes contre l’humanité, des actes de torture et de 
barbarie commis dans son pays. Ses avocats ont fait notamment valoir 
avec succès l’incompétence des pouvoirs judiciaires sénégalais pour le 
juger, le droit interne ne connaissant pas le principe de l’universalité, et 
l’absence de fondement à la poursuite étant donné que le droit sénégalais 
ne connaissait pas la catégorie des crimes contre l’unanimité et que les 
faits étaient antérieurs à la signature de la Convention sur la torture par le 
Sénégal79.  
Quoiqu’on dise au sujet de la bonne ou mauvaise interprétation du 
droit international par des instances nationales, ces décisions que l’on 
vient d’évoquer, illustrent la difficulté pour des juges nationaux de régler 
une affaire soumise à leur attention avec d’autres règles que les règles 
familières de leur droit interne. D’entrée de jeu, le droit pénal interne 
répugne à l’idée de juger des étrangers, ayant commis leurs crimes sur des 
étrangers et à l’étranger; ce n’est pas dans ses habitudes. Si on ajoute à 
cela le fait que le droit coutumier international reconnaît l’immunité 
découlant de la qualité officielle de chef d’État devant les cours nationales, 
des chefs d’État en fonction sont à l’abri de poursuites criminelles durant 
leurs fonctions devant un tribunal étranger. La Cour internationale de 
justice (CIJ) a rendu récemment un arrêt dans l’affaire Congo c. 
                   
77  Mohamed BENNOUNA, « La Cour pénale internationale », chapitre 59, dans Hervé 
ASCENSIO, Emmanuel DECAUX et Alain PELLET, Droit international pénal, 
CEDIN Paris X, Éditions A. Pedone, 2000, p. 736. 
78  Mouna NAÏM, « Colères, dialogues, menaces, pressions politiques : deux ans de 
dures négociations avec les familles », Le Monde, 10 janvier 2004. 
79  M. HENZELIN, op. cit., note 64. 
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Belgique80 et le jugement fait référence à l’immunité qui s’attache à un 
gouvernant étranger et confirme qu’elle fait toujours obstacle aux 
poursuites nationales en matière de crimes contre l’humanité. Selon la 
Cour internationale de Justice, un ministre des affaires étrangères en 
exercice ne peut être accusé que si l’État dont il est le représentant lève 
son immunité ou s’il doit répondre de ses actes devant une juridiction 
internationale81. 
À court et à moyen terme, c’est donc devant un forum international 
que l’on peut en pratique mieux réussir à mettre fin à l’impunité des 
principaux responsables de génocide, de crimes de guerre, crimes contre la 
paix et crimes contre l’humanité. Les tribunaux nationaux jusqu’à ce jour 
n’ont pas eu la volonté de le faire, n’ont pas eu la capacité juridique ou 
matérielle de le faire ou l’ont fait de façon on ne peut plus douteuse et 
discutable. Ce sont là les conditions suffisantes pour que la CPI prenne la 
relève et entre en opération, en tant que tribunal complémentaire de 
tribunaux nationaux « incapables » ou n’ayant pas la « volonté »82 de 
combattre l’impunité… 
                   
80  Congo c. Belgique, C.I.J., arrêt du 14 février 2002, Affaire relative au mandat d’arrêt 
du 11 avril 2000. 
81  « Ils ne bénéficient, en premier lieu, en vertu du droit international d’aucune 
immunité de juridiction pénale dans leur propre pays et peuvent par la suite être 
traduits devant les juridictions de ce pays conformément aux règles fixées en droit 
interne. 
En deuxième lieu, ils ne bénéficient plus de l’immunité de juridiction à l’étranger si 
l’État qu’ils représentent ou ont représenté décide de lever cette immunité. 
En troisième lieu, dès lors qu’une personne a cessé d’occuper la fonction de ministre 
des affaires étrangères, elle ne bénéficie plus de la totalité des immunités de 
juridiction que lui accordait le droit international dans les autres États. À condition 
d’être compétent selon le droit international, un tribunal d’un État peut juger un 
ancien ministre des affaires étrangères d’un autre État au titre d’actes accomplis avant 
ou après la période pendant laquelle il a occupé ces fonctions, ainsi qu’au titre d’actes 
qui, bien qu’accomplis durant cette période, l’ont été à titre privé. 
En quatrième lieu, un ministre des affaires étrangères ou un ancien ministre des 
affaires étrangères peut faire l’objet de poursuites pénales devant certaines 
juridictions pénales internationales dès lors que celles-ci sont compétentes » : Congo 
c. Belgique, C.I.J., arrêt du 14 février 2002, Affaire relative au mandat d’arrêt du 
11 avril 2000. (paragraphe 61) ». 
82  Statut de Rome, précité, note 4, art. 17.  
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2.  Le Canada et la CPI 
Même si le Canada entretient de bons sentiments humanitaires comme 
il s’est plu à le démontrer en signant le Traité de Rome, on peut réellement 
se demander s’il ne s’est pas plutôt lavé les mains en se délestant de 
l’obligation morale (certains la qualifieraient de juridique83) de poursuivre 
éventuellement devant ses tribunaux des responsables de génocides, de 
crimes de guerre et contre l’humanité qui pourraient se retrouver sur son 
territoire. En effet, cela peut être soutenu à partir de l’examen de la Loi 
récente sur les crimes de guerre et contre l’humanité84. Le législateur 
canadien exige, et cela est conforme à l’esprit du droit international au 
sujet de la compétence universelle et du droit canadien sur l’exigence de la 
présence de l’accusé à son procès, que la personne soupçonnée de crimes 
de génocide, de guerre et contre l’humanité soit sur son territoire pour 
l’assujettir à la procédure d’accusation au Canada qui ne peut pas être par 
contumace85. Si techniquement, l’on peut ouvrir une enquête sur un 
suspect qui ne se trouve pas au Canada, les poursuites à l’égard de ces 
infractions sont de toute façon subordonnées au consentement personnel 
du procureur général ou du sous-procureur général du Canada86 de sorte 
que les victimes de ces crimes, leurs héritiers ou des ONG les représentant 
ne peuvent déclencher la poursuite pénale. Bref, l’on doit comprendre par 
l’exigence de ce consentement personnel du procureur général, que les 
autorités politiques veulent conserver la mainmise sur de telles poursuites. 
La réticence à poursuivre les crimes de guerre et contre l’humanité devant 
les cours canadiennes est bel et bien réelle.  
                   
83  Comme on en a fait mention précédemment, le Canada a signé des conventions 
internationales qui prévoient une obligation de poursuivre des étrangers qui se 
trouvent sur son territoire qui ont commis à l’étranger, sur des étrangers, des crimes 
visés par la convention. On traduit généralement cette obligation dans la maxime 
« aut dedere aut judicare » : poursuivre ou extrader. Dans les pays de tradition 
dualiste, une obligation internationale exige son intégration dans le droit interne par 
voie législative pour devenir coercitive. Le Canada ne semble pas avoir intégré une 
pareille obligation de poursuivre dans son droit pénal interne lequel repose pour 
l’essentiel sur une opportunité ou discrétion de poursuivre.  
84  Précitée, note 29. 
85  Id., art. 9(2). 
86  Id., art. 9(3). 
LA COUR PÉNALE INTERNATIONALE (CPI)  119 
Le Canada préfère certainement agir en Ponce Pilate si, de plus, l’on 
fait le lien entre sa Loi sur les crimes de guerre et contre l’humanité et sa 
politique fondée sur la méfiance de l’étranger en matière d’immigration et 
d’accueil de réfugiés depuis le 11 septembre 2001. On imagine que le 
Canada, en filtrant de façon plus pointilleuse l’entrée de ses nouveaux 
arrivants ou en les expulsant préventivement, évite le dilemme de 
poursuivre ou de ne pas poursuivre des criminels soupçonnés de crimes de 
guerre et contre l’humanité devant ses propres tribunaux. D’ailleurs la 
politique canadienne de refoulement d’arrivants étrangers sur la base de 
tels soupçons est notoire et bien antérieure au 11 septembre; elle est tout à 
fait représentative du réflexe « pas dans ma cour ». En tout état de cause, 
si ses institutions carcérales se vident d’un certain pourcentage de 
prisonniers de droit commun parce que la criminalité décroît, elles se 
remplissent d’étrangers détenus sans avoir commis de crimes et qui sont 
en attente de statut de « personne libre » au Canada87. Si les mailles du 
filet contrôlant l’arrivée d’étrangers sur son sol s’avéraient trop larges et si 
le Canada acceptait, malgré lui, des criminels soupçonnés de génocide, de 
crimes de guerre et contre l’humanité, il pourrait fort bien remettre à la 
CPI tous ceux sur lesquels la Cour internationale peut exercer sa 
juridiction. Quant aux autres, le Canada pourrait les extrader vers le pays 
qui offre le meilleur forum pour les juger et finalement, se résoudre à 
poursuivre le reliquat : ceux qu’il faut absolument poursuivre pour ne pas 
se faire accuser par les Canadiens de complice de l’impunité. 
Rappelons maintenant l’incidence du droit relatif à l’immunité de 
fonction au regard des poursuites canadiennes en matière de génocides, 
crimes de guerre et contre l’humanité. Le Canada est appelé comme tous 
les autres pays du reste, à recevoir des chefs d’État chez lui dont certains 
pourraient avoir quelques crimes de guerre et contre l’humanité sur la 
conscience. Le droit jurisprudentiel est à l’effet que l’immunité de 
fonction est opposable à la mise en branle de la juridiction canadienne en 
matières criminelles contre un chef étranger. Les relations diplomatiques 
entre États souverains sont par conséquent sauves. Mais, le Canada réserve 
tout de même des surprises à un chef d’État en visite qui relèverait de la 
compétence de la CPI pour des crimes engageant sa responsabilité en 
                   
87  Les Services correctionnels pour adultes mentionnent que les personnes en détention 
temporaire, comme les personnes en détention aux fins d’immigration, représentent 
11 % de la population carcérale : voir Le Quotidien, mercredi 30 octobre 2002. Ces 
chiffres sont pour l’année 2000-2001. On peut supputer que ce taux est plus élevé en 
ce moment. 
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vertu du nouveau droit international pénal. Le Canada a modifié sa Loi sur 
l’extradition et énonce à l’article 6.1 que quiconque faisant l’objet d’une 
demande de remise de la part de la CPI ou par tout tribunal international 
établi par résolution du Conseil de Sécurité, ne peut bénéficier de 
l’immunité qui existe en vertu du droit statutaire ou de la common law 
relativement à son arrestation et son extradition vers la CPI ou un tribunal 
international ad hoc88. Il faut par contre comprendre que les chefs d’États 
en fonction qui ont un lourd passé qui ne peut être l’objet d’examen par la 
CPI, continuent d’avoir leur abri judiciaire au Canada lors de leurs visites 
amicales. Quant aux autres concernés par cette coopération canadienne 
avec la CPI ou autre tribunal ad hoc, on imagine qu’ils ne seront plus 
invités ou seront avisés de ne plus visiter le Canada! 
CONCLUSION : TROP DE DROIT PÉNAL, C’EST COMME PAS ASSEZ 
Voici un dernier paradoxe en guise de conclusion que nous avons 
intitulé : Trop de droit pénal, c’est comme pas assez. Cela nous amène à 
faire des liens entre cette nouvelle institution pénale internationale 
permanente qu’est la CPI et les mécanismes commerciaux de gouvernance 
mondiale.  
Ce qui frappe le plus, ces dernières décennies, c’est d’avoir vu les 
massacres se commettre en direct grâce aux moyens techniques 
d’information. La communauté internationale s’indigne de plus en plus 
souvent du spectacle de ce désordre mondial et demande à ses 
commettants politiques nationaux et internationaux de prendre des moyens 
susceptibles de les prévenir, d’arrêter à tout le moins les atrocités pour en 
contenir l’ampleur et de se doter de mécanismes efficaces de prévention 
de la guerre et de ses futurs massacres. Il semble en tout cas depuis une 
dizaine d’années que pour calmer la clameur publique, les politiciens du 
monde, pris en défaut de ne pas avoir imaginé et mis en place des 
politiques et des conditions économiques favorables à la paix, se soient 
tournés vers la voie judiciaire pénale nationale et/ou internationale comme 
remède à leur mauvaise conscience. La « solution pénale » est devenue le 
moyen de prédilection de s’en prendre aux principaux responsables des 
guerres injustifiables et des massacres innommables que la communauté 
politique mondiale n’a pas arrêtés en espérant prévenir les massacres de 
l’avenir avec la technique et la symbolique du pénal.  
                   
88  Loi sur l’extradition, L.C. 1999, c. 18, art. 6.1; L.C. 2000, c. 24, art. 48. 
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Or, depuis que l’on fait l’expérience politique de ce moyen juridico-
judiciaire, plusieurs formes d’expression de la voie judiciaire pénale 
internationale ont émergé en l’espace de dix ans pour sanctionner des 
responsables de génocides, crimes de guerre et contre l’humanité. La 
justice pénale internationale serait conçue à la carte et à la tête du client. Il 
y aurait en quelque sorte un libre marché pénal qui coïnciderait avec la 
réalité néo-libérale voulue par les superpuissances économiques qui 
construisent le monde global à leur façon et dans le sens de leurs intérêts. 
Le libre marché pénal fonctionnerait en quelque sorte comme l’actuel 
marché mondial en avantageant les gros criminels et en éliminant le menu 
fretin. On a créé un TPIY pour Milosevic, un TPIR pour des chefs Hutus 
du Rwanda (ministres, bourgmestres, para militaires, religieux, 
journalistes), l’ONU a établi un tribunal international et une commission 
de vérité pour le Sierra Leone; Charles Taylor du Libéria s’est réfugié au 
Nigeria tout en faisant l’objet d’un mandat d’arrêt international du Sierra 
Leone. Charles Taylor réclame l’invalidité du mandat devant la CIJ avec 
une prétention d’immunité de fonction et en s’autorisant du précédent 
Congo c. Belgique89. Dans l’intervalle, il est réputé avoir l’équivalent de 
plusieurs fois le produit national brut de son État dans des coffres suisses 
ficelés dans le secret bancaire alors que sa population meurt de faim et ne 
reçoit aucune éducation. Pendant ce temps-là, des bateaux de 
superpuissances battent pavillon libérien et polluent les mers en ne payant 
aucune redevance importante pour enrichir quelque peu le peuple du 
Libéria. Des multinationales achètent le bois libérien sans en payer le juste 
prix en vertu des lois du marché qui avantagent les gros et égorgent les 
petits. La République démocratique du Congo, quant à elle, ne compte 
plus ses victimes et un génocide sévit depuis quelques années sur fond de 
mines de diamants90; la situation paraît intéresser le procureur de la CPI 
qui a ouvert une enquête récemment91.  
                   
89  Extrait de l’intervention du procureur Moreno-Ocampo, devant l’assemblée des États 
parties, le 9 septembre 2003 : « Au cours d’une conférence de presse tenue le 16 
juillet à LaHaye, j’ai d’ores et déjà et déjà expliqué pourquoi il ne serait pas possible 
d’enquêter sur certaines de ces communications qui nous sont parvenues, j’ai retenu 
la situation en Ituri, en République Démocratique du Congo, comme étant celle 
méritant d’être suivie le plus attentivement et de la façon la plus urgente. »  
90  Rapport au Secrétaire Général du Panel d’experts sur l’exploitation illégale des 
ressources et autres formes de richesses en République démocratique du Congo, 
Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, 16 octobre 2002, S/2002/1146. 
91  M. HENZELIN, loc. cit., note 28. 
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La gouvernance mondiale se présente vidée de contenu politique et 
éthique et n’est qu’affaire de gestion de la circulation des marchandises et 
de la fluidité des capitaux. Pour cela, il lui faut un droit de « gérance » 
supranational sur les États et leurs autorités qui est fort bien rempli par des 
organismes comme l’OMC et la Banque mondiale. Paradoxalement, le 
commerce mondial favorise le développement du droit d’ingérence dans la 
souveraineté des États mais que pour s’en prendre aux misérables États 
voyous et à leur gang qui mettent en péril la sécurité des transactions et la 
fluidité du commerce. Le droit des biens est prêt à faire alliance avec le 
droit du mal (i.e. le droit pénal) dans l’espace interétatique mais à la 
condition que les institutions internationales de régulation économique 
d’une part et de droit pénal d’autre part protègent ou ne menacent pas les 
intérêts privés des superpuissances et des multinationales.  
La gouvernance mondiale ne conçoit pas l’espace international comme 
un ordre public mais seulement comme un espace d’ordonnancement 
d’intérêts privés. Cette organisation du désordre des intérêts individuels 
contradictoires produirait un bien commun et une institution politique 
comme l’ONU n’aurait pas à se mêler de définir autrement l’intérêt 
général. De plus, les seules institutions internationales pénales compatibles 
avec la régulation marchande dans l’ordre juridique mondial sont des 
tribunaux à la carte et à la pièce qui n’ont d’autres mandats que de s’en 
prendre aux autres et aux faibles. À cet égard, une Cour pénale interna-
tionale permanente élaborée à plusieurs et dont la compétence peut 
s’élargir est menaçante pour ce nouvel ordre économique. Elle s’inscrit 
dans le développement d’un ordre public international qui, pour l’instant, 
n’est pas voulu par ceux qui sont avantagés par l’ordre juridique marchand 
et qui ont une position hégémonique dans le marché total.  
La gouvernance mondiale n’a pas de morale et c’est pourquoi, elle 
s’acharne à nous montrer du doigt ceux qui sont réputés commettre les 
plus graves violations des droits de la personne pour nous détourner de ses 
pires immoralités et nous les cacher sous le couvert de remontrances 
adressées à autrui. Pour arriver à nous confondre, il faut nous présenter les 
droits universels et indivisibles de l’être humain en les amputant de leurs 
aspects sociaux, économiques et culturels. Affamer un peuple au point de 
faire mourir ses enfants, lui ravir ses ressources premières et son 
patrimoine culturel, le priver du minimum vital qui s’exprime en 
nourritures, éducation et services de santé, ce ne sont encore que des 
immoralités. C’est seulement lorsque le droit international pénal osera les 
nommer « crimes contre l’humanité » que nous commencerons à changer 
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92  Mireille DELMAS-MARTY, Vers un droit commun de l’humanité, Textuel, 1996, 
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This paper considers the impact of globalization’s favoured form of 
dispute resolution—international commercial arbitration—on Canada’s 
domestic legal system. The most important principle of international 
commercial arbitration is party autonomy. Party autonomy is used to justify 
deference to the independence of the arbitration process by national legal 
systems, both legislatures and courts. That principle relies on the assumption 
that parties to international commercial arbitrations are of relatively equal 
bargaining strength and want to be free of national procedural and 
substantive laws.  
When the principle of party autonomy and the practices of international 
commercial arbitration are transferred to the domestic arbitration arena and 
applied outside the context of commercial transactions, the justification for 
judicial deference and non-intervention in the arbitration process is 
considerably weaker. The principle of party autonomy, and hence deference 
to the arbitration process, is not as accepted by Canadian courts in the 
domestic context as it is in the international commercial context. While some 
decisions extend the same deference to the domestic arbitration process, 
others apply a higher level of judicial scrutiny. Some of this lack of deference 
to arbitral autonomy appears to be a remnant of judicial attitudes prevalent 
before the mid-1980s. Other judges, however, appear willing to scrutinize 
domestic arbitration agreements on the principled basis of respect for party 
autonomy.  
My focus in this paper is on consensual, domestic arbitrations. 
Consensual arbitration is a process in which a tribunal other than a court 
decides a dispute between two or more parties based on a prior agreement by 
which the parties agreed to honour the decision of the tribunal.1 The only 
interactions between the courts and consensual arbitration that I am 
concerned with in this paper are those facilitated by modern domestic 
                   
1  Institute of Law Research and Reform, Towards a New Arbitration Act for Alberta, 
Issues Paper No. 1 (Edmonton: Institute of Law Research and Reform, 1987) at 1. 
Arbitrations mandated by statute are not considered in this paper. 
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arbitration legislation, that is, cases brought since 1986 in British Columbia2 
and Québec,3 since 1991 in Alberta4 and Ontario,5 since 1992 in 
Saskatchewan6 and New Brunswick,7 since 1997 in Manitoba,8 and since 
1999 in Nova Scotia.9 Interactions between the courts and arbitration under 
provincial statutes still modeled on the English Arbitration Act, 188910 are 
not considered.11 
Part II of this paper discusses globalization and its relationship to 
international commercial arbitration, the principle of party autonomy, the 
competing principle of judicial scrutiny, and the theories underlying both of 
these principles. In Part III, I briefly summarize the reform of Canadian 
arbitration legislation to accommodate the principle of party autonomy, both 
in international commercial and domestic arbitrations. Part IV looks at 
Canadian courts’ responses to this change in the legislation in the context of 
applications to courts to stay litigation in favour of arbitration. There are 
other contentious areas of interaction, most notably applications for leave to 
appeal arbitration awards, appeals of awards and applications to set aside 
awards.12 Stay applications are, however, the most common and they often 
raise access to justice issues.  
                   
2  Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 55 [hereinafter BCCAA]. 
3  An Act to amend the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of 
arbitration, S.Q. 1986, c. 73, arts. 1-2. Provisions on arbitration have been inserted in the 
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 1926.1-1926.6 [hereinafter C.C.Q.] and the 
Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, as am. by S.Q. 1986, c. 73, and S.Q. 1992, c. 
57, arts. 940-951.2 [hereinafter C.C.P.]. 
4  Arbitration Act, S.A. 1991, c. A-43.1 [hereinafter AAA]. 
5 Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17 [hereinafter OAA]. 
6  Arbitration Act, S.S. 1992, c. A-24.1 [hereinafter SAA]. 
7  Arbitration Act, S.N.B. 1992, c. A-10.1 [hereinafter NBAA]. 
8  Arbitration Act, S.M. 1997, c. 4, C.C.S.M. c. A120 [hereinafter MAA]. 
9  Commercial Arbitration Act, S.N.S. 1999, c. 5 [hereinafter NSCAA]. 
10  Arbitration Act, 1889 (U.K.), 52 & 53 Vict., c. 49. 
11  Arbitration Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. A-14; Arbitration Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. A-16; 
Arbitration Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 7; Arbitration Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. A-5 (in force in 
Nunavut under the Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28). 
12  See the chart, “Domestic Arbitrations by Issue” in Appendix B, below. 
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I. GLOBALIZATION, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AND PARTY AUTONOMY  
The meaning and “badges” of globalization are discussed elsewhere in 
these Conference proceedings in papers by William A.W. Neilson and 
Patricia Hughes. For the purposes of this paper, I would highlight that 
globalization is generally associated with economic development, the 
internationalization of capital and financial markets, and the movement 
towards regional economic and political bodies.13 Banks and 
telecommunication, transportation, oil and gas, and manufacturing operations 
now routinely conduct business across national boundaries.14 National 
borders and territory-based legal systems are less and less of a barrier to the 
business of transnational corporations, capital flow and commerce. 
Most relevant to this paper is the recognition that one of the central 
phenomena of globalization is the “proliferation of actors” on the law-making 
scene.15 What is described by the concept “globalization” includes 
competition in law, in approaches to law, and in approaches to the state and 
governance in general.16 As other participants in this Conference have noted, 
the growth of extra-judicial forms of dispute resolution threatens to displace 
domestic judicial systems by privatizing the settlement of disputes and taking 
them outside the courts and, sometimes, outside the law.17 
Financial and commercial entities active in transnational trade and 
commerce want to avoid being “trapped in domestic, ethnocentric judicial 
                   
13  J. Stopford & S. Strange, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market 
Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 5. 
14  P.F. Drucker, “The Global Economy and the Nation-State” (1997) 76 Foreign Affairs 
159 at 168. 
15  A.-M. Slaughter, “Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actors in the International System” 
in Y. Dezalay & B.G. Garth, eds., Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation, 
and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2002) 12 at 13. 
16  Y. Dezalay & B.G. Garth, “Legitimating the New Legal Orthodoxy” in Dezalay & Garth, 
ibid. 306 at 308. See also K. Jayasuriya, “Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of 
Law: From Political to Economic Constitutionalism?” (2001) 8 Constellations 442. 
17  M.O. Chibundu, “Globalizing the Rule of Law: Some Thoughts at and on the Periphery” 
(1999) 7 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 79 at 81. 
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systems”18 should disputes arise. They want to avoid both the substantive and 
procedural laws of foreign states which may be totally alien and unacceptable 
to one or both of the parties.19 As one commentator notes:  
“The most typical international case is an arbitration agreement with 
ensuing arbitral proceedings between two parties who have their 
places of business in different countries. Each of the parties will 
probably have confidence only in its own law and misgivings about 
the law of the other party. The reason is not necessarily that the other 
law is in fact less favourable than one’s own law but that as a foreign 
law it is simply not so familiar and thus often perceived as strange. 
As in the similar situation of the choice of substantive law of the 
contract, the result is often to choose the law of a third country with 
which neither party is really familiar. In the context of arbitration, 
this means to choose a so-called ‘neutral’ venue which is equally 
foreign to both parties.”20  
The avoidance of local and national courts and legal systems is the main 
reason for the popularity of international commercial arbitration as 
globalization’s dispute resolution process of choice.21 It is argued that 
international trade and other transnational transactions, including Internet 
transactions, require a body of rules that is free from the idiosyncratic 
                   
18  E. Mendes, “Canada: A New Forum to Develop the Cultural Psychology of International 
Commercial Arbitration” (1986) 3 J. Int’l Arb. 71 at 81. 
19  Ibid. This desire to avoid national legal systems is also illustrated by the growing use of 
international commercial arbitration in foreign direct investment (FDI) disputes between 
states and private persons such as those overseen by the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the work of the Iran-United States 
Claims tribunal. Core provisions of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) include dispute 
settlement using arbitration. The particular dispute settlement provisions in NAFTA’s 
controversial Chapter 11 are based on those in the standard United States BIT. Under 
these procedures in the NAFTA, private investors may seek arbitration of a dispute 
against a signing party to NAFTA. The basic model for Chapter 11’s dispute resolution 
process is private international commercial arbitration. 
20  G. Herrmann, “The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: 
Introduction and General Provisions” in Petar Šarcevic, Essays on International 
Commercial Arbitration (London: Graham & Trotman, 1989) 3 at 5. 
21  L. Wilberforce, “Resolving International Commercial Arbitration Disputes: The 
Alternatives,” in R.K. Paterson & B.J. Thompson, UNCITRAL Arbitration Model in 
Canada: Canadian International Commercial Arbitration Legislation (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1987) 7 at 7. 
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differences that arise between national legal systems.22 It has been said that 
creating a “viable international adjudicative system which is truly 
supranational and multi-cultural in character, to meet the needs of the 
international business community” is one of the most challenging tasks 
facing the global community.23 And, it is argued, specialized systems of law 
devised and employed by groups of traders are the models of law-making 
towards which, in a deregulated, market-driven world, we should all aspire.24  
A basic tenet of international commercial arbitration law, therefore, is the 
idea that disputants should have the greatest freedom to select the rules 
applicable to the resolution of their dispute: “The principle of party autonomy 
seeks to free parties to international business disputes from the limitations 
and idiosyncrasies of particular legal systems and to fulfil their more 
cosmopolitan needs and expectations.”25 
In all of the late 20th century reforms of arbitration law, including those 
in Canada, a primary tension exists between two principles: 
• party autonomy—that is, that arbitration is founded on the 
agreement of the parties, and that agreement should be respected 
even though a court may have reservations about its terms, the 
process followed or the result achieved; and 
• judicial scrutiny—that is, that courts have a public right and 
responsibility as organs of the state to ensure that the process of 
arbitration operates in all cases according to a uniform, if 
minimum, standard imposed by law.26  
                   
22  R.D. Cooter, “Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy” (1994) 23 Sw. U. L. Rev. 
443. 
23  Mendes, supra note 18 at 92. 
24  Cooter, supra note 22. Such an assertion, of course, assumes that law exists to serve the 
economy rather than other ends: J. Goldring, “Consumer Protection, Globalization and 
Democracy” (1998) 6 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1 at 56. 
25  R.K. Paterson, “International Commercial Arbitration: An Overview” in Paterson & 
Thompson, supra note 21, 113 at 114. 
26  Law Commission, Report No. 20: Arbitration (Welland: Law Commission, 1991) at 65 
[hereinafter New Zealand Law Commission]. The tension is also reflected in the division 
between the majority report and the dissent on the extent of judicial supervision in the 
Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on Arbitration (Vancouver: Law 
Reform Commission of British Columbia, 1982). The majority stated that “[j]ustice, in 
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This tension is related to the conceptual basis for arbitration. As the New 
Zealand Law Commission noted in its 1991 report on arbitration law reform, 
“[t]here are various theories which have been put forward to explain 
arbitration—each with consequences for where the balance between party 
autonomy and judicial scrutiny should be.”27 
In the “Contractual Theory” of international commercial arbitration, the 
arbitration agreement is seen as an independent source of arbitrators’ 
authority. One definition of arbitration from this perspective is as follows:  
“Arbitration is a device whereby the settlement of the question, which 
is of interest for two or more persons, is entrusted to one or more 
other persons—the arbitrator or arbitrators—who derive their powers 
from a private agreement, not from the authority of a state, and who 
are to proceed and decide the case on the basis of such an 
agreement.”28 
The argument here is that the parties voluntarily agree to submit their 
disputes to arbitration, to appoint the arbitrator and, most importantly, to 
accept his award as having binding force.29 Once authorized by the parties to 
 
our view, should not be subordinated to considerations of speed and convenience” ibid. 
at 74. The dissent insisted that “the most important feature of an arbitration system is that 
it was intended to be quick and final” and “we must be sensitive to the needs of the 
people whom the system will serve and recognize their needs and expectations rather 
than the existing system they have sought to avoid” ibid. at 87-88. 
27  New Zealand Law Commission, ibid. at 66. 
28  R. David, Arbitration in International Trade (Deventer: Kluwer, 1985) at 5. See also 
H.C. Alvarez, “Introduction to International Commercial Arbitration”, Chapter 1 in 
Commercial Arbitration (Vancouver: Continuing Legal Education Society of British 
Columbia, 1986) at 1.1.02. 
29  My use of the male pronoun in referring to the arbitrator is gender-specific. A September 
2003 scroll through the list of arbitrators on the web sites of various arbitration 
organizations revealed that more than 90 per cent are male. See the ADR Institute of 
Canada web site at http://www.amic.org/, the British Columbia International Commercial 
Arbitration Centre web site at http://www.bcicac.com/ and the Québec National and 
International Commercial Arbitration Centre web site at http://www.cacniq.org/en/. 
There has not yet been much concern in Canada about who is deciding the cases referred 
to arbitration. The issue of gender in arbitration was addressed by an American 
Arbitration Association Task Force: see “Women and Diversity in ADR: A Roundtable”, 
(April/Sept. 1996) Dispute Resolution Journal 65 at 66. For a detailed analysis of the 
elite group of transnational lawyers that make up the field of international commercial 
arbitrators, see Y. Dezalay & B.G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial 
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make the award, the tribunal acts as an agent of the parties, and the award is 
binding on them as an agreement made on their behalf by their agent.30 This 
explanation of the legal nature of arbitration reduces the role of national law 
to a minimum.31  
The ascendency of the Contractual Theory as the predominant 
explanation for arbitration was assured in the international commercial arena 
quite some time ago.32 For example, a mid-1980s ICSID award stated: 
“Under the doctrine of party autonomy, parties to a contract are free to 
choose for themselves the law which is to govern their relationship. This 
doctrine has gained almost universal acceptance, particularly in international 
commercial arbitrations.”33  
The United States Federal Court of Appeal in 1987 proclaimed: “The 
right and duty to arbitrate disputes is purely a matter of contractual agreement 
between the parties.”34 The privatization of law under this perspective has led 
to charges of lawlessness35 and incompatibility with the rule of law.36  
 
Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996). 
30  New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 26 at 66-67. See also S.J. Toope, Mixed 
International Arbitrations: Studies in Arbitration between States and Private Persons 
(Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1990) at 9. 
31  J.D.M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Dobbs Ferry: 
Oceana, 1978) at 56-57. 
32  Ibid. at 51-66. See also Alvarez, supra note 28, “Introduction to International 
Commercial Arbitration”, Chapter 1 in Commercial Arbitration (Vancouver: Continuing 
Legal Education Society of British Columbia, 1986); P. Fouchard, L’Arbitrage 
commercial international (Paris: Dalloz, 1965) at 7-12; T.E. Carbonneau, “Arbitral 
Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment of its Remedial and Substantive Status in 
Transnational Commerce” (1984) 19 Texas Int’l L. Rev. 34. Each theory is contested: see 
e.g. F.A. Mann, “Lex Facit Arbitrum”, reprinted in (1986) Arbitration Int’l 241; A. 
Kassis, Théorie générale des usages du commerce (Paris: L.G.D.J., 1984). 
33  LETCO v. Republic of Liberia, ICSID Award, October 24, 1984 and March 31, 1986, 
reprinted in (1988) 13 Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 35 at 42-43. 
34  National Oil Co. of Iran v. Ashland Oil, Inc. 817, F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1987). 
35  P.J. McConnaughay, “The Risks And Virtues of Lawlessness: A ‘Second Look’ at 
International Commercial Arbitration” (1999) 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 453. McConnaughay 
states, at 453: 
   It is entirely possible today for parties to conduct an international arbitration in a 
nation that imposes no requirements or review whatsoever on the procedure or 
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The main alternative to the Contractual Theory is the “Jurisdictional 
Theory” which holds that the real authority of arbitration derives not from the 
contract between the parties, but from the recognition accorded by the state.37 
The validity of the arbitration agreement, the powers of the arbitrator, the act 
of adjudication by the arbitrator and the enforcement of the arbitrator’s award 
are all seen as depending on the law of the enforcing state.38 The arbitrator, in 
this theory, is more than an agent of the parties because he exercises a power 
that is beyond the authority of the parties to endow him. Therefore, the court, 
representing the state and applying its law, is entitled to insist on certain 
conditions. The courts need not recognize only the immediate needs and 
expectations of the parties before them; they are entitled to recognize, for 
instance, state interests in maintaining a fair and uniform system of law and 
order.39 The uniformity policy was the primary rationale for court 
intervention in England for a long time. Today court intervention is mainly 
justified by the felt need to protect weaker contractual parties from the 
consequences of their contracts or framed in terms of “procedural fairness.”40 
The result of adopting this theory is to subject arbitration to domestic law and 
assimilate arbitrators to judges.41  
The most important convention on international commercial arbitration 
and the most important impetus to the growth of international commercial 
arbitration in the latter half of the twentieth century is the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.42 The New York 
 
outcome of the arbitration. It is possible for the parties to elect, or for the arbitrators 
to decide, that the “law” governing the merits of the arbitration is basically no law 
at all. Further, it is possible for the parties to escape meaningful review of their 
resulting arbitral award and to secure the award's judicial enforcement in virtually 
all developed nations of the world. All but the last of these events, moreover, may 
occur in complete secrecy. 
36  W.E. Scheuerman, “Economic Globalization and the Rule of Law” (1999) 6 
Constellations 3. Scheuerman notes, at 3, that dispute resolution processes associated 
with globalization exhibit few of the virtues normally ascribed to the rule of law, relying 
instead on ad hoc, discretionary, closed and non-transparent legal forms. 
37  New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 26 at 66-67. 
38  Lew, supra note 31 at 52. 
39  New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 26 at 66-67. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Lew, supra note 31 at 53-54. 
42  UN Doc. E/Conf. 26/9/Rev. 1, reprinted in 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (in force June 7, 1959) 
[hereinafter the New York Convention]. According to C.O.D. Branson, “The Enforcement 
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Convention is an example of what William A.W. Neilson, in his paper for 
these Conference proceedings, calls “unification”. When the New York 
Convention entered into force in 1959, it put in place a treaty system which 
ensured the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards within 
contracting states. Nations adopted it unchanged as domestic law with full 
force and effect in their legal systems. The New York Convention limits the 
grounds for judicial review of awards and excludes any judicial review on the 
merits of an award by the court where enforcement is sought. It does not, 
however, contain any rules to guide the arbitration process and says nothing 
about control or supervision of the arbitral process by the courts at the place 
of arbitration. Those rules were supplied, in 1985, by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration.43 This blueprint for the unification of 
national laws embodies mid-1980s trends in international commercial 
arbitration and, particularly, American trends to allow the arbitration of 
previously non-arbitrable issues and to compel unwilling parties to 
arbitrate.44  
The central philosophy of the Model Law is one of party autonomy. The 
Model Law’s guiding principles can be summarized as follows:  
• parties should be free to design the arbitral process as they see fit, 
but the arbitral process should be “fair” to both parties;  
• parties who enter into valid arbitration agreements should be held 
to those agreements;  
• the arbitration tribunal should be neutral and as unbiased as 
possible, and should be empowered to determine its own 
jurisdiction;  
 
of International Commercial Arbitration Agreements in Canada” (2000) 16 Arbitration 
International 19 at 19, the New York Convention “the greatest contributing factor to the 
acceptance and use of international commercial arbitration today.” 
43  UN Doc A/40/17 (1985), reprinted in (1985) 24 I.L.M. 1302 [hereinafter the Model 
Law]. See also E. Chiasson, “Canada: No Man’s Land No More” (1986) J. Int’l Arb. 67. 
44  Mitsubushi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614 (1985) 
(U.S.S.C.) [hereinafter Mitsubishi]. 
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• the arbitration should proceed in confidence without substantial 
intervention by the courts; and  
• the resulting award should be readily enforceable, subject to 
review only on the basis of a limited and specified list of fatal 
flaws in form or procedure.45 
It is important to note that recognition of party autonomy as the basic 
norm of international commercial arbitration is not merely a consequence of 
theorizing that arbitration rests on the agreement of the parties. It is also the 
result of policy considerations geared to economic globalization.46 As Henry 
J. noted In Rio Algon Ltd. v. Sammi Steel Co., the purpose and spirit of the 
adoption of the Model Law by Ontario was to make commercial arbitration 
law in that province consistent with the law of other trading countries “so as 
to enhance and encourage international commerce in Ontario and the 
resolution of disputes by rules of international commercial arbitration ...”47 
II. REFORMING CANADA’S ARBITRATION LEGISLATION 
The adoption of the New York Convention and the Model Law in Canada 
in 1986 has been discussed extensively.48 The Manitoba Law Reform 
Commission’s 1994 report on arbitration provides a concise summary: 
“Federal and provincial government apathy about arbitration reform 
started to change in the 1980s due to the desire to attract international 
arbitration business. Canada was one of the last major international 
trading countries to accede to the 1958 United Nations Convention of 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, but it 
                   
45  R.A. Pepper, “Why Arbitrate?: Ontario’s Recent Experience with Commercial 
Arbitration”(1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 807 at para. 8. These central features and the 
primary motivations for their adoption are canvassed in greater detail in Uniform Law 
Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-Second Annual Meeting of the 
Uniform Law Conference of Canada (Toronto: Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 
1990) at 88 [hereinafter ULCC 1990] and in Mendes, supra note 18. 
46  Herrmann, supra note 20 at 9. 
47  (1991), 47 C.P.C. (2d) 251 at 257 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 
48  See e.g. Chiasson, supra note 43; Mendes, supra note 18; Paterson & Thompson, supra 
note 21; H. Alvarez, “The Role of Arbitration in Canada—New Perspectives” (1987) 21 
U.B.C.L. Rev. 247; and J.E.C. Brierley, “Québec’s New (1986) Arbitration Law” (1987-
88) 13 C.B.L.J. 58. 
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did so finally in 1986. This federal action was supported and 
implemented by uniform provincial statutes passed in 1986, the 
International Commercial Arbitration Act(s). 
Those statutes are patterned on the 1985 legislative model developed 
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). The UNCITRAL model was developed by a group of 
experts in the field of international arbitration and was reflective of 
the most progressive, developing views. The implementation of this 
model was ‘like going from the 19th century to the 21st century’ in 
international arbitration law. 
This momentum for change has been continued in the area of 
domestic arbitration by some provinces. In 1986, British Columbia 
enacted a new Commercial Arbitration Act, based on earlier 
recommendations of the British Columbia Law Reform Commission 
which pre-dated the UNCITRAL model but anticipated many of its 
general reforms. In the civil law arena, Québec also adopted a more 
progressive domestic arbitration law in 1986. 
The Alberta Law Reform Institute did major work in adapting the 
UNCITRAL model for provincial domestic arbitration use; this work 
was furthered by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada which in 
1990 produced a model Uniform Arbitration Act. This model uniform 
statute forms the basis for the new arbitration legislation enacted in 
Alberta, Ontario and Saskatchewan. New Brunswick has also passed 
an Act based on this uniform model...”49  
                   
49  Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Arbitration, Report #85 (1994) at 3 [footnotes 
omitted]. See the United Nations Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention Act, S.C. 1986, c. 
21; Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 17; International 
Commercial Arbitration Act, S.A. 1986, c. I-6.6; International Commercial Arbitration 
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 233; International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.M. 1986-87, c. 
32, C.C.S.M., c. C151; International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.N.B. 1986, c. I-12.2; 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. I-15; International 
Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. I-6; International Commercial 
Arbitration Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 234; International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 
1990, c. I.9; International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. I-5; 
International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.S. 1988-89, c. I-10.2; International 
Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.Y. 1986 (Supp.), c. 14 [hereinafter collectively 
International Commercial Arbitration Acts]. The history is reported in greater detail in 
the Preface to Paterson & Thompson, supra note 21 at vi-x. Paterson and Thompson 
attribute the most serious obstacle to creating a legal climate suitable for the business of 
resolving international commercial disputes as being “an attitudinal problem” that 
changed only when Canadian business began to take international trade more seriously. 
138  THE NEW RULE OF LAW / LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
Subsequently, Manitoba enacted its own new domestic arbitration law, 
modeled on the Alberta legislation.50 Nova Scotia also passed a new 
Commercial Arbitration Act in 1999,51 bringing to eight the number of 
provinces with domestic arbitration statutes strongly influenced by the 
UNCITRAL Model Law designed for international commercial arbitrations.  
The organization and principles of the Uniform Arbitration Act adopted 
by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC) in 1990 are recognizably 
those of the Model Law:  
“Generally speaking, the only interests involved in an arbitration are 
those of the parties. While it may be argued that a whole mandatory 
scheme should be imposed upon them for their own good, we see no 
justification for doing so. Party control is one fundamental principle 
upon which arbitration law should be based.”52  
However, the ULCC did conclude there was a greater role for judicial 
scrutiny of domestic arbitral procedure and awards.53 While the International 
Commercial Arbitration Acts apply only to “international” and “commercial” 
arbitration agreements,54 usually entered into by reasonably sophisticated 
                   
50  MAA, supra note 8. 
51  NSCAA, supra note 9. 
52  “Proceedings of the Seventy-first Annual Meeting” (Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 
Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, August 1989) [hereinafter ULCC 1989] [emphasis 
added]. 
53  ULCC 1990, supra note 45 at 88-89. 
54  The adoption of the Model Law created this distinction between international 
commercial and domestic arbitrations in Canada. With regard to being “international”, 
the most important provision, governing 90 to 98% of the cases regarded as international, 
is art. 1(3)(a) which provides that if the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the 
time of the conclusion of that agreement, their places of business in different states, then 
the arbitration is international. See Herrmann, supra note 20 at 22. Thus, for the most 
part, “international” means across state boundaries. There is no definition of 
“commercial” in the Model Law. Most Canadian common law jurisdictions have enacted 
a provision that slightly expands the application of the Model Law by stating it applies 
“in respect of differences arising out of commercial legal relationships, whether 
contractual or not.” See e.g. the International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.A. 2000, 
c. I-5, s. 2(2). However, the International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1990, 
which does not define “commercial” and restricts “international” by not adopting art. 
1(3)(c) which states that an arbitration is international if “the parties have expressly 
agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more than one 
country.” 
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commercial parties assumed to have relatively equal bargaining power, the 
domestic arbitration legislation applies to all forms of arbitration, whether 
commercial or not. The Uniform Arbitration Act, and the provincial statutes 
that shaped it or are modeled after it, are therefore based upon the following 
principles: 
• fairness, or equality of treatment 
• control by the parties (except as required by equality of 
treatment), and 
• efficiency, or satisfaction of the interests of the parties (except as 
required by equality of treatment, and except as agreed by the 
parties).55 
Fairness, or equality of treatment, represents the partial adoption of the 
Jurisdictional Theory. However, the Contractual Theory and party autonomy 
are well represented by the second and third principles. In the third—
efficiency—we also see economic globalization’s influence. 
III. RESHAPING CANADIAN JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
Canada was one of the last industrial nations to sign the New York 
Convention, albeit the first to adopt the Model Law.56 Our courts lag 
anywhere from five to fifteen years behind their United States counterparts in 
adopting a deferential attitude to arbitration. It was in the mid-1970s that 
American courts began to shed their hostility toward arbitral proceedings, 
characterizing the change as “an almost indispensable precondition to 
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any 
international business transaction.”57 The key to the evolution of judge-made 
                   
55  ULCC 1989, supra note 52. 
56  See text accompanying note 52. 
57  Scherk v. Alberto Culver, 417 U.S. 506 at 516 (1974). A further step was taken in 1985 
in Mitsubishi, supra note 44, when the United States Supreme Court overturned a series 
of lower court decisions that held the public interest in the enforcement of antitrust laws 
and the nature of antitrust claims made them inappropriate for arbitration. A brief history 
of the change in the American courts, attitude to arbitration and its acceptance of the 
New York Convention and the principle of party autonomy can be found in M.F. 
Hoellering, “International Commercial Arbitration: The United States Perspective” in 
Paterson & Thompson, supra note 21 at 17. 
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arbitration law in the United States is party autonomy and the courts have 
maintained a non-intervention policy in both domestic and international 
arbitrations since the early 1980s.58  
Despite the late start here, broad deference to arbitration under the Model 
Law has been shown in almost all Canadian international commercial 
arbitration cases.59 For example, the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1994 
acknowledged: 
“The purpose of the United Nations Conventions and legislation 
adopting them is to ensure that the method of resolving disputes, in 
the forum and according to the rules chosen by the parties, is 
respected. Canadian courts have recognized that predictability in the 
enforcement of dispute resolution provisions is an indispensable 
precondition to any international business transaction and facilitates 
and encourages the pursuit of freer trade on an international scale.”60  
The norm of party autonomy and its underlying Contractual Theory has 
been explicitly recognized in cases such as Cangene Corp. v. Octapharma 
AG,61 where Morse J. noted that “[c]ourts in Canada and the United States 
have, on the basis of freedom of contract, generally accepted and approved of 
the arbitration contemplated in the Act and there is little room for judicial 
intervention in the process.”62  
The question is whether the Contractual Theory predominates in domestic 
arbitration as it does in international commercial arbitration. To what extent 
have Canadian judges adopted the norm of party autonomy in domestic and, 
particularly, consumer cases? To what extent is the principle of judicial 
scrutiny, which was recognized as having a greater role to play in the 
                   
58  Hoellering, ibid. at 18. 
59  R.O. Chibueze, “The Adoption and Application of the Model Law in Canada” (2001) 18 
J. Int’l Arbitration 191 at 197. 
60  Automatic Systems Inc. v. Bracknell Corp. (1994), 18 O.R. (3d) 257 (C.A.) at 264. 
61  (2000) 147 Man.R. (2d) 228 (QB) relying on BWV Investments Ltd. v. Saskferco 
Products Inc. (1995), 137 Sask. L.R. 238 (C.A.). 
62  The relationship between globalization and the principle of party autonomy has also been 
acknowledged. See text accompanying note 47. 
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domestic context by those drafting the domestic legislation,63 incorporated 
into judicial decisions? 
For at least 500 years, judges have shown discomfort with their 
relationship to the arbitral process.64 However, in the past ten to twenty years, 
numerous law reform commission reports and legislative changes in 
Canada’s arbitration laws have opened the door to a change in judicial 
attitudes towards arbitration.65 The latest word from the Supreme Court of 
Canada on the relationship between the Canadian courts and arbitration—
Éditions Chouette (1987) Inc. c. Desputeaux66—is a particularly strong 
endorsement of the norm of party autonomy in arbitration and the expectation 
of deference by the judiciary to the arbitration process. In the context of 
limits on judicial review of the validity of arbitral decisions, the Supreme 
Court reversed a Québec Court of Appeal decision that an arbitrator must 
apply the rules of public order correctly, an approach that LeBel J. held that 
runs “counter to the fundamental principle of the autonomy of arbitration.”67 
And while acknowledging “limitations placed on the autonomy of the 
arbitration system”,68 just as there are limitations on the scope of individual 
legal action and contractual freedom,69 LeBel J. continued by noting the 
                   
63  See text accompanying note 55. 
64  See D. Roebuck, “The Myth of Judicial Jealousy” (1994) Arb. Int’l 395 and R.B. von 
Mehren, “From Vynior’s Case to Mitsubishi and Public Law” (1986) 12 Brooklyn J. Int’l 
L. 583. 
65  L. Biukovic, “Impact of the Adoption of the Model Law in Canada: Creating a New 
Environment for International Arbitration” (1998) 30 C.B.L.J. 376 at 379. 
66  2003 SCC 17 [hereinafter Éditions Chouette]. The Quebec National and International 
Commercial Arbitration Centre (CACNIQ) was one of the interveners in the action, 
broadly supporting the appellants in their arguments for the need to protect the role of 
arbitration. In a March 21, 2003 press release on its web site at 
http://www.cacniq.org/en/, the arbitration centre noted: “In a decision which is very 
favourable to arbitration and which adopted, in substance, arguments the CACNIQ 
presented as intervener, the Supreme Court of Canada has set aside a decision of the 
Quebec Court of Appeal that had annulled an arbitral award on various grounds.” The 
relevant Québec statutory framework, unlike that of the common law provinces, makes 
almost no statutory distinction between international and domestic arbitrations and thus 
some caution must be exercised in applying Éditions Chouette to cases under the 
domestic legislation of other provinces. 
67  Ibid. at para. 66. 
68  Ibid. at para. 51. 
69  Ibid. at para. 52. 
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concept of public order, in the context of arbitration, had to be interpreted 
and applied with regard to:  
“legislative policy that accepts this form of dispute resolution and 
even seeks to promote its expansion. For that reason, in order to 
preserve decision-making autonomy within the arbitration system, it 
is important that we avoid extensive application of the concept by the 
courts. Such wide reliance on public order in the realm of arbitration 
would jeopardize that autonomy, contrary to the clear legislative 
approach and the judicial policy based on it.”70  
Although a thorough analysis of the approach of Canadian courts to the 
modern domestic arbitration legislation is beyond the scope of this paper, I 
want to highlight some of the issues in the interpretation and application of 
that legislation which reveal the tension between the principles of party 
autonomy and judicial supervision. The question of the influence of 
international commercial arbitration’s norm of party autonomy will be 
examined in the context of applications to stay court proceedings in favour of 
arbitration, applications that speak directly to the judiciary’s relationship to 
arbitration. Although over two hundred cases have been decided under the 
modern domestic arbitration legislation,71 I consider only five of the many 
issues raised in stay applications. Only a few of the cases considering those 
five issues will be discussed: cases that illustrate the tension between the two 
supposedly contradictory principles of party autonomy and judicial scrutiny. 
In the last section of this part, I look at two recent cases suggesting the 
process of the “consumerization” of domestic arbitration has begun in 
Canada.  
A. Applications to Stay Court Proceedings in Favour of Arbitration 
All of the modern domestic arbitration legislation contains a provision 
stating the courts cannot intervene in the arbitration process except as 
                   
70  Ibid. [emphasis added]. 
71  See Appendix B, below for a breakdown of these cases by type of application before the 
court, by year, and by province. The cases were accumulated using the digests in the 
Canadian Abridgement Online, through queries for “arbitration” restricted by date in 
each of the relevant provinces’ “Judgments” databases in Quicklaw, and through 
references to other cases in those located through the first two sources. 
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expressly allowed by that legislation.72 Courts are expressly allowed to 
intervene in order to prevent the preemption of arbitration by court actions.73 
If a party to an arbitration agreement brings an action in court about a matter 
which it agreed to submit to arbitration, the court in which the action is 
brought must, when asked, stay the action except in the specific, limited 
circumstances listed in the legislation. I will focus on courts’ responses to the 
apparent removal of their discretion to refuse to stay court proceedings and 
courts’ approaches to interpreting these stay provisions.  
1. From “May” to “Must” and “Shall” 
The old arbitration acts, modeled on the English Arbitration Act, 1889,74 
made the granting of a stay a discretionary matter for the courts.75 It was the 
exercise of that discretion which is said to have led legislatures to regard 
refusals of stays as judicial intervention.76  
Almost all courts have taken note of the change in the domestic 
arbitration legislation which appears to make the granting of stays mandatory 
if the enumerated preconditions are met. For example, in International 
Resource Management (Canada) Ltd. v. Kappa Energy (Yemen) Inc., the 
Alberta Court of Appeal heard an appeal from an order staying legal 
proceedings conditionally and noted: “[T]he Arbitration Act section 7 has 
rewritten the rules for a stay. The court must stay a suit in favour of 
                   
72  BCCAA, supra note 2, s. 32; AAA, supra note 4, s. 6; SAA, supra note 6, s. 7; MAA, supra 
note 8, s. 6; NSCAA, supra note 9, s. 8; NBAA, supra note 7, s. 6; OAA, supra note 5, s. 6; 
art. 940.3 C.C.P. 
73  BCCAA, ibid., s. 15; AAA, ibid., s. 7; SAA, ibid., s. 8; MAA, ibid., s. 7; NSAA, ibid., s. 9; 
NBAA, ibid., s. 7; OAA, ibid., s.7; art. 940.3 CCP. See Appendix A, below for the 
wording of these sections. 
74  Supra note 10. 
75  See e.g. OAA, supra note 5, which provided that if a party to an arbitration agreement 
applied to court to stay court proceedings “a judge of that court, if satisfied that there is 
no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the 
submission … may make an order staying the proceeding” [emphasis added]. 
76  Gulf Canada Resources Ltd. v. Arochem International Ltd. (1992), 66 B.C.L.R. (2nd) 
113 (C.A.). 
144  THE NEW RULE OF LAW / LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
arbitration when the plaintiff is a party to the contract for arbitration. It has 
no choice.”77 
The court later emphasized that “the general scheme of the Act, and the 
evil to remedy for which it was passed, suggest an inflexible duty to stay, 
with few and clear exceptions.”78 This same point was acknowledged in 
Deluce Holdings, an Ontario case: 
“Whereas prior to the enactment of this legislation the courts in 
Ontario had a broad discretion whether or not to stay a court action, 
the focus has now been reversed: the court must stay the court 
proceeding and allow the arbitration to go ahead unless the matter 
either falls within one of the limited exceptions or is not a matter 
which the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.”79  
However, in some cases decided under the modern domestic arbitration 
statutes, courts have continued to act as though they had a discretion to refuse 
a stay. For example, in North Sea Products Ltd. v. Carmar Fish Corp.,80 the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal heard an application for leave to appeal 
from a dismissal of North Sea’s stay application. That stay application had 
been dismissed on the basis that the dispute was outside the scope of the 
arbitration clause. Southin J., in a brief oral judgment refusing leave, 
indicated her “tentative view” that the arbitration clause did not include 
licensing disputes.81 However, the main reason for her dismissal appeared to 
be the perceived futility of a stay of the court proceedings: 
“One of the considerations on granting leave is whether there is 
practical utility in the appeal. It seems to me there is no practical 
utility for these parties in this proposed appeal over the issue of 
whether the licensing questions are within the arbitration clause. 
They can litigate that in this court. They may end up litigating it again 
                   
77  (2001), 16 B.L.R. (3d) 163, 92 Alta. L.R. (3d) 25, 281 A.R. 373, 2001 ABCA 146 (C.A.) 
at para. 12 [emphasis added]. 
78  Ibid. at para. 20. 
79  Deluce Holdings Inc. v. Air Canada (1992), 12 O.R. (3d) 131 at 148 (Gen. Div.) 
[hereinafter Deluce Holdings] [emphasis added]. 
80  [1998] B.C.J. No. 3097 (S.C.), online: QL (BCJ); [1998] B.C.J. No. 2758 (C.A.), online: 
QL (BCJ). The dispute concerned monies owing under a herring roe processing contract 
between North Sea and Carmar Fish. 
81  Ibid. at para. 8. 
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in the Court below. If the matter were to go to arbitration, and the 
arbitrator were to say, ‘Yes, the thing is included,’ there would then, 
no doubt, be an attack on the arbitration award on the question of 
jurisdiction, and this case would go on forever unresolved.”82 
There is no discussion of whether a court can hear an appeal of a refusal 
of a stay application, no discussion of the statutory provision governing stays, 
and no discussion of who decides questions of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. 
Instead, Southin J. essentially refused leave to appeal the stay refusal because 
she perceived the court to be a better forum in which to decide the issues. 
However, the appropriateness or convenience of the forum are not relevant 
considerations under the new domestic arbitration legislation, as other courts 
have noted.83 
At the opposite extreme of the approach taken in North Sea Products is 
that seen in AMEC E & C Services Ltd. v. Nova Chemicals (Canada) Ltd.84 
AMEC applied to the court for a declaration that any liability they might 
have had under a contract with Nova Chemicals had expired with the passage 
of time.85 During the hearing of the application, Sachs J. raised the question 
of whether the issues in the application were within the scope of the 
arbitration clause in the parties’ contract. While acknowledging the “relevant 
statutory provisions”86 contemplated a stay order would be made on 
application by a party to an arbitration agreement, Sachs J. held that court 
                   
82  Ibid. at para. 10. 
83  See e.g. Scotia Realty Ltd. v. Olympia & York SP Corp. (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 414 (Gen. 
Div.) and Pembina Resources Ltd. v. Saskenergy Inc., (1993) Alta. L.R. (3d) 153 (C.A.). 
84  (2003) 35 B.L.R. (3d) 100 (Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter AMEC]. 
85  AMEC had provided engineering consulting services to Nova for the expansion and 
upgrading of a chemical plant at Sarnia and the work had been completed in 1998, four-
and-one-half years earlier. The parties’ contract provided that any liability which AMEC 
may have had under the contract would expire two years after the date the work was 
completed. The same contract provided: “Any dispute between the Parties that cannot be 
resolved by negotiation within 60 days shall be finally settled by arbitration pursuant to 
the International Chamber of Commerce Rules and procedures for Arbitration.” 
86  Sachs J. referred to both the domestic arbitration legislation and the international 
commercial arbitration legislation despite the fact that, by their provisions, they are 
mutually exclusive. 
146  THE NEW RULE OF LAW / LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
could, on its own motion, stay the proceedings and refer the dispute to 
arbitration.87 Sachs J. stated: 
“[T]he fact that neither party has clearly asked for a stay does not 
detract from the fact that this is a case where the parties have agreed 
to have their disputes dealt with through arbitration and, having 
reached that agreement, they should be encouraged by the courts ‘to 
hold their course’ in that regard, absent legitimate considerations to 
the contrary.  
… 
Proceeding to arbitration will necessitate some more delay but, taken 
as a whole, this delay is not a sufficient reason to depart from what I 
see to be an important principle—that parties who contractually agree 
to submit their dispute to arbitration should be held to that agreement, 
rather than being encouraged to separate out certain aspects of their 
dispute for determination by the courts in separate proceedings.”88  
AMEC’s application for a declaration was stayed and the parties were 
referred to arbitration, something neither of them asked for. Having once 
agreed their disputes “shall be finally settled by arbitration,” the parties were 
held to their contract, enhancing arbitral, if not party, autonomy.89  
2. The Use of Heyman v. Darwins Ltd.90  
The leading case under the old arbitration statutes in which the granting 
of a stay was discretionary was Heyman, a 1942 decision of the House of 
Lords. The four-step approach to deciding how to exercise the court’s 
discretion was described in that case as follows: 
                   
87  She found such authority in s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 
which provided: “A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or 
not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.” 
88  AMEC, supra note 84, at paras. 28, 30. 
89  The parties could have agreed to terminate the arbitrator’s mandate under s. 14(1)(b) of 
the OAA. 
90  [1942] A.C. 356, [1942] 1 All E.R. 337 (H.L.) [hereinafter Heyman cited to A.C.]. 
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“Where proceedings at law are instituted by one of the parties to a 
contract containing an arbitration clause and the other party, founding 
on the clause, applies for a stay, the first thing to be ascertained is the 
precise nature of the dispute which has arisen. The next question is 
whether the dispute is one which falls within the terms of the 
arbitration clause. Then [consider] whether the clause is still effective 
or whether something has happened to render it no longer operative. 
Finally… [determine] whether there is any sufficient reason why the 
matter in dispute should not be referred to arbitration.”91  
Oddly enough, Heyman is the most often cited precedent in cases 
considering the mandatory stay provisions in the modern domestic arbitration 
legislation.92 Use of Heyman, however, implies the old discretion remains.93  
                   
91  Ibid. at 370. 
92  Heyman is cited, for example, in AMEC, supra note 84; Axia Supernet Ltd. v. Bell West 
Inc., [2003] A.J. No. 283, online: QL (AJ) 2003 ABQB 195 [hereinafter Axia]; 
Continental Commercial Systems Corp. v. Davies Telecheck International, Inc., [1995] 
B.C.J. No. 2440 (S.C.) [hereinafter Continental]; Daigneault Holdings Ltd. (c.o.b. 
NorSask Aboriginal Consulting Group) v. Metis Nation of Sask Secretariate Inc., [2000] 
S.J. No. 390 (Q.B.); Ontario v. Abilities Frontier Co-operative Homes Inc., (1996), 5 
C.P.C. (4th) 81 (Ont. Gen. Div.), leave to appeal refused, [1997] O.J. No. 238 (C.A.), 
online: QL (OJ) [hereinafter Abilities Frontier]; Thompson General Hospital v. CSL 
Hospital Services Ltd., [1996] M.J. No. 495 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Thompson General 
Hospital]. Many other cases merely cite Abilities Frontier for the proper approach but in 
that case, at page 86, Sharpe J. adopted the Heyman approach, relying on prior approval 
for it in T1T2 Ltd. Partnership v. Canada, [1994] O.R. (3d) 66, (1994), 19 B.L.R. (2d) 72 
(Ont. Gen. Div.) [hereinafter T1T2]. See e.g. Durham (Regional Municipality) v. Oshawa 
(City), [2003] O.J. No. 776 (Sup. Ct.) and Mantini v. Smith Lyons LLP, [2003] O.J. No. 
1831 (C.A.), online: QL (OJ) at para.17 [hereinafter Mantini]. A reference to the 
approach taken in T1T2, as well to that in Abilities Frontier, is therefore a reference to 
the Heyman approach to stay applications. 
93  See e.g. McCulloch v. Peat Marwick Thorne (1991), 124 A.R. 267 (Q.B.). Perras J. 
found that the approach set out in Heyman was reflected in s. 7 of the new Alberta 
legislation. He refused to grant a stay, despite what he referred to as a “relatively 
encompassing” arbitration clause in a partnership agreement, because the plaintiff had 
alleged tortious conspiracy to remove him from an accounting partnership and loss of 
reputation and these matters were not capable of being the subject of arbitration under the 
Alberta Act. The decision was criticized by a member of the Alberta Law Reform 
Institute at a ULCC annual meeting for implying the old discretion remained through the 
use of stay rules from a decision made long before the new legislation significantly 
revamped the stay rules. See P.J.M. Lown, “Judicial Interpretation of the Uniform 
Arbitration Act” in Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-
seventh Annual Meeting, supra note 52 at app. K. 
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There are several challenges to the principle of party autonomy when 
courts use the Heyman approach. Its first step requires the “precise nature of 
the dispute” be determined. In B & N Holdings Ltd. v. Acrylon Plastics MB 
(1983) Inc.,94 a tenant applied for a stay in order to submit a dispute to 
arbitration under the terms of a lease and Manitoba’s new legislation. 
Schulman J. referred to a 1990 Manitoba Court of Appeal decision, Injector 
Wrap Corp. v. Agrico Canada Ltd.,95 which was, as Schulman J. noted, a 
case decided under the old legislation. In Injector Wrap, the Court of Appeal 
had held, relying on Heyman, that a litigant who wishes to obtain an order 
staying an action and referring the issue to arbitration must first file an 
affidavit showing the precise nature of the dispute between the parties.96 In B 
& N Holdings, the tenant argued the different requirements of the modern 
legislation to no avail. Schulman J. concluded:  
“[I]n order for these defendants to succeed on an application for a 
stay on the ground that the matter should be submitted to arbitration, 
the defendants must set out in affidavit form the nature of the dispute. 
The defendants must satisfy this requirement for two reasons. Firstly, 
as under the former statute, the statute requires that there be a ‘matter 
in dispute,’ and the court, on an application of this kind, must go 
through the steps of ascertaining the nature of the dispute and 
ascertaining whether the dispute is one which falls within the terms of 
the arbitration clause. Secondly, under subsection 2(e), the court is 
required to consider whether ‘the matter in dispute is a proper one for 
default or summary judgment.’”97  
In contrast to the high level of scrutiny given the nature of the dispute in 
B & N Holdings, other courts appear to simply review claims alleged in the 
pleadings.98  
                   
94  (1999), 135 Man. R. (2d) 95 (Q.B.) [hereinafter B & N Holdings]. 
95  (1990), 67 Man. R. (2d) 158 (C.A.). 
96  Ibid. at 158-159. 
97  B & N Holdings, supra note 94 at para. 15. Schulman J. went on to find that, based on the 
very limited information the tenants provided, and despite not having a motion for 
summary judgment before him, s. 7(2)(e) applied. 
98  See e.g. the approach of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Armstrong v. Northern Eyes Inc., 
[2001] O.J. No. 1085, online: QL (OJ), 2001 CarswellOnt 1100 (Ont. C.A.) online: 
eCarswell http://www.ecarswell.com, aff’g (2000), 8 B.L.R. (3d) 46, 133 O.A.C. 366, 48 
O.R. (3d) 442, [2000] O.J. No. 1594 (Div. Ct.), online: QL (OJ) [hereinafter Armstrong]. 
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The second step in the Heyman approach is for the court to determine 
whether the dispute or disputes fall within the terms of the arbitration clause. 
One of the most common issues raised in stay applications is whether the 
parties agreed to arbitrate the disputes before the courts, i.e., whether the 
dispute is covered by the wording of their arbitration agreement.99 That 
agreement can be interpreted either narrowly or liberally.  
A more liberal approach to interpretation of arbitration clauses is often 
adopted when the court says nothing about the approach that should be taken 
to interpreting the legislative stay provisions.100 In Québec, a liberal approach 
appears to be tied to the policy change evidenced by the legislature’s 
approval and encouragement of arbitration.101 Most often, especially in 
Ontario, a court taking a liberal approach cites Onex Corp. v. Ball Corp.,102 a 
case decided under Ontario’s international commercial arbitration legislation. 
In Onex, Blair J. had indicated that courts should not try to put too fine a 
distinction on nuances between words such as “under,” “in relation to,” or “in 
connection with” when interpreting the scope of arbitration clauses. He went 
on to say: 
“At the very least, where the language of an arbitration clause is 
capable of bearing two interpretations, and on one of those 
interpretations fairly provides for arbitration, the courts should lean 
                   
99  The requirement that the party commencing the court action be a “party to an arbitration 
agreement” has resulted in arguments resisting stays on the basis the plaintiff or 
petitioner was not a party to the arbitration agreement, but such arguments are less 
common than those about the scope of the agreement. 
100  See e.g. Kwan & Kwan Ltd. v. Daimler Chrysler Canada Inc. (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 
792 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) online : eCarswell http://www.ecarswell.com. 
101  See e.g. Condominiums Mont Saint-Sauveur Inc. c. Constructions Serge Sauvé Ltée, 
[1990] A.Q. No. 2052 (C.A.), online: QL (AQ) [hereinafter Condominiums]; Clavel c. 
Productions Musicales Donald K. Donald Inc., [1994] A.Q. No. 411 (C.A.), online: QL 
(AQ) [hereinafter Clavel]; Bridgepoint International (Canada) Inc. v. Ericsson Canada 
Inc., [2001] Q.J. No. 2470 (Sup. Ct.), online: QL (QJ). 
102  (1994), 12 B.L.R. (2d) 151 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [hereinafter Onex]. Agrifoods International 
Cooperative Ltd. v. Agropur, Coopérative Agro-Alimentaire (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 
911 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) online: eCarswell http://www.ecarswell.com at para. 26 and 
Thompson General Hospital, supra note 92 at para. 20, are two cases which cite Onex for 
this purpose. 
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towards honouring that option, given the recent developments in the 
law in this regard to which I have earlier referred.”103  
Many cases, however, are still quite concerned with the nuanced 
distinctions between phrases such as “under”, “arising out of” or “arising in 
connection with.”104 Heyman figures in these cases too, cited for the finding 
that the words “arising out of” have a wider meaning than “under.”105 As 
well, the distinction made in Heyman between “limited” or “executory” 
arbitration clauses and clauses of a “universal” character which are a “general 
resort to arbitration” remains in use in Ontario.106  
Deference to arbitration and respect for party autonomy would appear to 
require a more pragmatic and policy-oriented approach to determining 
whether a dispute before the court is within the scope of the parties’ 
arbitration agreement. Close attention to the exact words used and how they 
have been interpreted over the past sixty or seventy years and the 
categorization of types of clauses as “universal” or “limited” has been 
disparaged as the “old strict constructionist approach,”107 more in keeping 
with judicial scutiny of the boundaries of arbitration.  
3.  Who Decides Whether the Disputes are Within the Scope of the 
Arbitration Agreement? 
It is true that an arbitration agreement can be drafted as narrowly or 
broadly as the parties wish, referring all or only certain disputes to 
arbitration. The real issue, however, is who determines whether the dispute 
                   
103  Onex, ibid. at 160. One commentator said of this passage from Onex, “This statement 
provides both a refreshing approach to the conflicting authorities on defining the scope of 
an arbitration clause, and a strong endorsement of party autonomy.” See Pepper, supra 
note 45 at para. 37 [footnote omitted]. 
104  See e.g. Campney & Murphy v. Bernard & Partners, [2002] F.C.J. No. 1520, online: QL 
(FCJ), 2002 FCT 1136 (T.D.) (decided under the BCCAA); D.G. Jewelry Inc. v. 
Cyberdiam Canada Ltd., [2002] O.J. No. 1465 (S.C.J.), online: QL (OJ); and Mantini, 
supra note 92. 
105  Heyman, supra note 90 at 356, Porter L.J. 
106  See e.g. Deluce Holdings, supra note 79 at 150 and Cityscape Richmond Corp. v. 
Vanbots Construction Corp. (2001), [2001] O.J. No. 638, online: QL (OJ), 8 C.L.R. (3d) 
196, 2001 CarswellOnt 517 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) online: eCarswell http://www.ecarswell.com 
at para. 21. 
107  Branson, supra note 42 at 52. 
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before the court is within the scope of the arbitration agreement. All of the 
modern domestic arbitration legislation provides that an arbitrator may rule 
on his own jurisdiction to conduct the arbitration—the Competence de la 
Competence principle.108 They all state that in doing so, the arbitrator may 
rule on objections to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. 
They also all provide that, if the arbitration agreement is a clause in another 
agreement, an arbitration clause is to be treated as an independent agreement 
for the purposes of ruling on jurisdiction and may survive even if the main 
agreement is found to be invalid.109 Despite the existence of the last 
mentioned provision in the Ontario, Alberta and Manitoba domestic 
legislation, some courts in those provinces rely on Heyman for the 
independence of the arbitration clause principle110 and not the statutory 
provision. 
The difference in approaches to the question of who decides whether the 
disputes before the courts are within the scope of the arbitration clause can be 
illustrated by contrasting two cases from British Columbia. Deference to the 
arbitrator’s authority to decide his own jurisdiction is evident in Swanson v. 
Mitchell Bay Properties Ltd.,111 a case in which the sole issue was whether 
all of the plaintiff’s claims were within the scope of the arbitration clause. 
That case is one of the very few British Columbia cases to take note of 
section 22(1) of the BCCAA. Shabbits J. noted that section 22(1) states that 
unless the parties otherwise agreed the rules of the BCCAA for the conduct of 
domestic commercial arbitrations applied. Rule 20(1) of that arbitral 
organization stated the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, 
                   
108  See AAA, supra note 4, s. 17(1); OAA, supra note 5, s. 17(1); SAA, supra note 6, s. 18; 
MAA, supra note 8, s. 17; NSCAA, supra note 9, s. 19; NCAA, supra note 7, s. 17. The 
BCCAA provision is different. S. 22(1) merely states that the rules for domestic 
commercial arbitrations of the British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration 
Centre (the BCICAC) apply unless the parties otherwise agree. Those incorporated rules 
include the Competence de la Competence principle. 
109  See AAA, ibid., s. 17(3); SAA, ibid., s. 18(3); OAA, ibid., s. 17(2); MAA, ibid., s. 17(3); 
NSCAA, ibid., s. 19(3); NCAA, ibid., s. 17(3). Again the BCCAA merely provides in s. 
22(1) that the domestic commercial arbitration rules of the BCICAC are applicable unless 
the parties otherwise agree and those rules include the independence of the arbitration 
clause provision. 
110  For reliance on Heyman, supra note 90, see e.g. Axia, supra note 92; B & N Holdings, 
supra note 94; Thompson General Hospital, supra note 92. 
111  2002 BCSC 1434, 2002 CarswellBC 2485 (B.C.S.C.) online: eCarswell 
http://www.ecarswell.com. 
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including on any objection with respect to the existence or validity of the 
arbitration agreement. The court deferred to the arbitrator’s authority in the 
first instance.112  
That deferential approach can be contrasted with the judicial scrutiny 
brought to bear on the same issue in Maher v. Morelli Chertkow.113 A former 
partner commenced an action against the law firm he was forced to leave and 
the firm applied for a stay based on the partnership agreement’s arbitration 
clause. Maher opposed the application on the basis there was an issue as to 
whether the partnership agreement was valid and binding and argued that 
where there is that type of issue, it cannot go to the arbitrator because it 
effectively requires the arbitrator to decide an issue outside his jurisdiction. 
Maher relied on Heyman which, among other things, held that where there is 
a dispute as to whether there has ever been a binding contract between the 
parties, such a dispute cannot be within the scope of an arbitration clause in 
the challenged contract. Williams J. held: 
“In my view, that issue (whether a party is bound by the arbitration 
clause) will be resolved by the court, in the context of an application 
such as the present one, assuming sufficient evidence exists to enable 
a finding to be made. I take this from a plain reading of section 15 of 
the Commercial Arbitration Act ... 
For one party to simply contend that it does not consider itself bound 
by the arbitration clause cannot, standing alone, entitle that party to 
avoid the application of the clause. As I read subsection (2), the 
Court is mandated to determine whether the arbitration agreement 
(here, incorporated into the Partnership Agreement) is ‘void, 
inoperative or incapable of being performed’, or, alternatively, 
whether it is valid and in force.”114  
                   
112  Clavel, supra note 101, is another example of deference to the arbitrator’s authority to 
decide his own jurisdiction. The court acknowledged the dispute before the court was not 
an ordinary kind of dispute under the parties’ contract because it involved the deliberate 
and gratuitous sabotage of a rock concert. Nevertheless, the court held that because 
arbitrators had the power to decide their own competence under art. 943 C.C.P., subject 
to possible review by the court, it was up to the arbitrators to decide, in the first instance, 
whether the arbitration clause covered this dispute. 
113  (2003), 2003 CarswellBC 35 (B.C.S.C.) online: eCarswell http://www.ecarswell.com. 
There is no mention in this case that the parties had chosen any particular arbitration 
rules. 
114  Maher, ibid. at para. 16 [emphasis added]. 
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There is also said to be a “somewhat disturbing trend”,115 adverse to party 
autonomy, in cases relying upon statements of Blair J. in Deluce Holdings 
Inc. v. Air Canada.116 That case considered the interplay of the parties’ 
shareholder agreement, which included an arbitration clause, with the 
oppression remedy provisions of the Canada Business Corporations Act. 
Blair J. held that the real subject matter of the dispute was not the fair market 
value of the shares but one which “strikes at the very underpinning of the 
contractual mechanism itself.”117 In staying the arbitration proceedings, he 
stated that “[t]he question is whether that oppression is such that it destroys 
the very underpinning of the arbitration structure, thus taking the subject of 
the dispute out of the ‘matters to be submitted to arbitration under the 
agreement.’”118 The case is critiqued, however, for the court’s usurpation of 
the arbitration panel's authority to rule on its own jurisdiction.119 In addition, 
the reasoning in Deluce Holdings is seen as an invitation to narrowly 
construe the ambit of arbitration clauses and to find rather too easily that the 
conduct under consideration “destroys the very underpinning of the 
arbitration structure.”120  
4. Reasons to Refuse a Stay of Court Proceedings 
The modern domestic arbitration legislation in all but British Columbia 
lists five reasons the court may refuse a stay even if the arbitration agreement 
covers the disputes before the court.121 Only one of those five is frequently an 
issue, the ground that the arbitration agreement is invalid. In British 
                   
115  Pepper, supra note 45 at para. 48. 
116  Supra note 79. 
117  Ibid. at 150. 
118  Ibid. at 149. 
119  Pepper, supra note 45 at para. 50. 
120  Ibid. at para. 51. Cases that rely on Deluce Holdings, supra note 79, for this point include 
Jaffasweet Juices Ltd. v. Michael J. Firestone & Associates (1996), 45 C.P.C. (3d) 350 
(Ont. Gen. Div.) and Kightley v. Beneteau, [1999] O.J. No. 1892 (Sup. Ct.), online: QL 
(OJ) [hereinafter Kightley]. 
121  The five grounds are: (1) a party entered into the arbitration agreement while under a 
legal incapacity; (2) the arbitration agreement is invalid; (3) the subject-matter of the 
dispute is not capable of being the subject of arbitration under the relevant province’s 
law; (4) the motion was brought with undue delay; and (5) the matter is a proper one for 
default or summary judgment. 
154  THE NEW RULE OF LAW / LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
Columbia, where the legislation is less specific and more Model Law-like on 
this point, similar issues are raised because the court is required to refer the 
parties to arbitration unless it finds the arbitration agreement is null and void, 
inoperative, or incapable of being performed.122  
In dealing with arguments alleging the arbitration agreement is invalid 
and a stay should therefore be refused, some courts ignore the provision 
stating that the arbitration clause in a main agreement shall be considered a 
separate contract for the purposes of determining the arbitrator’s jurisdiction 
and may survive even if the main agreement is found to be invalid.123 Other 
courts ignore the fact that it is invalidity of the arbitration agreement, not the 
main agreement, that is listed as a reason to refuse a stay. For example, in the 
context of a wrongful dismissal suit in which the employer attempted to 
invoke an arbitration clause, Caswell J. in Novak v. Rodak,124 while 
acknowledging that the arbitration clause was very broad, declined to 
exercise what she called her “discretion” to stay on the ground that the 
validity of the main agreement was in issue. Why the validity of the main 
agreement was relevant to the validity of the arbitration clause in that main 
agreement was not discussed. Neither was the source of the court’s 
discretion.  
Part of the problem in cases such as Novak appears to stem from Heyman 
again and also older Supreme Court of Canada cases, such as 
Stokes-Stephens Oil Co. v. McNaught,125 which adopted the principle that “if 
one party to the alleged contract is contending that it is void ab initio 
(because, for example, the making of such a contract is illegal), the 
arbitration clause cannot operate, for on this view the clause itself is also 
void.”126  
                   
122  See s. 15(2) BCCAA in Appendix A, below. 
123  See e.g. G. v. G. (2000), 79 Alta. L.R. (3d) 153, [2000] 7 W.W.R. 363 (Q.B.) at para. 19. 
124  [1999] O.J. No. 4996 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), online: QL (OJ) [hereinafter Novak]. Wat-Char 
Holdings Ltd. v. Deltram Corp., [1999] O.J. No. 109 (Ont. Gen. Div.), online: QL (OJ) is 
a very similar case in which the court also declined to exercise its “discretion” to stay 
legal proceedings. 
125  (1918), 57 S.C.R. 549, 44 D.L.R. 682, [1918] 2 W.W.R. 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
McNaught cited to S.C.R.]. 
126  Ibid. at 559. 
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These old authorities were considered in Armstrong v. Northern Eyes 
Inc.,127 which concluded that reliance upon them was questionable due to the 
clear shift in policy in the legislation governing arbitration. Pitt J. refused to 
follow the older authorities, stating: 
“Presumably, parties seeking a stay to pursue arbitration will not 
acknowledge invalidity. There are, therefore, two possible ways to 
interpret section 7(2)2 of the Arbitration Act. Either it applies 
wherever the party resisting arbitration argues for invalidity, or where 
the court makes a prima facie determination that invalidity is a 
serious issue. In my view, the latter is the more reasonable 
interpretation, as the former would mean a mere allegation of 
invalidity would doom any attempt to invoke an arbitration clause in 
all cases, even where it is quite clear that is what the parties wanted 
when they made the agreement.”128  
 In the above passage, Pitt J. suggested, as a way to approach section 7(2) 
in which the invalidity of the arbitration agreement is a reason to refuse a 
stay, that the court make a “prima facie determination” that the alleged 
invalidity is a “serious issue”. However, the agreement which was alleged to 
be invalid in MG Canada was the main agreement in which the arbitration 
clause was contained. What of the independence of the arbitration clause and 
the possibility it might survive any invalidity of the main agreement?  
A more deferential attitude to party autonomy and a more deferential 
approach to arbitration acknowledges that the validity of the arbitration 
agreement can be attacked only if the grounds for attack specifically affect 
that part of the agreement and not just the contract in general.129 In a less 
deferential approach, doctrines such as fraud, unconscionability and duress 
which are alleged to affect the main agreement have been invoked as grounds 
for a court to refuse a stay.130  
                   
127  (2000), 8 B.L.R. (3d) 46 (Ont. Div. Ct.). See also MG Canada Ltd. v. Melitta Canada 
Inc. (2001), 11 C.P.C. (5th) 391, 18 B.L.R. (3d) 78 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter MG 
Canada]. 
128  MG Canada, ibid. at para. 18 [emphasis added]. 
129  New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 26 at 140. 
130  Unconscionability is the most common basis for allegations that the arbitration 
agreement itself is invalid. It has been raised several times in the franchise context but as 
most franchisors are American corporations the governing statutes are usually the ICA 
Acts. In such cases, many of the reasons for staying Canadian court actions in favour of 
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5. Partial Stays 
In all of the new domestic arbitration legislation except that of British 
Columbia, the provision governing stays contains a subsection providing that 
the court may stay those matters in dispute before it which are dealt with in 
the arbitration agreement and allow the court action to continue with respect 
to the other matters.131 In the exercise of this discretion, a court must find that 
the arbitration agreement deals only with some of the matters in dispute and 
that “it is reasonable to separate the matters in dispute dealt with in the 
agreement from the other matters.” The mere existence of this subsection 
causes some problems. One of its preconditions is that the court must find the 
arbitration agreement deals with only some of the matters in dispute and not 
others. It seems to demand the kind of close scrutiny called for in the 
Heyman approach and appears hostile to an arbitrator’s being able to 
determine his own jurisdiction.  
One specific issue that has arisen is whether the court has discretion to 
refuse a stay altogether and allow the entire court proceeding to continue if a 
partial stay is not reasonable or whether the only alternative is for a court to 
grant a complete stay of the court proceedings, given the section’s 
introductory and mandatory “shall stay” requirement. As Stewart J. in 
MacKay v. Applied Microelectronics Inc.132 noted, there is case law adopting 
both interpretations.133 Staying the entire court proceeding when a severing 
of causes of action is not “reasonable” is more deferential to the autonomy of 
the arbitral process. Referring none of the issues to arbitration, even though 
some of them are covered by the parties’ arbitration agreement, is usually 
 
arbitration in the United States rely on the Canadian franchisees not being vulnerable 
consumers and on American cases considering the same issues and the same franchise 
agreements. See e.g. Ellis v. Subway Franchise Systems of Canada Ltd. (2000), 8 B.L.R. 
(3d) 55, 2000 CarswellOnt 1659 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) online: eCarswell 
http://www.ecarswell.com; Continental, supra note 92; Petrolon Distribution Inc v. 
Petro-Lon Canada Ltd. (1995), 19 B.L.R. (2d) 123 at 135 (Ont. Gen. Div.); D.L.T. 
Holdings Inc. v. Grow Biz International, Inc., [2001] P.E.I.J. No. 29 (S.C. (T.D.)), 
online: QL (PEIJ). 
131  See AAA, supra note 4, s. 7(5); OAA, supra note 5, s. 7(5); SAA, supra note 6, s. 8(5); 
MAA, supra note 8, s. 7(5); NSCAA, supra note 9, s. 9(5); NCAA, supra note 7, s. 7(5). 
See Appendix A, below for the wording of the statutes. 
132  [2001] N.S.J. No. 342 (S.C.), online: QL (NSJ). 
133  See Rosedale Motors Inc. v. Petro-Canada Inc., [2001] O.J. No. 5368 (Div. Ct.), rev’g 
(1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 776 (Gen. Div.); Hammer Pizza Ltd. v. Domino's Pizza of Canada 
Ltd., [1997] A.J. No. 67 (Q.B.), online: QL (AJ); Kightley, supra note 120. 
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ON CANADIAN LAW AND COURTS 157 
done in the name of the inefficiency of multiple proceedings and the 
possibility of inconsistent results from the two different forums.134 
IV. THE CONSUMERIZATION OF ARBITRATION AND THE NORM 
OF PARTY AUTONOMY 
In 1997, one American commentator noted that the era of “consumerized 
arbitration” had arrived in the United States:  
“A sampling of judicial opinion and published commentary revealed 
mounting preoccupation with the use of arbitration in contracts 
involving employees, investors, franchisees, consumers of medical 
care and a host of other goods and services. On this broad front lie 
unprecedented challenges and perils for consensual conflict 
resolution. In contrast to the historical roots of commercial 
arbitration, members of the public were finding themselves steered 
into a process about which they knew little by virtue of boilerplate in 
a mass-produced contract presented by employers or businesses.”135  
A variety of consumer groups in the United States have made arbitration 
a major issue. They allege mandatory arbitration clauses are used to deny 
millions of Americans their right to sue in court; that they undermine 
consumer protections designed to level the playing field between big 
business and individuals; that private arbitration is much more expensive 
than going to court;136 that mandatory arbitration clauses are used to defeat 
class actions; and that a pro-business bias is built into the arbitration 
                   
134  See e.g. Angelo Breda Limited v. Guizzetti, [1995] O.J. No. 3250 (Gen. Div.), online: QL 
(OJ) and Self v. Abridean Inc., [2001] N.S.J. No. 493, online: QL (NSJ), 2001 NSSC 
191. See also the discussion of these issues in the context of conflicts and choice of law 
in the paper by C.A. Kent collected in these Conference proceedings. 
135  T.J. Stipanowich, “The Growing Debate Over ‘Consumerized’ Arbitration: Adding Cole 
to the Fire” Dispute Resolution Magazine 3:4 (Summer 1997) 20. 
136  One of the main problems in many of the American cases was the adoption of the rules 
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in arbitration clauses. Those rules 
required the initiating party to pay the filing fee and the costs were prohibitive for many 
consumers, sometimes $1,500 or $2,000. The AAA recently announced it would cap 
consumer arbitration costs at $375 for cases involving less than $75,000 and require the 
business to pay the remainder. It also announced it would no longer enforce pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in health insurance contracts. 
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system.137 Arbitration in the consumer context has even been an election 
issue in the United States.138 
Arbitration in the employment arena has attracted special criticism in the 
United States, where pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate employment 
disputes of all types, including allegations of discrimination and sexual 
harassment, became a common condition of non-unionized employment in 
the 1990s.139 Arbitration, and especially mandatory, pre-dispute agreements 
to arbitrate are said to be unlawfully coercive and a form of second-class 
justice.140 Even the National Academy of Arbitrators announced its 
opposition to such practices.141 Some courts refused to uphold such 
agreements on the basis that employees’ waivers of a judicial forum for 
claims such as sexual harassment and sex discrimination were not knowing 
or voluntary,142 but most lower courts upheld such agreements.  
Bearing in mind that changes in judicial attitude in favour of party 
autonomy in arbitration began ten to fifteen years earlier in the United States 
than in Canada, is there any indication that these types of concerns will be 
                   
137  State Action, http://www.cfpa.org/issues/mandatoryarbitration/index.cfm (date accessed: 
August 18, 2003) 
138  In the last state-wide election in Alabama, visible and plentiful placards promoted or 
derided arbitration, proclaiming such slogans as “Arbitration is a license to steal” or 
“Trial lawyers win—enough said.” See F.M. Haston, III, “Arbitration in Alabama: Of 
Road Signs and Reality” Ala. Law. 62 (January 2001) 63; M.C. McDonald & K.E. Reid, 
“Arbitration Opponents Barking up the Wrong Branch” Ala. Law. 62 (January 2001) 56 
56; T.J. Methvin, “Alabama—The Arbitration State” Ala. Law. 62 (January 2001) 48; 
M.B. Hutchens, “At What Costs?: When Consumers Cannot Afford the Costs of 
Arbitration in Alabama” (2002) 53 Ala. L. Rev. 599. The issues that had arisen in the 
consumer context—the reasons why arbitration was an election issue—included 
unconscionability, mutuality, post-contract notification, fraud as a defence, non-signatory 
challenges, the effects on class actions, and arbitration’s applicability in product warranty 
cases. Interestingly enough, pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are 
illegal per se in Alabama. In addition, consumers have to waive their Seventh 
Amendment rights to a jury trial when they sign an arbitration provision. 
139  See Gorman, “The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public Law Disputes” 
(1995) U. Ill. L. Rev. 635 and Hoffman, “Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute 
Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?” (1996) 17 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. Law 
131. 
140  See e.g. R. Alleyne, “Statutory and Discriminatory Claims: Rights ‘Waived’ and Lost in 
the Arbitration Forum” (1996) 13 Hofstra Labor Law Journal 381. 
141  Stipanowich, supra note 135. 
142  See e.g. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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coming before Canadian courts in the near future? The issue of the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses in pre-employment contracts has recently 
arisen in this country, as has the use of arbitration agreements as risk 
management tools to avoid class actions. Based on the American experience, 
these few cases may well be just the beginning. 
In Huras v. Primerica Financial Services Ltd.,143 potential employees of 
the defendant were required to undergo training without pay prior to 
commencing employment, contrary to the British Columbia Employment 
Standards Act. The defendant applied for a stay of the class proceedings on 
the basis of an arbitration provision in the employment agreements. The 
defendant’s application was dismissed on the ground that the employment 
contracts were entered into only when the employees began full-time 
employment, after the “no pay” training. That timing point was the only point 
on which the judgment of Cumming J. in Chambers was upheld by the Court 
of Appeal. It is, however, the comments of Cumming J. on the strictly obiter 
matters of exclusion of mandatory law and unconscionability that are of more 
interest in connection with the norm of party autonomy: 
“Very few, if any, of the putative class members would even consider 
proceeding to an arbitration of a dispute with Primerica given the cost 
of paying for one’s own arbitrator in the first instance and the risk of 
substantial costs in the event of failure. The arbitration clause 
mandates a three-person arbitration panel. There are cost sanctions if 
the plaintiff is unsuccessful at arbitration.  
Two of the normative purposes of an arbitration provision are to 
expedite the resolution of a dispute and to save costs that would be 
seen in a court action. The arbitration provision in the case at hand is 
to the opposite effect. As I have said, someone in the plaintiff’s 
position is not as a practical reality going to seek an arbitration. At 
the same time, if the arbitration provision is binding, there is not 
recourse to a court, including Small Claims Court. Thus, the 
provision inhibits and effectively frustrates aggrieved individuals 
from being able to obtain any resolution of disputes through a neutral, 
independent adjudicator. Primerica submits that the arbitration clause 
is enforceable even if utilization of the clause might prove 
                   
143  Huras v. Primerica Financial Services Ltd., [2000] O.J. No. 1474, online: QL (OJ), 
[2000] O.T.C. 533, (2000) 13 C.P.C. (5th) 114 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d (2000), 137 O.A.C. 79 
(C.A.) [hereinafter Huras]. 
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inconvenient or more costly to the plaintiff and similarly-situated 
persons.  
I disagree. The existence of the arbitration clause in Primerica's 
contractual documents gives a superficial appearance of fairness to 
the unsophisticated. In reality, the arbitration clause serves to prevent, 
any resolution of a dispute other than upon the terms dictated by 
Primerica. The existence of the arbitration clause is unfair. It would 
be perverse and in conflict with the normative purposes of an 
arbitration clause to enforce the one at hand.”144  
Although explicitly neither approved of nor disapproved of by the Court 
of Appeal, these comments suggest a deeper look at the principle of party 
autonomy.  
However, the more recent case of Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc.145 takes a 
very different approach. Kanitz, decided in 2002, is the first Canadian case to 
deal with the issue of whether the right to pursue a class action can be 
contracted away in an arbitration agreement. In that case the answer was 
“yes” and class proceedings were stayed because of the arbitration clause.  
The arbitration clause in that case arose in rather unusual circumstances. 
The plaintiffs in the proposed class action were former subscribers to the 
defendant’s high-speed Internet access service. The user agreement between 
the defendant and subscribers provided that the defendant could amend that 
agreement any time by posting notice of such changes on its web site. 
Continued use of the service following notice meant that the subscriber 
agreed to the changes. The defendant amended the user agreement to add an 
arbitration clause and a waiver of the right to commence or participate in a 
class action against the defendant and then posted the amendment on its web 
site. Nordheimer J. held that the terms of the amending provision in the 
original user’s agreement placed a duty on users to check the web site to 
determine if any changes had been made. Applying Rudder v. Microsoft 
Corp.,146 he held that reviewing five screens to get to the user agreement and 
                   
144  Ibid. at paras. 42-44 [emphasis added]. 
145  [2002] O.J. No. 665, online: QL (OJ), [2002] O.T.C. 143, (2002) 21 B.L.R. (3d) 104, 
(2002) 16 C.P.C. (5th) 84, (2002) 58 O.R. (3d) 299 (Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter Kanitz]. 
146  [1999] O.J. No. 3778, online: QL (OJ), (1999) 106 O.T.C. 381, (1999) 47 C.C.L.T. (2d) 
168, (1999) 40 C.P.C. (4th) 394, (1999) 2 C.P.R. (4th) 474 [hereinafter Rudder]. Rudder 
was a choice of forum and choice of law case, and not an arbitration case, but it also 
involved an application for a stay of intended class proceedings. Microsoft based its stay 
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then scrolling down the user agreement to find the separate arbitration clause 
with its own heading does not mean the amendment is “buried” and does not 
make the amendment analogous to the fine print on the back of rent-a-car 
agreements. Nordheimer J. therefore found there was an arbitration 
agreement. As a result, he held there was a mandatory stay of any action 
under section 7(1) of the OAA unless one of the exceptions in section 7(2) 
was applicable.  
The plaintiffs argued the arbitration agreement was invalid and its 
subject-matter was not arbitrable. They argued it was invalid because it was 
unconscionable, relying on the lower court’s decision in Huras. Nordheimer 
J. dealt with this argument by first discussing the standard to be applied in 
deciding whether any of the exceptions applied. He adopted the conclusions 
of Hart J. in the Alberta decision of G. v. G.,147 saying the mere suggestion of 
invalidity was not enough because “it would effectively negate the clear 
legislative intent to promote arbitral autonomy.”148 He acknowledged there 
clearly was an inequality of bargaining power between a single consumer and 
a corporation the size of Rogers. As he also noted, in reality there was no 
bargaining at all; it was a “take it or leave it” form of contract.149 However, 
he rejected the argument that the mere imposition of a clause mandating 
arbitration and waiving rights to class actions was evidence that Rogers took 
advantage of its superior bargaining power. Neither did he find the clause 
analogous to the one in Huras. The plaintiffs had argued the prohibition 
 
application on an alleged agreement that the courts in King County in Washington would 
have exclusive jurisdiction. In analyzing how to approach forum selection clauses, 
Winkler J. drew on Sarabia v. Oceanic Mindoro (The) (1996), 4 C.P.C. (4th) 11 at 20 
(B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal denied [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 69, online: QL (SCCA) where 
Huddart J. adopted the view that forum selection clauses should be treated with the same 
deference as arbitration agreements, stating they were “fundamentally similar.” The 
plaintiffs in Rudder had attacked the agreement on the basis of its form, and in particular 
argued that the necessity to scroll down the Member’s Agreement to find the choice of 
forum clause made it analogous to “fine print” in hard copy contracts. Winkler J. rejected 
the analogy to “fine print”, holding that giving effect to this argument “would lead to 
chaos in the marketplace, render ineffectual electronic commerce and undermine the 
integrity of any agreement entered into through this medium”, Rudder, ibid. at para. 16. 
147  G. v. G., supra note 123. 
148  Ibid. at para. 25, cited in Kanitz, supra note 145 at para. 35. 
149  Kanitz, supra note 145 at para. 38. 
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against class actions defeated the public policy behind the Class Proceedings 
Act, 1992,150 and was for that reason unconscionable.  
Class action legislation is generally seen as having three underlying 
policy objectives: first, there is a goal of facilitating access to justice for 
claimants of relatively small amounts of money; second, the legislation seeks 
to achieve cost efficiencies and economies in the use of resources by 
providing that common issues be litigated in a single proceeding involving 
many claimants; and, third, by facilitating access to justice, the legislation is 
said to act as a mode of regulating business conduct.151 The public policy 
argument was rejected on the basis the Ontario courts had always held that 
statute was a procedural statute, not a substantive statute, whereas the 
arbitration clause in Huras was characterized as one denying the plaintiffs’ 
mandatory legal rights. 
Like Cumming J. in Huras, the court in Kanitz addressed the issue of 
whether the arbitration clause was, in effect, a waiver of remedy because no 
customer would pursue arbitration for the amount involved. On this point, the 
court adopted observations made by Chief Justice Rehnquist of the United 
States Supreme Court in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. 
Randolph.152 Instead of acknowledging that few of the potential class 
members would even consider proceeding to arbitration due to the cost of 
paying for their “judges”, as Cumming J. did in Huras, the deciding factor in 
Kanitz was that there was no evidence on the record that any one customer 
was put off from arbitrating due to cost and no evidence of the cost of 
arbitration. 
Most Canadian provinces today have legislation facilitating class 
proceedings.153 Even in those provinces without specific statutes, class 
                   
150  Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6. 
151  See Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534 [hereinafter 
Dutton]. See also Huras, supra note 143 at para. 45. 
152  531 U.S. 79 (2000) at 90-91. The Green Tree Financial Corp.–Alabama case figured 
prominently in making arbitration an election issue in Alabama recently. See supra note 
128. 
153  See the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, supra note 150; Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 
1996, c. 50; Class Proceedings Act, C.C.S.M. c. C130; Newfoundland and Labrador 
Class Actions Act, S.N.L. 2001, c. 18.1; C.C.P., Book IX and Act Respecting the Class 
Action, R.S.Q., c. R-2.1; Class Actions Act, S.S. 2001, c. 12.01; and the Federal Court 
Rules, as am. by Rules Amending the Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/2002-417, s. 17. 
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proceedings are now available under the traditional representative rule as a 
result of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Western Canadian 
Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton.154 The reasoning in both Huras and Kanitz 
therefore has wide applicability, as evidenced in part by the dismay with 
which the result in the Dutton case has been greeted in some circles. 
According to one oil and gas lawyer, it means that “plaintiffs are now granted 
access to the Courts with claims which, if taken on an individual basis, would 
be uneconomic.”155 Defendants do not welcome legislative or judicial 
facilitation of class actions, especially if plaintiffs have small claims that are 
not viable if pursued individually.156  
Reaction to Kanitz in those same circles has, on the other hand, been 
much more positive. A number of the larger corporate commercial law firms 
in Canada have begun to tout the benefits of arbitration agreements as “class 
action risk management tools.”157 The Co-Chair of Macleod Dixon’s Class 
Action Practice Group, for example, concluded a brief article summarizing 
the Kanitz decision with the following advice on managing corporate 
exposure to class proceedings: 
“While the decision in [Kanitz] may be distinguished on a variety of 
grounds, business enterprises who contract with numerous customers 
using standard form agreements would be well advised to take a hard 
look at using arbitration clauses as part of their risk management 
strategy.”158  
 
Alberta introduced a Class Proceedings Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-16.5 [Bill 25, 2003], and it 
received Royal Assent on May 16, 2003 but was not yet proclaimed by June 2003. 
154  Supra note 151. 
155  D. McGrath, “Avoiding Class Actions in the Oil & Gas Industry”, available at Blake 
Cassels & Graydon LLP, 
http://www.blakes.com/english/publications/bog/bogjulaug02_class actions.asp. 
156  W.K. Branch, Class Actions in Canada (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2003) at 6-4, 6.200. 
157  See e.g. A.D. Borrell, “Arbitration and Choice of Law Provisions as Class Actions Risk 
Management Tools” (Vancouver 2002) (published on the web site of Fasken Martineau 
DuMoulin LLP at http://www.fasken.com, Information Resources, Publications, Class 
Actions); S.K. Leiti, “Ontario Court Forces Proposed Class Action Plaintiffs to Arbitrate 
Claims” in Vantage: Class Actions Newsflash, Macleod Dixon LLP, Fall 2002; McGrath, 
supra note 155. 
158  Leiti, ibid. 
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Dalton McGrath of Blake, Cassels & Graydon was even more explicit 
when he advised that:  
“[a]lthough many factors are considered by the Court in determining 
whether to certify a class action, the use of an arbitration clause may 
provide a simple and expedient method of defending expensive and 
time-consuming class action proceedings which may otherwise arise 
from the many standard form contracts executed routinely in the oil 
and gas industry.”159  
Other jurisdictions which have modeled their reformed arbitration 
legislation on the Model Law have incorporated consumer protection into 
their new legislation. They did so in the name of party autonomy. For 
example, the New Zealand Law Commission’s 1991 draft domestic 
arbitration legislation states that when a consumer enters into a contract 
which contains an arbitration clause, the arbitration clause is enforceable 
against the consumer only if the consumer, in a separate written agreement, 
certifies that, having read and understood the arbitration agreement, the 
consumer agrees to be bound by it.160 It also provides that non-compliance 
means the arbitration agreement shall be treated as “inoperative” in the words 
of the Model Law. The Law Commission defended this special treatment for 
consumer arbitration agreements on the basis of the Contractual Theory: 
“Our approach to arbitration is premised on a recognition of its 
contractual nature. The general law of contracts assumes that parties 
who have voluntarily undertaken obligations as part of a bargain or 
agreement should be held to those obligations or pay damages should 
                   
159  McGrath, supra note 155. 
160  New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 26 at 139-146. The Consumer Arbitration 
Agreements Act 1988 (UK) provides that arbitration cannot be enforced against a 
consumer unless the consumer gives written consent after the dispute has arisen, or 
submitted to the arbitration, or where a court makes an order that it is not detrimental to 
the interest of the consumer for the dispute to be referred to arbitration having regard to, 
in particular, the availability of legal aid and the expense which may be involved in 
arbitration. See G.G. Howells, “The Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act 1988” 
Company Lawyer 10 (1989) 20, who argues,  
“[t]he objection is to small print clauses which make arbitration a compulsory 
alternative to the courts. The average consumer is unlikely to read these clauses, if he 
does read then will probably not understand them and even if he does object to the 
clause he is unlikely to be able to buy the goods or services without accepting the 
clause.” 
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they breach them. The assumption accords with reality and 
expectations in the case of a transaction between two business parties 
but is often criticized as inappropriate for consumer transactions. The 
topics of inequality of bargaining power, standard form contracts 
(also known as contracts of adhesion), and the absence of true 
consent remain contentious and the subject of divided opinions within 
the ranks of policy makers and legal commentators and 
academics.”161  
Even if Canadian courts do adopt the principle of party autonomy in the 
domestic arbitration context, the basis of that principle in the Contractual 
Theory raises thorny issues about what deference to party autonomy may 
actually require from the courts. This is especially true in the pre-
employment arbitration agreement context where the party with less 
economic power may be denied the protection of mandatory laws when the 
arbitration agreement is accompanied by choice of forum and choice of laws 
provisions. It is also especially true in the class action context where the cost 
of arbitration may deny access to justice in any forum.162  
CONCLUSION 
Canadian courts are not yet to the point of the American courts’ 
acceptance of arbitration. Nor has the backlash to the consumerization of 
                   
161  New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 26 at 140. 
162  According to information posted on the relevant organizations web sites in August 2003: 
• at the BCICAC (http://www.bcicac.com/), the non-refundable fee for commercial 
arbitration is $500 plus GST for claims up to $50,000 and $1,500 plus GST for 
claims over that amount. In addition, there is an administrative fee of $150 per 
party. The hourly rate of the arbitrator(s) is set by the arbitrator.  
• at the CACNIQ (http://www.cacniq.org/en/), the online arbitration fee for claims 
less than $100,000 is $500; the arbitrator’s fees are not included in that amount.  
• at ADR Chambers, there is an administrative fee of $500 per party and a deposit 
of $3,000 is required for each day of arbitration that is booked. For the ADR 
Chambers in Ontario and Québec, the arbitrator’s hourly rate is set at $450; in 
western Canada at $400 per hour; and in the Atlantic provinces, $350 per hour.  
• at the ADR Centre (http://www.amic.org/), in BC and Alberta, the fee is $1,200 
for a 4 hour, 2 party arbitration, inclusive of the arbitrator and the facilities, and 
there is also an administration fee of $250 per file. 
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arbitration and the privatization of law and judging begun here yet, as it has 
there. There are, however, indications both are beginning to happen. 
Arbitration begins with and depends upon an agreement between the 
parties to submit their disputes to arbitration. It is based on voluntariness, and 
voluntariness on the part of both parties. There is little concern that 
arbitration is voluntary in a genuine sense in the context of commercial 
arbitrations between business concerns that enter into arbitration agreements 
knowingly and with legal advice. But the situation may be quite different 
when the arbitration clause is “boilerplate” in a lease, an installment sales 
contract, or another document where the parties’ bargaining power may not 
be even roughly equal. Are arbitration clauses in contracts of insurance, 
employment, franchisee agreements, and leases really bargained for or are 
they offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive insureds, employees, 
franchisees and tenants?  
If the justification for arbitration is indeed party autonomy, then more 
attention has to be paid to the Contractual Theory underlying it. That 
explanation for arbitration relies upon the parties voluntarily agreeing to 
submit their disputes to arbitration, to appoint the arbitrator and, to accept the 
arbitral tribunal’s award as having binding force. If there is no agreement, if 
the terms are dictated by the commercial party with more resources, then it is 
not voluntary. The statutory reforms in New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom recognize this, even if they do not really address the “take it or 
leave it” contract offered by corporations such as Rogers, Primerica Financial 
Services and Microsoft. There is, however, no indication of consumer-
oriented changes to the modern domestic arbitration legislation in Canada.  
The question I predict will be increasingly confronting Canadian courts is 
whether or not it is for the state to determine if, and to what extent, some 
parties should be able to order their private relations. If it is not a matter for 
Canadian courts and legislatures, then it is a matter of private law-making 
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La création de normes par le moyen des traités internationaux a 
décuplé tant par le nombre de conventions qui sont nées que par les sujets 
qui y sont traités et la nature des obligations qui y sont contenues, ce qui 
ne va pas sans soulever le problème de la réception de cette prolifération 
de normes en droit interne. Le Canada a adopté une approche dualiste 
d’incorporation des normes internationales conventionnelles en droit 
interne, ce qui signifie que le législateur doit indiquer explicitement son 
intention de donner effet à ces normes en droit canadien1.  
Le législateur peut employer diverses techniques législatives de mise 
en œuvre du droit international2. Il peut choisir de donner force de loi à 
toute une convention internationale et l’incorporer entièrement en droit 
interne3. Il peut référer à une convention dans une loi et indiquer 
clairement qu’il met en œuvre certaines obligations spécifiques auxquelles 
il a consenti4 ou déléguer à l’Exécutif le pouvoir d’incorporer le traité en 
                   
1  Sur la signification du monisme et du dualisme, voir entre autres Jean-Maurice 
ARBOUR, Droit international public, 3e éd., Cowansville (Qc.), Éditions Yvon Blais, 
1997, p. 143 et 144. 
2  Sur ces différentes techniques, voir Sylvie SCHERRER, « L’effet des traités dans 
l’ordre juridique interne canadien à la lumière de la jurisprudence récente », dans 
Service de la formation permanente, Barreau du Québec, vol. 31, Développements 
récents en droit administratif (2000), Cowansville (Qc), Éditions Yvon Blais, p. 57, à 
la page 62. 
3  Par exemple, voir la Loi concernant la Convention des Nations Unies sur les contrats 
de vente internationale de marchandises, L.R.Q., c. C-67.01, art. 1. 
4  Par exemple, l’article 98 et l’annexe I de la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des 
réfugiés, L.C. 2001, c. 27, qui incorporent les dispositions de la Convention de 
Genève sur les réfugiés relatives aux motifs d’exclusion. La loi peut également référer 
de façon limitée à un traité, par exemple à l’intérieur de son préambule. Sur la 
question de l’incorporation par référence à l’intérieur d’un préambule, voir : R. c. 
Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 R.C.S. 213, par. 127. 
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droit interne par règlement5. Il peut également référer à une convention 
dans une loi, mais adapter les dispositions qui y sont contenues au 
contexte canadien6. Ces références législatives explicites constituent des 
preuves suffisantes de l’intention du législateur d’incorporer des normes 
de droit international en droit interne.  
À défaut d’une telle indication explicite du législateur, et cela arrive 
fréquemment en raison notamment des ramifications complexes et 
multiples de ces traités sur les ordres fédéral et provinciaux7, le juge peut, 
lorsque certaines conditions sont remplies, présumer que le législateur 
désire néanmoins se conformer aux normes internationales conven-
tionnelles. Toutefois, les conditions d’application de la présomption de 
conformité au droit international se sont considérablement obscurcies dans 
la jurisprudence issue de la Cour suprême du Canada depuis une dizaine 
d’années (I). Dans la tradition de common law, cette opacité grandissante 
des jugements est porteuse de changements, car elle crée un espace pour le 
dialogue entre le juge et le juriste. Par des débats riches et animés dans la 
doctrine canadienne, les contours d’assises théoriques alternatives 
gouvernant les rapports entre le droit international et le droit interne 
canadien émergent qui mettent en évidence les tensions entre deux 
perspectives théoriques sur le concept de la rule of law (II). Cette tension 
est notamment due au fait qu’un nombre important de normes 
internationales portent sur des questions fondamentales en droit 
contemporain. L’une d’entre elles est la protection des droits des 
personnes et la question centrale est de savoir si une place particulière doit 
être accordée aux normes internationales visant la protection des droits de 
la personne dans l’ordre constitutionnel canadien (III).  
                   
5  Par exemple, l’article 21(1)j) de la Loi sur la protection d’espèces animales ou 
végétales sauvages et la réglementation de leur commerce international et 
interprovincial, L.C. 1992, c. 52 qui accorde expressément au Gouverneur en Conseil 
le pouvoir de réglementer dans le but d’incorporer la Convention sur le commerce 
international des espèces de faune et de flore sauvages menacées d’extinction, 3 mars 
1973, 993 R.T.N.U. 243. 
6  Voir la Loi sur les aspects civils de l’enlèvement international et interprovincial 
d’enfants, L.R.Q., c. A-23.01 qui adapte les dispositions de la Convention de La Haye 
du 25 octobre 1980 sur les aspects civils de l’enlèvement international d’enfants.  
7  Procureur général du Canada c. Procureur général de l’Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326. 
LA RÉCEPTION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE 177 
 
I. LES CONDITIONS D’APPLICATION DE LA PRÉSOMPTION DE 
CONFORMITÉ AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN DROIT 
ADMINISTRATIF CANADIEN 
Lorsqu’une loi de mise en œuvre du droit international n’a pas été 
édictée, le juge peut néanmoins donner un effet indirect aux normes 
internationales en droit interne en les utilisant comme outil d’inter-
prétation des règles de nature législative8. Pour appliquer la présomption, 
deux conditions doivent cependant être remplies : le texte de la norme de 
droit interne doit être ambigu et des traces indiquant une volonté 
législative de donner effet à des normes internationales doivent exister9. 
Dans l’arrêt Baker c. Canada (Ministère de la Citoyenneté et de 
l’Immigration)10, qui a été l’un des arrêts les plus discutés par les 
chercheurs en droit au Canada ces dernières années11, la Cour suprême du 
Canada a donné effet à la présomption de conformité au droit international 
dans le cadre d’un litige à l’égard duquel les arguments de la majorité sont 
particulièrement vagues sur l’application de ces deux critères.  
En l’espèce, il s’agissait d’interpréter la portée d’un large pouvoir 
discrétionnaire attribué au ministre de l’Immigration par l’article 114(2) 
de la Loi sur l’immigration12, qui édicte que « [le] gouverneur en conseil 
                   
8  Pierre-André CÔTÉ, Interprétation des lois, 3e éd., Montréal, Éditions Thémis, 1999, 
p. 466-468; Ruth SULLIVAN, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3e éd., 
Markham (Ontario), Butterworths, 1994, p. 330. Cette présomption de conformité au 
droit international tire sa source du principe de droit international coutumier pacta 
sunt servanda, codifié à l’article 26 de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des 
traités, 23 mai 1969, Can. T.S. 1980, no 37. Voir également l’article 27 de cette 
convention. 
9  Capital Cities Communications Inc. c. Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des 
télécommunications canadiennes, [1978] 2 R.C.S. 141, p. 173; Schavernoch c. 
Commission des réclamations étrangères, [1982] 1 R.C.S. 1092, 1098. 
10  Baker c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration), [1999] 2 R.C.S. 
817 [ci-après cité : Baker].  
11  Ainsi que les arrêts Suresh c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de 
l’Immigration), [2002] 1 R.C.S. 3 [ci-après cité : Suresh]; Ahani c. Canada (Ministère 
de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration), [2002] 1 R.C.S. 72; 114957 Canada Ltée 
(Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) c. Hudson (Ville), [2001] 2 R.C.S. 241; 
Pushpanathan c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration), [1998] 1 
R.C.S. 1222. 
12  Loi sur l’immigration, L.R.C. 1985, c. I-2. Cette loi est maintenant abrogée et a été 
remplacée par la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés, précitée, note 4.  
178 THE NEW RULE OF LAW  /  LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
 
peut, par règlement, autoriser le ministre à accorder, pour des raisons 
d’ordre humanitaire, une dispense d’application d’un règlement pris aux 
termes du paragraphe (1) ou à faciliter l’admission de toute autre 
manière », et par l’article 2.1 du Règlement sur l’immigration13. Ainsi, par 
le jeu des dispositions législative et réglementaire, le ministre de 
l’Immigration peut dispenser un requérant qui invoque des raisons d’ordre 
humanitaire de faire une demande de résidence permanente de l’extérieur 
du Canada. Madame Baker, qui vivait illégalement sur le territoire 
canadien depuis onze ans, a fait une telle demande en invoquant, entre 
autres, l’intérêt de ses enfants mineurs nés au Canada. En 1994, le ministre 
refuse la demande de Madame Baker et les notes de l’enquêteur révèlent 
que ce dernier n’a pas tenu compte de l’intérêt des enfants de la requé-
rante. Madame Baker demande le contrôle judiciaire de cette décision 
auprès de la Cour fédérale du Canada. Elle estime que la décision de 
l’agent d’immigration est contraire aux articles 3, 9 et 12 de la Convention 
relative aux droits de l’enfant14. Cette Convention a été ratifiée par le 
Canada, mais elle n’a pas été explicitement incorporée en droit de 
l’immigration. À la suite d’une interprétation contextuelle des pouvoirs de 
l’Administration, la majorité de la Cour a conclu au bien-fondé de 
l’argument de la requérante et a annulé la décision de l’Administration. 
Les textes juridiques pertinents dans cette affaire illustrent bien les 
limites des deux conditions qui doivent être satisfaites afin que le juge 
puisse appliquer la présomption de conformité en droit public canadien et 
plus précisément en droit administratif. En effet, ils montrent que le critère 
de l’ambiguïté du texte législatif n’est pas un discriminant particu-
lièrement utile dans un contexte normatif fortement marqué par 
l’attribution de pouvoirs discrétionnaires (A). Quant à l’examen de 
l’incorporation législative formelle des normes conventionnelles de droit 
international en droit interne, il n’occupe plus une place centrale lors de 
                   
13  Règlement sur l’immigration de 1978, (1978) 112 Gaz. Can. II, 758, art. 2.1 mod. par 
le Règlement sur l’immigration de 1978 – Modification, (1993) 127 Gaz. Can. II, 
605 : « Le ministre est autorisé à accorder, pour des raisons d’ordre humanitaire, une 
dispense d’application d’un règlement pris aux termes du paragraphe 114(1) de la loi 
ou à faciliter l’admission au Canada de toute autre manière. » Ces règlements sont 
également abrogés, voir note 12. Ils ont été remplacés par le Règlement sur 
l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés, DORS/2002-227, 11 juin 2002. 
14  Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant, R.T. Can. 1992 no 3. Cette convention a 
été ratifiée par les autorités canadiennes le 13 décembre 1991 et, sur le plan 
international, l’entrée en vigueur a été fixée au 12 janvier 1992 pour le Canada.  
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l’examen de conformité puisque la majorité de la Cour a délaissé la 
méthode téléologique d’interprétation des lois (axée sur la stricte 
recherche du but du législateur à partir des textes juridiques et de sources 
historiques) pour adopter une approche plus englobante : la méthode 
contextuelle, favorisant ainsi une perspective « non-originaliste » d’inter-
prétation des lois15. Selon cette perspective, l’interprète analyse les 
dispositions législatives conformément au but qui convient le mieux « aux 
besoins, aux valeurs publiques ou aux idéaux de justice et de bien 
commun qui animent la société contemporaine »16. Il envisage les sources 
sous un angle dynamique, « compte tenu des meilleures sources et 
considérations contemporaines pertinentes et crédibles (perceptions 
changeantes, nouvelles attentes liées à des changements sociaux, 
technologiques, politiques, culturels ou économiques, par exemple) »17. Il 
résulte de ce changement de méthode interprétative que toutes les traces 
étatiques indiquant une volonté de donner effet aux normes conven-
tionnelles de droit international peuvent être prises en compte (B). 
A. Le caractère non-discriminant du critère de l’ambiguïté de la 
norme législative 
Selon son sens ordinaire en interprétation des lois, l’ambiguïté signifie 
que la simple lecture du texte de la norme ne suffit pas pour en 
comprendre sa signification : deux ou plusieurs interprétations du texte 
sont possibles et raisonnables. Le rôle de l’interprète est d’identifier la 
signification qui, selon la dogmatique positiviste, lui semble correcte en 
tenant compte de la volonté du législateur, telle celle qui apparaît être 
exprimée dans le texte de la norme (interprétation littérale) ou dans le but 
                   
15  Les expressions « originaliste » et « non-originaliste » sont directement empruntées 
au vocabulaire développé en théorie constitutionnelle américaine. P. BREST, « The 
Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding », (1980) 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204, 204 et 
205. 
16  Luc B. TREMBLAY, « L’interprétation téléologique des droits constitutionnels », 
(1995) 29 R.J.T. 459. Voir aussi : Luc B. TREMBLAY, « L’interprétation téléolo-
gique : une approche cohérentiste et constructiviste », dans MINISTERIO DE ADMI-
NISTRACIONES PÚBLICAS ET L’INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ADMINISTRACIÓN 
PÚBLICA D’ESPAGNE, 7° Congreso Internacional de metodología jurídica, 2001, 
p. 2; K.-M. GEBBIA-PINETTI, « Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy 
and Legal-System Values », (1997) 21 Seton Hall Legislative J. 233.    
17  L.-B. TREMBLAY, id., p. 2. 
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du législateur, tel celui qui peut être vraisemblablement inféré à la lecture 
du texte de loi dans son entier et de sources historiques (interprétation 
téléologique). Cette façon de concevoir l’ambiguïté se comprend 
relativement bien lorsqu’elle est appliquée aux règles primaires 
d’obligation, pour reprendre la typologie de Hart. L’exemple classique est 
celui interdisant l’utilisation d’un véhicule dans un parc. Un Nord-
Américain comprend clairement que les véhicules à moteur sont visés par 
l’interdiction. Il comprend aussi que les landaus sont autorisés. Entre ces 
deux balises externes, d’autres situations sont plus ambiguës : Est-ce que 
la circulation à bicyclette est permise ou interdite? Dans la ville de 
Montréal (notamment dans l’arrondissement d’Outremont), un panneau 
indique aux entrées de chacun des parcs si les bicyclettes peuvent ou non y 
circuler. Ainsi, l’ambiguïté est dissipée. 
Afin de déterminer si le législateur veut donner effet au droit 
international en droit interne, le concept d’ambiguïté est un discriminant 
utile, du moins en théorie, lorsque le législateur a clairement fixé les 
balises externes d’application des règles, comme dans le cas des règles 
primaires d’obligation. Toutefois, lorsque l’interprète fait face à des règles 
secondaires (de reconnaissance, de changement ou de décision), le concept 
d’ambiguïté n’est plus un discriminant utile parce que ce type de règles est 
ambigu en soi : deux ou plusieurs interprétations sont nécessairement 
possibles notamment parce que les frontières externes des normes ne sont 
pas fixées dans le temps. Pour les délimiter, l’interprète ne peut pas 
simplement tenir compte du texte et du contexte législatif de la règle (y 
compris son histoire), car ces données figent sur le plan temporel les 
significations possibles de la norme, alors que le propre des règles 
secondaires est leur capacité d’évoluer dans le temps. Voici deux 
exemples. 
Dans le cas de la norme floue, la difficulté d’interprétation réside dans 
la détermination des valeurs de référence qui peuvent servir à un moment 
donné afin que l’interprète puisse juger si une situation donnée est compa-
tible avec ces valeurs. Les normes secondaires reconnaissant des droits 
fondamentaux sont des exemples classiques : Est-ce que la liberté d’ex-
pression comprend le droit de diffuser de la pornographie? Est-ce que le 
droit à la vie comprend le droit à l’avortement?18 En droit constitutionnel 
                   
18  En droit administratif canadien, les organismes administratifs peuvent, lorsqu’ils 
rendent des décisions individuelles (tels les commissions administratives, les 
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canadien, la Cour suprême utilise une méthode évolutive d’interprétation 
(the living tree doctrine) afin d’éviter de figer temporellement la 
signification des Lois constitutionnelles de 1867 et 1982. 
Dans le cas de la norme spongieuse, la difficulté d’interprétation réside 
dans le fait qu’il s’agit de normes qui absorbent les changements factuels 
et axiologiques extérieurs. Ces normes sont conçues de manière à ce 
qu’elles puissent s’adapter aux situations spécifiques des individus. Les 
normes secondaires de décision, telles celles qui confèrent des pouvoirs 
discrétionnaires à l’Administration publique, en sont un exemple. Pour 
déterminer si l’autorité administrative a correctement exercé sa discrétion 
et, par conséquent, validement interprété le sens de la norme19, la 
compréhension du contexte factuel est un élément incontournable. Certes, 
son importance varie en fonction du degré de discrétion conféré à 
l’organisme administratif, mais les décideurs ne peuvent pas ne pas en 
tenir compte. De plus, tant et aussi longtemps que le contexte factuel n’est 
pas connu, le sens de la norme peut et doit demeurer relativement 
indéterminé. En effet, l’incertitude entourant ce type de norme ne peut 
jamais être définitivement résolue, car cela aurait pour effet d’entraver 
l’exercice de la discrétion (fettering of discretion), ce qui irait à l’encontre 
de la volonté même du législateur. À cet égard, le cas des normes qui se 
situent à l’extrémité du discrétionnaire (comme celles en jeu dans l’arrêt 
Baker) est particulièrement intéressant puisque le texte de ce type de 
normes n’est pas signifiant en soi. À titre de rappel, la Cour avait à 
interpréter la portée de l’article 114(2) de la Loi sur l’immigration qui 
 
tribunaux administratifs et les organismes de régulation économique), se pencher sur 
la validité constitutionnelle des lois qu’ils appliquent et les déclarer inopérantes en 
vertu de l’article 52 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, partie I de la Loi 
constitutionnelle de 1982 [annexe B de la Loi de 1982 sur le Canada (1982, R.-U., c. 
11)]. Tel que la Cour suprême l’a décidé dans une trilogie d’arrêts, tous les 
organismes administratifs qui ont la compétence d’interpréter le droit en vertu de leur 
loi constitutive ont également le pouvoir de déclarer les règles de droit incons-
titutionnelles : Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. c. Douglas College, [1990] 3 R.C.S. 
570 (collèges); Cuddy Chicks Ltd. c. Ontario Relations Board, [1991] 2 R.C.S. 5; 
Tétreault-Gadoury c. Canada (Commission de l’emploi et de l’immigration), [1991] 2 
R.C.S. 22. 
19  Il est intéressant de noter que la majorité de la Cour suprême a souligné dans l’arrêt 
Baker, précité note 10, qu’il n’était plus nécessaire de distinguer entre l’exercice de la 
discrétion par l’Administration et son interprétation des paramètres du pouvoir 
discrétionnaire qui lui a été conféré par la loi pour les fins du contrôle judiciaire de la 
validité des décisions de cette dernière. 
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conférait au ministre de l’Immigration le pouvoir d’accorder, pour des 
raisons d’ordre humanitaire, une dispense d’application d’un règlement.  
Les multiples significations de cette norme sont influencées par 
plusieurs variables. Elles fluctuent tout dépendant du type de dispense 
d’application d’un règlement (et ces règlements font souvent l’objet de 
modifications), de la situation personnelle de l’administré et du facteur 
temporel qui affectent le champ des valeurs qui surdétermine la norme. 
Lorsque l’article 114(2) a été édicté en 1976, l’intérêt des enfants d’un 
requérant, nés au Canada, n’était pas un facteur pertinent afin de 
déterminer s’il y avait un motif humanitaire pour accorder une dispense 
d’application d’un règlement au requérant. En vérité, le concept de 
« l’intérêt des enfants » était au mieux en émergence au Canada à cette 
époque. Il ne faisait donc pas encore partie du champ des valeurs de 
référence de cette norme. Dans l’arrêt Baker, la Cour suprême devait 
déterminer si la décision de l’agent de l’immigration qui a été prise en 
1992, et refusant la demande de la requérante, était nulle en raison du fait 
qu’il n’avait pas tenu compte de l’intérêt des enfants Baker. Bien que la 
décision du fonctionnaire fût conforme à la pratique canadienne 
d’immigration en 1992 à cet égard, elle était incompatible avec les 
obligations contenues dans la Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant 
que le Canada avait ratifié. De plus, lorsque la Cour a annulé la décision 
en 1999, la décision de l’agent était alors devenue incompatible avec les 
représentations du gouvernement canadien sur la scène internationale 
relatives à la mise en œuvre de la Convention dans son droit de 
l’immigration et avec les changements que le ministre de l’immigration 
avait apportés aux directives guidant l’exercice de la discrétion des 
fonctionnaires lors de l’application de l’article 114(2) de la Loi. 
En résumé, les normes secondaires sont des normes qui peuvent 
généralement être qualifiées d’ambiguës. Par conséquent, la condition 
préliminaire d’ambiguïté nécessaire, nous disent les juges, afin d’appliquer 
la présomption de conformité au droit international peut être aisément 
satisfaite en droit administratif puisque ce sont principalement des normes 
secondaires qui gouvernent les actes de l’Administration. Il en résulte que 
le caractère discriminant de cette condition perd, dans le contexte du droit 
administratif (et du droit public plus généralement), son utilité. Cette 
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conclusion trouve d’ailleurs appui dans l’arrêt National Corn Growers20 
puisque la Cour suprême a écarté le critère de l’ambiguïté manifeste du 
texte de la norme pour justifier le recours au droit international comme 
source d’interprétation d’une disposition législative. La Cour a jugé que 
l’ambiguïté pouvait également être latente21.  
Ce constat emporte des conséquences sur l’application de la deuxième 
condition. En effet, les méthodes valides de réception du droit interna-
tional en droit interne se sont considérablement diversifiées en droit 
canadien, si bien que les traces d’une volonté législative ne sont plus le 
seul élément pertinent de la donne interprétative : toutes les traces 
étatiques comptent. 
B. La diversification des traces étatiques indiquant une volonté de 
donner effet au droit international 
La présomption de conformité du droit interne au droit international 
est une présomption simple qui peut être renversée par une argumentation 
contraire. Si la loi a vu le jour après la convention et que l’interprète 
conclut qu’elle en découle, à cause par exemple d’une similarité entre les 
concepts utilisés dans la loi et dans le droit international22, il est alors 
logiquement pertinent d’appliquer la présomption. En effet, la pré-
somption existe parce qu’il est postulé que les principes du droit 
international, « dans la mesure où il[s] constitu[ent] un élément du 
contexte d’adoption de la loi nationale »23, font partie du cadre juridique 
au sein duquel une loi est adoptée et doivent à ce titre être examinés.  
                   
20  National Corn Growers Assn. c. Canada (Tribunal des importations), [1990] 2 R.C.S. 
1324 (j. Gonthier). 
21  Id., 1371. 
22  C’est d’ailleurs un des arguments que le juge Dickson a utilisés dans sa dissidence 
dans le Renvoi relatif à la Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alb.), [1987] 1 
R.C.S. 313, 348. En matière de droits de la personne, c’est généralement la 
conclusion qui est tirée par l’État canadien. Pour des exemples d’adoption par le 
législateur fédéral de normes conventionnelles en matière de droits de la personne, 
voir William A. SCHABAS, Précis de droit international des droits de la personne, 
Cowansville (Qc), Éditions Yvon Blais, 1997, p. 259-266. 
23  P.-A. CÔTÉ, op. cit., note 8, p. 467; R. SULLIVAN, op. cit., note 8, p. 330 citée avec 
approbation par la juge L’Heureux-Dubé dans Baker, précité, note 10, par. 70. 
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En revanche, si la loi a vu le jour avant la création d’un instrument 
international, l’application de la présomption de conformité au droit 
international perd son sens lorsque l’analyse est axée sur la recherche de la 
volonté du législateur24. Ces situations sont fréquentes en droit canadien et 
pour éviter d’engager la responsabilité internationale du Canada, en raison 
d’un défaut de mettre en œuvre les obligations auxquelles le Canada a 
librement consenti par convention internationale25, les juges de la Cour 
suprême ont modifié l’approche interprétative. Ils favorisent une méthode 
d’interprétation dynamique et évolutive des lois ordinaires, ce qui leur 
permet de tenir compte d’éléments extérieurs au texte de loi. Cette 
transition est significative puisque le juge peut maintenant chercher des 
traces d’une réception du droit international en droit interne en tenant non 
seulement compte du texte, mais également du contexte axiologique et 
empirique de la norme. 
L’approche contextuelle d’interprétation vise à identifier le sens des 
termes d’une loi dans son contexte global, ce qui comprend non seulement 
le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec l’esprit de la loi, 
l’objet de la loi et l’intention du législateur, les valeurs contenues dans des 
conventions de droit international et dans le droit public canadien ainsi 
que dans les directives et autres règles administratives créées par les 
autorités administratives. En somme, cette perspective interprétative 
signifie que tant le texte de la norme qui la détermine, que le contexte 
factuel qui la codétermine, que les valeurs qui la surdéterminent sont des 
éléments dont il faut tenir compte, même si l’importance de chacun peut 
varier dans le cadre du travail interprétatif. 
Ce changement de méthode d’interprétation emporte plusieurs 
conséquences. 1. Si le législateur ne veut pas incorporer des normes 
internationales dans son droit interne, il devra s’exprimer clairement en ce 
                   
24  Telle était la difficulté dans l’arrêt Baker. Comme il a déjà été mentionné à la page 5 
du texte, les dispositions législatives et réglementaires avaient été adoptées en 1976 
dans un contexte où le concept « intérêts des enfants » n’était, au mieux, qu’en 
émergence en droit canadien. 
25  Sur les difficultés que cette situation peut engendrer sur le plan de la responsabilité 
internationale de l’État canadien, voir : Gerald L. MORRIS, « The Treaty-making 
Power: a Canadian Dilemna », (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 478; André PATRY, « La 
capacité internationale des États fédérés », dans Jacques BROSSARD (dir.), Les 
pouvoirs extérieurs du Québec, Montréal, Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1967, 
p. 23. 
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sens. 2. Il est plus difficile pour le juge de justifier la déduction selon 
laquelle le silence du législateur signifie qu’il manifeste une volonté de ne 
pas vouloir se conformer au droit international. 3. Le juge peut donner 
effet aux normes conventionnelles du droit international en droit interne 
canadien, lorsque les prescriptions juridiques contenues dans la Charte 
canadienne des droits et libertés, les lois et règlements, les règles de 
common law et même les actes gouvernementaux et administratifs ne 
seront pas jugés contraires aux normes du droit international26. Ainsi, 
lorsque le gouvernement canadien fait des représentations sur la scène 
internationale selon lesquelles son droit interne est déjà conforme au traité 
– avant la ratification de ce dernier – le juge pourra en tenir compte dans 
le cadre de l’interprétation contextuelle27. Par ailleurs, si – à la suite de la 
ratification du traité – l’État prend certaines mesures administratives28 
(programmes éducatifs, allocation de ressources financières ou de plans 
d’aménagements environnementaux29), le juge pourra également en tenir 
compte. L’histoire des actes gouvernementaux, puis administratifs et 
judiciaires et finalement législatifs pertinents à la mise en œuvre de la 
Convention relative au droit de l’enfant en droit canadien de 
l’immigration est instructive à cet égard. 
                   
26  Pour Brunnée et Toope, une conclusion autre conduirait à légitimer l’hypocrisie du 
gouvernement canadien :  
« Indeed, the Government frequently reports to international bodies that it has 
already implemented the treaty in question and therefore has met its international 
commitments. For example, in its reports to the Human Rights Committee under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Canada has claimed 
implementation mainly through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and related 
constitutional jurisprudence, complemented by various amendments to existing 
statutes. » 
 Jutta BRUNNÉE et Stephen J. TOOPE, « A Hesitant Embrace: Baker and the 
Application of International Law by Canadian Courts », [à paraître dans le Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law, 9].  
27  Selon Brandon, cette pratique se fait essentiellement en matière de droit des 
personnes. Elizabeth BRANDON, « Does International Law Mean Anything in 
Canadian Courts? », (2001) 11 J.E.L.P. 399. 
28  Id., 420. Brandon emploie en fait les termes « positive action ».  
29  Id., 422. La Convention sur la diversité biologique (Mai 1992), 31 I.L.M. 818 est un 
exemple où un traité a été incorporé en droit interne canadien par l’entremise de la 
méthode d’incorporation par mesures administratives. 
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La Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant inclut le critère de 
l’intérêt de l’enfant à ses articles 3, 9 et 12. Elle a été ratifiée par le 
Canada en décembre 1991 et elle est entrée en vigueur (pour le Canada) en 
janvier 1992. Cette Convention comprend un mécanisme de mise en 
œuvre qui est le rapport. Dans ses rapports qui doivent être fournis 
périodiquement, un État doit expliquer les mesures qu’il a adoptées pour 
donner effet aux droits reconnus dans la Convention ainsi que sur les 
progrès réalisés dans la jouissance de ces droits. Le Canada a, à ce jour, 
déposé deux rapports : le premier en 1994 et l’autre en 2001. Entre ces 
deux rapports, le Comité des Nations-Unies sur les droits de l’enfant a fait 
des recommandations au gouvernement canadien afin qu’il améliore 
notamment son droit de l’immigration eu égard au respect du principe de 
l’intérêt de l’enfant. 
Dans son premier rapport, le Canada explique au Comité qu’en 
matière d’application de l’article 114(2) de la Loi sur l’immigration sa 
pratique consiste à ne pas accorder la résidence permanente aux parents 
qui ont des enfants nés au Canada. En 1995, le Comité recommande au 
Canada « d’attacher une attention particulière à la mise en œuvre du 
concept de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant […] et de chercher des solutions 
propres à éviter les mesures d’expulsion causant la séparation des familles, 
dans l’esprit de l’article 9 de la Convention ». Le 8 mars 1999, le 
gouvernement canadien complète la révision de son Guide de 
l’immigration et notamment des directives portant sur l’application de 
l’article 114(2). On peut lire que lors de l’évaluation des cas pouvant 
entraîner la séparation des parents et des enfants, les agents pourront 
dorénavant tenir compte de toutes « les circonstances de tous les membres 
de la famille, en accordant une attention particulière aux intérêts et à la 
situation des enfants de l’individu sans statut ». De plus, le ministre réfère 
explicitement à la Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant dans le 
nouveau texte de sa directive. Cette même année, dans l’arrêt Baker, la 
majorité de la Cour suprême fait référence au Guide de l’immigration pour 
argumenter que les directives qui y sont contenues et données par le 
ministre aux agents d’immigration reconnaissent et révèlent les valeurs et 
la démarche qui sont énoncées dans la Convention. En 2001, le Canada 
remet son deuxième rapport au Comité des Nations-Unies. Dans ce 
rapport, le gouvernement canadien réfère explicitement aux changements 
du Guide de l’immigration afin de donner suite à la recommandation de 
1995 du Comité des Nations-Unies. Finalement, dans sa nouvelle Loi sur 
l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés (entrée en vigueur en 2002) le 
législateur fait explicitement référence au critère de l’intérêt supérieur des 
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enfants à l’article 25 qui attribue le pouvoir au ministre d’accorder des 
dispenses pour des motifs humanitaires.  
En résumé, le juge canadien peut tenir compte de plusieurs facteurs 
pour évaluer s’il peut donner effet au droit international en droit interne. 
Dans la mesure où des traces d’une volonté de donner effet au droit 
international sont trouvées dans le texte et le contexte factuel ou 
axiologique de la norme. Toutefois, l’arrêt Baker n’a pas manqué de 
susciter un regain de l’intérêt des juristes de droit public. Ils ont profité de 
la controverse suscitée par cet arrêt pour engager un dialogue avec la Cour 
en proposant d’autres théories visant l’aménagement des rapports entre le 
droit international et le droit interne dans la société contemporaine 
canadienne. 
II. L’ÉMERGENCE DE THÉORIES ALTERNATIVES DANS LA 
DOCTRINE CANADIENNE 
Dans l’ordre constitutionnel de la fédération canadienne, c’est le 
gouvernement fédéral qui a le pouvoir de traiter sur le plan international. Il 
peut signer et ratifier des traités sans l’approbation formelle des 
gouvernements provinciaux et de leurs Assemblées législatives ainsi que 
du Parlement fédéral. Dans la pratique, toutefois, le gouvernement fédéral 
ne s’engage généralement pas sur le plan international avant d’avoir 
entamé des négociations au préalable avec les provinces et d’avoir obtenu 
des assurances qu’elles mettront en œuvre la convention internationale une 
fois que celle-ci sera ratifiée (si, bien sûr, elle touche un domaine de 
compétence provinciale). Un autre élément de la politique canadienne 
qu’il est important de souligner est que la séparation des pouvoirs entre les 
organes étatiques n’est pas étanche. Le parti politique qui fait élire la 
majorité de ses candidats gagne les élections et forme le gouvernement. Ce 
gouvernement détient aussi la majorité des sièges au sein de l’organe 
législatif. En somme, lorsque le gouvernement fédéral engage la responsa-
bilité internationale du Canada par la ratification d’un traité, c’est parce 
qu’il sait qu’il obtiendra la coopération du Parlement fédéral, et probable-
ment celle des gouvernements et assemblées législatives provinciaux.  
En tenant compte de ces données, il est plus facile de comprendre les 
raisons politiques qui justifient l’application de la présomption de 
conformité au droit international même en l’absence d’une volonté claire 
du législateur en ce sens. En prenant pour acquis que la majorité de la 
Cour suprême a tenu compte de cette réalité politique lorsqu’elle a rendu 
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son jugement dans l’arrêt Baker, elle a néanmoins fait preuve de prudence. 
En effet, bien qu’elle ait conclu que la présomption de conformité entre le 
droit interne et le droit international recevait application en l’espèce, la 
juge L’Heureux-Dubé a clairement indiqué que les normes de la 
Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant expriment des valeurs chères à 
la société canadienne, lesquelles peuvent être « prises en compte dans 
l’approche contextuelle de l’interprétation des lois. »30 
La majorité a donc insisté sur la force persuasive plutôt qu’obligatoire 
des normes internationales auxquelles les instances étatiques sont 
présumées vouloir se conformer, sans donner les justifications théoriques 
en droit sur lesquelles elle a fondé son raisonnement. Depuis lors, deux 
grandes perspectives théoriques d’application du droit international en 
droit interne ont émergé dans la doctrine canadienne. Le point de 
convergence entre les auteurs est qu’ils accordent une place plus 
importante à une conception pluraliste des ordres juridiques, sans complè-
tement délaisser l’idée d’une certaine prépondérance de l’ordre juridique 
interne. Dans les deux cas, toutefois, les auteurs cherchent à mieux 
circonscrire le rôle des organes étatiques (autres que le législateur) dans le 
maintien d’un équilibre entres les ordres étatique et international. Deux 
courants s’affirment. Le premier donne préséance au pouvoir discrétion-
naire du gouvernement (A). C’est à lui qu’il revient de déterminer dans 
quelle mesure la norme internationale aura du poids dans l’ordre interne. 
Le deuxième donne préséance au pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge (B). 
A. La préséance du pouvoir discrétionnaire du gouvernement 
Le point de départ des réflexions des professeurs Brunnée et Toope31 
repose sur la critique du travail accompli par nos tribunaux supérieurs en 
matière d’interprétation du droit international. Plus spécifiquement, ils 
dénoncent à la fois l’absence d’uniformité des jugements et la tendance à 
définir la norme internationale comme ayant une simple valeur persuasive, 
indépendamment du fait que celle-ci soit issue ou non d’un traité liant le 
Canada sur la scène internationale Ils s’inquiètent des dangers que peut 
représenter l’arrêt Baker32 à plus long terme. Ils estiment qu’une 
                   
30  Baker, précité, note 10, par. 70. 
31  J. BRUNNÉE et S. J. TOOPE, loc. cit., note 26. 
32  Et la suite de celui-ci, nommément l’arrêt Suresh, précité, note 11. 
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utilisation strictement persuasive de toutes les normes du droit 
international non-incorporées en droit canadien ne peut qu’effriter la 
présomption de conformité et réduire les obligations internationales du 
Canada au rang d’anecdotes. 
Afin de contrer cet effet qu’ils jugent indésirable, Brunnée et Toope 
proposent une méthode d’interprétation fondée sur la distinction entre les 
instruments internationaux ratifiés et non ratifiés. Dès que le Canada 
ratifie un traité, il engage sa responsabilité internationale. Pour cette 
raison, les tribunaux sont contraints de donner effet aux normes du droit 
international en droit interne, indépendamment de leur incorporation par 
voie législative33, et d’interpréter le droit canadien conformément aux 
normes contenues dans les traités qu’il a ratifiés. Lors du travail d’inter-
prétation, les auteurs suggèrent aux juges de s’attarder au sens réel du 
traité et, le cas échéant, d’utiliser les règles d’interprétation inscrites dans 
la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités34.  
Selon cette perspective théorique, les juges ne peuvent plus, comme l’a 
fait la majorité de la Cour suprême dans l’arrêt Baker, considérer un traité 
ratifié et non incorporé comme possédant une simple valeur persuasive 
pouvant guider, à la seule discrétion du juge, l’interprétation du droit 
canadien35. En revanche, Brunnée et Toope privilégient la solution retenue 
dans l’arrêt Baker pour les normes internationales qui ne lient pas le 
Canada sur la scène internationale36. Les juges doivent alors conserver la 
                   
33  J. BRUNNÉE et S. J. TOOPE, loc. cit., note 26, 26 et 27. 
34  Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, précitée, note 8. 
35  J. BRUNNÉE et S. J. TOOPE, loc. cit., note 26, 17 et 18 :  
«The Convention on the Rights of the Child should not merely have been at the 
Court’s discretion to ‘help inform’ its interpretative effort-something less than 
what is required by the traditional presumption of conformity. Instead, the Court 
was obliged to strive, to the extent possible, for an interpretation that is consistent 
with the legal commitments that Canada made by ratifying the Convention. » 
36  Pour ces auteurs, ces normes sont : les règles de traités non ratifiés par le Canada, les 
décisions de tribunaux internationaux; les parties non contraignantes d’un traité ratifié 
(préambule, dispositions non impératives), les déclarations de principes et codes de 
conduite n’ayant pas encore le statut de coutume internationale. La coutume 
internationale, malgré les tergiversations de la jurisprudence, doit recevoir selon les 
auteurs une application directe en droit interne canadien. De ce fait, tout comme pour 
les traités ratifiés par le Canada, les tribunaux ont l’obligation d’interpréter toute 
disposition législative ou règle de common law en accord avec le droit coutumier 
international. J. BRUNNÉE et S. J. TOOPE, loc. cit., note 26, 25 et 26. 
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discrétion de s’y référer dans les cas qu’ils estiment adéquats. 
Contrairement aux normes issues de traités ratifiés, ces normes non-
contraignantes peuvent être utilisées à titre persuasif lors de l’interpré-
tation du droit canadien. 
L’approche de Brunnée et Toope a été critiquée parce que la 
distinction créée entre les normes internationales contraignantes et non 
contraignantes polarise l’influence du droit international en droit canadien 
sur un plan strictement formaliste, ce qui a pour effet de soumettre tout le 
droit international, sans distinction entre ses normes, à la seule volonté 
d’intérêts nationaux. Lorsque le Canada ratifie un traité, l’application du 
droit international en droit interne s’effectue alors sans discernement37. Le 
juge perd son pouvoir discrétionnaire38. 
B.  La préséance du pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge 
Contrairement à Brunnée et Toope, d’autres auteurs estiment que 
l’arrêt Baker constitue un tournant significatif dans la jurisprudence cana-
dienne. En consacrant l’importance du droit international à titre de source 
interprétative des lois ordinaires39, indépendamment de sa ratification ou 
                   
37  Karen KNOP, « Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts » (2000) 32 
N.Y.U.J. Intl L. & Pol. 501, 505 :  
« […] proponents of the traditional model have defended bindingness over 
persuasion on the ground that bindingness provides a safeguard against hegemony. 
But this defence assumes that international law generally, and therefore 
international law binding on domestic courts, is not hegemonic, an assumption that 
many would question. […] If the domestic application of international law is 
equated with the recognition of a global standard of good, then any and every 
domestic application is desirable. But this tacitly locates the authority of 
international law in its embodiment of liberal democracy, rather than understanding 
its authority as partly created by the reasoning in each case. » 
38  Id., 516. Elle dénonce en effet que :  
« The language used to promote domestic courts as instruments of international 
law—implementation, compliance, enforcement—only further de-emphasizes the 
exercise of judgment involved in translating from international to domestic law. 
Rhetorically, domestic judges are reduced to bureaucrats who, depending on the 
scholarly viewpoint, simply need to be better trained, better motivated, or more up-
to-date. » 
39  E. BRANDON, loc. cit., note 27, 444 exprime bien ce point de vue : « The relevance 
of treaties hinges more on their importance to Canada as expressions of international 
values and principles, than on their precise legal status at the domestic level. Thus the 
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de son incorporation en droit interne, la majorité de la Cour suprême 
propose une analyse centrée sur le contenu normatif du traité40. Le juge, 
figure centrale dans un système parlementaire, est investi de la tâche de 
déterminer quelles sont les normes internationales qui méritent d’être 
considérées plus sérieusement que d’autres. Dans la doctrine, on peut 
identifier une version forte et une version faible de cette approche 
théorique favorisant l’exercice de la discrétion par le juge, plutôt que par 
le gouvernement. Selon la version forte, l’exercice du pouvoir discrétion-
naire du juge n’est contraint par aucune limite balisant son pouvoir de 
faire le choix des normes internationales qui compteront lors du travail 
interprétatif. Selon la version faible, l’exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire 
par le juge est partiellement lié par des principes de droit public. 
C’est la professeure Knop qui a proposé une version forte de cette 
perspective théorique. Selon cette auteure, les tribunaux devraient consi-
dérer le droit international comme un droit étranger et l’analyser en 
conséquence41. En utilisant les méthodes interprétatives de droit comparé, 
lesquelles accordent une valeur strictement persuasive aux normes 
étrangères, les tribunaux peuvent accorder aux normes internationales, 
qu’elles soient contraignantes ou non, la place qui leur revient en droit 
canadien : « Since foreign law is not binding, we must be persuaded of its 
relevance, and comparative law offers us structures of persuasion that may 
prove illuminating for international law as well. Ultimately, the under-
standing of persuasion found in comparative law may challenge the 
narrowness of what international lawyers model as the domestic 
application of international law. »42 Au nom d’une application moins 
déterministe du droit international, Knop limite la portée de la pré-
somption de conformité au droit international puisque même en présence 
d’un traité ratifié, l’application de la présomption ne peut imposer une 
contrainte au pouvoir judiciaire d’interpréter le droit interne confor-
mément au droit international43. Selon cette perspective, l’opinion de la 
majorité dans Baker constitue pour Knop un modèle de flexibilité et de 
 
limits of the contextual approach to statutory interpretation are being redefined to 
include a large body of international law. » 
40  Id. 
41  K. KNOP, loc. cit., note 37, 520. 
42  Id., 530 et 531. 
43  Id., 525 et suiv. 
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nuance à suivre pour les tribunaux puisque les juges conservent l’entière 
discrétion d’utiliser, à titre persuasif, les normes et valeurs du droit 
international qu’ils estiment adéquates pour résoudre le litige44. 
L’approche Knop a été critiquée par Brunnée et Toope qui craignent 
que l’absence de contrainte sur le pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge mène, à 
plus long terme, vers moins que plus de nuance dans le choix des normes 
internationales servant à interpréter le droit interne45. C’est dans cette 
optique que s’inscrit le projet de Van Ert puisqu’il cherche à expliciter, 
dans sa version faible de l’approche théorique de la réception du droit 
international en droit interne46, les principes de droit public qui doivent 
guider le juge lorsqu’il exerce son pouvoir discrétionnaire. Pour cet auteur, 
deux principes gouvernent l’entière question de l’utilisation des traités en 
droit interne canadien : l’autonomie gouvernementale et le respect du droit 
international. Le principe de l’autonomie gouvernementale réaffirme la 
capacité d’une communauté de s’autodéterminer librement, sans influence 
externe. Par influence externe, il réfère à toute institution (juridique, 
politique ou autre) n’ayant pas fait l’objet d’une approbation expresse par 
une communauté donnée. Celle-ci ne peut être obtenue qu’à la suite d’un 
processus décisionnel démocratique, lequel est formé de délibération, de 
représentation et de participation47. Selon l’auteur, seul l’organe législatif, 
à l’exclusion de l’organe exécutif, regroupe ces trois caractéristiques; 
accepter que l’Exécutif puisse légiférer sans le concours du Parlement 
viole le principe d’autonomie gouvernementale.  
Quant au principe du respect du droit international, le juge doit en tenir 
compte, car ce droit trouve son fondement non seulement dans la raison et 
la justice, mais aussi dans le fait que le Canada est membre du concert des 
nations : « […] if we do not respect international law we must cease to be 
                   
44  K. KNOP, loc. cit., note 37, 535. 
45  J. BRUNNÉE et S.J. TOOPE, loc. cit., note 26, 19. « We fear that this approach 
[Knop], if not carefully applied as a supplementary analytical tool, could easily lead 
to less rather than more nuance. The temptation may be great to treat all international 
law, whether binding on Canada or not, as « optimal information » and to disregard 
the particular interpretative onus that is placed upon the courts by the presumption of 
conformity with Canada’s international obligations. »  
46  Gibran VAN ERT, « Using Treaties in Canadian Courts », (2000) 38 C.Y.B.I.L. 3. 
47  Id., 7. 
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part of the civilized world. »48 Pour Van Ert, tout traité ratifié, qu’il soit ou 
non incorporé, produit des effets juridiques en droit interne. La 
présomption de conformité s’applique dans ce cas et le juge doit inter-
préter les normes de droit international de manière libérale49. Cependant, 
Van Ert ajoute que le juge doit limiter les effets du droit international en 
droit interne, dès que le principe d’autonomie gouvernementale est trop 
sérieusement affecté par l’application du principe du respect du droit 
international. Afin d’aider les juges à déterminer si les effets vont au-delà 
de ce qui devrait être acceptable, Van Ert propose un test dont les 
composantes reviennent en somme à une analyse formaliste qui ne tient 
pas compte, du moins explicitement, du contenu des normes de droit 
international50. 
* * * * * * 
Dans l’état actuel de la jurisprudence canadienne, il semble bien que la 
majorité de la Cour suprême penche en faveur de l’approche Van Ert dans 
la mesure où elle a cherché à maintenir un équilibre entre les principes du 
droit interne et du droit international dans le cadre d’un litige faisant appel 
à des normes de droit international qui avaient été ratifiées par le Canada. 
                   
48  Id., il reprend ainsi les propos de Blackstone. 
49  Selon van Ert, la présomption devrait s’appliquer aux lois tant antérieures que 
subséquentes à la ratification du traité, et devrait viser de façon égale tant les lois 
d’incorporation que les lois dites ordinaires. Id., 37 et 38. 
50  G. VAN ERT, loc. cit., note 48, 52 et 53 :  
« First, a court should consider the extent to which applying the treaty presumption 
to the case at bar will relieve the executive of the need to seek implementation of 
the treaty by Parliament or the provincial Legislatures. […] A second consideration 
should be the content of the treaty obligation under consideration. Treaty 
provisions of a purposive, interpretive, or general nature will often be more 
susceptible to judicial application by means of the treaty presumption than specific, 
particular, or detailed commitments, which will usually require implementing 
legislation to be given domestic legal effect. […] Finally, courts should be 
cognizant of the respective roles of legislatures and the judiciary in the Canadian 
reception system. The system assigns the task of vindicating the principle of self-
government to Parliament and the provincial Legislatures in exercise of their 
sovereignty to legislate in violation of international law and their discretion as to 
whether, and to what extent, to implement treaty obligations incurred by the 
executive. In contrast, the role of asserting the principle of respect for international 
law is confided in the judiciary. » 
194 THE NEW RULE OF LAW  /  LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
 
En effet, dans l’arrêt Baker, la Cour suprême a fait référence à des 
principes et valeurs du droit public lors du processus d’interprétation. La 
Cour estime donc que la discrétion des juges n’est pas illimitée lorsqu’il 
s’agit de donner effet à la présomption de conformité entre le droit interne 
et le droit international. Toutefois, la jurisprudence de la Cour est encore 
trop rudimentaire pour qu’il soit possible d’affirmer avec certitude si la 
forme (la ratification d’un traité) compte toujours davantage en droit 
canadien que le contenu de la norme. Néanmoins, certains développe-
ments, notamment dans l’arrêt Baker, laissent croire qu’une majorité de 
juges seraient enclins à accorder une place particulière aux normes 
internationales visant la protection des droits de la personne.  
III. LA PLACE PARTICULIÈRE DES NORMES INTERNATIONALES 
VISANT LA PROTECTION DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE 
La protection des droits de la personne occupe un espace non 
négligeable dans la pensée juridique occidentale contemporaine. L’essor 
du droit international des droits de la personne est un facteur qui a joué un 
rôle de premier plan à cet égard. C’est dans la foulée de ces dévelop-
pements que les entités fédérale et provinciales de l’État canadien ont 
élaboré des instruments généraux de protection des droits et libertés 
fondamentaux des citoyens, dont la Charte canadienne des droits et 
libertés. Par ailleurs, un sondage effectué en 2002 indiquait que 92 % de 
88 % des Canadiens connaissant la Charte adhèrent à ce projet de 
protection des droits de la personne. 
À plusieurs reprises, la Cour suprême a eu l’occasion de constater la 
similitude entre les droits et libertés fondamentaux protégés par la Charte 
et ceux inscrits dans les normes internationales des droits de la personne. 
Cet argument a non seulement servi à justifier une interprétation large des 
droits protégés par la Charte de manière à en assurer la compatibilité avec 
les normes internationales, mais a également eu pour conséquence de 
donner aux normes internationales un effet juridique en droit constitu-
tionnel canadien. Puisque, en vertu de l’article 32 de la Charte, l’État 
canadien a créé un ordre juridique supérieur qui lie le Parlement, les 
législatures provinciales et les gouvernements (incluant les administrations 
publiques), il n’est pas étonnant, par ricochet, que l’Administration 
s’estime liée par les normes du droit international contenues dans les 
jugements de la Cour portant sur la Charte. Il n’est pas étonnant non plus 
que l’Administration publique exprime cette obligation par diverses tech-
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niques normatives, incluant les directives et autres règles administratives, 
afin de développer son droit de manière compatible à ces normes51.  
En s’attribuant ce rôle, l’Administration agit de façon cohérente avec 
la prescription de l’article 32 de la Charte, mais ce constat ne signifie pas 
d’emblée qu’elle peut utiliser de son propre chef des instruments normatifs 
tels la directive, afin de donner effet à un droit de la personne dont la 
source provient uniquement du droit international. Pour plusieurs 
constitutionnalistes canadiens, la prétention contraire promeut une thèse 
indéfendable dans un système juridique où prédomine le principe de la 
séparation des pouvoirs et duquel découle la doctrine dualiste de réception 
du droit international en droit interne. Toutefois, cette conception formelle 
du droit constitutionnel perd du terrain puisque la Cour suprême recourt 
depuis quelques années à des principes non-écrits, la constitution de 
common law52, afin de donner effet à des valeurs fondamentales 
structurant l’ordre démocratique canadien. En s’appuyant sur ces dévelop-
pements, d’autres constitutionnalistes canadiens argumentent que la 
constitution de common law porte un coup fatal à la doctrine dualiste en 
droit interne lorsqu’il s’agit de donner effet à certaines valeurs 
fondamentales issues du droit international (A). C’est par l’application de 
ces principes constitutionnels non-écrits que ces spécialistes argumentent 
la légitimité de la réception des normes internationales par tous les 
organes étatiques, dans la mesure toutefois ou ces normes reflètent des 
valeurs fondamentales protégées par la constitution de common law. 
Lorsqu’il s’agit des droits de la personne, le problème qui se pose est de 
déterminer si un droit reconnu par une norme internationale (mais non par 
une norme constitutionnelle écrite) est une valeur protégée par la 
constitution de common law. Afin de résoudre cette difficulté, le concept 
de droit cosmopolite a été proposé (B). 
                   
51  Voir les exemples dans : France HOULE, Les règles administratives et le droit 
public : aux confins de la régulation juridique, Cowansville (Québec), Éditions Yvon 
Blais, 2001, p. 161-166 et 189-192; France HOULE, « La lecture des blancs dans le 
droit et la validité des règles administratives : essai sur deux modèles issus du 
positivisme juridique », dans Ysolde GENDREAU (dir.), Le lisible et l’illisible, 
Montréal, Éditions Thémis, p. 52-125. 
52  Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec, [1998] 2 R.C.S. 217 et Renvoi relatif à la 
rémunération des juges, [1997] 3 R.C.S. 3; Baker, précité, note 10. Sur la 
Constitution de common law, voir entre autres, Mark WALTERS, « The Common 
Law Constititution in Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta as Fundamental Law », 
(2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 91. 
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A. La constitution de common law 
La constitution de common law comprend tout principe constitutionnel 
non écrit représentant des valeurs fondamentales de la société 
canadienne53. Parmi ces valeurs, il y a celles relatives à la démocratie 
parlementaire, à l’État de droit et aux droits de la personne.54. La Charte 
canadienne des droits et liberté constitue une forme de confirmation de 
certaines de ces valeurs fondamentales55. Par le recours aux principes 
constitutionnels de common law, Dyzenhaus estime possible de légitimer 
l’utilisation de la présomption de conformité du droit interne au droit 
international lorsque les valeurs contenues dans ce dernier sont non 
seulement compatibles avec les valeurs prévues dans la Charte, mais 
également avec d’autres dispositions de droit positif relatives aux droits de 
la personne. En somme, la constitution de common law accorde aux 
individus une protection conforme aux valeurs fondamentales, et ce, 
même en l’absence de dispositions légales formelles à cet effet56.  
C’est en ce sens que pour Dyzenhaus, la constitution de common law 
consacre une conception plus riche de la démocratie menant vers une 
application beaucoup moins étanche du principe de la séparation des 
pouvoirs. Pour cette raison, il critique le principe de l’autonomie gouver-
nementale défendue par Van Ert. Dyzenhaus souligne que la prétention 
selon laquelle seul le Parlement est représentatif de l’ordre démocratique 
relève d’une conception pauvre de ce dernier. La démocratie est l’une des 
valeurs fondamentales enracinées dans la constitution de common law et, 
de ce fait, elle s’enrichie par l’interaction avec les autres valeurs du droit 
constitutionnel écrit et non-écrit. Il en résulte que l’ordre démocratique ne 
peut être considéré comme exclusivement issu de l’activité législative57, 
                   
53  David DYZENHAUS, « Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in 
Administrative Law », (2001-2002) 27 Queen’s L. J. 445; voir aussi : David 
DYZENHAUS et Evan FOX-DECENT, « Rethinking the Process/Substance 
Distinction : Baker v. Canada » (2001) 51 U. of Toronto L.J. 193; David 
DYZENHAUS, Murray HUNT et Michael TAGGART, « The Principle of Legality in 
Administrative Law: Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation », (2001) 1 Oxford 
U. Commonwealth L.J. 5. 
54  D. DYZENHAUS, loc. cit., note 53, 6 et 35. 
55  Id., 6. 
56  Id., 38. 
57  La vision enrichie de la démocratie proposée par Dyzenhaus l’amène à critiquer la 
dissidence des juges Iacobucci et Cory dans l’arrêt Baker, précité, note 10, ainsi que 
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notamment lorsqu’il s’agit de mettre en œuvre des protections relatives 
aux droits des personnes. Sur ce point, Dyzenhaus est d’accord avec 
Walters : 
« This argument is more in line with the democratic vision, since 
the plausibility of the idea of the common law constitution is said 
to be premised on a blurring of the division between the powers. 
Walters […] suggest that the idea of a common law constitution is 
more about the protection of fundamental values and less about 
constitutional rules relating to institutional structure, including the 
separation of powers. Hence, unless a violation of such structure 
‘also amounts to the violation of basic human rights’, structure 
should not be asserted as part of the unwritten constitution. »58 
Selon Dyzenhaus et Walters, il revient au juge d’exercer sa discrétion 
afin d’établir, d’utiliser ou d’interpréter diverses règles de common law. 
En ce qui concerne les règles de common law faisant état de valeurs 
fondamentales propres à la société canadienne (autre que la séparation des 
pouvoirs), ils estiment que le juge doit leur accorder un poids 
prépondérant en droit canadien, notamment par l’entremise d’une 
application généreuse de la présomption de conformité59. Leur refuser cet 
effet signifie l’adhésion à une vision formelle du constitutionnalisme, 
consacrant la préséance du principe de la séparation des pouvoirs au 
détriment des autres valeurs fondamentales, telles la protection des droits 
 
l’obiter dictum du juge Lamer de la Cour suprême dans l’arrêt Cooper c. Canada 
(Commission canadienne des droits de la personne), [1996] 3 R.C.S. 854. Dans cette 
affaire, le juge Lamer (qui était alors juge en chef de la Cour) avait émis l’opinion 
selon laquelle les questions relatives à Charte devraient relever exclusivement du 
pouvoir judiciaire et non des tribunaux administratifs, contrairement à la 
jurisprudence constante de la Cour suprême sur cette question depuis la trilogie 
Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Association c. Douglas College, précité, note 18, Cuddy 
Chicks Ltd. c. Commission des relations de travail de l’Ontario, précité, note 18 et 
Tétreault-Gadoury c. Canada (C.E.I.), précité, note 18. Dyzenhaus est d’accord avec 
les propos de la juge McLachlin qui, dans cette même affaire, s’inscrit contre 
l’opinion du juge Lamer. Il explique : « I call the vision of constitutionalism [of 
McLachlin] democratic, because, in her view, if judges have such exclusive 
jurisdiction, then the Charter is put out of reach of the people whom it serves in part, 
as it is before tribunals rather than the courts that most people are likely to contest 
their rights. » D. DYZENHAUS, M. HUNT et M. TAGGART, loc. cit., note 53, 21. 
58  D. DYZENHAUS, loc. cit., note 53, 27. 
59  D. DYZENHAUS et E. FOX-DECENT, loc. cit., note 53, 17. 
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de la personne. En revanche, leur accorder une telle place milite en faveur 
d’une vision démocratique du constitutionnalisme60. 
Toutefois, il ne s’agit pas de laisser le juge sans paramètres 
décisionnels afin de déterminer quelles sont les valeurs fondamentales 
relatives aux droits des personnes devant recevoir application en droit 
interne. À cet égard, les normes du droit international serviraient d’étalon 
de mesure plus objectif que le recours aux préférences personnelles des 
juges, administrateurs et législateurs (lorsqu’il s’agit d’un droit non 
protégé par les chartes). Elles agiraient comme un rempart contre une 
version appauvrie des protections pouvant être accordées aux personnes. 
Pour Walters, ces balises posées par le droit international des droits de la 
personne forment le substrat d’un concept, celui du droit cosmopolite, sur 
lequel peut reposer une argumentation servant à justifier la légitimité d’un 
ordre démocratique canadien fondé sur le respect des droits de la 
personne. 
B. Le droit cosmopolite 
Le concept de droit cosmopolite signifie l’ensemble des droits 
individuels inaliénables découlant d’un principe de justice humanitaire 
universelle constituant le fondement de la théorie du droit rationnel de 
Kant61. Fondée sur la raison et non sur le droit divin ou l’expérience 
humaine, cette théorie pose que l’être humain doit être considéré comme 
une fin en soi et non comme un moyen. Selon Kant, toute morale ou 
système normatif doit servir à promouvoir et à garantir les droits et libertés 
individuels de chaque citoyen, indépendamment de sa nation, de sa race 
ou de sa religion. De plus, il argumente que seul un mécanisme de 
protection des droits de la personne à l’échelle globale, qu’il nomme le 
droit cosmopolite, peut constituer une mesure efficace. En effet, le 
                   
60  Sur le concept de constitutionnalisme démocratique, voir la note 57 ainsi que le texte 
de D. DYZENHAUS, note 53. 
61  Mark D. WALTERS, « The Common Law Constitution and Legal Cosmopo-
litanism », texte manuscrit, p. 11 (à paraître). Walters s’inspire des enseignements de 
Kant et de ses successeurs, notamment John Rawls et David Held. Sur ces auteurs, 
voir David HELD, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to 
Cosmopolitan Governance, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, p. 227-234; Emmanuel 
KANT, Projet de paix perpétuelle (1795-96), trad. par J. Gibelin, Paris, Vrin, 1990; 
John RAWLS, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999, 
p. 10. 
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caractère transcendant de la théorie du droit rationnel la rend imperméable 
face à l’action ou l’inaction des acteurs étatiques et non-étatiques 
puisqu’elle doit être considérée comme complètement distincte et 
autonome des ordres de droit interne et international. Walters argumente 
que le concept kantien du cosmopolitisme, vu à la lumière de 
considérations normative et historique, peut fournir « a compelling 
theoretical explanation for, or a least a useful theoretical insight to, the 
relationship between the common law constitution, judicial review, and 
international law »62. Sur le plan historique, il montre notamment que le 
droit cosmopolite fait partie depuis longtemps de la constitution de 
common law63. Il conclut que la common law cosmopolite comprendrait 
ainsi un corpus de valeurs fondamentales, transcendantes et indépendantes 
des ordres juridiques interne et international relatifs aux droits des 
personnes, pris dans un sens large. Sur le plan normatif, il estime que 
l’intégration du droit cosmopolite à la constitution de common law permet 
l’utilisation d’une méthode d’interprétation de rechange à la méthode 
traditionnelle de telle sorte que les juges puissent se référer aux valeurs 
d’un traité non incorporé en droit interne, non pas comme s’il s’agissait de 
droit positif, mais « as a body of general or universal legal principles 
having force independently of positive sources »64. 
« […] a vigorous approach by common law judges to the 
articulation of “humane standards” for executive decision-making 
by more consistent and active reference to international legal 
sources need not to be considered “subverting the constitution of 
states” or “misuse of legal concepts and terminology” or upsetting 
“the balance maintained by our Parliamentary tradition”. The 
                   
62  M.D. WALTERS, id., p. 2. 
63  Id., p. 8. Le droit universel des nations a été reconnu dès 1608 dans le Calvin’s Case, 
(1608) 2 St Tr 559, 669-670 : the « common law of England is grounded upon the law 
of God, and extends itselfe to the originall lawe of nature, and the univesall lawe of 
nations ». Blackstone était du même avis, voir William BLACKSTONE, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1765, I, 43. Le 
point de vue de Blackstone a été repris récemment dans une décision anglaise, Mabo 
v. Queensland (No 2), (1992) 175 CLR 1, 42. Le juge Brennan de la High Court a 
écrit « international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of 
common law. » Ces citations sont tirées du texte de M. D. WALTERS, id., p. 5. 
64  M.D. WALTERS, id. Il cite Alan BRUDNER, « The Domestic Enforcement of 
International Covenants on Human Rights: A Theoritical Framework », (1985) 35 U. 
of Toronto L.J. 219, 222. 
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principles of parliamentary sovereignty and separation of powers 
cannot be threatened by the “backdoor” incorporation of 
international legal norms by this approach because the norms that 
qualify as cosmopolitan, as opposed to the positive legal norms in 
which they are evidenced, are not just parts of international law but 
also part of the ius cosmopoliticum or ius gentium that forms an 
integral part of the common law constitution. »65 
Selon cette méthode, tous les actes gouvernementaux et législatifs 
seraient soumis aux impératifs de la constitution non-écrite comprenant le 
droit de la common law-cosmopolite, sans que le juge ait à démontrer 
l’ambiguïté de la loi66. De plus, puisque ces valeurs font partie de la 
constitution de common law, le juge pourrait même y recourir lorsqu’il 
estime qu’une norme de droit interne est contraire au droit cosmopolite67. 
Mais plus important encore, la perspective de Walters pose les jalons 
d’une discussion sur la valeur constitutionnelle des normes internationales 
relatives aux droits de la personne en droit interne et qui ne sont pas 
explicitement inscrites dans les chartes des droits et libertés68.  
CONCLUSION 
L’État canadien adhère toujours, dans son discours officiel, à 
l’approche dualiste d’incorporation du droit international conventionnel en 
droit interne, ce qui reflète le rôle traditionnel du législateur dans une 
démocratie de type parlementaire. Toutefois, la presque totalité des 
conventions que le Canada signe ne sont pas reçues dans une loi de mise 
en oeuvre. Afin de remédier à cette situation embarrassante, les juges de la 
Cour suprême appliquent la présomption de conformité du droit interne au 
droit international de façon large dans la mesure où les conditions 
                   
65  M.D. WALTERS, id., p. 13. 
66  M.D. WALTERS, id., p. 4. Dans l’arrêt Baker, précité, note 10, par. 70, la juge 
L’Heureux-Dubé aurait laissé entendre qu’il serait possible de référer à un traité 
même lorsque les dispositions législatives sont claires. 
67  M.D. WALTERS id., p. 14. 
68  Sur les dispositions constitutionnelles écrites relatives aux droits des personnes, 
Pushpanathan c. Canada (Ministre de l’emploi et de l’Immigration), précité, note 11; 
Slaight Communications Inc. c. Davidson [1989] 1 R.C.S. 1038, par. 23; Suresh c. 
Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration), précité, note 11. 
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préliminaires d’application de la présomption – l’ambiguïté du texte 
législatif et les traces d’une volonté législative de donner effet au droit 
international – ne sont plus, somme toute, discriminantes. En effet, en 
favorisant une méthode contextuelle d’interprétation des lois autorisant 
ainsi l’interprète à tenir compte de tous les actes étatiques antérieurs, 
concomitants et postérieurs à la ratification du traité, la Cour suprême 
favorise une perspective non-originaliste d’interprétation des lois. De ce 
point de vue, les sources sont considérées légitimes si elles sont 
pertinentes et la pertinence s’infère des justifications qui sont données. Ce 
faisant, le juge peut non seulement faire appel à des principes et valeurs du 
droit international pour interpréter la loi, mais aussi justifier son appui aux 
initiatives hétérodoxes de l’Administration publique lorsque celle-ci reçoit 
des normes conventionnelles de droit international en droit interne 
canadien par le moyen de règles administratives (telles les guides, 
directives et politiques).  
Cette orientation de la Cour suprême est importante parce qu’elle est 
annonciatrice de changements profonds dans l’organisation, le rôle et les 
pouvoirs des institutions publiques de l’État canadien à l’égard du droit 
international, mais également à l’égard de lui-même, dans la mesure où le 
juge et l’Administration publique seront progressivement appelés à 
devenir des figures actives dans la mise en œuvre du droit international en 
droit interne canadien. En effet, face aux multiples ramifications et 
interrelations entre les ordres juridiques en droit contemporain, il est 
incertain que le Parlement puisse, à lui seul, mettre en œuvre ce grand 
projet du rapprochement des ordres interne et international. À cet égard, 
les théories de réception du droit international en droit interne qui ont été 
proposées par les juristes canadiens depuis l’arrêt Baker convergent sur un 
point : tous les actes étatiques constituent des indications utiles, bien qu’ils 
n’aient pas tous la même valeur, pour le juge afin de déterminer l’effet du 
droit international en droit interne.  
Toutefois, cela ne signifie pas que la question de savoir quel est acteur 
étatique qui doit avoir le dernier mot soit réglée. La tendance doctrinale et 
jurisprudentielle penche en faveur du juge à qui l’on accorde une plus 
grande confiance lorsqu’il s’agit de choisir les orientations normatives qui 
auront préséance en droit canadien. Toutefois, le débat reste encore ouvert 
sur la question de savoir si la discrétion du juge doit être limitée par des 
principes du droit constitutionnel canadien (et, si oui, lesquels?). Entre les 
perspectives de Knop (discrétion non limitée) et Van Ert (discrétion 
limitée par un équilibrage de principes prédéterminés), une troisième voie 
se dessine dans la doctrine canadienne. S’appuyant sur l’arrêt Baker, 
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Dyzenhaus et Walters estiment que le juge doit donner préséance aux 
normes relatives à la protection des droits de la personne tel que prescrit 
par la constitution de common law.  
Il est encore trop tôt pour affirmer l’existence d’une pensée achevée 
chez les juges de la Cour suprême à cet égard, mais l’arrêt Baker a jeté des 
assises qui serviront à la construction d’un nouveau rapport entre le droit 
international et le droit interne. Certes une théorie compréhensive et mieux 
articulée reste à formuler, mais trois jalons pourrait rallier les points de 
vue des uns et des autres : 1. la perspective strictement formaliste 
véhiculée par l’approche dualiste ne joue plus nécessairement un rôle de 
premier plan; 2. le contenu de la norme internationale est dorénavant un 
facteur dont il doit être tenu compte lors de l’analyse de l’effet du droit 
international en droit interne. 3. le droit international des droits de la 
personne constitue une catégorie de normes pour lesquelles la perspective 
dualiste est appelée à jouer un rôle de second plan. Ces jalons soulèvent, 
bien sûr, des interrogations qui vont au-delà de cette recherche : Quelle est 
l’étendue de la catégorie des droits de la personne? Comprend-elle le droit 
international relatif à la santé, la sécurité et l’environnement 
(Spraytech69)? Le cas échéant, comment justifier le même traitement de 
ces normes sur le plan constitutionnel? Doit-on opposer le droit 
international économique à ces autres normes? Faudrait-il formuler un 
cadre analytique adapté à chaque catégorie de normes? Comment 
déterminer les fondements constitutionnels qui auront préséance lors de 
chacune de ces analyses?  
Ces quelques questions montrent l’ampleur des travaux qui restent à 
réaliser afin de nourrir la réflexion sur les enjeux liés à la juxtaposition de 
systèmes juridiques dont les points de rencontre se réduisent, bien souvent, 
à peu de chose. Malgré les difficultés qui s’accumulent, le recours aux 
normes internationales demeure un projet légitime, car il comporte un 
avantage non négligeable sur le plan du développement du droit canadien. 
En effet, le sentiment diffus qui se dégage lorsqu’on observe l’évolution 
des deux systèmes juridiques est que le droit canadien est, à bien des 
égards, à la remorque du droit international. Le désenchantement à l’égard 
de nos propres institutions politiques y est sans doute pour quelque chose, 
car notre emprise sur le renouvellement des idées et des projets sociaux 
                   
69  114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) c. Hudson (Ville), précité, note 
11. 
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semble paralysée par différents facteurs (le déficit démocratique, la qualité 
de nos représentants, la pesanteur des procédures, la lenteur des réformes 
et innovations, etc.). Faute de remède et peut être aussi faute de volonté 
pour y arriver, nous avons passivement assisté au déplacement des centres 
de pouvoir vers les institutions internationales et autres organismes 
d’envergure internationale. Ce changement peut non seulement expliquer 
(du moins en partie) la capacité des acteurs internationaux à renouveler le 
droit international de telle sorte qu’il puisse répondre aux nouvelles 
réalités du monde contemporain, mais également offrir une justification à 
l’intégration de ce droit dans notre système juridique lorsque les acteurs 
étatiques sont d’avis que la norme internationale constitue une repré-
sentation symbolique valide des valeurs et aspirations des Canadiens70. En 
adoptant la prémisse selon laquelle le droit étatique et international 
partagent des fondements communs et sont, par conséquent, intégralement 
lié pour des raisons qui ne peuvent pas être expliquées par la volonté 
législative, la toile de fond interprétative des juges devient plus riche et 
plus nuancée71. Cette prémisse permet aussi de concevoir autrement le rôle 
de l’État-nation. Elle rend possible l’idée d’un concept de « souveraineté 
différenciée et polycentrique »72 où « différents centres de pouvoir, à 
                   
70  A. BRUDNER, loc. cit., note 64, 225-226; David HELD, « Law of States, Law of 
Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty », (2002) 8 Legal Theory 1. 
71  M.D. WALTERS, op. cit., note 62, p. 10. Il cite Murray HUNT, Using Human Rights 
Law in English Courts, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 199, p. 12-17. 
72  Le concept « polycentrique » est entré dans le vocabulaire de la Cour suprême. Elle 
l’utilise dans le cadre de l’analyse pragmatique et fonctionnelle servant à déterminer 
la norme de contrôle applicable aux décisions de l’Administration publique. La Cour 
s’en sert pour appuyer le point de vue selon lequel « la nature du problème n'exige 
pas l'application stricte de règles juridiques ni l'interprétation de la loi, mais plutôt une 
analyse éminemment contextuelle et polycentrique. » : Chamberlain c. Surrey School 
District No. 36, [2002] C.S.C. 86, 20 décembre 2002. Elle l’utilise aussi pour qualifier 
certaines décisions de « polycentriques », c’est-à-dire lorsqu’il s’agit de concilier les 
intérêts de différents groupes dans le cadre d’un processus décisionnel administratif : 
Dr. Q c. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] CSC 19,  
par. 30, 31 et 37; University Trinity Western c. British Columbia College of Teachers, 
[2001] 1 R.C.S. 772, par. 15; voir aussi : Pezim c. Colombie-Britannique 
(Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 R.C.S. 557; Canada (Directeur des enquêtes et 
recherches) c. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 R.C.S. 748. La Cour a également fait référence 
à la nature polycentrique de la négociation de conventions collectives dans le Renvoi 
relatif à la Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alb.), [1987] 1 R.C.S. 313, 418. 
Certaines décisions administratives ne possèdent pas ce caractère polycentrique : 
Barrie Public Utilities c. Assoc. canadienne de télévision par câble, [2003] CSC 28; 
Pushpanathan c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration), précité, 
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l’échelle locale, nationale, multinationale, continentale ou internationale, 
se partageraient les tâches, selon les types de problèmes qu’il s’agit de 
maîtriser. »73 L’État-nation peut ainsi être conçu « comme un lieu, parmi 






note 11, par. 48, Baker, précité, note 10, par. 55; Chieu c. Canada (Ministre de la 
Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration), [2002] 1 R.C.S. 84, par. 26.  
73  Stéphane COURTOIS, « Droits individuals ou droit des peoples? », document 
présenté au soutien d’une conférence du Colloque sur les normes internationales au 
21e siècle, Aix-en-Provence, 11-14 septembre 2003, p. 11 du manuscrit. Il cite au 
soutien de cette idée : D. HELD, op. cit., note 62, p. 27; Michael KEATING, 
« Nations without States: The Accomodation of Nationalism in the New State 
Order »; Thomas POGGE, « Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty », (1992) 103 Ethics 
48, 58 et suiv.; dans M. KEATING et J. McGARRY (dir.), Minority Nationalism and 
the Changing International Order, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 19-43. 
74  S. COURTOIS, id., p. 11. 
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The fault, dear Brutus, is not in the stars, [b]ut in ourselves…1 
 
 
Whether we jealously guard the prescription that our constitutional 
rights as citizens to participate in our political futures through peaceful 
protest can only be curbed by such “reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”2 is 
ultimately the fundamental issue addressed in this paper. Put simply, can 
our post-September 11th legislative initiatives and law enforcement 
responses—put in place in the name of security—be justified as 
“reasonable limits” on citizens’ rights to protest actively the actions of 
their governments in a “free and democratic society”; or can they only be 
justified as reasonable limits in a society that measures these limits by 
yardsticks characterized by a palpable collective sensibility of fear, 
insecurity and overwhelming government control? 
To address these questions, this paper will be divided into four main 
sections. After this introductory section, I discuss—in Part II—the RCMP 
commission that looked into complaints made in connection with the 1997 
APEC Summit in Vancouver. This commission—having addressed head-
on the tension between citizens’ Charter rights to protest against 
government action on public property and the authority of police to limit 
such protests—provides a useful tool for evaluating security responses in 
the context of current peaceful protest. Next, in Part III, I discuss our 
current collective sensibility of fear that—in my view—acts to collapse 
the important distinction between protesters and terrorists, by militating 
against full opportunities for citizen participation and peaceful protest. In 
Part IV, with this backdrop of fear, I look at the landscape of citizen 
participation and peaceful protest in the context of post-September 11th 
                   
1  W. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act 1, Sc. 2, in W. Harness (ed.), Shakspeare’s [sic] 
Dramatic Works, vol. 7 (London: J.F. Dove, 1830) at 9. 
2  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 1 [hereinafter the Charter]. 
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anti-globalization protests in Canada. Specifically, I use as an example 
police responses to the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta. In Part 
V, the paper looks at Charter rights to free expression and the obligations 
that, in my view, we as Canadians have to allow for broader and more 
meaningful opportunities for expression than those afforded citizens in 
Kananaskis. Several counter-arguments are also addressed in this part of 
the paper. Finally, the paper finishes, in Part VI, with some concluding 
observations. 
I. APEC 
On July 31, 2001, the Honourable Commissioner Ted Hughes, Q.C. 
released his interim report3 following the public hearing4 into the 
complaints made in connection with the organization and policing of the 
1997 APEC conference in Vancouver, B.C.5 
A.  Background6 
The practice of APEC has traditionally been to hold its annual 
meetings in remote, relatively isolated locations to promote the 
atmosphere of a “retreat”.7 In 1997, the annual conference was held at 
                   
3  Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP, RCMP Act—Part VII, 
Subsection 45.45(14); Commission Interim Report Following a Public Hearing Into 
the complaints regarding the events that took place in connection with 
demonstrations during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in 
Vancouver, B.C. in November 1997 at the UBC Campus and at the UBC and 
Richmond detachments of the RCMP, File No. PC 6910-199801 by Ted Hughes 
(Ottawa: CPC RCMP, July 31, 2001) [hereinafter APEC Interim Report]. 
4  The “APEC Inquiry”. 
5  The November 1997 APEC—Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation—Conference 
involved delegates from 18 Pacific Rim economies who met in Vancouver to discuss 
economic issues of mutual interest to the participant countries. See APEC Interim 
Report, supra note 3 at 10. 
6  I have discussed the APEC Inquiry elsewhere. See e.g. T.C.W. Farrow, “Negotiation, 
Mediation, Globalization Protests and Police: Right Processes; Wrong System, Issues, 
Parties and Time” (2003) 28 Queen’s L.J. 665 at 672-674 [“Negotiation, Mediation, 
Globalization Protests and Police”]. See also W.W. Pue, “Executive Accountability 
and the APEC Inquiry: Comment on Ruling on Applications to Call Additional 
Government Witnesses” (2000) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 335; W.W. Pue, “The Prime 
Minister’s Police? Commissioner Hughes’ APEC Report” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall 
L.J. 165; W.W. Pue, ed., Pepper in Our Eyes: The APEC Affair (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2000). 
7  APEC Interim Report, supra note 3 at 57, 75, 77. 
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several locations in Vancouver, B.C. including the University of British 
Columbia.8 The license agreement between the federal government and 
UBC—providing for how, where and when the event would take place—
contemplated the exercise of “lawful protest and… free speech”.9 
However, according to Commissioner Ted Hughes, notwithstanding this 
provision, the result was a location that looked much like a “fortress”.10 
During the days leading up to, and on the final day of the Summit, 
there were a number of forms of protest on the UBC campus.11 The 
RCMP, charged with the duty of keeping the entire event secure, 
responded to these protests with various policing techniques, including the 
use of force, pepper spray, detention and strip searches.12 As a result of 
these actions, 52 formal complaints were made by protesters.13 Those 
complaints resulted in an inquiry being conducted under the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police Act.14 
B.  APEC Inquiry 
The Commission approached the entire issue—following the lead of 
the complainants’ submissions—by looking at whether there was an 
“unprecedented RCMP crackdown” on protest at the Summit.15 It found 
                   
8  Ibid. at 10-11. 
9  Pursuant to s. 6.3 of the agreement, it was provided that “[t]he parties undertake not to 
impede any lawful protest and the exercise of free speech outside the Properties and 
other designated areas, as determined by the RCMP in conjunction with UBC.” See 
ibid. at 34. 
10  Ibid. at 72. 
11  The protests included: (1) a tent city and a small break-away group of tents were set 
up; (2) the Tibetan flag was raised from the Graduate Student Society building flag 
pole; (3) a speak-out rally was organized; (4) a protest and symbolic arrest of 
Indonesia’s President Suharto was arranged; (5) students attended at and pushed over 
the security fence; and (6) the three access and exit routes to the meetings were 
blocked. See ibid. at 87, 109, 128, 220, 242, 290, 301. 
12  Ibid. at 5-9. 
13  Ibid. at 5-9, 148-430, Appendix III. 
14  R.S. 1985, c. R-10, s. 45.29(1) [hereinafter the RCMP Act]. See APEC Interim 
Report, supra note 3 at 2. The terms of reference of the APEC Inquiry were 
essentially three-fold. Specifically, they were to look into and report on: (1) the events 
at the APEC Summit between 23-27 November 1997; (2) whether the conduct of the 
RCMP was appropriate, as defined under the RCMP Code of Conduct, found in s. 37 
of the RCMP Act; and (3) whether the conduct of the RCMP was consistent with s. 2 
of the Charter. See APEC Interim Report, supra note 3 at 3, 38-45. 
15  APEC Interim Report, ibid. at 46. 
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that there was a crackdown, in that some instances of RCMP conduct were 
not appropriate, and further, some instances were not consistent with 
section 2 of the Charter.16  
The Commission then formulated its analysis by looking at the two 
most likely explanations for the crackdown, as suggested by the 
complainants’ counsel: (1) below standard policing; and/or (2) improper 
federal government pressure to curtail demonstration, primarily to 
facilitate the attendance of Indonesia’s President Suharto.17 The exercise of 
looking into these explanations—involving 153 witnesses, 710 exhibits 
and 40,000 pages of transcript over 170 days,18 a process that “cost the 
taxpayers nearly $10 million”19—primarily focused on the second of these 
possible explanations. The balance focused on the first.20  
The Commission, in its final analysis, found substandard policing to be 
the explanation for the RCMP’s crackdown,21 not improper government 
pressure.22 Based on this analysis, the Commission concluded with a 
number of recommendations for future protest events.23 On September 7, 
                   
16  Ibid. The APEC Inquiry largely focused on protest rights—to free expression—found 
in s. 2(b) of the Charter. 
17  Ibid. at 47. 
18  Ibid. at 3. 
19  House of Commons Debates No. 109 (November 5, 2001) (P. Venne), online: 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/109_2001-11-05/han109_ 
1105-E.htm. 
20  APEC Interim Report, supra note 3 at 47. To analyze the RCMP’s conduct, the 
Commission essentially formulated its analysis by: (1) grouping the 52 complaints 
into 17 complaint categories (see ibid. at 148-430); (2) looking at the events 
underlying those complaints and the RCMP’s response; (3) consistent with its terms 
of reference (see supra note 14), evaluating the response as to its reasonableness; and 
(4) evaluating the response in terms of its consistency or inconsistency with s. 2 of the 
Charter. 
21  Ibid. at 82-445. Not surprisingly, Commissioner Hughes concluded by finding that 
some of the RCMP’s conduct was appropriate and some of it was not. Further, he 
made similar findings with respect to Charter violations. See ibid. at 431-440.  
22  Ibid. at 102. There are in my view, however, several Commission determinations that 
only questionably support this conclusion. See my discussion on this point in 
“Negotiation, Mediation, Globalization Protests and Police”, supra note 6 at 673, 
no. 19. 
23  First, the Commissioner emphasized the importance of making room for peaceful 
protest, and for promoting the practice of the RCMP working cooperatively with 
protesters and protest organizers. See APEC Interim Report, supra note 3 at 446-448. 
Second, notwithstanding his rejection of the improper government intervention 
explanation for the “crackdown”, Commissioner Hughes did make some 
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2001, RCMP Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli responded to the APEC 
Interim Report.24 The final report of the APEC Inquiry was released on 25 
March 2002.25 
C.  Making Room for Protest 
In the APEC Interim Report, Commissioner Hughes acknowledged 
that the Canadian government and the RCMP may be justified in using 
public protest restrictions, in a “narrow sense”, for the protection of 
visiting heads of state in the context of international meetings, including, 
for example, avoiding “violent physical assault or a more symbolic act, 
such as a flying pie”.26 Other restrictions were also acknowledged by 
Commissioner Hughes to prevent visiting leaders from being “grossly 
humiliated” by “illegal acts”.27 However, other than these limited 
circumstances, according to Commissioner Hughes: 
“[N]either the federal government nor the RCMP may curtail 
political criticism by protesters. The right to express political views 
lies at the very core of the freedom of expression provided for in 
the Charter. The fact that a visiting leader may be merely upset or 
angered by the expression of contrary political views and criticism 
by Canadians does not justify the suppression of such 
expression.”28 
 
recommendations as to police independence that go to the issue of proper government 
influence: ibid. at 451-452. Third, he focused on a need for police to get adequate 
legal advice on issues that might invoke the Charter and other rights of citizens: ibid. 
at 448. Finally, he also made a number of recommendations for future policing 
operations: see e.g. infra notes 26-30 and surrounding text. 
24  G. Zaccardelli, RCMP Commissioner’s Response to the Interim APEC Report 
(Ottawa: September 7, 2001), online: RCMP homepage http://www.rcmp-
grc.gc.ca/news/apec_comm_e.htm. 
25  Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP, RCMP Act—Part VII, 
subsection 45.46(3), Chair’s Final Report Following a Public Hearing into the 
complaints relating to RCMP conduct at events that took place at the UBC campus 
and the Richmond Detachment during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Conference in Vancouver, B.C., in November 1997, File No. PC 6910-199801 
(Ottawa: CPC RCMP, March 25, 2002) (Chair: Shirley Heafey) [hereinafter APEC 
Final Report, and, together with the APEC Interim Report, the APEC Report]. 
26  APEC Interim Report, supra note 3 at 54. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Ibid. See also generally ibid. at 38-45. 
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As a result, in his recommendations regarding “policing public order 
events”, Commissioner Hughes advocated for an express “opportunity for 
protest”:29 
When the RCMP is called upon in the future to police public order 
events, the leadership of the Force should ensure that: 
• generous opportunity will be afforded for peaceful protesters to 
see and be seen in their protest activities by guests to the event; 
and  
• no attempt will be made to use a university campus as the 
venue for an event where delegates are to be sequestered and 
protected from visible and audible signs of dissent.30 
Similar conclusions were reached by the New Zealand Justice and 
Electoral Committee that was set up to look into police treatment at and 
around the 1999 APEC Summit in New Zealand of demonstrators 
protesting the visit of Jiang Zemin, President of the People’s Republic of 
China, and that country’s involvement in Tibet. In its December 2000 
report,31 the committee recognized that “freedom of expression and 
freedom of peaceful assembly are the starting point for the Police in 
making operational decisions about policing protests.”32 This New Zealand 
APEC Report was favourably referred to by Commissioner Hughes in the 
APEC Interim Report.33  
                   
29  Ibid. at 446. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Inquiry into matters relating to the visit of the President of China to New Zealand in 
1999 (December 2000), accessible online: http://216.239.57.104/search?q=cache: 
5vPmAsJzlW4J:www.gp.co.nz/wooc/i-papers/i7a-china.html+Tim+Barnett+and+% 
22Justice+and+Electoral%22+and+APEC&hl=en&ie=UTF8 [hereinafter New Zeal-
and APEC Report]. The specific terms of reference of the New Zealand APEC Report 
were:  
“To examine the handling of demonstrations held during the visit of the President 
of China to New Zealand in 1999, and the impact of those events on the civil 
liberties and fundamental rights of New Zealanders. In particular… assessing 
whether there are enough protections for peaceful and lawful protest; and… 
assessing whether the powers of government pertaining to the maintenance of 
public order are appropriate; and… assessing the procedures for the exercise of 
those powers.” Ibid. at 7. 
32  Ibid. at 5-6. 
33  APEC Interim Report, supra note 3 at 54. 
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So what happened between the issuing of the APEC Interim Report, 
which recommended a narrow scope for limiting future peaceful 
expression, and the virtual elimination of meaningful protest that occurred 
at the 2002 Alberta G8 Summit? It is to that question to which I will now 
turn.  
II. COLLECTIVE SENSIBILITY OF FEAR 
A.  Responses to September 11th 
Less than two months after the APEC Interim Report was released, the 
September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States occurred. Almost 
immediately, the massive legislative, law enforcement and military powers 
of the Unites States,34 Canada,35 numerous other nations36 and the United 
                   
34  In the United States, for example, on September 18, 2001, Congress authorized the 
President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks…” Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 
Stat. 224 (2001). Shortly thereafter, Congress passed significant and far-reaching anti-
terror legislation. See e.g. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter USA Patriot Act]. For 
general commentary, see e.g. Norman Abrams, Anti-Terrorism and Criminal 
Enforcement (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2003) [hereinafter Anti-Terrorism and 
Criminal Enforcement]; D.J. Musch, Balancing Civil Rights and Security: American 
Judicial Responses Since 9/11 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc., 2003) 
[hereinafter Balancing Civil Rights and Security]. 
35  See e.g. Anti-terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, 
s. 2, 83.01-83.33. In addition to these legislative initiatives, as the Canadian 
government has outlined, “Following September 11th, the Government moved 
quickly to implement a range of national security initiatives in both legislative and 
operational areas. In December 2001, the Federal Budget allocated $7.7 billion over 
the next five years to keep Canada safe, terrorists out and the border open.” 
Government of Canada, “Safety and Security for Canadians”, Government of Canada 
homepage, online: http://canada.gc.ca/wire/2001/09/110901-US_e.html. For further 
summary information on Canada’s security budget, see Department of Finance 
Canada, “Budget 2003 Supports Social and Economic Agenda While Maintaining 
Balanced Budgets”, online: http://www.fin.gc.ca/news03/03-010e.html#Highlights. 
36  In the U.K., for example, see Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (U.K.), 
2001, c. 24. For general commentary, see e.g. Y. Alexander & E.H. Brenner, eds., The 
United Kingdom’s Legal Responses to Terrorism (London: Cavendish Publishing 
Limited, 2003) [hereinafter The United Kingdom’s Legal Responses to Terrorism]. 
For a useful collection of Canadian and international anti-terror initiatives, see Jurist, 
“World Anti-Terrorism Laws”, online: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/terrorism/terrorism 
3a.htm. 
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Nations37—the “full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement 
communities”38—were unleashed in the name of security and anti-terror.39 
B.  “Everything Changed” 
From that day forward, there has been precious little mention of the 
APEC Inquiry or the resulting findings.40 In my view, the APEC Report 
has largely been swept off the radar screen by the irresistible wave of anti-
terror initiatives and fear that have rolled over our collective political 
communities and consciousness. Put simply: the APEC Report was then; 
this is now. The reason: people generally believe that the world has 
changed since September 11th.  
Political statements from high-level political figures constantly 
reinforce this sentiment. For example, according to press materials from 
President George W. Bush, “The attacks of September 11th changed 
America”.41 Similarly, according to recent statements from former British 
                   
37  See e.g. SC Res. 1373, UN SCOR (September 28, 2001). 
38  US President George W. Bush, “Statement by the President and His Address to the 
Nation” (September 11, 2001), online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2001/09/20010911-16.html. 
39  This paper does not purport to address in a comprehensive manner our post-
September 11th legislative, law enforcement and judicial responses. I have looked 
briefly at these responses elsewhere. See e.g. T.C.W. Farrow, “Law & Politics After 
September 11th: Civil Rights & The Rule of Law” (2003) 35 Hosei Riron J. of L. and 
Pol. 163 at 165-167 [hereinafter “Law & Politics After September 11th”]. For other, 
more fulsome examinations of these post-September 11th responses, see e.g. 
R. Chesney, “Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Paradigm: The Guilt by Association 
Critique” (2003) 101 Mich. L. Rev. [forthcoming], “Responding to Terrorism: Crime, 
Punishment, and War” (2002) 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1217. For a more general discussion 
on the aftermath of September 11th, see e.g. R. Jervis, “An Interim Assessment of 
September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not” (2002) 117 Pol. Sci. Q. 37. 
See also D. Daubney et al., eds., Terrorism, Law & Democracy: How is Canada 
Changing Following September 11? (Montréal: Éditions Thémis, for the Canadian 
Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2002); R.J. Daniels, P. Macklem & K. 
Roach, The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-terrorism Bill (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2001) [hereinafter The Security of Freedom] The United 
Kingdom’s Legal Responses to Terrorism, supra note 36; Anti-Terrorism and 
Criminal Enforcement, supra note 34; Balancing Civil Rights and Security, supra 
note 34. 
40  The APEC Final Report—setting out the findings and recommendations as the Chair 
“sees fit” from the APEC Interim Report—was released on March 25, 2002. See 
APEC Final Report, supra note 25 at 1. 
41  The White House, “President’s Biography”, online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
president/gwbbio.html. 
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Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, as a result of the “horror of Sept. 11”, 
the United States “will never be the same again.”42 
Similar arguments are made from a legal perspective. For example, 
during an October 2001 interview, Anne McLellan—then Canada’s 
Minister of Justice—stated that the notion of “reasonable limit” in section 
1 of the Charter has shifted since September 11th.43 Similarly, in the 
context of discussing national security and arrest powers, John Manley—
then Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and chair of an ad hoc Cabinet 
committee on security and anti-terrorism—was similarly reported as 
stating that “Either nothing changed on Sept. 11 or everything changed”.44 
Many people agree with and have applauded these political and legal 
responses. As one Canadian report indicated, “two out of every three… 
[Canadians] believed fighting terrorism outweighed the need to protect 
individual rights and the due process of law”.45 In the US, prior to the 
recent events in Iraq, a September 2002 CNN-Gallop poll gave President 
Bush a 66 percent approval rating, with “most Americans saying he has 
achieved just the right balance between protecting their treasured civil 
liberties and fighting terrorism.”46 Others, rejecting the notion that 
                   
42  M. Thatcher, “Advice to a Superpower” The New York Times (February 11, 2002), 
online: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/11/opinion/11THAT.html?.  
43  S. McCarthy, “The War on Terror: Anne McLellan’s New Ideals” The Globe and 
Mail (October 22, 2001) A7.  
44  L. Chwialkowska, “Police Get Vast Power of Arrest: ‘Deter, Disable, Dismantle’” 
National Post (October 16, 2001) A1, online: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/tt-
watch/message/6777?source=1. See also I. Cotler, “Thinking Outside the Box: 
Foundational Principles for a Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy” in The Security of 
Freedom, supra note 39 at 111. Even the title of the CIAJ Conference at which this 
paper was presented—see supra note *—contemplates the possibility of a changed 
legal society through a “New Rule of Law”. 
45  D. Small, “Backlash, Terrorism & Civil Liberties” (2001) 10 National 15 at 18. 
46  R. MacGregor, “Jefferson’s Words Treasured by Patriots, Twisted by Terrorists” The 
Globe and Mail (September 7, 2002) A11. For a discussion of opinion polls on 
September 11th and their aftermath, see e.g. L. Huddy, N. Khatib & T. Capelos, 
“Reactions to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001” (2002) 66 Pub. Op. Q. 
418. See also generally R.P. Hart, S.E. Jervis & E.T. Lim, “The American People in 
Crisis: A Content Analysis” (2002) 23 Pol. Psych. 417; A.F. Healy et al., “Terrorists 
and Democrats: Individual Reactions to International Attacks”, ibid. at 439; V.A. 
Chanley, “Trust in Government in the Aftermath of 9/11: Determinants and 
Consequences”, ibid. at 469; L. Huddy et al., “The Consequences of Terrorism: 
Disentangling the Effects of Personal and National Threat”, ibid. at 485; D.J. 
Schildkraut, “The More Things Change… American Identity and Mass and Elite 
Responses to 9/11”, ibid. at 511. 
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everything has changed,47 have criticized our collective response as a 
“deeply disturbing” move unlawfully to infringe upon long-standing and 
fundamental rights and liberties.48 
Regardless with which side of the debate one agrees, it is certainly 
clear, in my mind, that our response—reminiscent of the Kennedy 
administration’s nuclear fallout shelter program during the 1961 Berlin 
crisis—is largely the result of a widespread collective sense of insecurity 
and fear.49 People are scared. And it is with this mindset that we are 
responding to current world events.50 This sense of collective fear was 
recently commented on by Margaret Atwood when discussing post-
September 11th America: 
“You’re gutting the Constitution. Already your home can be 
entered without your knowledge or permission, you can be 
snatched away and incarcerated without cause, your mail can be 
spied on, your private records searched… I know you’ve been told 
all this is for your own safety and protection, but think about it for 
a minute. Anyway, when did you get so scared? You didn’t used to 
be easily frightened.”51 
Unfortunately, I think Atwood is right. But regardless of whether we 
are, in the end, motivated by fear or not, it is also clear that our responses 
to the tragic events of September 11th have resulted in significant 
restrictions on freedom of movement, speech and assembly. Further, the 
                   
47  Kent Roach, for example, has recently argued that “the idea that September 11 
changed everything must be rejected”. K. Roach, “Did September 11 Change 
Everything? Struggling to Preserve Canadian Values in the Face of Terrorism” (2002) 
47 McGill L.J. 893 at para. 82. See also K. Roach, “The Dangers of a Charter-Proof 
and Crime-Based Response to Terrorism” in The Security of Freedom, supra note 39 
at 131. 
48  American Civil Liberties Association (“ACLU”), “Keep America Safe and Free”, 
online: ACLU homepage http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFreeMain.cfm. 
See also ACLU, “Freedom Under Fire: Dissent in Post-9/11 America”, online: ACLU 
homepage http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12666&c=206. 
49  President Kennedy reportedly believed, in retrospect, that his 1961 call for a national 
fallout shelter program had overexcited people. See A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., A 
Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1965) at 723, 748. 
50  I am grateful to Patricia Hughes, Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Calgary, for 
comments on this aspect of my argument. 
51  M. Atwood, “A Letter to America” The Globe and Mail (March 28, 2003) A17 
[hereinafter “A Letter to America”]. 
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argument that the world is a “changed” place after September 11th has 
acted to cloud the more basic question of how properly to balance liberty 
and security—in the context of citizens actively, yet peacefully, 
participating in their political futures—in a free and democratic society. 
As such, we have—through our fear—largely collapsed the difference 
between activists and terrorists. It is to this issue, discussed through the 
lens of recent anti-globalization protests, to which I will now turn. 
III. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND PEACEFUL PROTEST 
A.  Anti-Globalization Protests 
For the past 10 or 15 years, and now most famously since the Seattle 
anti-WTO protests in 1999, there has been a growing movement of 
criticism against current globalization trends. This movement, made up of 
a vast array of individual and group interests, has been loosely 
characterized as the “anti-globalization movement”.52 In 1999, prior to 
Seattle, it was estimated that the International Civil Society included 
approximately 800 organizations from more than 75 countries.53 That 
number has since increased.54 
Following Seattle, significant protests in connection with world trade 
and other international meetings have been organized in a number of 
different cities across the globe, including Davos, Washington, Ottawa, 
Milan, Québec,55 New York, Tokyo, and elsewhere. These protests, 
                   
52  For recent discussions of current anti-globalization protests, see e.g. T.C.W. Farrow, 
“Reviewing Globalization: Three Competing Stories, Two Emerging Themes, and 
How Law Schools Can and Must Participate” (2003) 13 Meikei L. Rev. 176, trans. 
into Japanese by M. Kuwahara, (2003) 44 Aichigakuin L. Rev. 29 [hereinafter 
“Reviewing Globalization”]; “Negotiation Mediation, Globalization Protests and 
Police”, supra note 6 at 670-672. See also M. Barlow & T. Clark, Global Showdown: 
How the New Activists Are Fighting Global Corporate Rule (Toronto: Stoddart 
Publishing Co. Limited, 2002). 
53  Members of the International Civil Society, “Statement from Members of 
International Civil Society Opposing a Millennium Round or a New Round of 
Comprehensive Trade Negotiations”, online: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/wtomr-
cn.htm. 
54  See e.g. “The Growth in the Number of NGOs in Consultative Status with the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations”, online: City University London 
homepage http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/NGOS/NGO-GRPH.HTM#data. 
55  For a judicial discussion of security measures at the 2001 Québec Summit, see 
Tremblay v. Québec (Procureur Général), [2001] J.Q. No. 1504 (C.A.), online: QL 
(JQ), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 231, online: QL (SCCA). 
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loosely speaking, primarily involve objections to current and dominant 
neo-liberal trends of free trade, international capital flow and strong 
corporate influence. A primary theme of the protest movement is that the 
current balance of political power and world economic arrangements leads 
to a wide disparity of wealth and lack of equality across world 
populations. The approach of these protests has largely involved direct and 
active street demonstrations and the widespread use of the Internet. For 
purposes of this paper, it is important to recognize that, while there has 
been some violence, the vast majority of protests have been peaceful. 
These protests have also become popular media targets.56 
B.  2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis 
In the context of public anti-globalization demonstrations in Canada 
following the events of September 11th, national security and the threat of 
terrorism have been used as justifications for deploying significant police 
and military units around these meetings of world leaders. For the 
purposes of this paper, I will look specifically at the June 2002 G8 
Summit.  
At that Summit—in Kananaskis, Alberta—there was a region-wide 
security perimeter set up making it essentially impossible for protesters to 
get anywhere near the international leaders and trade delegates. Even in 
Calgary, more than 100 kilometers away, protest zones and access to 
public areas were severely restricted. The cost of these heavy police and 
military security precautions in place surrounding the entire 2002 G8 
Summit was estimated at between $300 and $500 million.57 The reason for 
                   
56  For further discussions of post-September 11th Canadian anti-globalization protests, 
including the November 2001 G20 Summit in Ottawa and the June 2002 G8 Summit 
in Alberta, see “Negotiation, Mediation, Globalization Protests and Police”, supra 
note 6 at 674-688; “Reviewing Globalization”, supra note 52 at 192-204; “Law & 
Politics After September 11th”, supra note 39 at 176-178. 
57  T. Maloney, “Deputy Chief Defends $34.3M Tab” Calgary Herald (June 26, 2002) 
A6; T. Maloney, “Federal Ministers Showered With Catcalls” Calgary Herald 
(June 26, 2002) A7. For a summary of the 2002 Alberta G8 security initiatives, see 
e.g. RCMP, “G8 Summit Security”, online: http://www.g8summitsecurity.ca/g8/ 
news/nr-02-02.htm#newsrelease; Government of Alberta, “Security”, online: 
http://www.gov.ab.ca/home/g8/Display.cfm?id=4. See also M. Reid, “Police Steps Up 
Security Measures: Extra Fencing, Water Cannons in Place” Calgary Herald 
(June 22, 2002) A1.  
 As it turned out, the protests in Calgary and the neighboring areas surrounding the G8 
Summit in Kananaskis were peaceful and were carried off without major incident. As 
one report indicated, “Protesters preferred to party rather than fight… The protesters 
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these precautions: security, primarily including security against terrorist 
attacks.58 The result of these precautions: a virtual shut-down of any 
meaningful debate or protest in the vicinity of the leaders and other 
powerful decision-makers.59 
This lack of opportunity for meaningful dissent and protest was 
troubling in itself.60 In my view, the police lock-down of the Kananaskis 
region was a clear violation of the rights to free speech and expression that 
are enshrined in section 2 of the Charter.61 There is no way in my mind, 
on any reading of section 1 of the Charter, that a 100 km region-wide 
security perimeter could be a justified restriction on peaceful dissent and 
protest.  
 
danced and pounded drums, but were otherwise peaceful.” S. Crowson, “Party Breaks 
Out at ‘Showdown’” Calgary Herald (June 26, 2002) A1. See also J. Mahoney, 
“Calgary Protests Get Off to Peaceful Start” The Globe and Mail (June 24, 2002) A8; 
D. Walton & L. Nguyen, “So Long, Seattle: Protests Turn Polite” The Globe and Mail 
(June 27, 2002) A1; E. Poole et al., “Polite Protesters Give Peace a Chance in 
Downtown Streets” Calgary Herald (June 27, 2002) A7. 
58  The reason for extensive security was also, at least arguably in part, to protect the 
environmentally sensitive area—Kananaskis Country—in which the Federal 
Government decided to host the Summit. While, in my view, the Government 
purposely chose and used the nature of the area as a strategic tool to bolster its 
argument that a shut down of the region was warranted, there is no doubt that the 
Kananaskis/Canmore/Banff regions are certainly environmentally sensitive areas. For 
example, even as I delivered this paper at the Participatory Justice Conference—see 
supra note *—deer were walking and grazing just feet away outside the conference 
room window. I am grateful to Constance D. Hunt, Justice, Alberta Court of Appeal, 
for comments on the issue of the environmental sensitivity of the Kananaskis region 
and the fact that the decision to hold the Summit in that region was ultimately made 
by the Federal Government, not the RCMP. 
59  As one report leading up to the 2002 G8 Summit indicated, “… officials tasked with 
managing the nuisance of protesters have all but ensured that their part in this 
grandiose theatre does not happen at all… The police have done a splendid job of 
marginalizing the protesters.” B. Cooper & D. Bercuson, “Protest Fest? Not at 
Kananaskis” National Post (May 23, 2002), online: http://www.nationalpost.com/ 
scripts/prin...nter.asp?f=stories/20020523/312656.html.  
60  I attended the protest sites in Calgary during the 2002 G8 Summit and observed, first 
hand, many of the security initiatives that were in place. 
61  It also signaled a clear change from previous G8 meetings in Canada. As Prime 
Minister Chrétien reportedly indicated at the June 2003 Evian G8 meeting, 
commenting fondly on the 1995 G8 meeting in Halifax, there the leaders were able to 
walk “into the crowds and shake hands with people… The people were fabulous” and 
“we’ve not been able to repeat it” because of security concerns. Canadian Press, 
“Chrétien Marks 10th and Last G-8 Summit as PM”, online: http://www.ctv.ca/ 
servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1054655547437_68.  
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However, perhaps more troubling still is the chilling effect that the 
post-September 11th approach to demonstration zones has on any kind of 
meaningful public debate, dissent and protest. Increased police powers, 
through anti-terrorism initiatives and other law enforcement tools, now 
provide governments with wide powers to shut out protest and to 
investigate potential “terrorists”.62 As Bill Blaikie, New Democratic Party 
member of Parliament from Winnipeg-Transcona questioned prior to the 
2002 G8 Summit with respect to military action and the resulting 
suppression of political protests: “I want to ask this government, what is it 
they’ve got against legitimate protesters who may not share their world 
view from time to time[?]”63 Ultimately, these government powers and 
police actions—exemplified in the June 2002 shut-down of the 
Kananaskis area—have in my view largely silenced meaningful peaceful 
public protest. 
C.  Lessons From APEC 
Returning now to the findings of the APEC Inquiry, Commissioner 
Hughes stated, in the recommendation section of the APEC Interim 
Report,64 that: 
“The Vancouver APEC conference was an extraordinary event in 
Canadian policing but the evidence is clear that police in Canada 
and around the world will face increasing challenges as they are 
called upon to police international gatherings that attract growing 
dissent. Their role is to protect government leaders and officials 
and also to safeguard citizens’ rights to lawful protest. As I have 
quoted Mr. Justice Doherty saying, in the Brown case: ‘We want to 
be safe, but we need to be free.’”65 
I think Commissioner Hughes was right: challenges raised by the 
number and diversity of voices that attend anti-globalization and other 
public protest events combined with the background of terrorism that has 
been foregrounded by the events of September 11th do create “increasing 
                   
62  Supra notes 34-39. 
63  CBC News Staff, “Don’t Use Anti-terror Bill to Block G-8 Protests: Critics” CBC 
News (November 30, 2001), online: http://cbc.ca/stories/2001/11/30/blaikie_ 
security011130. 
64  APEC Interim Report, supra note 3 at 446-453. 
65  Ibid. at 446, citing Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force (1998), 43 O.R. (3d) 223 
at 251 (C.A.). 
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challenges” for government officials and police officers. There is no doubt 
that modern policing is a challenging business.66 
Unfortunately, however, rather than following the recommendations of 
the APEC Commission, what we have done in Canada since September 
11th in terms of policing public events—as exemplified by the June 2002 
G8 Summit in Alberta—is largely, in my view, the opposite of what 
Commissioner Hughes recommended. Opportunity for active participation 
and protest—allowing protesters “to see and be seen” and avoiding 
locations that allow government officials to be “sequestered and protected 
from visible and audible signs of dissent”67—has not occurred. As the 
security arrangements for the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis 
demonstrate, what has instead occurred has been a complete shut-down of 
meaningful public dissent in the name of securing public leaders from 
terrorist threats. 
IV. OPENING UP DEBATE 
A.  Wide Latitude for Expression 
It is an understatement to say that the Court has traditionally 
recognized the importance of free expression, and in particular, free 
political expression. As McLachlin C.J. and LeBel J. stated in Retail, 
Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada 
Beverages (West) Ltd:68  
“The Court, moreover, has repeatedly reaffirmed the importance of 
freedom of expression. It is the foundation of a democratic 
society… The core values which free expression promotes include 
self-fulfilment, participation in social and political decision 
making, and the communal exchange of ideas. Free speech protects 
human dignity and the right to think and reflect freely on one’s 
circumstances and conditions. It allows a person to speak not only 
for the sake of expression itself, but also to advocate change, 
                   
66  For a useful look at policing in the context of protests in Canada, see J. Esmonde, 
“The Policing of Dissent: The Use of Breach of the Peace Arrests at Political 
Demonstrations” (2002) 1 J. of L. & Equality 247. 
67  APEC Interim Report, supra note 3 at 54, 446. See further supra notes 29-30 and 
surrounding text. 
68  [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156. 
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attempting to persuade others in hope of improving one’s life and 
perhaps the wider social, political, and economic environment.”69 
Similarly, in the context of complaints made about police treatment of 
demonstrators at President George W. Bush’s January 2001 inauguration, 
Kessler J. of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
stated, when considering the kind of speech at issue in the dispute:  
“we are considering the essence of First Amendment freedoms—
the freedom to protest policies and programs to which one is 
opposed, and the freedom to organize, raise money, and associate 
with other like-minded persons so as to effectively convey the 
message of the protest.70 This wide freedom to exchange ideas also 
includes—in the context of the anti-globalization movement—the 
freedom actively to criticize dominant world views and trends such 
as ‘global capitalism’ and ‘corporate interests’”.71  
These rights to free expression are, in my view, of increased 
importance in an era when world leaders are debating not only trade 
restrictions and agreements, but more fundamentally, the future of nations, 
leaders and political regimes. Now, more than ever, we need the 
opportunity to debate and take seriously both according and dissenting 
opinions.72 
                   
69  Ibid. at 172-173. See further Reference re: Secession of Québec (1998), 161 D.L.R. 
(4th) 385 at 417 (S.C.C.), Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 927 at 970. See also generally P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 
looseleaf, vol. 2 (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1997) at 40-1–40-51. 
70  International Action Center v. United States of America, [2002] Civil Action No. 01-
72 (D.C. Cir.) at 5, online: http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/district-court-2002.html. 
71  Lee v. City of Seattle, [2001] Civil Action No. C01-1928P (W.D.W.) 1 at 3 
[hereinafter Lee]. 
72  Justice Gonthier recently stated that: “The new era of democratic rights and 
responsibilities into which the Charter has propelled us demands considerable effort 
on the part of every player in the Canadian democracy… we must make real and 
significant the enlightened participation of the public in fundamental debates that 
guide society… It is here that the roles of courts, Parliament and the media unite: in 
serving the public, as well as in creating public space where ideas can propagate and 
evolve.” The Honourable Charles D. Gonthier (Main Address, The Honourable 
Charles D. Gonthier Benefit Dinner, CIAJ, Montréal, April 29, 2003) CIAJ 
Newsletter XIII: 2 (Summer 2003) 6 at 7. 
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Protecting our populations from the threat of terrorism is clearly 
important. However, peaceful protesters are not terrorists. They should not 
be treated as such.73 Further, it is important to remember—when labeling 
“terrorists”—that, as the Supreme Court in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) acknowledged, “Nelson Mandela’s African 
National Congress was, during the apartheid era, routinely labeled a 
terrorist organization, not only by the South African government but by 
much of the international community.”74  
Without leaving room for dissent and debate, we impoverish any 
chance for a fulsome consideration of all views at a time when political 
stakes are exceptionally high. Protest, debate and demonstration need not 
be feared; rather, they should be celebrated and encouraged by the 
majority, and at least vigorously protected by our courts. 
B.  Anti-Globalization and Beyond 
There are several places—flashpoints—where these freedoms will 
likely clash “on the ground” with state interests of security in the context 
of anti-globalization and other public protests. These flashpoints 
potentially include: (1) injunctive relief challenging time, manner and 
place protest permit restrictions and denials;75 (2) similar injunctive relief 
                   
73  For useful discussions on the treatment of dissent and protest in the post-September 
11th era, see A.-G. Gagnon, “A Dangerously Shrinking Public Sphere” (September 
2002) 23 Policy Options 18; L. Panitch, “Violence as a Tool of Order and Change: 
The War on Terrorism and the Anti-Globalization Movement”, ibid. at 40; 
R. Morden, “Finding the Right Balance”, ibid. at 45; A. Borovoy, “Protest 
Movements and Democracy”, ibid. at 54. 
74  [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, online: QL (SCJ) at para. 95. 
75  In Canada, in June 2002, the Alberta Federation of Labour (“AFL”) and the Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association challenged a Calgary City by-law invoked to prohibit an 
anti-globalization protest in a Calgary park during the 2002 G8 Summit. While the 
by-law was not enacted to protect against terrorism, it was used in the name of 
security primarily against terrorism. The challenge was settled following the 
permission by the City to use the park for peaceful demonstrations. See AFL, “AFL 
and Civil Liberties Association Launch Court Challenge to Defend Freedom of 
Assembly in Calgary City Parks” (News Release, June 24, 2002), online: 
http://www.telusplanet.net/public/afl/newsreleases/june2402.html. See also R. 
Rowland, “Security at G8; Watching on Three Fronts” CBC News, online: 
http://cbc.ca/news/features/g8/security.html. 
 In the US, see e.g. the November 2001 injunction granted by Pechman J., United 
States District Court, Western District of Washington at Seattle, ordering the City of 
Seattle to permit a WTO anniversary protest in Seattle’s Westlake Park. Lee, supra 
note 71. For a report of the decision, see Z.D. Lyons, “N30 Lawsuit Against City 
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challenging the constitutionality of specific crowd control measures;76 (3) 
surveillance tactics of police and investigative agencies;77 (4) efforts by 
protesters to resist arrest;78 (5) after-the-fact general challenges of police 
crowd control techniques;79 and (6) complaints about illegal detentions of 
protesters.80 
Further, the importance of this discussion is not limited to the anti-
globalization movement. As the critics of recent anti-terror initiatives have 
made clear,81 the protection of nations against the threat of terrorism has 
resulted in massive government restrictions on basic human rights and 
liberties. For example, after pointing to the prisoners being held by the US 
in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, Russia’s military involvement in Chechnya, 
and China’s restrictions on Muslims—all largely in place in the name of 
terrorism—Mary Robinson “blasted governments for using terrorism [the 
‘T-word’] as an excuse to trample human rights… under the pretext of 
 
Continues in Federal Court” The Settle Press (January 3, 2002), online: 
www.seattlepress.com/print-9411.html. 
76  Tremblay v. Québec (Procureur Général), supra note 55. 
77  Prior to complaints made by the ACLU, the New York City police reportedly 
attempted to collect information from arrested anti-war protesters on prior political 
activity. See e.g. W.K. Rashbaum, “Police Stop Collecting Data on Protesters’ 
Politics” The New York Times (April 10, 2003), online: http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2003/04/10/nyregion/10NYPD.html.  
78  Smith c. R., [2003] Q.J. No. 6525, online: QL (QJ) (Sup. Ct.), in which the appellant, 
a protester at the April 2001 Québec Summit of the Americas, was arrested—after 
refusing to remove a scarf—for resisting arrest. 
79  In Canada, see e.g. the APEC Inquiry, above, Part II. In New Zealand, see e.g. the 
New Zealand APEC Report, supra notes 31-32. In the United States, several class 
actions have been launched in connection with police treatment of protesters at large 
anti-globalization and other anti-government rallies. For example, in connection with 
the April 2000 IMF-World Bank protests in Washington, D.C, see Alliance for Global 
Justice v. District of Columbia (US District Court for the District of Columbia, 01-
CV-811) (amended complaint), online: http://www.justiceonline.org/a16/a16 
complaint.html. In connection with demonstrations at President George W. Bush’s 
January 2001 inauguration, see International Action Center v. United States (US 
District Court for the District of Columbia, 01-CV-72). For a discussion of the case, 
in the context of an interlocutory discovery motion, see International Action Center v. 
United States of America, [2002] Civil Action No. 01-72 (D.C. Cir.), online: 
http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/district-court-2002.html.  
80  See e.g. APEC Interim Report, supra note 3 at 9. 
81  See e.g. supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
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fighting international terrorist groups.”82 Clearly these issues are of critical 
importance to all citizens, not simply to members of the anti-globalization 
movement or to members of traditional minority groups. 
More specifically, other individuals and contexts that are potentially 
directly affected by this discussion—perhaps with modification83—
include: (1) anti-poverty protests;84 (2) abortion clinic protests;85 
(3) environmental protests;86 (4) access to government officials;87 
(5) university students protesting higher tuition fees;88 and (6) potentially 
many others.89 
                   
82  CBC News Staff, “Outgoing UN Rights Chief Lashes US, Russia, China” CBC News 
(September 9, 2002), online: http://cbc.ca/cgi-bin/templates/print.cgi?2002/09/08/ 
robinson_rights020908. 
83  What counts as “reasonable limits” may (and should) change depending on the type 
and context of expression involved. See, for example, the treatment of expression at 
abortion clinic protests in B.C.: R. v. Lewis, [1997] 1 W.W.R. 496 (B.C.S.C.). 
84  See e.g. the October 2001 anti-poverty protest organized by the Ontario Common 
Front, a coalition that includes the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty. For reports of 
the protest, see e.g. J. Rusk, “Activists Hope to Snarl Traffic” The Globe and Mail 
(October 16, 2001) A23, G. Smith & J. Rusk, “Protesters Snarl Downtown Traffic” 
The Globe and Mail (October 17, 2001) A18. For a discussion of the protest in the 
context of anti-terror legislation, see A. Dostal, “Casting the Net Too Broadly: The 
Definition of ‘Terrorist Activity’ in Bill C-36” (2002) 60 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 69 at para. 
3. 
85  See e.g. R. v. Lewis, supra note 83. See also R. v. Demers (2003), 177 B.C.A.C. 16, 
leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 103, online: QL (SCCA). 
86  In Canada, see e.g. the Supreme Court’s approach in MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson, 
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 1048. For a comment on that case, see Amir Attaran, “Mandamus in 
the Environment of the Criminal Law: Ending the Anti-Protest Injunction Habit—
Issues Arising from MacMillan Bloedel v. Simpson” (1999) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 181. 
More recently, see e.g. Hamilton (City) v. Loucks, [2003] O.J. No. 3669, online; QL 
(OJ) (Sup. Ct.) (involving the construction of an expressway through an environ-
mentally sensitive area of Ontario). In the United States, see e.g. Headwaters Forest 
Def. v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
1000 (2002) (involving the use of pepper spray against peaceful anti-logging 
protesters). In Europe, see e.g. Steel and Others v. United Kingdom (1998), 28 
E.H.R.R. 603 (E.C.H.R.) (involving arrests of hunting protesters). 
87  See e.g. R. v. Behrens, [2001] O.J. No. 245 (Prov. Off. Ct.). 
88  See e.g. Canadian Federation of Students, “Students Declare February 6 Day of 
Action” Canadian Federation of Students Newswire (February 4, 2002), online: 
http://action.web.ca/home/cfso/alerts.shtml?scrl=1&scr_scr_Go=7&AA_EX_Session
=1db855ffac51c07dca231c950c5ed818.  
89  For example, consideration should also be given to the impact of these issues on the 
use of the Internet and other forms of electronic communication for the purposes of 
citizen participation and peaceful protest. 
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C. Potential Counter-Arguments 
I anticipate several challenges to the underlying premises of this paper. 
First, what about the argument that—in light of the tragedies of September 
11th—governments need wide latitude to legislate against terror and to 
have its law enforcement officials vigilantly protect its citizens? Certainly 
there is merit in this argument. And I do not, as a general matter, disagree. 
What I do take issue with is the underlying sensibility of fear that drives 
this argument. What we do by resigning ourselves uncritically to this 
argument is normalize the fear by which this argument is driven. I do not 
believe that we can, in a sophisticated modern society ruled by law, reject 
the notions of freedom and democracy that these governmental initiatives 
are themselves purportedly designed to protect. It quite frankly makes no 
sense. As Nordheimer J. recently stated in France v. Ouzchar: 
“While I appreciate that recent world events have brought the 
existence of terrorism to the forefront of most people’s thoughts, I 
would hope that the vast majority of reasonably informed, right-
thinking members of our community would agree that, notwith-
standing those events, every citizen of this country is still entitled 
to their basic constitutional rights and freedoms…”90 
This point was further driven home recently by Chief Justice 
McLachlin who stated, in an interview with The Lawyers Weekly, that: 
“Without wanting to trivialize in any way… September 11th—
which stands in a class, obviously, of its own—what I am saying is 
it’s the same intellectual effort [in Charter review] that the 
struggle… and the task of the law is to find ways to maintain our 
freedoms and our democracy and the rule of law while maintaining 
security… I think the court is vigilant to maintain liberties. We are 
very cognizant of the difficulties of police work, of course, and the 
difficulties that face law enforcement officers in the modern age… 
but we are also very conscious of the need to maintain liberty, and 
to ensure that Canada remains a democratic and liberal and free 
country where freedoms are impinged as little as possible.”91 
                   
90  [2001] O.J. No. 5713 at para. 26 (Sup. Ct.). 
91  C. Schmitz, “Chief Justice McLachlin Discusses Terrorism, Liberty, Live Webcasting 
of Appeals” The Lawyers Weekly 21:33 (January 11, 2002) 1 at 19. 
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Second, even if one agrees that total deference to government and law 
enforcement action is not warranted, surely a wide latitude in the form of 
time, manner and place restrictions92 is permissible and appropriate at this 
time. Again, as a general matter, I do not necessarily disagree with this 
argument. However, what I do take issue with is the fact that these 
restrictions—post-September 11th—seem to have been used, in effect, to 
shut expression down completely. As argued above,93 I do not see how a 
100 km buffer zone between protesters and government officials at the 
2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis can be seen as a reasonable time, manner 
and place restriction. In my view, it was a prohibition on meaningful 
expression.  
It is not enough to say that the protesters still were able to demonstrate 
in Calgary. First, there were restrictions imposed even there.94 But in any 
event, there was no meaningful access to the desired target of the protests. 
While reasonable people could disagree on the exact distance that 
protesters should be kept away from political leaders, the right to free 
expression must include the right to expression within some kind of 
proximity to the target audience.  
As Cronin J. indicated in the lower court judgment in R. v. Lewis, “It is 
not an answer to the violation of the Section 2 rights of the protesters to 
say that they are free to protest elsewhere”.95 Similarly, the Georgia ACLU 
legal director, Gerry Weber, recently indicated that the “right to free 
speech doesn’t mean much if you can’t communicate with the folks you 
are trying to communicate with”.96 Again, as Commissioner Hughes 
commented in the APEC Interim Report, police officials should ensure 
                   
92  For a general review of time, manner and place restrictions in Canada, see Hogg, 
supra note 69 at 40-18–40-20. 
93  Above, Part IV(ii). 
94  See e.g. supra note 75. 
95  R. v. Lewis, [1996] 4 W.W.R. 27 (B.C. Prov. Ct. (Crim. Div.)), rev’d, R. v. Lewis, 
supra note 83 (C.A.). For a useful discussion of the case, see B. Daisley, “Legislation 
Banning Protests Outside Abortion Clinics Constitutional: B.C.S.C.” The Lawyers 
Weekly 16:24 (November 1st, 1996). The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of adequate alternative opportunities for expression in the 
context of time, place and manner restrictions. See e.g. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. 
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 at 94 (1977), City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 at 54 
(1994). 
96 “Burk Appeals Protest Ruling” The New York Times (April 9, 2003), online: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/09/sports/golf/y09burk.html.  
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that a “generous opportunity will be afforded for peaceful protesters to see 
and be seen in their protest activities by guests to the event”.97 
Third, as a related matter, critics make the argument that the anti-
globalization movement has made diligent use of the media to disseminate 
its messages. As such, regardless of where it is allowed to protest, the 
movement’s message will get out. It is true that the movement has made 
good use of modern media. Not only has the movement itself made strong 
use of the Internet and other mass media vehicles, but it has also become 
the subject of both popularization and vilification in the press.98 
However, in addition to the constitutional rights not only to expression 
but expression that is conducted within a reasonably desirable proximity to 
the intended target audience,99 chosen forms of expression that are 
inexpensive or are otherwise accessible must be available.100 Notwith-
standing media coverage and the ability of some non-governmental 
organizations and other protest groups to afford and access mainstream 
media channels, many participants in the anti-globalization movement rely 
on historically protected and typically inexpensive modes of expression 
such as placards, leaflets, megaphones, marching, peaceful sit-ins, 
dancing, music, and the like. It is not an answer to these people to say that 
they should go and put their message on television or in newspaper 
advertisements. Those modes of expression, while potentially effective, 
may be prohibitively expensive. 
Finally, critics will likely raise the argument that if we do not leave 
security decisions to our elected representatives, then it will be either 
police officers on the street or unelected judges who will be deciding what 
is reasonable or not in any given circumstance. As to the first concern, I 
agree that we need clear guidelines—for the benefit of both police officers 
and the public—as to what is appropriate expression or not.101 However, 
there is inherently a measure of discretion in the role of policing. If police 
                   
97  APEC Interim Report, supra note 3 at 446 [emphasis added]. 
98  See supra note 56 and surrounding text. 
99  See supra notes 95-97 and surrounding text. 
100  In Canada, see e.g. Libman v. Québec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 at 
617; Ramsden v. Peterborough (City), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084 at 1101-1103; Committee 
for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 at 198, 251. In the 
US, see e.g. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, supra note 95 at 57. 
101  See APEC Interim Report, supra note 3 at 446-453. See also supra note 23 and 
surrounding discussion. 
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officers are guided by clear and appropriate guidelines, abuse of their 
discretion will hopefully be minimized.  
Further, and in any event, to the extent that we are called on to review 
the actions of governments or security officials, it is ultimately the job of 
the courts—and not the government—to decide what is in line with our 
constitutional norms and traditions.102 As the Honourable Rosalie Abella, 
Justice, Court of Appeal for Ontario, recently stated: 
“Judges will be required, as they inevitably are in unsettled times 
of crisis, to monitor and determine even more scrupulously than 
usual the permissibility of any limits imposed by the state when it 
purports in good faith to calibrate the tension between the public’s 
insecurities and its need for security. What, for example, will 
constitute reasonable limits in a free and democratic society 
confronting terrorism? What evidentiary basis will assist us in 
deciding whether, how high, and for how long to raise the 
justificatory threshold for government intrusion? 
President Bush changed the name of the campaign against 
terrorism from Operation Infinite Justice to Operation Enduring 
Freedom. Either way, the adjective connotes a long-term 
undertaking for his allies. That means that the public is likely to be 
apprehensive and raw for a long time. And that, in turn, means that 
as judges we will have to be vigilant for a long time: vigilant that 
we are neither over nor underreacting; vigilant that we are paying 
closer attention to the law and evidence before us than to our own 
fears or misconceptions; vigilant in remembering that compliance 
                   
102  For a useful discussion of the court’s judicial review function in the context of post-
September 11th Canada, see L.E. Weinrib, “Terrorism’s Challenge to the 
Constitutional Order” in Security of Freedom, supra note 39 at 93; L.E. Weinrib, 
“Canada’s Charter of Rights: Paradigm Lost?” (2002) 6 Rev. of Const. Stud. 119. See 
further the recent remarks of the Honourable Mr. Justice A.H.J. Wachowich, Chief 
Justice of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, indicating that:  
  “In a democracy, one of the roles of the Court is to ensure that neither the 
legislative nor the executive level of government oversteps their respective 
boundaries. That is a mandate conferred on the courts by the Constitution and the 
Rule of Law. It is important [to]…understand that this is a mandate specifically 
conferred by Parliament through the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms—it 
is not a mandate that the courts took on themselves, as some seem to think.”  
 A.H.J. Wachowich, “Opening of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, 2002-2003 
Session” (Edmonton, September 3, 2002), online: Alberta Courts homepage 
http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/qb/notices/opening02-03speech.pdf. 
230 THE NEW RULE OF LAW  /  LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
 
with public opinion may jeopardize compliance with the public 
interest; and vigilant that our independence and impartiality are not 
cauterized by controversy. Vigilant, in short, that we do our best to 
keep doing our jobs properly.”103 
There are, I am sure, other potential challenges to this discussion.104 
However, in my view—at least in the context of those set out above—
none of them challenge the more fundamental principle that free 
expression, in the context of citizen participation and peaceful protest, 
                   
103  R.S. Abella, “Judging in the 21st Century” (2002) 25 Advocates’ Q. 131, 138-139. 
Madame Justice Abella has further argued that:  
  “democracy is enhanced, not cauterized, by a judiciary effectively fulfilling its 
Charter mandate, and… democratic values are strengthened not only by a strong 
legislature, but also by a strong judiciary… democracy is not—and never was—
just about the wishes of the majority. What pumps oxygen no less forcefully 
through vibrant democratic veins is the protection of rights, through courts, 
notwithstanding the wishes of the majority. It is this second, crucial aspect of 
democratic values which has been submerged by the swirling discourse… When 
legislatures elected by majorities enact laws like the Charter, the majority is 
presumed to agree with that legislature’s decision to entrench rights and extend a 
constitutionally guaranteed invitation to the courts to intervene when legislative 
conduct is not demonstrably justified in a democratic society. In enforcing the 
Charter, therefore, the courts are not trespassing on legislative authority, they are 
fulfilling their assigned democratic duty to prevent legislative trespass on 
constitutional rights.” 
 R.S. Abella, “The Judicial Role in a Democratic State” (Keynote Address, 1999 
Constitutional Cases Conference, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
April 7, 2000), online: http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/court_of_appeal/speeches/ 
judicialrole.htm. See also R.S. Abella, “The Future After Twenty Years Under the 
Charter” (Closing Session, Canadian Rights and Freedoms, 20 Years Under the 
Charter, The Association for Canadian Studies, Ottawa, April 20, 2002), online: 
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/court_of_appeal/speeches/future.htm. 
 Further, and in any event, even if a court charged with the duty of reviewing 
government action gets the balance wrong, s. 33 of the Charter—the 
“notwithstanding clause”—provides some comfort to those who are skeptical of an 
all-powerful judiciary. While a comprehensive discussion of s. 33 of the Charter is 
beyond the scope of this paper, for a general discussion, see Hogg, supra note 69 at 
36-1–36-11. I am grateful to Barbara Billingsley for raising this issue. 
104  For example, others might argue that the amount of damage that has been caused, and 
that is potentially caused, by anti-globalization protesters warrants significant security 
restrictions. The result of this approach, however, is that the vast majority of 
protesters—participating in a peaceful manner—are treated in a similar fashion as a 
totally different group—a minority—of violent protesters. Again, while I 
acknowledge that police may put into place appropriate time, manner and place 
measures that help to curb violence, property damage and injury, labeling all 
protesters as violent—or worse still, as terrorists—fails to tailor narrowly restrictions 
on Charter freedoms. 
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must be jealously guarded by a society characterized by freedom and 
democracy, not by fear and authority. 
CONCLUSION 
At the outset of this paper, I queried whether our post-September 11th 
legislative initiatives and law enforcement responses—for example, as 
discussed in this paper, the police responses around the 2002 G8 Summit 
in Alberta—can be justified as “reasonable limits” on citizens’ rights to 
protest actively; or whether they instead can only be justified as 
reasonable limits in a society characterized by fear, insecurity and 
government control?  
If we accept as “reasonable” those limits on expression that we saw in 
Kananaskis, then what we have done, in my view, is to normalize a 
sensibility of fear by which to judge those limits. As with the discussion 
between Cassius and Brutus in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar set out at the 
beginning of this paper,105 whether we follow this trajectory of fear is, in 
the end, up to us. This paper urges a step away from our current path. 
Rather, I argue for a path that puts the “reasonable” back into “reasonable 
limits” of section 1 of the Charter. If we do not take this step, then 
through our far-reaching anti-terrorism initiatives we will have started to 
silence not only those who want to tear down buildings, but also those 
who peacefully want to question what those buildings stood for, not in the 
name of terror, but rather in the name of institutional tinkering and future 
reform. By giving our police and governments unbridled power, we will 
be ignoring the very democratic principles for which our governments are 
currently fighting. 
This point was made recently (and more artfully) by Margaret Atwood 
who, again when commenting on the state of post-September 11th 
America, cautioned that:  
“If you proceed much further down the slippery slope, people 
around the world will stop admiring the good things about you. 
They’ll decide that your city upon the hill is a slum and your 
democracy is a sham, and therefore you have no business trying to 
impose your sullied vision on them. They’ll think you’ve 
                   
105  Supra note 1. 
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abandoned the rule of law. They’ll think you’ve fouled your own 
nest. 
The British used to have a myth about King Arthur. He wasn’t 
dead, but sleeping in a cave, it was said; in the country’s hour of 
greatest peril, he would return. You, too, have great spirits of the 
past you may call upon: men and women of courage, of 
conscience, of prescience. Summon them now, to stand with you, 
to inspire you, to defend the best in you. You need them. ”106 
Similarly, we as Canadians need to be strong and resist the fear that 
embraces us. This is what a commitment to free expression demands. The 
analysis provided by Commissioner Hughes through the APEC Inquiry 
provides us with a good starting point. 
Shirley Tilghman, President of Princeton University, commented 
shortly after the events of September 11th that: “Defending… freedom of 
speech is not particularly difficult in times of peace and prosperity. It is in 
times of national crisis that our true commitment to freedom of speech and 





                   
106  “A Letter to America”, supra note 51. 
107  S.M. Tilghman, “Discovery and Discourse, Leadership and Service: The Role of the 
Academy in Times of Crisis” (Presidential Installation Address, Princeton University, 
September 28, 2001), online: http://www.princeton.edu/pr/news/01/q3/0928-
SMT.htm. 
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This paper will explore the role of public interest advocacy 
organizations in Supreme Court of Canada cases from 1982 to 2002. More 
specifically, I will outline the extent and character of public interest 
interventions in Supreme Court cases in the last twenty years in the areas 
of labour law, family law, and equality rights law. Litigation strategies 
employed by interveners will be discussed, particularly the use of 
international law to influence the judicial interpretation of these areas of 
law.  
I will elaborate my reasons for choosing these three areas, and my 
methodology below. To begin, I will discuss why I believe it is important 
to devote attention to these issues. First, I am interested in exploring the 
construction of constitutional litigation by the Supreme Court, which has 
used a “dialogue” metaphor in a number of cases to explain the 
development of the law, and the role of and discussion between the courts 
and the legislatures in this process.1 I will discuss whether “conversation” 
is a more apt metaphor, and the breadth of this conversation, taking into 
account the role of public interest interveners in constitutional cases and in 
other areas of law. 
                   
1  Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at paras. 137-139; M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 
at paras. 78, 286, 328; Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 at para. 116; R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 at para. 57; Little 
Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 
1120 at para. 268 [hereinafter Little Sisters]; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. 
Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 at paras. 65-66; Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 
2002 SCC 68 at paras. 17, 104-108; R. v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64 at para. 43; Figueroa v. 
Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 37 at para. 183. The dialogue metaphor has its 
genesis in P.W. Hogg & A.A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislatures” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75. Hogg also uses the notion of 
“dialogue” in describing the role of interveners. See P.W. Hogg, “The Charter 
Revolution: Is It Undemocratic?” (2001/2002) 12:1 Constitutional Forum 1 at 4. 
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An analysis of this aspect of the role of interveners is timely, given the 
critique, from a range of perspectives, of the courts as “judicial activists”.2 
It is trite to acknowledge the expanded role of the judiciary since the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect in 1982, and 
to note that courts are not democratically elected nor accountable to the 
public. A broad approach to allowing interveners to appear before the 
courts may offset this critique to a degree, and ensure that judges hear 
from as wide a range of voices as their counterparts in the legislature.  
A second reason for studying public interest advocacy flows out of self 
interest. I have been involved in the Women’s Legal Education and Action 
Fund (LEAF) as a staff lawyer and volunteer since 1995. My own 
experience, and my assumption in undertaking this research is that the 
work of interveners matters in allowing the courts to consider a range of 
perspectives on the issues before them.3 I am interested in exploring the 
different approaches taken by interveners, and the influence of these 
approaches, with a view to enhancing the conversation amongst intervener 
groups so that they can continue and strengthen their ability to be of 
assistance to the courts.  
A third reason for studying public interest interventions relates to 
recent comments by members of the Supreme Court that public interest 
groups have had their day in court, and it is perhaps time to be more 
restrictive about allowing intervener status. Justice Iacobucci, in a 2000 
interview with The Globe and Mail, said of interveners: “Should there be 
                   
2  See for example F.L. Morton & R. Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court 
Party, (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000); C. Manfredi, Judicial Power and the 
Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism (Don Mills: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); F.C. DeCoste, “The Separation of State Powers in Liberal 
Policy: Vriend v. Alberta” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 231; M. Mandel, The Charter of 
Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Thompson Educational 
Publishing, 1994). For responses to Morton & Knopff, see P.W. Hogg, ibid.; 
M. Smith, “Ghosts of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: Group Politics and 
Charter Litigation in Canadian Political Science” (2002) 35 Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 3. Smith also discusses the role of the media in the critique of 
judicial activism (at 4). 
3  In this sense, I am what Gregory Hein calls a “judicial democrat”, as it is my view 
that the litigation process can “enhance democracy” rather than curtail it, particularly 
as regards the interests of the disadvantaged. See G. Hein, “Interest Group Litigation 
and Canadian Democracy”, in P. Howe & P. Russell, eds., Judicial Power and 
Canadian Democracy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) 214 at 217, 
237. For an earlier proponent of this view, see P.L. Bryden, “Public Interest 
Intervention in the Courts” (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 490.   
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as many? ... Looking back, those intervenors played a highly significant 
role. But it’s now getting on to be 18 years or so later. Should we be 
looking at the question in different ways?”4 In 1999, Justice Major 
commented on interveners as follows:  
“Those interventions that argue the merits of the appeal and align 
their argument to support one party or the other with respect to the 
specific outcome of the appeal are ... of no value. That approach is 
simply piling on, and incompatible with a proper intervention. ...  
[I]f interveners fail to demonstrate the value of their role, the 
present liberal granting of that status may grow more restrictive.”5 
Other commentators have been critical of the frequency and tenor of 
interventions as well.6 Most notably, Morton and Knopff have critiqued 
“the court party” on the basis that interveners wield unprecedented 
powers, at state expense, to put forward and realize their policy 
objectives.7  
Another significant development is that in 1999, the Supreme Court 
announced that it would “strictly enforce” the rules for applications for 
leave to intervene.8 A study by Patrick Monahan shows that the Court 
continued to grant intervener status generously in the year immediately 
following these remarks,9 but more recent cases indicate that the Court has 
                   
4  K. Makin, “Intervenors: how many are too many?” The Globe and Mail (March 10, 
2000) A2. 
5  Mr. Justice J.C. Major, “Interveners and the Supreme Court of Canada” (1999) 8:3 
National 27 at 27, 28. 
6  DeLloyd Guth, professor of law at the University of Manitoba, was also cited in the 
Makin article as somewhat skeptical of interveners: “Let’s face it. Some intervenors 
are there in the hope of a headline or a byline. They want to be able to go back and 
justify themselves at the group’s annual meeting. The court doesn’t need that.” Supra 
note 4. 
7  F.L. Morton & R. Knopff, supra note 2 at 26. 
8  Supreme Court of Canada, Notice to the Profession (September 1999). 
9  P. Monahan, “Intervention in Constitutional Cases At Supreme Court Increase 
Despite Stricter Enforcement of Rules” (Osgoode Hall Professional Development 
Program, 2000 Constitutional Cases, April 2001) [unpublished]. Monahan found that 
“the frequency and number of interventions in constitutional cases at the Supreme 
Court of Canada increased in 2000” (at 1). See also B.A. Crane & H.S. Brown, 
Supreme Court of Canada Practice 2002, (Scarborough: Carswell, 2002) at 300, who 
note that the Court rarely denies applications for leave to intervene. The authors do 
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been more restrictive in allowing applications for interventions, and even 
where it does so, in allowing oral submissions to be made. If it is the case 
that interventions are being limited, what impact will this have on the 
development of the law, and on principles of democracy and participation?  
In terms of methodology, I reviewed all Supreme Court of Canada 
decisions in labour,10 family11 and equality rights12 law from 1982 to 2002 
to assess a number of trends: numbers of interventions, frequency of 
interventions of particular public interest groups, the number of 
interventions where coalitions or groups were at play, and the use of 
international law by interveners, parties and the Court. I selected these 
three subject areas because they cover the spectrum in terms of areas of 
law traditionally considered to be private and public, and I am interested 
in exploring different levels of interventions along this spectrum.13 I also 
reviewed recent cases where intervener applications were denied or 
restricted, to determine the trends in this area.  
Second, I conducted interviews with representatives of four of the five 
public interest groups that intervened most often in family, labour and 
equality rights cases from 1982 to 2002.14 Interveners were asked a series 
 
cite a number of cases in which leave was recently denied, or interveners were limited 
to written submissions. These cases will be discussed below at 14-15, below. 
10  This category includes both labour and employment law cases, and cases involving 
the statutory regulation of the workplace. 
11  This category includes matrimonial property, divorce, custody and access, spousal 
and child support, child welfare, parental benefits, and immigration cases.  
12  The equality rights cases in the sample exclude criminal cases, as most such cases 
involve multiple sections of the Charter. I chose to focus on “pure” equality cases 
where a law or state action was being challenged as violating s. 15 of the Charter as 
opposed to cases where s. 15 was cited to support a law, or as an interpretive 
principle.  
13  Future research will explore the impact of rights discourse in challenging the 
public/private divide, and the role of interveners in this respect. There is a vast 
literature critiquing the categorization of laws as private and public. See for example 
S.B. Boyd, ed., Challenging the public/private divide: feminism, law, and public 
policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); Law Commission of Canada, 
ed., New Perspectives on the Public-Private Divide (Vancouver : UBC Press, 2003). 
14  Interview with Diana Majury, Chair, National Legal Committee, LEAF (August 18, 
2003) [hereinafter LEAF interview]; Interview with Bruce Porter, Coordinator, 
Charter Committee on Poverty Issues (August 18, 2003) [hereinafter CCPI 
interview]; Interview with Laurie Beachell, National Coordinator, Council of 
Canadians with Disabilities (August 20, 2003) [hereinafter CCD interview]; Interview 
with Alan Borovoy, General Counsel, Canadian Civil Liberties Association (August 
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of questions about their legal strategies, their processes and criteria for 
selecting and developing arguments in cases, and their measurements of 
success.  
In section II of this paper, I will review the extent of public interest 
interventions in the selected areas from 1982 to 2002, and the strategies of 
the public interest groups involved in these interventions. In section III, I 
will address the influence of the interveners’ use of international law, and 
the Court’s treatment of these submissions. My research supports the 
conclusion that public interest interveners should be seen as an integral 
part of a conversation amongst the courts, legislatures and the broader 
public. 
I.  PUBLIC INTEREST INTERVENTIONS BEFORE THE SUPREME 
COURT OF CANADA, 1982-2002 
Table 1 – Number of Interventions at Supreme Court, 1982-200215  
Interveners Family Labour Equality Total 
Interventions 
Coalitions 
Any public interest 
interveners 





9 5 9 17 4 
Canadian Labour 
Congress 








0 4 6 8 3 
Charter Committee 
on Poverty Issues 
4 0 6 7 1 
 
 
22, 2003) [hereinafter CCLA interview]. An interview could not be arranged with a 
representative of the Canadian Labour Congress. 
15  As my interest is in the influence of public interest groups, I have not included 
interventions by attorneys general, or by tribunals and other government bodies.  
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As shown in Table 1, the total number of cases with public interest 
interveners in the areas of family, labour and equality rights law from 
1982 to 2002 is 55.16 Of these cases, 18 are decisions in family law, 25 are 
decisions in labour law, and 27 are decisions in equality rights law.17 Of 
particular interest is the number of equality rights cases, which can be 
compared to the number of Supreme Court cases in this area from 1982 to 
2002 where there were no interveners: ten cases.18 Interveners were thus 
present nearly three times more often than not in equality rights cases. 
Given that the mandates of several intervener groups relate to the 
promotion and protection of equality rights, or the restriction of such 
rights, as will be discussed below, this is not a surprising result. Another 
matter of note is that there were significant numbers of public interest 
interventions in family and labour law cases, even though these areas of 
law have traditionally been viewed as “private”.  
Table 1 also sets out the five public interest groups that intervened 
most frequently in the 55 cases, and in which areas.19 According to Table 
1, LEAF was the most frequent intervener in the three subject areas, with a 
total of 17 interventions. These interventions occurred in all three subject 
areas, although equality rights and family cases were the most frequent 
sites of involvement for LEAF. The Canadian Labour Congress had 12 
interventions, predominantly in labour and employment law cases, but 
                   
16  A list of these cases is set out in Appendix 1. 
17  Some cases are classified as falling into more than one of these subject areas. For 
example, Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 [hereinafter 
Dunmore], see Appendix 1 at ix, below, is a labour and equality case; Thibaudeau v. 
Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 [hereinafter Thibaudeau] (see Appendix 1 at iii, below) is 
a family and equality case. It must also be remembered that s. 15 of the Charter did 
not come into effect until 1985, so there is a 3 year shorter time period for these cases. 
18  Rudolph Wolff & Co. v. Canada, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 695; Dywidag Systems 
International, Canada Ltd. v. Zutphen Brothers Construction Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 
705; Harrison v. University of British Columbia, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 451; Stoffman v. 
Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483; Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. 
v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570; McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 
S.C.R. 229; Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995; Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 
418; Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 
497; Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, 2002 SCC 83. 
19  Again, there is overlap in the categories of cases, so the numbers in the different 
subject areas may be more than the total number of interventions. There are a number 
of other interveners that are close behind the top five in these subject areas: Equality 
for Gays and Lesbians Everywhere (5 interventions), the Evangelical Fellowship of 
Canada (4 interventions), and the Canadian Bar Association (4 interventions). 
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also in an equality case outside the labour context.20 The Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association intervened in 9 of the 55 cases, most often in the 
labour area.21 The Council of Canadians with Disabilities22 had 8 
interventions, mostly in the area of equality rights. Lastly, the Charter 
Committee on Poverty Issues intervened in 7 cases, also predominantly in 
the area of equality rights. The total number of cases where one or more of 
these five groups was present is 37, or two thirds of the total number of 
cases with interveners in the selected areas.  
One observation from this data is that all of the groups intervening 
most often in the three subject areas examined could be classified as rights 
seeking groups. For the most part, the interventions of these groups are 
based on ideologies which seek to promote individual or group rights and 
freedoms, as opposed to restricting them. This result is obviously affected 
by my choice of subject areas, as research looking at interventions more 
broadly indicates that other interest groups are frequently present before 
the courts, including corporate interests, professionals, and social 
conservatives.23 This is apparent in my sample of 55 cases, where several 
of the interveners appearing multiple times were social conservatives 
seeking to restrict the rights of the disadvantaged, and to protect the 
“traditional family”.24  
                   
20  Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [hereinafter Egan], see Appendix 1 at iii, 
below. 
21  The CCLA only made s. 15 arguments in one of the equality cases, Adler v. Ontario, 
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (see Appendix 1 at iv, below).  
22  This group was formerly called the Coalition of Provincial Organizations of the 
Handicapped (COPOH), and I have included cases involving both organizations in 
the sample.  
23  These are the terms used by Gregory Hein, supra note 3 at 218-219. See also Mandel, 
supra note 2, who argues that business interests have played a powerful role as 
interveners.  
24  For example, REAL Women intervened in a number of cases: Tremblay v. Daigle, 
[1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 [hereinafter Tremblay], see Appendix 1 at ii, below; Canada 
(Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 [hereinafter Mossop], see Appendix 1 at 
iii, below; M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, see Appendix 1 at vi, below. Focus on the 
Family intervened in Mossop, Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [hereinafter 
Vriend], see Appendix 1 at vi, below, and M. v. H. The Evangelical Fellowship of 
Canada intervened in Mossop, Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G. (D.F.), 
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 927, see Appendix 1 at v, below, Vriend, and M. v. H. 
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A related trend is that in cases where more than one of the top five 
interveners was present, the groups would typically appear on the same 
side of the issue.25 This observation is not to detract from the nuances or 
different perspectives of the arguments made by the interveners, 
however.26 Moreover, if criminal cases had been included in the sample, 
this trend would likely have been different, particularly comparing the 
positions of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the other 
groups.27 
Interviews with representatives of the most frequent intervener groups 
in the selected areas suggest that most have a sophisticated process for 
case selection. The groups begin with their mandates, and choose cases 
which will further this agenda.28 This may involve taking on cases outside 
of their specific areas of interest to focus on the development of theory.29 
Even within their mandates, groups are selective about which cases they 
seek to intervene in, looking at a range of factors: whether the case will 
further the interests of their constituency, particularly the most vulnerable 
members,30 the impact they might make in the case, including a 
                   
25  For example, in Tremblay, ibid., LEAF and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association 
both supported the abortion rights of the respondent Chantal Daigle; in U.F.C.W., Local 
1518 v. KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083 [hereinafter Kmart Canada Ltd.], see 
Appendix 1 at vii, below, the Canadian Labour Congress and the Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association both supported a broad right of secondary picketing.  
26  For example, in the Little Sisters case, supra note 1, Appendix 1 at viii, below, the 
Canadian Civil Liberties Association focused its submissions on freedom of 
expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, while LEAF was concerned with equality 
rights under s. 15. 
27  For example, LEAF and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association took opposing 
positions on the constitutionality of the rape shield provisions in R. v. Seaboyer, 
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 577; R. v. Gayme, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577. 
28  The mandates of the groups are: LEAF: the advancement of the equality rights of all 
women and girls in Canada; CCD: promotion of the equality rights of persons with 
disabilities; CCLA: protection and promotion of fundamental civil liberties and 
human rights; CCPI: promotion of the rights of the poor under international human 
rights law, the Charter, human rights law, and other laws in Canada; CLC: promotion 
of fair wages and working conditions, improved health and safety laws, fair taxes and 
strong social programs, and social equality. 
29  For example, LEAF intervened in Law Society British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter Andrews] (see Appendix 1 at i, below), although this was not 
a case involving women’s equality, in order to shape the Court’s approach to s. 15 of 
the Charter; the Canadian Labour Congress intervened in Egan, supra note 20 (see 
Appendix 1 at iii, below), although this was not a labour or employment case.  
30  Interviews with CCD, CCLA, LEAF, supra note 14.  
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consideration of whether other interveners will make similar arguments,31 
overall case load, in terms of both human resources and the range of issues 
involved,32 remedial issues,33 follow up potential for the group’s law 
reform and education activities,34 and cost.35 Many of the groups noted the 
difficulty in mounting interventions involving provincial legislation, given 
that the Court Challenges Program (CCP) funds only challenges to federal 
law.36 This often effectively excludes interventions in cases within the 
areas of interest of many of the groups in question. For example, laws 
relating to social assistance, health, and the family are often within 
provincial legislative competence, and beyond CCP’s mandate.  
Processes for case selection vary, but all of the groups interviewed 
employ extensive discussions within the organization before deciding 
whether to seek intervener status in a case. A majority of the groups also 
undertake consultations with legal experts, members of their 
constituencies and other public interest groups in making this decision.37 
The process for developing arguments in an intervention is similarly 
complex for all of the groups interviewed, including discussions amongst 
counsel, committees of experts, and members of the affected communities. 
Some groups spoke of the time and expense involved in this process, and 
reiterated the importance of funding for interventions.38 
It is important to note that public interest litigation is not the only legal 
strategy utilized by these groups. All groups were involved, to a greater or 
lesser extent, in law reform activities—submitting briefs to government, 
testifying before legislative committees, and consulting with government 
                   
31  Interviews with CCLA, CCPI, LEAF, ibid.  
32  Interviews with LEAF, CCPI, ibid. 
33  Interviews with LEAF, CCD, ibid. 
34  Interview with LEAF, ibid. 
35  Interviews with LEAF, CCPI, CCD, ibid. (although CCD noted that it is one of the 
few organizations with core funding). Cost was said not to be such a significant issue 
for the CCLA, even though it accepts no government or Court Challenges Program 
funding. Of course, the participation of interveners may also increase the costs of the 
parties. For a discussion of this issue, see Bryden, supra note 3 at 516. 
36  Interviews with LEAF, CCPI, CCD, ibid.  
37  Interviews with LEAF, CCPI, CCLA, ibid. 
38  Interviews with LEAF, CCD, and CCPI, ibid. 
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officials—as well as international human rights work,39 public, legal and 
judicial education,40 media work,41 and other research and writing 
activities.42 The groups may undertake more than one legal strategy in 
relation to a particular issue, and for most, the relative level of public 
interest litigation changes over time.43 This supports the contention that 
the groups are involved in a conversation with both the courts and 
legislatures.  
Interveners often work together in coalition or alliance—in other 
words, they work with one another to file a joint factum and deliver one 
set of oral submissions in a given case. In the sample of all cases with 
interveners, the total number of cases where coalitions were at work is 
21/55; and in the smaller sample involving the top five interveners, it was 
14/37—over 35%—of the cases in both samples.44 Interviews with the 
most frequent interveners elaborated on why the groups work in coalition: 
to share costs,45 to trade ideas and expertise,46 and to deal with intersecting 
issues.47 Coalitions may be centred around a particular constituency,48 or 
around a particular issue, including the development of theory.49 All of the 
                   
39  Interview with CCPI, ibid. This work includes submissions to the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee, the 
preparation of shadow reports, and education at the international level.  
40  Interviews with LEAF, CCPI, CCLA, and CCD, ibid.  
41  Interviews with CCLA, LEAF, ibid.  
42  Interviews with LEAF, CCLA, CCPI, ibid. All the groups interviewed provide copies 
of their intervener facta and government submissions on request, and sometimes on 
their websites.  
43  LEAF estimates that it does 75% litigation and 25% law reform and legal education; 
CCD noted that in its early days, it did mostly law reform, but its litigation activities 
increased in the 1990s due to government cutbacks and deficit reduction, making law 
reform and lobbying less viable options; for CCLA, litigation is a more recent 
strategy as compared to law reform; and CCPI engages in approximately 65-70% 
litigation and 30% law reform and international human rights work.  
44  See Appendix 1, below. 
45  Interview with CCPI, supra note 14. 
46  Interviews with CCPI, CCLA, and LEAF, ibid. 
47  Interviews with CCPI, LEAF, ibid. 
48  For example, CCD often intervenes in coalition with other disability rights groups, 
and LEAF often intervenes with other groups focusing on women’s equality.  
49  Interviews with CCD, CCPI and LEAF indicate that these three groups often 
intervene in coalition with other equality seeking groups, even if the groups have a 
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groups interviewed were adamant that coalition work is undertaken not 
just for the sake of it, or to “pile on” interveners, but to make the 
intervention more meaningful. Coalition work renders the intervention 
process more time consuming, expensive, and complicated; it is not done 
lightly.50 The groups viewed coalition work as positive for the courts, as it 
reduces the number of written and oral arguments overall, and allows the 
courts to explore the intersections of different perspectives and contexts.51 
At the same time, groups should not be forced to work together in an 
intervention, as has happened in at least two Supreme Court cases, given 
the process and resource issues raised above.52  
In addition to working in formal associations, public interest groups 
may share ideas, arguments, and strategies even if only one of the groups 
applies for intervener status in a case.53 Moreover, interveners often meet 
before a case is heard, or even before their motions for leave to intervene 
are filed, in order to work out their respective areas of interest and to 
ensure no duplication occurs.54  
Thus, it is fair to say that there is significant dialogue amongst 
interveners, and a well developed process for determining which groups 
will file motions for leave to intervene, in which cases, with whom, and 
with what submissions. Limits on resources, both financial and human, 
indicate that these interveners are very selective about where they believe 
they can offer the most insight. 
Despite this selectivity, there are a number of recent cases where the 
Supreme Court has denied or restricted interventions. In Dunmore v. 
Ontario, the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues was denied leave to 
 
different constituency. The CCLA typically restricts its alliances to other civil 
liberties groups, although it may work more broadly in its law reform work.  
50  Interviews with CCD, CCPI, LEAF, ibid. 
51  Interviews with LEAF, CCPI, ibid. 
52  See J. Sopinka & M.A. Gelowitz, The Conduct of an Appeal, 2nd ed. (Toronto: 
Butterworths Canada Ltd., 2000) at 272, citing Central Okanagan School District No. 
23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 [hereinafter Renaud] (Appendix 1 at ii, below) and 
Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236.  
53  Interviews with CCPI, LEAF, supra note 14. 
54  Interviews with CCPI, CCD, LEAF, ibid. (although CCD noted that this has become 
more difficult now that many organizations are strapped for resources). 
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intervene.55 In Lovelace v. Ontario, several groups were either denied 
leave to intervene,56 or restricted to written submissions.57 The second 
trend is notable in other cases as well.58 Unfortunately, reasons are often 
not provided for these decisions, or they are generic, noting that the 
applicants did not satisfy the Court that they would provide fresh 
information or a fresh perspective on the issues in the case.59 Reasons 
would certainly be helpful to interveners so that they could respond to the 
concerns of the Court in future applications. The Court is also becoming 
stricter with late applications, as it noted it would in its 1999 Notice to the 
Legal Profession.60  
                   
55  Dunmore, supra note 17, see Appendix 1 at ix, below. See Supreme Court of Canada, 
Bulletin of Proceedings (August 25, 2000), Major J. CCPI’s application for 
reconsideration was denied on January 8, 2001. See Supreme Court of Canada, 
Bulletin of Proceedings, (January 19, 2001), Major J. Reasons were not given for 
either decision. 
56  Groups denied leave to intervene in Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 
[hereinafter Lovelace] (see Appendix 1 at viii, below) include the B.C. Native 
Women’s Society, Antoine Algonquin First Nation and Aboriginal Legal Services of 
Toronto Inc. See Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings (July 9, 1999), 
Bastarache J.  
57  Groups denied leave to present oral arguments in Lovelace, ibid. include CCPI and 
the Metis National Council of Women.  
58  For example, in Boston v. Boston, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 413 [hereinafter Boston], see 
Appendix 1 at viii, below, LEAF was granted leave to intervene, but was not 
permitted to make oral arguments. See Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of 
Proceedings (January 12, 2001), Binnie J.: “LEAF’s written argument fully sets out 
the general principles that in LEAF’s submission ought to govern the disposition of 
cases such as the present; and ... it would be inappropriate to permit LEAF to appear 
at the hearing of the appeal to make detailed submissions supporting the respondent’s 
position on the merits any more than is already done in the written argument”. See 
also Dunmore, supra note 17, Appendix 1 at ix, where the Labour Issues Coordinating 
Committee’s request to present oral argument was dismissed (Supreme Court of 
Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings (February 23, 2001)).  
59  For example, see Lovelace, supra note 56 (Appendix 1 at viii, below), Supreme Court 
of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings (July 9, 1999), Bastarache J.; Boston, ibid. 
(Appendix 1 at viii, below). 
60  See Lovelace, ibid. For a case to the contrary, see Berry v. Pulley, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 
493, Appendix 1 at ix, where the Canadian Labour Congress was allowed an 
extension of time to file its motion (Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of 
Proceedings (June 8, 2001), L’Heureux Dubé J.). 
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Many of the groups interviewed find the inability to make oral 
arguments frustrating.61 This is particularly so given that interveners’ facta 
are typically limited to 20 pages, and oral argument is seen as an 
opportunity to emphasize critical points and develop the nuances of the 
arguments beyond what is possible in a document of this length. 
Moreover, the interveners believe that oral argument provides a chance to 
engage the Court and respond to its questions, thereby having a true 
dialogue.62 
Interestingly, there are a number of leading Supreme Court cases 
where public interest groups did not seek intervener status. For example, 
in Law v. Canada, the Court developed new guidelines for claims under 
section 15 of the Charter, but there were no interveners involved in the 
case.63 Many observers were surprised that the Court took this opportunity 
to consolidate its approach to section 15 without the assistance of 
interveners who had been present in so many other equality rights cases. 
This new test for section 15 has been extensively critiqued, and it must be 
asked whether having interveners there would have made a difference.64 
One possible solution is that courts could post a call for interveners if they 
intend to use a case as one where new tests or guidelines will be 
developed. While this does not appear to have been done at the Supreme 
Court, it has happened at the lower court level.65 
Overall, then, interveners have been present in a large number of cases 
in all three areas canvassed in this study. Interviews with the four most 
frequent interveners reveal that this involvement is well thought out and 
coordinated, and that the groups attempt to make their voices heard on the 
most critical issues, and in the most significant fora. This gives rise to the 
next question—are the voices of interveners being heard?  
                   
61  Interviews with LEAF, CCPI, supra note 14. 
62  Interviews with LEAF, CCLA, ibid. CCLA did note that perhaps oral argument was 
not always required, but said that if it was granted, 10 minutes was not sufficient.  
63  Law v. Canada, supra note 18. 
64  See B. Baines, “Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality” (2000) 11:3 Constitutional 
Forum 65 at 67. For other critiques of the case, see D. Pothier, “Connecting Grounds 
of Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences”, (2001) 13 C.J.W.L 37; J. Ross, 
“A Flawed Synthesis of the Law”, (2000) 11:3 Constitutional Forum 74. 
65  See Kane v. Alberta Report, 2001 ABQB 570, where the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench called for interveners in a special case to assist it in rendering an opinion on 
the interpretation of a new section of the Human Rights, Citizenship and 
Multiculturalism Act. 
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II. THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC INTEREST INTERVENTIONS: 
THE EXAMPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A more difficult issue is how to assess the impact of public interest 
interveners on the development of the law in the selected areas. While this 
may seem to be a simple matter of methodology, it also raises the question 
of whether this is a challenge to which interveners should have to 
respond.66 By definition, interveners are playing a valuable role when they 
make submissions to the courts, as they are only granted leave where they 
will present arguments “which will be useful and different from those of 
the other parties.”67 Still, given the recent tendency of the Supreme Court 
to fail to recognize the benefit of interveners in some cases, it is pertinent 
to review this issue.  
In terms of methodology, one could try to determine the win/loss 
records of interveners, and draw inferences about their influence in this 
way.68 A problem with this approach, however, is how to decide whether a 
case is a win or loss. This may do an injustice to the nuances in the 
interveners’ arguments, and may ignore the long term, incremental impact 
of their submissions.69 Another approach would be to look at explicit 
references to interveners by the courts, whether positive or negative. The 
difficulty of this method is that courts often adopt or reject interveners’ 
positions without attributing them to the groups in question.70 A third 
approach is to review interveners’ arguments and the court’s decisions, to 
try to assess the court’s receptivity to the submissions in substance if not 
by explicit reference. I decided to test the latter method by looking at a 
discreet issue—the use of international law by interveners and the courts.71 
                   
66  I thank Philip Bryden for engaging me on this point.  
67  Reference re: Workers’ Compensation Act, 1983 (Newfoundland), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 
335 at 339.  
68  See, for example, Morton & Knopff, supra note 2 at 26 (referring to LEAF). 
69  M. Smith is also critical of an approach that focuses on win/loss records, supra note 2 
at 26-27.  
70  This was a complaint for at least one intervener, who noted that courts should 
acknowledge interveners explicitly as a sign of respect. It was noted that this is done 
more often in the United States. Interview with CCLA, supra note 14.  
71  I used a broad definition of international law, including not only treaties to which 
Canada is a party, but other treaties, declarations and resolutions, and reports and 
decisions of international bodies. This is in keeping with Baker v. Canada (Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 [hereinafter Baker], see 
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For this part of the study, I restricted the sample to the same areas of 
law, and reviewed those cases where one or more of the five most frequent 
intervener groups was present. This was done in order to have a smaller, 
more manageable sample size, and based on my assumption that there is a 
greater likelihood of a group making arguments based on international law 
if it has some sophistication and expertise as an intervener. I reviewed the 
facta of all parties and interveners, and the decisions in these cases to 
determine the extent to which interveners are using international law in 
their submissions, the extent to which this is the only or primary way these 
arguments are being placed before the Court, and the extent to which the 
Court has adopted these arguments in its judgments.  
Table 2  











Andrews (1989) Yes Yes (LEAF) Yes 
Lavigne (1991) Yes Yes (CLC) Yes 
Egan (1995) Yes Yes (EGALE, Interfaith coalition) No 
Gordon v. Goertz 
(1997) Yes No No 
Winnipeg Child and 
Family Services v. G. 
(1997) 
Yes 
Yes (Women’s Health 
Clinic coalition, Centres 
jeunesse du Quebec, 
Catholic Group for Life) 
No 
Granovsky (2000) Yes No No 
Dunmore (2001) Yes Yes (CLC) Yes 
Gosselin (2002) Yes Yes (CCPI, others)  Yes 
  
Table 2 sets out eight family, labour and equality rights cases from 
1982 to 2002 where the Court cited international law, and where one or 
more of the five interveners was present.72 In six of the eight cases, or 
 
Appendix 1 at vi, below, where a majority of the Court took a broad approach to the 
use of international law. See also Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Suresh], where the Court unanimously 
endorsed this approach. 
72  There were 11 cases out of the sample of 37 where the Court cited international law. 
Only 8 of these cases could be reviewed in full, as three were in the process of being 
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75%, interveners cited international law in their submissions, in four of the 
eight cases, or 50%, the parties cited international law, and in two of the 
eight cases, or 25%, the Court referred to international law without the 
benefit of legal argument in this respect. While this is a small sample, it 
suggests that interveners are more likely than the parties in a case to place 
arguments concerning international law before the Court. This is 
consistent with Justice Major’s 1999 comments about where interveners 
can be most useful to the Court—in presenting 
“comparative views of other national and international courts in 
constitutional litigation ... particularly in private actions where 
litigants lack the resources to do the research necessary to provide 
a comprehensive comparative brief. This provides an opportunity 
for interveners with specialized knowledge to complement the 
appeal.”73  
How useful has the Court found interveners’ arguments concerning 
international law? A review of the eight cases in Table 2 indicates three 
categories of cases, each suggesting different results.  
The first category of cases includes those where neither the parties nor 
interveners cited international law, but the Court did. In Gordon v. Goertz, 
the facta of the parties and the interveners were silent on international law. 
Nevertheless, L’Heureux Dubé J., in a concurring judgment, employed 
international law to support her interpretation of the best interests of the 
child and residence issues.74 Similarly, in Granovsky v. Canada, neither 
the parties nor intervener cited international law, but the Court did so in its 
judgment to explain its differentiation between physical impairments and 
 
transferred to microfiche at the Supreme Court, and the facta were not otherwise 
available (Lovelace, supra note 56, Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 [hereinafter Delisle] and Baker, ibid.). Table 2 sets out the 
statistics for the remaining 8 cases.  
73  Mr. Justice John C. Major, supra note 5 at 27. 
74  Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27 at paras. 87-88 [hereinafter Goertz], La Forest 
and Gonthier JJ. concurring, see Appendix 1 at iv, below, citing the League of 
Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1924), the United Nations Declaration 
of the Rights of the Child (1959), the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction.  
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socially constructed limitations.75 In these two cases, it is fair to conclude 
that the interveners did not have a direct impact on the Court’s utilization 
of international law.  
The second category of cases includes those where the parties did not 
cite international law, but interveners and the Court did. There are two 
cases in this category.  
In Egan, neither of the parties relied upon international law in their 
factum. The intervener Equality for Gays and Lesbians Everywhere 
(EGALE) cited a number of international documents in support of its 
argument that sexual orientation should be recognized as a protected 
ground under section 15 of the Charter.76 One of these, the European 
Parliament’s Resolution on Equal Rights for Homosexuals and Lesbians in 
the European Community, was cited by a majority of the Court in finding 
in favour of this argument.77 Another intervener, the Inter-faith Coalition 
on Marriage and the Family, cited international law to bolster its position 
that sexual orientation should not be recognized,78 but these documents 
were not cited by the minority of the Court that adopted this position. 
Egan is thus a case where the arguments of one of the interveners appears 
to have influenced the decision of the Court, even though the Court did 
not refer to EGALE in this part of its decision. 
Another case in the second category is Winnipeg Child and Family 
Services v. G.(D.F.). In this case, the parties did not cite international law, 
but three of the interveners did. The Catholic Group for Health, Justice 
                   
75  Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] S.C.R. 703 
at para. 34 [hereinafter Granovsky], Binnie J. for the Court, see Appendix 1 at viii, 
below, citing the World Health Organization’s International Classification of 
Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps: A Manual of Classification Relating to the 
Consequences of Disease (1980), and the United Nations Decade of Disabled 
Persons, 1983-1992: World Programme of Action concerning Disabled Persons.  
76  Egan, supra note 20 (Intervener Egale’s Factum at para. 7). EGALE also cited the 
United Nations Proclamation and Guiding Principles for the International Year of the 
Family (1994), and the United Nations Vienna International Centre NGO Committee 
on the Family Guiding Principles on the Family. 
77  Egan, ibid. at 601-602, Cory J. See Appendix 1 at iii, below. 
78  Egan, ibid. (Intervener Inter-Faith Coalition on Marriage and the Family’s Factum at 
para. 41), citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
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and Life relied on the preamble of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child to argue that the fetus requires legal protection.79 This argument was 
accepted by the dissenting justices, who cited the United Nations 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) for the same proposition.80 
While two other interveners in the case cited international law, the 
documents relied upon were not referred to by the Court.81 It appears, 
though, that at least one of the interveners in the case had an impact on the 
Court’s use of international law.  
The third category of cases includes those where at least one of the 
parties and an intervener cited international law, as did the Court. There 
are four cases in this category.  
In Andrews, McIntyre J., in dissent, referred to article 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in analyzing the interplay 
between section 15 and section 1 of the Charter.82 This approach was put 
forward by an intervener, the Attorney General of Nova Scotia, as well as 
the appellant Law Society of British Columbia.83 The other party in the 
case, Andrews, relied on a decision of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities to support the proposition that the requirement of citizenship 
                   
79  Winnipeg Child and Family Service v. G. (D.F.), supra note 24 (Intervener The 
Catholic Group for Health, Justice and Life’s factum at para. 11). 
80  Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G.(D.F.), ibid. at para. 119, Major and 
Sopinka JJ., in dissent, see Appendix 1 at v, below. The majority did not cite 
international law in its reasons for decision.  
81  See Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G. (D.F.), ibid. (Interveners Women’s 
Health Clinic, Métis Women of Manitoba, Native Women’s Transition Centre, and 
Manitoba Association of Rights and Liberties’ factum at paras. 38-40), citing art. 25 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; art. 12 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the Report of Canada Concerning the 
Rights Covered by Articles 10-15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (1993), and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women; Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G. (D.F.), 
ibid. (Intervener Association des Centres jeunesse du Québec’s factum), citing the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women. 
82  Andrews, supra note 29 at 177, see Appendix 1 at i, below. The Court also referred to 
the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution in this regard. 
83  Andrews, ibid. (Intervener Attorney General of Nova Scotia’s factum at para. 19); 
Andrews, ibid. (Appellant’s factum at para. 13).  
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for lawyers is not justifiable.84 This case was cited by La Forest J. in his 
concurring judgment.85 LEAF was the only public interest intervener to 
refer to international law in its factum, arguing that international human 
rights documents should be used by the Court to decide upon analogous 
grounds under section 15 of the Charter.86 While this point was not 
explicitly adopted by the Court, it did decide upon an approach to section 
15 that allowed for the protection of both enumerated and analogous 
grounds.  
In Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Wilson J., in a 
minority judgment, distinguished a case of the European Human Rights 
Commission relied on by the appellant, Lavigne, to establish a freedom 
not to associate.87 In a similar vein, the Canadian Labour Congress and 
Ontario Federation of Labour cited the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and the International Labour Organization Convention 
No. 87, all ratified by Canada, to argue that section 2(d) of the Charter 
should not be construed as encompassing the freedom not to associate.88 
While this is the position that was taken by Wilson J., she did not refer to 
these international treaties in support of this view.89 La Forest J., for the 
plurality, cited article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to 
buttress the finding that section 2(d) of the Charter includes the freedom 
not to associate.90 This argument was put forward by Lavigne.91 Thus the 
parties’ arguments appear to have had more explicit influence than those 
of interveners in the use of international law in this case.  
                   
84  Andrews, ibid. (Respondents Mark David Andrews and Gorel Elizabeth Kinersly’s 
factum at para. 69). 
85  Andrews, ibid. at 204, La Forest J., see Appendix 1 at i, below. 
86  Andrews, ibid. (Intervener Women’s Legal Education And Action Fund’s factum at 
para. 53). 
87  Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 at 255-266 
[hereinafter Lavigne], see Appendix 1 at ii, below. 
88  Lavigne, ibid. (Interveners Canadian Labour Congress and the Ontario Federation of 
Labour’s factum at para. 18). 
89  Lavigne, ibid., Wilson J. (L’Heureux-Dubé concurring), see Appendix 1 at ii, below.  
90  Lavigne, ibid. at 228.  
91  Lavigne, ibid. (Appelant’s factum at para. 51). 
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In Dunmore v. Ontario, both the appellants (Dunmore and the United 
Food and Commercial Workers International Union) and the intervener 
Canadian Labour Congress relied on international law to argue that 
section 2(d) of the Charter should be interpreted so as to oblige the 
provincial government to include agricultural workers in its labour 
relations legislation.92 A majority of the Court accepted this argument, and 
cited international law in support of this interpretation of section 2(d).93 
The Respondent Fleming Chicks also cited international law, arguing that 
section 15 of the Charter should not be interpreted to include occupational 
status as an analogous ground.94 A majority of the Court did not deal with 
the section 15 issue, and in a concurring judgment, L’Heureux Dubé J. 
rejected the argument of the Respondent.95 Overall, then, Dunmore is a 
case where both the arguments of the parties and the interveners appear to 
have influenced the Court’s use of international law. 
Finally, in Gosselin v. Quebec, the appellant Gosselin,96 as well as a 
number of public interest interveners, cited international law to support an 
interpretation of sections 7 and 15 of the Charter and section 45 of the 
Quebec Charter that encompassed social and economic rights, including a 
positive obligation on governments to provide adequate levels of social 
                   
92  Dunmore, supra note 18 (Appelant’s factum at paras. 98-99) citing the International 
Labour Organization Convention (No. 11) concerning the Rights of Association and 
Combination of Agricultural Workers; I.L.O. Case No. 1900, Complaint Against the 
Government of Canada (Ontario); Dunmore, ibid. (Intervener Canadian Labour 
Congress’s factum at 9-10, 16, 20). 
93  Dunmore, ibid. at paras. 27, 41 (Bastarache J.), see Appendix 1 at ix, below, citing the 
Convention (No. 87) concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organize; the Convention (No. 11) concerning the Rights of Association and 
Combination of Agricultural Workers; Convention (No. 141) concerning 
Organisations of Rural Workers and Their Role in Economic and Social 
Development; Case No. 1900, Complaint against the Government of Canada 
(Ontario).  
94  Dunmore, ibid. (Respondent Fleming Chicks’ factum at paras. 91-93), citing the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
95  Dunmore, ibid. at paras 166-170, Appendix 1 at ix, below. Justice L’Heureux Dubé 
did not rely on international law in her judgment. 
96  Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. 84 [hereinafter Gosselin] 
(Appelant Louise Gosselin’s factum), citing the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.  
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assistance.97 Three of the five members of the Supreme Court who wrote 
opinions in the case cited international law. For the majority, McLachlin 
C.J. distinguished the language of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights from the language of the Quebec Charter in finding that the 
latter document did not support the position of the Appellant.98 LeBel J. 
also cited the Covenant in agreeing with the majority’s interpretation of 
the Quebec Charter.99 In contrast, L’Heureux Dubé J. found that the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights closely 
resembled section 45 of the Quebec Charter, and substantiated the 
arguments of the Appellant and interveners that this document protects an 
adequate standard of living.100 Thus Gosselin is a case where the 
arguments of the parties and interveners found favour with some members 
of the Court. 
There is a fourth category of cases as well. The Court did not cite 
international law in 26 out of the 37 cases involving the five most frequent 
interveners, but in several of these cases, interveners had made arguments 
on this basis.101 
                   
97  Gosselin, ibid. (Intervener Charter Committee on Poverty Issues’ factum), citing the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the European Social Charter, and 
several reports of international committees; Gosselin, ibid. (Intervener National 
Association of Women and the Law’s factum), citing the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women; and a number of reports of international 
committees; Gosselin, ibid. (Intervener Rights and Democracy’s factum). 
98  Gosselin, ibid. at para. 93, McLachlin C.J. for the majority, see Appendix 1 at ix, 
below. 
99  Ibid. at paras. 419-420. LeBel J. agreed with Bastarache J. (in dissent) that the 
Quebec legislation violated s. 15 of the Charter.  
100  Ibid. at para. 147, L’Heureux Dubé J., in dissent. 
101  See, for example, Brooks v. Canada Safeway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 [hereinafter 
Brooks], see Appendix 1 at i, below, where LEAF cited the Preamble to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (at 
para. 38 of its factum); Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 
872 [hereinafter Weatherall], see Appendix 1 at iii, where LEAF cited the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (at para. 37 of its 
factum); Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 [hereinafter Symes] (Appendix 1 at 
iii, below), Thibaudeau, supra note 17, see Appendix 1 at iii, below, with LEAF), 
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Overall, the analysis of these cases and the facta of the parties and 
interveners suggest that interveners are useful to the Court in presenting 
arguments on international law, not just in constitutional litigation, as 
envisioned by Justice Major, but in other areas as well.102 It is interesting 
to see the reach of international law and rights discourse in this respect. At 
the same time, there have been many cases in the past where the Courts 
have not been receptive to arguments based on international law.  
This may change in light of Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration), where a majority of the Court found that international 
law is “a critical influence on the interpretation of the scope of the rights 
included in the Charter”, and broadly envisioned the scope of interna-
tional documents it would entertain in this regard. Even international 
human rights norms that have not been implemented or adopted by 
Canada, and are not strictly part of Canadian law, “may help inform the 
contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review.”103  
Importantly, the Court seems more amenable to arguments based on 
international law since the Baker decision. Both in cases with,104 and 
without interveners,105 the Court has cited international law in several 
recent judgments. In many cases, the international materials referred to 
were not binding on the Court, and included treaties that had not been 
incorporated into Canadian law, and reports of United Nations and other 
 
Eldridge v. B.C. (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (Appendix 1 at v, below) 
and New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. [1999] 3 
S.C.R. 46 (Appendix 1 at vii, below), where the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues 
cited the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  
102  For example, Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G.(D.F.), supra note 24 did not 
involve constitutional issues. 
103  Baker, supra note 71 at paras 69-70, L’Heureux Dubé J. for the majority. In a 
concurring judgment, Iacobucci and Cory JJ. disagreed with this approach, finding 
that only treaties ratified and then incorporated into Canadian law by implementing 
legislation should be used in interpreting domestic law (at paras. 79-80). See, 
however, Suresh, supra note 71, where the Court unanimously adopted the majority’s 
approach from Baker. 
104  Delisle, supra note 71 (Appendix 1 at vii, below); Granovsky, supra note 75 
(Appendix 1 at viii, below); Lovelace, supra note 56 (Appendix 1 at viii, below); 
Dunmore, supra note 17 (Appendix 1 at ix, below); Gosselin, supra note 96 
(Appendix 1 at ix, below). 
105  See for example Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 519; 
Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, 2002 SCC 83. 
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international bodies.106 This should serve as encouraging evidence for 
intervener groups to continue, or to commence using international law in 
their submissions. At the same time, groups must take care that such 
arguments are not seen as “rhetorical”, as there is some suggestion that 
members of the Court will continue to approach non-binding international 
law with caution.107  
This leads to a discussion of the most frequent intervener groups and 
their use of international law. For some of the groups, such arguments are 
routine, and part of their litigation strategies. For example, the Charter 
Committee on Poverty Issues cited international law in all seven of its 
interventions in the selected areas from 1982 to 2002. Indeed, the group’s 
mandate is to strengthen and promote economic and social rights and 
positive obligations under the Charter using international law. While the 
Court has not always been explicitly receptive to such submissions, the 
group views the success of its arguments in the long term, and notes that 
its systematic use of international law is beginning to bear some fruit. For 
example, the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues was one of the 
interveners present in the Baker case, and was influential in arguing the 
“significant normative force” of non-binding international law.108 
LEAF cited international law in approximately 1/4 of its 17 inter-
ventions in family, labour and equality rights cases from 1982 to 2002.109 
In an interview with LEAF, it was said that the group is increasingly using 
                   
106  See for example, supra note 75, Appendix 1 at viii, below, citing the World Health 
Organization’s International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities, and Han-
dicaps: A Manual of Classification Relating to the Consequences of Disease (1980), 
and the United Nations, Decade of Disabled Persons, 1983-1992: World Programme 
of Action concerning Disabled Persons; Lovelace, supra note 56, see Appendix 1 at 
viii, below, citing United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Canada), E/C. 12/1/Add.31, 4 December 1998 (Iacobucci J. at para. 69); 
Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W., ibid., L’Heureux-Dubé J. for the 
majority at paras. 73, 81 and Arbour J. at para. 7, in dissent, McLachlin C.J. 
concurring, citing the Convention of the Rights of the Child. 
107  See D. Gambrill, “The ‘problem’ of international law for the SCC” Law Times (22 
April 2002) at 5, citing Justice LeBel’s 2002 speech at a Charter conference in 
Toronto.  
108  Baker, supra note 71 (Intervener Charter Committee on Poverty Issues’s factum at 
para. 4). 
109  These cases are: Andrews, Brooks, Weatherall, and Thibaudeau, see Appendix 1, 
below. 
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international law in its facta, partly in response to its perception that the 
Court appears to be more interested in hearing such arguments. LEAF is 
of the view that comparative law work is also important, and has been 
even more active in this regard.110 
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association has referred to international 
law in its facta, but this is not a strategy the group uses systematically. 
According to the Association, it is more inclined to make comparative law 
arguments.111 The Council of Canadians with Disabilities is also a group 
which does not often cite international law in its arguments, but it does 
argue comparative law, particularly at the tribunal level.112  
Thus, at least some of the most frequent intervener groups have played 
a significant role in the Court’s use of international law, as have other 
interveners. Returning to the theme of this section, the broader conclusion 
can be drawn that interveners have had an impact on the Court’s 
judgments. International law is an area where there has been dialogue 
between the Court and public interest groups, and to the extent that 
international law describes norms created by international bodies, the 
conversation widens to include those working at the international level.  
CONCLUSION 
My research shows that interveners have played a significant role at 
the Supreme Court of Canada in the last 20 years, both in sheer number, 
and on a more substantive level, both in “public” and “private” areas of 
law. Moreover, the processes, criteria and strategies employed by frequent 
interveners suggests that their work is carefully chosen and created, often 
                   
110 Interview with LEAF, supra note 14. Comparative law arguments were made in 12/ 
17 of LEAF’s interventions, or 70.6%. 
111 Interview with CCLA, supra note 14. For an international law example, see Kmart 
Canada Ltd., supra note 25 (Intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Association’s factum 
and Allsco Building Products Ltd. v. U.F.C.W., Local 1288P, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1136 
(Intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Association’s factum at paras. 35-36) where the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is noted. For a 
comparative law example, see Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G.(D.F.), supra 
note 24 (Intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Association’s Factum) citing several 
American and British cases. 
112  Interview with CCD, supra note 14. The CCD often intervenes in tribunal hearings 
such as those involving the Canadian Radio and Telecommunications Commission 
and the Canadian Transportation Agency. 
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in dialogue with other public interest groups and experts. In this sense, the 
conversation metaphor is an apt one, although the Court has not always 
listened to the extent the interveners would hope. The Court’s willingness 
to entertain submissions based on international law is one area where there 
is promise for a strong and productive conversation with public interest 
groups into the future. It is also important to recognize that interveners 
from a broad range of perspectives have been present before the Court, 
and have made submissions based on international law. The critique that 
there is an elite “court party” shaping the Court’s discourse in a particular 
direction is not supported by the evidence.  
While the Court’s determination to control its process and prevent the 
misuse of interventions is understandable, there are nevertheless actions 
that might be taken to render the participation of interveners more 
effective. Courts should recognize the selectivity of most interveners, and 
deny applications for leave to intervene only in cases where the groups are 
truly “piling on” and do not meet the criteria for such applications. It 
should also be understood that oral argument can be critical to allow 
interveners to expand upon and highlight their submissions, and to 
respond to questions and concerns from the bench. Placing restrictions on 
oral argument may hamper a full and constructive dialogue between the 
Court and interveners. If such restrictions are made, it would be helpful for 
the Court to provide meaningful reasons so that public interest groups can 
respond to its concerns in future cases. Similarly, the explicit recognition 
of interveners’ submissions in judicial decisions would allow the influence 
of interveners to be assessed more readily. Another way of ensuring the 
effective participation of interveners is for the Court to consider requesting 
their presence when leading cases are to be decided. Lastly, the federal 
government should consider changing the parameters of the Court 
Challenges Program, so that interventions in cases involving provincial 
legislation can be funded. This will help to ensure that interveners can 
participate in the full range of issues where their expertise and contextual 
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*  Présidente du Tribunal des droits de la personne du Québec et Commissaire à la 
Commission Internationale de Juristes à Genève. 
 Ce texte est à jour au 1er janvier 2004. Il s’insère dans le cadre du projet de la Section 
canadienne de la Commission Internationale de Juristes portant sur l’indépendance et 
l’impartialité de la magistrature dans les pays du Sud-Est adriatique. 
 Je tiens particulièrement à remercier Me Julie Plante qui a contribué de façon 
significative à la recherche et à la rédaction de ce texte. 
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En 1998, la Section canadienne de la Commission Internationale de 
Juristes1 a mis sur pied un Projet d’appui à l’indépendance et à 
l’impartialité des juges de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie, Projet 
qui a toutefois été suspendu à la suite du déclenchement des frappes de 
l’OTAN le 24 mars 1999 lors de la guerre du Kosovo. 
Consciente des besoins réels de formation des juges dans la région, la 
CIJ-Canada a alors développé un Projet similaire destiné aux juges de la 
Croatie. Le Projet, qui a débuté en janvier 2000 pour une période de deux 
ans, a permis d’établir plusieurs échanges entre la magistrature croate et la 
magistrature canadienne. 
Le succès de ce premier Projet est indéniable. L’effort de consien-
isation et d’information a permis de solidifier les bases de l’indépendance 
et de l’impartialité des juges croates. Les résultats de cette première phase 
du projet continuent, même à ce jour, à se concrétiser. 
L’évaluation du Projet en Croatie a convaincu la CIJ-Canada d’étendre 
son programme à d’autres pays du Sud-Est adriatique, dont l’État de 
Serbie et Monténégro2, tout en poursuivant dans une phase deuxième le 
travail en Croatie. Le nouveau Projet en Serbie a débuté en 2002, 
également pour une période de deux ans3. 
                   
1  Ci-après la CIJ-Canada. 
2  Nouveau nom depuis le 4 février 2003, auparavant la République Fédérale de 
Yougoslavie. Voir Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro, aligned at the Commission meeting held on December 6th, 2002, art. 1 : 
« The name of the State Union is Serbia and Montenegro ». 
3  À ce sujet, il est possible de consulter la documentation préparée par la CIJ-Canada, 
notamment COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE DE JURISTES (Section 
canadienne), « Background Documentation, Serbia », Regional Program to Support 
the Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary in South East Adriatic Countries, 
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Afin de bien comprendre le contexte dans lequel la CIJ-Canada tente 
de mener à terme son Projet d’appui à l’indépendance et à l’impartialité de 
la magistrature en Serbie, il convient de rappeler quelques événements 
importants : 
• En 1945, le maréchal Tito forme la République fédérale populaire 
de Yougoslavie, composée de six républiques fédérées4, et crée 
ensuite la République fédérale socialiste de Yougoslavie en 1963. 
Le règne du maréchal Tito s’étendra jusqu’à sa mort, en 1980. 
• Le 8 mai 1989, Slobodan Milosevic, alors à la tête du Parti 
socialiste serbe5, est élu président de Serbie.  
• En 1990, la Slovénie déclare son indépendance de la Yougoslavie, 
suivie de la Croatie en juin 19916. S’ensuit alors une guerre en 
Bosnie7, guerre qui se termine par la conclusion de l’Accord de 
Dayton, signé le 14 décembre 1995 par les dirigeants de la Bosnie, 
de la Croatie et de la Serbie8. 
 
Juin 2003; COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE DE JURISTES (Section 
canadienne), « Briefing material for Canadian judges », Regional Program to Support 
the Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary in South East Adriatic Countries, 
Court Efficiency Seminars, Organised Crime Round Table, Serbie, Juin 2003. Voir 
également le texte écrit par l’honorable Michèle Rivet dans le cadre du colloque 
portant sur la Cour pénale internationale tenu à Montréal en mai 2003 : Michèle 
RIVET, « De la Haye à Zagreb et Belgrade : la construction de la société civile », 
dans INSTITUT CANADIEN D’ADMINISTRATION DE LA JUSTICE, La voie 
canadienne vers la cour pénale internationale : tous les chemins mènent à Rome, Les 
Journées Maximilien-Caron 2003, Montréal, 1er et 2 mai 2003. 
4  La Bosnie-Herzégovine, la Croatie, la Macédoine, le Monténégro, la Serbie et la 
Slovénie. 
5  Le Parti socialiste serbe est le continuateur de la Ligue communiste serbe, dont 
Slobodan Milosevic était le président depuis 1986. 
6  Ces pays seront reconnus indépendants par les Nations Unies en 1992. 
7  Voir notamment Georges CASTELLAN, Histoire des Balkans, Paris, Fayard, 1999, 
p. 562. 
8  À la suite d’un cessez-le-feu intervenu entre les parties le 5 octobre 1995, des 
négociations se sont poursuivies à Dayton, en Ohio, entre les représentants de la 
Bosnie, de la Croatie et de la Serbie. De fortes pressions américaines ont finalement 
mené à la conclusion de l’Accord de Dayton, accord qui mit fin au conflit qui aura 
duré quatre années. 
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• Le 15 juillet 1997, Slobodan Milosevic se fait élire à la tête de la 
Yougoslavie, puis le 24 mai 1999, il est accusé de crimes contre 
l’humanité devant le Tribunal pénal international pour l’Ex-
Yougoslavie mis sur pied par les Nations Unies9.  
• À partir du 24 septembre 2000, lors des élections fédérales de 
Yougoslavie, un énorme mouvement d’opposition tente de 
renverser Slobodan Milosevic, qui concède finalement sa défaite le 
5 octobre 2000 en faveur d’un gouvernement de coalition 
regroupant 18 partis politiques10. 
• En novembre 2001, un ensemble de lois est adopté dans le 
domaine judiciaire, modifiant notamment la structure des cours et 
créant la nouvelle Division du crime organisé. Ces lois feront 
l’objet de plusieurs amendements en juillet 2002, amendements qui 
seront toutefois déclarés inconstitutionnels pour la plupart dans une 
décision de la Cour constitutionnelle de Serbie rendue en décembre 
200211. 
• Le 4 février 2003, l’État de Serbie et Monténégro est créé par un 
amendement à la Constitution12. 
• Le 12 mars 2003, le Premier ministre Zoran Djindjic est assassiné, 
après une première tentative ayant eu lieu peu de temps avant, au 
mois de février. L’état d’urgence est immédiatement déclaré, 
                   
9  Le procès de Slobodan Milosevic ne débutera toutefois qu’en 2002. À ce sujet, voir 
notamment BELGRADE CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Human Rights in 
Yugoslavia 2002, Belgrade, Vojin Dimitrijevic et Tatjana Papic, 2003, p. 463 et suiv. 
10  Voir notamment COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE DE JURISTES (Section 
canadienne), « Briefing material for Canadian judges », loc. cit., note 3; et Lenard J. 
COHEN, Serpent in the Bosom, The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic, Colorado 
(États-Unis), Westview Press, 2001. 
11  À ce sujet, voir notamment COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE DE JURISTES 
(Section canadienne), « Background Documentation , Serbia », loc. cit.,  note 3. 
12  Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, précitée, note 2, 
art. 1 : « The name of the State Union is Serbia and Montenegro ». 
280 THE NEW RULE OF LAW  /  LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
autorisant entre autres des détentions irrégulières de 60 à 90 
jours13. 
• Le 13 mars 2003, le Ministre de la Justice demande la mise à la 
retraite de 35 juges, par application de l’article 52 de la Loi sur les 
juges14, ce à quoi la Présidente de la Cour suprême, la juge 
Leposava Karamarkovic, s’oppose en faisant valoir qu’une telle 
application de l’article 52 aurait un effet rétroactif inconstitu-
tionnel15.  
• Le 19 mars 2003, de nouveaux amendements, établissant notam-
ment un processus de destitution des juges, sont apportés aux lois 
adoptées en novembre 2001 et amendées une première fois en 
juillet 2002.  
• Le 20 mars 2003, la juge Leposava Karamarkovic démissionne de 
son poste de Présidente de la Cour suprême. Le lendemain, la juge 
Sonia Bkric, à ce moment Présidente de la Cour de district de Novi 
Sad, est nommée Présidente de la Cour suprême. 
• Le 3 avril 2003, l’État de Serbie et Monténégro accède au Conseil 
de l’Europe. 
• Le 25 avril 2003, l’état d’urgence est levé en Serbie, alors que le 
droit de détention irrégulière de 60 à 90 jours était toujours en 
                   
13  Voir notamment COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE DE JURISTES (Section 
canadienne), « Briefing material for Canadian judges », loc. cit., note 3. 
14  Law on Judges, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 63/2001, art. 52: « A 
judge shall be deemed to have reached the retirement years of service when reaching 
the age of sixty or forty years of service. » 
15  En effet, la Loi du travail (Labour Law, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia” 
No. 55/96), adoptée en 1996, prévoit à l’article 110, para. 2, que l’âge de la mise à la 
retraite des juges est repoussé à 67 ans. L’article 53, par. 1 de la Loi sur les juges 
(Law on Judges, id.), adoptée le 1er janvier 2002, prévoit pour sa part que l’âge de la 
mise à la retraite des juges ne peut dépasser 60 ans. L’application rétroactive d’une loi 
étant interdite par l’article XXII, par. 1 de la Constitution de l’État de Serbie et 
Monténégro, précitée, note 2, les juges qui bénéficient de la prolongation accordée 
par la Loi du travail ne peuvent se la voir retirée par la Loi sur les juges.  
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vigueur et que plus de 4 000 personnes furent arrêtées durant cette 
période d’un mois et demi16. 
• Alors que plusieurs dirigeants et collaborateurs de l’ancien régime 
continuent à occuper des postes au sein de la fonction publique 
serbe, une loi de « lustration »17 est adoptée par la Serbie en mai 
2003, loi qui est en vigueur depuis septembre 2003 pour une durée 
de dix ans18. 
• Enfin, la Convention [européenne] de sauvegarde des droits de 
l’Homme et des libertés fondamentales19 est ratifiée par l’État de 
Serbie et Monténégro le 26 décembre 2003. 
• Le Parti Radical serbe ultranationaliste a remporté les élections 
parlementaires qui se sont déroulées le 28 décembre 2003, sans 
toutefois pouvoir obtenir la majorité nécessaire pour former à lui 
seul le gouvernement. 
C’est en tenant compte de tout ce passé que s’édifie actuellement 
l’État de droit en Serbie et que se reconstruit la société civile dans ce pays 
en pleine transition.  
L’établissement d’un système de justice dans un contexte de transition 
s’avère parfois un exercice difficile et complexe parce qu’il s’édifie non 
pas à travers une théorie générale faisant abstraction de toute référence 
contextuelle, mais dans le cadre d’une dynamique sociale, politique et 
économique très particulière. Par conséquent, toute amorce de réforme ne 
peut se faire qu’en tenant compte de différents enjeux et cela, au risque 
même de heurter certains principes enracinés dans la culture judiciaire 
canadienne. 
                   
16  Voir notamment COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE DE JURISTES (Section 
canadienne), « Briefing material for Canadian judges », loc. cit., note 3. 
17  Accountability for Human Rights Violations Act, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Serbia, No. 58/2003. 
18  Id., art. 34(1) : « This Law shall come into force on the eighth day after its publication 
in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia and shall apply three months after 
entering into force ». La Loi ayant été publiée dans la Gazette Officielle en juillet 
2003 est donc applicable depuis septembre 2003. Art. 34(3): « This Law shall be 
applied for 10 years after entering into force ». 
19  CONSEIL DE L’EUROPE, S.T.E. no 005, entrée en vigueur le 3 septembre 1953. 
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Ainsi, la mise en place de moyens judiciaires ou non judiciaires, 
souvent provisoires et assujettis à certaines conditions, sera nécessaire afin 
de mettre sur ses rails une justice qui autrement ne pourrait assurer une 
transition vers la démocratie. Certains de ces moyens, alors qu’ils 
s’avèrent nécessaires à la reconstruction de la Serbie, apparaîtront souvent 
aux juges canadiens tel un compromis auquel il n’est pas toujours évident 
de souscrire. Cela est particulièrement le cas lorsqu’il s’agit de mettre en 
place un processus qui, afin d’assainir le système judiciaire, vise la 
destitution de certains membres de la magistrature. 
Il est indéniable que les juges canadiens qui participent à cette 
construction20 voient certaines de leurs certitudes remises en question, 
particulièrement en ce qui a trait au principe d’inamovibilité, inviolable à 
leurs yeux en tant que garantie d’indépendance judiciaire. 
En effet, principe enraciné dans la culture judiciaire canadienne, 
protégé notamment par l’alinéa 11d) de la Charte canadienne des droits et 
libertés21, principe reconnu spécifiquement par l’article 23 de la Charte 
des droits et libertés de la personne22 du Québec, principe clairement 
établi par les tribunaux23, l’indépendance judiciaire constitue, pour les 
juges canadiens, un principe fondamental qui ne doit, a priori, faire l’objet 
d’aucun compromis.  
L’indépendance de la magistrature au Canada est assurée par trois 
composantes essentielles, soit l’inamovibilité, la sécurité financière et la 
sécurité institutionnelle. Comme le fait remarquer Martin L. Friedland 
dans un rapport préparé pour le Conseil canadien de la magistrature : 
                   
20  Comme d’ailleurs ceux qui travaillent en Croatie. 
21  Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, Partie I de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 
[annexe B de la Loi de 1982 sur le Canada (1982, R.-U., c. 11)]. 
22  L.R.Q., c. C-12. 
23  Voir notamment les arrêts Valente c. La Reine, [1985] 2 R.C.S. 673; R. c. 
Beauregard, [1986] 2 R.C.S. 56; Mackeigan c. Hickman, [1989] 2 R.C.S. 267; R. c. 
Lippé, [1991] 2 R.C.S. 114; R. c. Généreux, [1992] 1 R.C.S. 259; N.B. Broadcasting 
Co. c. N.-É., [1993] 1 R.C.S. 319; Ruffo c. Conseil de la magistrature, [1995] 4 
R.C.S. 267; Renvoi relatif à la rémunération des juges de la Cour provinciale de l’Île 
du Prince Édouard, [1997] 3 R.C.S. 3; Therrien (Re), [2001] 2 R.C.S. 3; Moreau-
Bérubé c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Conseil de la magistrature), [2002] 1 R.C.S. 249; 
Mackin c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre des Finances), [2002] 1 R.C.S. 405; Rice c. 
Nouveau-Brunswick, [2002] 1 R.C.S. 405; Ell c. Alberta, 2003 CSC 35. 
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« […] Le juge nommé à titre amovible pourrait façonner ses 
décisions de manière à plaire à l’autorité détenant le pouvoir de 
mettre fin à ses fonctions. Celui qui ne jouirait pas de la sécurité 
financière pourrait être tenté d’accepter des faveurs ou la promesse 
de faveurs de personnes ayant un intérêt dans le litige. Et si les 
juges ne jouissent pas d’une certaine indépendance institutionnelle, 
du moins en ce qui concerne l’exercice de leurs fonctions 
judiciaires, le pouvoir exécutif pourrait, par exemple, exercer un 
contrôle sur l’attribution des causes à tel ou tel juge24. » 
Mais comment doit se comprendre le principe d’inamovibilité lorsqu’il 
s’agit non pas de garantir ce principe au sein d’une magistrature saine et 
forte, mais lorsqu’il s’agit plutôt de transformer cette magistrature et de 
l’assainir? Comment doit se comprendre le principe d’impartialité? 
Comment doit se mesurer la distance requise et l’étanchéité entre 
l’exécutif et le judiciaire? Telles sont là quelques-unes des questions qui 
se posent aux juges canadiens, qui doivent nécessairement relativiser leurs 
certitudes.  
C’est là tout le défi de travailler dans un pays en transition. 
Ainsi, à la lumière de la situation globale des réformes entreprises, les 
juges canadiens devront notamment remettre en question leurs certitudes 
relatives au principe d’inamovibilité, composante première de l’indépen-
dance judiciaire. C’est aussi en tenant compte des divers moyens qui sont 
à la disposition d’un pays en transition que les juges tenteront de concilier 
le principe d’inamovibilité avec les exigences de souplesse qu’impose une 
réforme rapide et profonde.  
L’examen des divers moyens utilisés par les États pour assurer leur 
transition vers la démocratie fera donc l’objet de notre première partie, 
puisqu’il est indispensable à la compréhension du processus de 
« lustration » mis en place en Serbie en mai 2003, avec la Loi sur la 
responsabilité pour les violations des droits de la personne25, processus 
qui fera l’objet de notre deuxième partie.  
                   
24  Martin L. FRIEDLAND, Une place à part : l’indépendance et la responsabilité de la 
magistrature au Canada, Rapport présenté pour le Conseil Canadien de la 
Magistrature, 1995, p. 2. 
25  Précitée, note 17.  
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I.  LES DIFFÉRENTS MOYENS UTILISÉS PAR LES ÉTATS POUR 
ASSURER LEUR TRANSITION VERS LA DÉMOCRATIE 
Pour accomplir efficacement la transition dans une société, il ne faut 
pas uniquement transformer les institutions, il faut aussi accorder des 
réparations aux victimes de violations des droits de la personne et ce, non 
seulement pour effacer les atrocités de la mémoire collective et pour 
permettre aux populations affectées de retrouver la paix, mais également 
pour gagner la confiance du public envers les nouvelles institutions 
démocratiques. 
Le passage vers la démocratie ne peut s’effectuer qu’en prenant en 
compte un double objectif, soit celui de réparer les violations du passé et 
celui de reconstruire une société égalitaire. 
Parmi les principales approches utilisées par les pays en transition, 
retenons notamment les programmes de restitution des biens, 
l’établissement de la vérité par des moyens non judiciaires tels les 
commissions de vérité, les poursuites pénales nationales ou internationales 
des auteurs de violations des droits de la personne et la destitution de 
ceux-ci de leur poste au sein du pouvoir étatique, le cas échéant, à l’aide 
de lois de « lustration »26. 
A. Les programmes de restitution des biens ou de compensation 
monétaire 
Déjà en 1995, la République fédérale de Yougoslavie reconnaissait, en 
signant l’Accord de Dayton, l’importance, pour atteindre une situation de 
paix durable, du rétablissement des réfugiés et des personnes autrement 
déplacées dans leur propriété d’origine27.  
                   
26  À propos des différents moyens à la disposition des États pour assurer leur transition 
vers la démocratie, voir notamment Priscilla HAYNER, « Justice in Transition: 
Challenges and Opportunities », Presentation to the 55th Annual DPI/NGO 
Conference, Rebuilding Societies Emerging from Conflict: A Shared Responsibility, 
Nations Unies, New York, 9 septembre 2002. 
27  Accord de Dayton, article VII. 
   « Recognizing that the observance of human rights and the protection of 
refugees and displaced persons are of vital importance in achieving a lasting 
peace, the Parties agree to and shall comply fully with the provisions concerning 
human rights set forth in Chapter One of the Agreement at Annex 6, as well as 
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Ainsi, l’article 1 de l’Annexe 7 de l’Accord de Dayton prévoit que 
tous les réfugiés ou les personnes autrement déplacées ont le droit de 
retourner librement dans leur propriété d’origine, ou d’être indemnisés 
dans les cas où ladite propriété ne peut être restituée et ce, de façon 
sécuritaire, sans risque de harcèlement ou d’intimidation, de persécution 
ou de discrimination28. 
Le morcellement de l’Ex-Yougoslavie a en effet entraîné le 
déplacement de plus de 1.3 millions de personnes, dont plus de 800 000 
étaient toujours, en 2002, éparpillées un peu partout à travers la 
République fédérale de Yougoslavie, la Croatie et la Bosnie-
Herzégovine29. 
 
the provisions concerning refugees and displaced persons set forth in Chapter 
One of the Agreement at Annex 7. » 
L’État de Serbie et Monténégro, en adoptant en 2003 l’article 23 du Charter on 
Human and Minority Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (partie intégrante de la 
Constitution de l’État de Serbie et Monténégro, précitée, note 2), a par ailleurs réitéré 
le droit de toute personne à la propriété, qui comprend le droit de ne pas être privé de 
ses biens. Voir également, à propos des programmes de restitution des propriétés, 
Catherine LU, « Victimhood, Retribution and the Project of Moral Regeneration », 
dans INSTITUT CANADIEN D’ADMINISTRATION DE LA JUSTICE, op. cit., 
note 3. 
28  « Chapter One: Protection 
Article I: Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons 
  All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes 
of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which 
they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated 
for any property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of refugees 
and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Parties confirm that they will accept the return 
of such persons who have left their territory, including those who have been 
accorded temporary protection by third countries. 
  The Parties shall ensure that refugees and displaced persons are permitted to 
return in safety, without risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution, or 
discrimination, particularly on account of their ethnic origin, religious belief, or 
political opinion. » 
29  Ces informations nous proviennent du site Internet de l’Organisation pour la Sécurité 
et la Coopération en Europe (ci-après l’OSCE) relatif à la mission de l’Organisation 
en Bosnie : http://www.oscebih.org/human_rights/property.asp. 
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Selon l’Organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe 
(OSCE), la procédure de retour est freinée par un manque de respect des 
droits fondamentaux, dont le droit à la possession de ses biens30, garanti 
notamment par l’article 1 du Protocole additionnel à la Convention de 
sauvegarde des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés Fondamentales31.  
Le problème de la restitution des propriétés est une question très 
épineuse en Serbie. Malgré tout, aucune loi s’y rapportant n’a encore été 
adoptée.  
La principale question qui occupe les autorités serbes pour l’instant est 
la restitution des immeubles à logements. En effet, non seulement ces 
immeubles ont-ils été nationalisés, mais les appartements qu’ils ren-
ferment ont été loués, sous l’ancien régime, à certaines personnes 
privilégiées. Des familles vivent donc dans ces appartements depuis des 
décennies et n’ont aujourd’hui aucun autre endroit où habiter. 
Dans ce contexte, la restitution des immeubles devient un double 
problème puisque l’État ne doit pas seulement retourner les immeubles à 
leurs propriétaires d’origine, mais doit également trouver une solution 
pour les gens qui habitent ces immeubles. Avec des moyens financiers 
limités, le problème demeure entier. 
Un autre problème majeur auquel fait face la Serbie est la restitution 
des usines à leurs propriétaires d’origine, usines qui ont été investies par 
l’État à partir de 1945.  
Comment évaluer la valeur de l’usine à l’époque où elle appartenait à 
son ancien propriétaire et sa valeur actuelle? Alors que l’État de Serbie a 
proposé une compensation monétaire, les propriétaires réclament une 
restitution en nature. Encore une fois, le problème demeure entier32. 
                   
30  Id. 
31  Conseil de l’Europe, S.T.E. no 009, entré en vigueur le 18 mai 1954 : 
« Article 1 – Protection de la propriété 
Toute personne physique ou morale a droit au respect de ses biens. Nul ne peut être 
privé de sa propriété que pour cause d’utilité publique et dans les conditions prévues 
par la loi et les principes généraux du droit international. » 
32  Ces informations nous ont été transmises par Svetlana Vukomanovic, Coodinatrice de 
programme au Center for Democracy Foundation de Belgrade. 
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Selon l’OSCE, deux éléments sont très importants dans la réussite 
d’un programme de restitution des propriétés. D’abord, une saine structure 
légale permettant aux réfugiés et aux personnes autrement déplacées de 
reprendre possession de leur propriété et instaurant un programme de 
compensation dans les cas où les propriétés ne peuvent être retournées à 
leurs propriétaires d’origine. Deuxièmement, un système judiciaire neutre, 
c’est-à-dire qui n’a pas de préjugé ou d’apparence de préjugé face aux 
victimes qui désirent reprendre possession de leurs biens33.  
Mais comment restituer la propriété de personnes déplacées alors que 
d’autres y demeurent parfois depuis des décennies? Et qu’en est-il lorsque 
ces seconds occupants sont décédés et que leurs descendants y vivent 
maintenant de façon légitime? Plus problématique encore, comment 
résoudre ces questions de restitution des propriétés privées alors que 
celles-ci ont été nationalisées sous l’ancien régime? Un juge peut-il 
décider d’évincer un occupant légitime au profit de l’occupant d’origine, 
alors que le propriétaire actuel de cette propriété est peut-être l’État? Un 
large programme de compensation monétaire serait-il plus approprié? Et 
qu’en est-il si l’on pense que dans un contexte de transition, les ressources 
doivent être utilisées avec parcimonie?  
Ce ne sont là que quelques-unes des questions qui démontrent 
l’ampleur du problème auquel doivent faire face les États en transition et 
qui nous permettent d’affirmer que le problème de restitution des 
propriétés est sans doute, pour ces sociétés, un des problèmes les plus 
importants.  
B. Les commissions de vérité 
 Pour implanter solidement les bases d’un État de droit dans un pays 
en transition, il ne suffit toutefois pas d’accorder des réparations de nature 
économique aux victimes de violations des droits de la personne, il faut 
également prévenir la répétition de ces violations. 
                   
33  En effet, selon l’OSCE, les réfugiés ou les gens autrement déplacés hésitent souvent à 
retourner dans leur lieu de résidence d’origine par peur des arrestations et des 
détentions arbitraires. 
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La Commission des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies reconnaît 
que la prévention de la répétition des crimes passe, entre autres, par la 
divulgation complète de la vérité34, divulgation qui constitue également un 
élément essentiel de la transition vers la démocratie35. 
C’est dans ce double objectif de reconnaissance des violations passées 
des droits de la personne et de transition vers la démocratie que plusieurs 
États ont choisi de mettre sur pied une commission de vérité36 dont l’une 
des principales fonctions consiste à enquêter sur les faits se rapportant aux 
violations des droits de la personne, à l’intérieur d’un espace-temps 
déterminé, puis d’émettre un rapport officiel complet sur ces événements 
                   
34  (Projet de) Principes fondamentaux et directives concernant le droit à réparation des 
victimes de violations [flagrantes] des droits de l’homme et du droit international 
humanitaire, Commission des droits de l’homme, Nations Unies, avril 1997, principe 
15 : 
  « 15. Satisfaction et garanties de non-renouvellement doivent être prévues, y 
compris, si nécessaire : 
  (b) Vérification des faits et divulgation publique et complète de la vérité; 
Excuses, notamment reconnaissance publique des faits et acceptation de 
responsabilité; 
  Inclusion dans la formation aux droits de l’homme et dans les livres d’histoire 
ou les manuels scolaires d’un compte rendu fidèle des violations commises dans 
le domaine des droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire. » 
35  Voir notamment Phenyo Keiseng RATAKE, « Transitional Justice in South Africa 
and the Former Yugoslavia—A Critique », dans HISTORY WORKSHOP AND THE 
CENTRE FOR STUDY OF VIOLENCE AND RECONCILIATION, TRC: 
Commissioning the Past, Johannesbourg, 11-14 juin, 1999, p. 8 : 
« Failure on the part of a new government to deal with past human rights 
violations often has drastic consequences for the birth of the new society. It is 
important for a society to reconcile itself with its past. A society which 
deliberately ignores its past human rights violations is sitting on a bomb which 
may go off at any time. […] societies which deliberately ignore the legacy of 
past human rights violations such as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia leave 
behind myths, half-truths, speculations, guilt and denials. These uncertainties 
create a ‘thick wall’ between perpetrators and victims. Such a ‘thick wall’ 
results in a shaky foundation for a new society because ‘the beast is not looked 
in the eye’. In order to ‘look the beast in the eye’ it is important to know the 
causes of the problem, so as to deal with the symptoms. » 
36  Parmi les pays qui ont mis sur pied une commission de vérité, notons, entre autres, le 
Rwanda, l’Argentine, le Guatemala, le Brésil, le Salvador, le Chili et le Zimbabwe.  
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de même que des recommandations quant à la façon d’éviter qu’ils ne se 
répètent dans le futur37.  
Pour accomplir cette tâche, les commissions de vérité recueillent 
divers documents et entendent les victimes autant que les auteurs des 
crimes à propos desquels il y a enquête. 
N’étant pas soumises aux règles de procédure et de preuve applicables 
devant les tribunaux, les commissions de vérité ont notamment l’avantage 
de faire ressortir des vérités plus larges et plus complètes que celles qui 
émergent lors d’un procès.  
En outre, les commissions de vérité permettent d’appréhender un plus 
grand nombre d’auteurs de violations des droits de la personne que les 
poursuites judiciaires, ces dernières étant restreintes par l’insuffisance de 
preuve, l’absence de compétence des tribunaux locaux, les catégories 
d’actes criminels punissables, etc.  
Les commissions de vérité ont par ailleurs un certain pouvoir théra-
peutique sur les victimes puisqu’elles exposent les événements passés à 
partir de leur perspective. Les victimes ont la possibilité de s’exprimer 
librement sur ce qu’elles ont vécu, leur témoignage n’étant pas restreint, 
comme c’est le cas dans le contexte d’une procédure judiciaire, par les 
questions des procureurs.  
Dans certains États, tel le Rwanda, la commission de vérité est 
accompagnée d’une procédure d’amnistie afin d’inciter les auteurs de 
violations des droits de la personne à dévoiler tous leurs actes38. Cette 
décision des pouvoirs publics constitue en fait un compromis permettant 
aux auteurs de violations des droits de la personne de se confesser sans 
                   
37  Au sujet des commissions de vérité, voir notamment Priscilla HAYNER, « 15 Truth 
Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study », (1994) 16(4) Human Rights 
Quarterly 597; P. K. RATAKE, loc. cit., note 35; William A. SCHABAS, 
« Addressing Impunity in Developing Countries: Lessons from Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone », dans INSTITUT CANADIEN D’ADMINISTRATION DE LA JUSTICE, 
op. cit., note 3. 
38  À ce sujet, voir notamment P.K. RATAKE, id.; W.A. SCHABAS, id.; G. THEISSEN, 
« Supporting Justice, Co-Existence and Reconciliation aft… : Strategies for Dealing 
with the Past », dans BERGHOF RESEARCH CENTER FOR CONSTRUCTIVE 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, 
2000 : http://www.berghof-center.org/handbook/theissen/abstract.htm.  
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crainte de poursuite judiciaire, et aux victimes d’avoir accès à un récit des 
faits le plus complet possible39.  
L’amnistie doit toutefois être limitée aux personnes ayant participé aux 
conflits armés seulement, et ne doit pas s’appliquer aux auteurs de géno-
cides, de crimes de guerre, de crimes contre l’humanité ou d’autres 
violations flagrantes des droits de la personne, telles les tortures et les 
disparitions forcées, sans quoi elle serait contraire au droit pénal 
international40. 
Dans les cas où la procédure d’amnistie ne peut être appliquée, comme 
dans les cas où elle n’est pas du tout envisagée par l’État, la commission 
de vérité permettra malgré tout de rassembler des éléments de preuve 
pouvant servir à d’éventuelles poursuites judiciaires. 
C. Les poursuites pénales des auteurs de violations des droits 
de la personne 
Différents instruments internationaux de protection des droits de la 
personne, telles les quatre Conventions de Genève41, la Convention sur le 
génocide42, Le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques43 et 
la Convention contre la torture44 prévoient que les violations flagrantes des 
                   
39  Il est important toutefois de s’assurer que l’amnistie n’entraîne pas l’annulation des 
obligations de l’État face au droit à la réparation des victimes de violations des droits 
de la personne, telle la mise sur pied d’un programme de compensation monétaire, par 
exemple. 
40  Voir infra, partie 3 – Les poursuites pénales des auteurs de violations des droits de la 
personne. 
41  Convention de Genève pour l’amélioration du sort des blessés et des malades dans 
les forces armées en campagne; Convention de Genève pour l’amélioration du sort 
des blessés, des malades et des naufragés des forces armées sur mer; Convention de 
Genève relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre; Convention de Genève 
relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre, adoptées par la 
Conférence diplomatique de Genève le 12 août 1949, entrées en vigueur le 21 octobre 
1950. 
42  Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, (1951) 78 
R.T.N.U. 277, [1949] R.T.Can. no 27. 
43  Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, (1976) 99 R.T.N.U. 171, 
[1976] R.T.Can. no 47. 
44  Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou 
dégradants, Doc. N.U. A/39/51 (1984), p. 197, [1987] R.T.Can. no 36. 
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droits de la personne, les génocides, les crimes de guerre et les crimes 
contre l’humanité doivent faire l’objet d’une enquête, les États ayant 
l’obligation de poursuivre leurs auteurs en justice45. 
Par ailleurs, la Commission des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies, 
dans son Projet de Principes fondamentaux et directives concernant le 
droit à réparation des victimes des violations [flagrantes] des droits de 
l’Homme et du droit international humanitaire, fait expressément mention 
du devoir des États de faire respecter les droits de la personne et le droit 
international humanitaire46. 
La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a pour sa part rendu, en 
mars 2001, une décision concluant que la Convention [européenne] de 
sauvegarde des droits de l’Homme et des libertés fondamentales47 
« implies a primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in place 
effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences 
which endanger life, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the 
prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such 
provisions »48. 
                   
45  À ce sujet, voir notamment William A. SCHABAS, loc. cit., note 37. 
46  Précité, note 34, principes 1 et 2 : 
« Devoir de respecter et de faire respecter les droits de l’homme et le droit 
international humanitaire 
Selon le droit international, tout État a le devoir de respecter et de faire respecter 
les droits de l’homme et le droit international humanitaire. 
Portée de l’obligation de respecter et de faire respecter les droits de 
l’homme et le droit international humanitaire 
L’obligation de respecter et de faire respecter les droits de l’homme et le droit 
international humanitaire comprend le devoir de lutter contre les violations, 
d’enquêter sur celles-ci, de prendre les mesures appropriées contre leurs auteurs 
et d’assurer recours et réparations aux victimes. La lutte contre les violations 
flagrantes des droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire et le 
devoir de poursuivre et de punir les auteurs d’actes constitutifs de crimes au 
regard du droit international doivent faire l’objet d’une attention particulière. » 
47  Précitée, note 19. 
48  Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme, 22 
mars 2001, par. 86. 
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La Serbie, en adoptant la Loi sur l’organisation et la juridiction des 
autorités gouvernementales dans les poursuites des auteurs de crimes de 
guerre49 en juin 2003, a mis en place un cadre légal et institutionnel 
nécessaire à la bonne marche des procès pour crimes de guerre. 
Cette loi très innovatrice crée, entre autres, l’Office du procureur 
public pour les crimes de guerre, le Service d’enquête sur les crimes de 
guerre, la Division des crimes de guerre de la Cour de district de Belgrade 
et l’Unité de détention spéciale pour les auteurs de crimes de guerre. Cette 
loi met également en place quelques nouveautés sur le plan procédural, tel 
le témoignage par vidéo et l’enregistrement audio des procès.  
Les juges affectés à la Division des crimes de guerre sont des juges de 
la Cour de district de Belgrade nommés par le président de celle-ci. Pour 
l’instant, six juges d’instruction et deux juges enquêteurs ont été nommés. 
Ces huit juges sont responsables de la Division des crimes de guerre pour 
tout le territoire de la Serbie et utiliseront, avec les juges qui seront 
affectés à la Division du crime organisé, les salles de cour du nouveau 
bâtiment abritant le Tribunal spécial pour la lutte contre le crime organisé, 
dont une des salles de cour a été inaugurée le 20 décembre 2003 par le 
Ministre de la Justice de la Serbie, Vladan Batic50.  
Aucune formation en matière de crimes de guerre n’est obligatoire, 
mais certains des juges nommés ont assisté à des séminaires sur les crimes 
de guerre. À cet égard, d’autres séminaires seront organisés notamment 
                   
49  Law on the Organization and Jurisdiction of Government Authorities in Prosecution 
of Perpetrators of War Crimes, texte traduit en anglais par l’OSCE, disponible dans 
COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE DE JURISTES (Section canadienne), 
« Background Documentation, Serbia », loc. cit., note 3. 
50  Cette nouvelle salle de cour a été construite en un temps record de 69 jours, en 
conformité avec les plus hauts standards en matière de sécurité et d’équipements 
techniques. D’une superficie de 900 mètres carrés, cette salle de cour peut recevoir 
jusqu’à 550 personnes. Elle est constituée d’une partie centrale, où prennent place le 
juge, les avocats et les huissiers, d’une aire entourée d’une vitre anti-balle pour 
l’accusé, et d’un balcon destiné à recevoir le public. Des salles de presse spéciales ont 
également été prévues pour les journalistes qui couvrent les procès. Cette salle de 
Cour, selon le Ministre de la Justice Vladan Batic, est une réponse de la Serbie 
démocratique face au crime organisé et abritera le procès pour le meurtre de l’ancien 
Premier ministre de Serbie Zoran Djindjic. 
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par l’OSCE et par les juges du Tribunal pénal international pour l’Ex-
Yougoslavie51. 
Il est indéniable que les poursuites pénales des auteurs de violations 
des droits de la personne, tout comme le processus de « lustration » dont 
nous discuterons ci-après, posent le problème de la rétroactivité des 
punitions, rétroactivité qui est contraire aux droits fondamentaux52. Mais 
une véritable lutte contre l’impunité dans les pays en transition ne peut 
évacuer la nécessité de panser les plaies et de s’attaquer aux sources de 
violations.  
À l’aide de certaines techniques d’interprétation judiciaire, ce retour en 
arrière peut être effectué de façon démocratique, sans violation du principe 
de non-rétroactivité des lois. 
D’abord, il est possible de soutenir que les lois en vertu desquelles 
certaines personnes ont commis des violations des droits de la personne 
étaient elles-mêmes soumises à d’autres lois, supérieurement hiérar-
chiques, qui interdisaient ces violations. Trois types de lois supérieures 
                   
51  Ces informations nous proviennent de la juge Radmila Dicic, de la Cour de district de 
Belgrade. 
52  Voir notamment l’article 20 de la Charte des droits de la personne, des minorités et 
des libertés fondamentales, partie intégrante de la Constitution de l’État de Serbie et 
Monténégro, précitée, note 2, qui interdit la rétroactivité des lois, de même que 
l’article XXII de la Constitution de l’État de Serbie et Monténégro, précitée, note 2, 
qui permet toutefois la rétroactivité des lois si l’intérêt public le justifie : 
« Prohibition of retroactivity, punishment only on the basis of law  
Article 20 
No one shall be considered guilty or punished for an act that was not prescribed by 
law as punishable before it was committed.  
The punishments are determined in accordance with the law that prevailed at the 




The Laws and other acts issued by the institutions of Serbia and Montenegro 
cannot be retroactive.  
Exceptionally, if required by the public interest established in the process of law 
enactment, certain provisions of the Law can be retroactive. »  
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peuvent être invoquées, selon le cas, soit les lois constitutionnelles, les lois 
internationales53 et les lois de justice naturelle. 
Une autre façon de résoudre le problème de la rétroactivité est le cas 
où le législateur peut adopter une loi d’interprétation par laquelle il 
déclarera que le droit positif qui prévalait sous l’ancien régime, malgré les 
apparences, n’a jamais autorisé les actes reprochés.  
Ou encore, au lieu d’adopter une loi d’interprétation, le législateur peut 
allonger rétroactivement les délais de prescription prévus dans les lois 
permettant la punition des auteurs de violations des droits de la personne 
dans la mesure, bien entendu, où de telles lois existaient au moment de la 
commission des actes reprochés54. 
                   
53  L’article 15 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, précité, note 
43, est intéressant à cet égard puisqu’il prévoit que rien ne s’oppose à la 
condamnation d’un individu pour des actes considérés comme criminels selon les 
principes de droit international alors que cet acte ne constitue pas un crime en vertu 
du droit interne : 
« Article 15 
Nul ne sera condamné pour des actions ou omissions qui ne constituaient pas un 
acte délictueux d’après le droit national ou international au moment où elles ont 
été commises. […] 
Rien dans le présent article ne s’oppose au jugement ou à la condamnation de tout 
individu en raison d’actes ou omissions qui, au moment où ils ont été commis, 
étaient tenus pour criminels, d’après les principes généraux de droit reconnus par 
l’ensemble des nations. » 
La Serbie, sous l’ancien régime, a adhéré à plusieurs instruments internationaux de 
protection des droits de la personne, dont le Pacte international relatif aux droits 
civils et politiques. 
54  À propos du problème de la rétroactivité des lois et de la façon d’y faire face, voir 
notamment Eric A. POSNER et Adrian VERMEULE, Transitional Justice as 
Ordinary Justice, Chicago, 2003 : http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/ 
resources/eap-av.transitional.pdf, p. 22 suiv. Selon eux, ces différentes techniques 
consistent simplement à prendre l’ancien régime aux mots : 
« […] When the new regime’s court ignore the law in action in favor of the 
nominal law, or treat the old regime’s international commitments as good-faith 
obligations, they are merely holding the old regime to its word. […] the appeal to 
international norms weakens the wrongdoers’ argument that the retroactive 
punishment comes as an unfair surprise; […] A similar point holds for retroactive 
extensions of statutes of limitations, which only apply to those who have, after all, 
violated underlying substantive law that was in effect when they violated it. » 
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L’impunité ébranle le principe d’État de droit, constitue un affront à la 
justice et peut mener à un manque de confiance de la population envers la 
nouvelle démocratie.  
À l’inverse, le fait, pour un gouvernement, d’intenter des poursuites 
judiciaires contre les auteurs de violations des droits de la personne envoie 
un message clair selon lequel nul n’est au-dessus de la loi et contribue à 
dissuader les éventuels futurs criminels55.  
Les poursuites judiciaires permettent également d’individualiser les 
coupables en les sanctionnant individuellement. Comme le fait remarquer 
l’auteur Richard Goldstone, ce processus d’individualisation est très 
important dans la prévention de la haine à l’endroit de peuples entiers : 
« […] When one looks at the emotive photographs of the accused 
in the dock at Nuremberg one sees a group of criminals. One does 
not see a group representative of the Germans – the people who 
produced Goethe or Heine or Beethoven. The Nuremberg Trials 
were a meaningful instrument for avoiding the guilt of the Nazi’s 
being ascribed to the whole German people56. » 
Toutefois, le corollaire du devoir de poursuivre en justice les auteurs 
de violations flagrantes des droits de la personne est l’obligation de 
s’assurer que la justice sera rendue conformément aux standards interna-
tionaux, notamment en matière d’indépendance et d’impartialité des juges. 
Or, l’affaiblissement du système judiciaire, phénomène qui touche la 
plupart des pays en transition, peut provoquer une déstabilisation de 
l’indépendance de la magistrature, déstabilisation qui peut résulter, entre 
autres, d’une peur ou d’une intimidation des juges, d’une partialité poli-
tique des juges et des procureurs, ou encore d’un manque de ressources et 
de connaissances.  
                   
55  P.K. RATAKE, loc. cit., note 35, p. 12. Voir également William A. SCHABAS, 
« Réconciliation nationale et poursuites pénales : comment résoudre cette équation 
dans le respect des droits fondamentaux et de la démocratie? », dans CENTRE 
INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE ET DU DÉVELOP-
PEMENT DÉMOCRATIQUE, Campagne contre l’impunité : Portrait et Plan 
d’action, Montréal, 1997, p. 237. 
56  Cité dans P.K. RATAKE, id., p. 26. 
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C’est dans ce contexte que la communauté internationale a mis sur 
pied des tribunaux internationaux responsables de poursuivre les auteurs 
de crimes de guerre subsidiairement aux tribunaux domestiques, c’est-à-
dire lorsque les États ne sont pas en mesure ou ne veulent pas traduire en 
justice les responsables ou les auteurs de crimes de guerre.  
À cet égard, mentionnons notamment la Cour pénale internationale, 
créée par le Statut de Rome57, et le Tribunal pénal international pour l’Ex-
Yougoslavie, mis sur pied par les Nations Unies58.  
Le Tribunal pénal international pour l’Ex-Yougoslavie exerce sa 
compétence de façon concurrente avec les juridictions nationales serbes, 
en ayant toutefois primauté sur ces dernières et il peut, dans l’intérêt de la 
justice, non seulement transférer des dossiers au niveau national, mais 
également demander le dessaisissement d’une juridiction nationale dans 
une enquête ou une affaire donnée s’il juge que le procès ne se déroule pas 
selon les standards internationaux59.  
Le Tribunal pénal international pour l’Ex-Yougoslavie prévoit 
terminer ses enquêtes à la fin de 2004, finir ses procès de première 
instance en 2008 et ses procédures d’appel en 2010, les autorités natio-
nales devant prendre la relève à ce moment. L’amélioration de l’efficacité 
                   
57  Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale, A/CONF. 183/9 du 17 juillet 1998, 
entré en vigueur le 1er juillet 2002. La juridiction de la Cour n’est applicable qu’aux 
crimes commis après l’entrée en vigueur du statut. Pour le texte intégral du statut, voir 
le site Internet des Nations Unies, à l’adresse suivante: http://www.un.org/law 
/icc/statute/french/rome_statute(f).pdf. Pour plus d’informations, voir également les 
actes du colloque portant sur la Cour pénale internationale, organisé par l’Institut 
canadien d’administration de la Justice, dans le cadre des Journées Maximilien-Caron, 
tenu à Montréal en mai 2003. 
58  En vertu de la Résolution 827 adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies le 
25 mai 1993, en réponse à la menace pour la sécurité internationale représentée par 
les violations graves du droit international humanitaire commises sur le territoire de 
l’Ex-Yougoslavie depuis 1991. Pour plus d’informations sur le Tribunal pénal 
international pour l’Ex-Yougoslavie, voir le site Internet des Nations Unies, à 
l’adresse suivante : http://www.un.org/icty/index-f.html, de même que le site Internet 
de l’OSCE, à l’adresse suivante : http://www.osce.org/documents/fry/2003/11/ 
1156_en.pdf.  
59  Aucune disposition législative ne prévoit quels dossiers peuvent être transférés au 
niveau domestique ou être retirés des juridictions nationales, et cela dépendra des 
choix politiques. Ces informations nous ont été transmises par la juge Radmila Dicic, 
de la Cour de district de Belgrade. 
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du système judiciaire serbe devient donc un objectif de première 
importance. 
Selon l’OSCE, un des éléments nécessaires au succès de la Serbie dans 
sa croisade contre l’impunité est l’intégration de la doctrine de la 
responsabilité des commandants, développée par le Tribunal pénal 
international pour l’Ex-Yougoslavie60. 
Cette doctrine, selon laquelle les commandants doivent être tenus 
responsables des actes de leurs subordonnés, s’applique non seulement 
aux commandants militaires, mais a également été étendue par le Tribunal 
aux dirigeants civils. 
Or, la Loi sur l’organisation et la juridiction des autorités 
gouvernementales dans la poursuite des auteurs de crimes de guerre61 ne 
fait aucune référence à la doctrine de la responsabilité des commandants.  
Alors que la doctrine de la responsabilité des commandants permet de 
pallier au problème de preuve fréquemment rencontré en matière de 
crimes de guerre, il est légitime de se demander si cette déficience de la loi 
constituera un obstacle au succès de la Serbie dans sa lutte contre les 
violations des droits de la personne. 
D.  Le processus de « lustration » 
Afin de restaurer la confiance du public envers les nouvelles 
institutions démocratiques, notamment envers le système judiciaire, 
certains États62, dont la Serbie, ont pris l’initiative de démettre de leurs 
fonctions les personnes qui occupent ou sont candidats à un poste au sein 
de la fonction publique ou de la magistrature et qui ont participé aux 
violations des droits de la personne commises sous l’ancien régime.  
                   
60  Voir notamment le rapport de l’OSCE relatif aux crimes de guerre, disponible sur le 
site Internet de l’Organisation, à l’adresse suivante : http://www.osce.org/documents/ 
fry/2003/11/1156_en.pdf. 
61  Précitée, note 49. 
62  Parmi les États ayant adopté des lois de « lustration », notons entre autres la 
Tchécoslovaquie, la Pologne et la Hongrie. 
298 THE NEW RULE OF LAW  /  LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
En effet, comment un système judiciaire peut-il être crédible si les 
juges qui doivent décider de la culpabilité des auteurs de violations des 
droits de la personne sont les mêmes que ceux qui ont autorisé ces crimes 
par le passé? 
L’adoption de lois dites de « lustration » est une des façons de mettre 
en œuvre ce processus de destitution.  
La notion de «lustration», est un concept propre aux pays du bloc 
communiste. Ce terme vient du latin lustrare, qui signifie purifier par le 
feu, ou encore clarifier les choses en les soumettant à la lumière. Plus 
concrètement, la « lustration » est la détermination judiciaire ou 
administrative qu’une personne a participé aux violations des droits de la 
personne commises sous l’ancien régime et la punition, pour pareille 
activité, consiste en la dénonciation publique et au congédiement du poste 
occupé.  
La Commission des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies a d’ailleurs 
reconnu l’importance des sanctions administratives, autant que judiciaires, 
dans la prévention de la répétition des violations des droits de la 
personne63.  
Le processus de « lustration » peut revêtir diverses formes, selon l’État 
où il est mis sur pied.  
D’abord, la « lustration » peut être individuelle ou elle peut être 
collective. Dans le premier cas, dès qu’il est établi qu’une personne a 
participé aux violations des droits de la personne, celle-ci doit 
démissionner de son poste, sous peine de dénonciation publique64.  
                   
63  Projet de Principes fondamentaux et directives concernant le droit à réparation des 
victimes des violations [flagrantes] des droits de l’homme et du droit international 
humanitaire, précité, note 34, article 15e) : 
« 15. Satisfaction et garanties de non-renouvellement doivent être prévues, y 
compris, si nécessaire : 
Sanctions judiciaires ou administratives à l’encontre des personnes responsables 
des violations. » 
64  C’est du moins ce qui est prévu par la Loi sur la responsabilité pour les violations des 
droits de la personne, précitée, note 17. 
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La « lustration » collective, pour sa part, consiste à déterminer des 
groupes de personnes pour lesquels il sera dorénavant interdit d’occuper 
un poste au sein de la fonction publique. Dans cette dernière hypothèse, il 
ne s’agit pas de déterminer si une personne, individuellement, a participé 
aux violations des droits de la personne, mais seulement de savoir si cette 
personne fait partie d’un des groupes identifiés par la loi de « lustration ».  
Dans l’affirmative, cette personne sera démise de ses fonctions, à 
moins de parvenir à faire valoir qu’elle est l’exception qui n’a participé à 
aucune violation des droits de la personne, l’exception qui ne représente 
aucune menace pour la nouvelle société démocratique et qui, par 
conséquent, ne devrait pas faire partie du groupe.  
La plupart du temps toutefois, il n’existe aucun moyen de faire valoir 
son innocence. Et s’il en existe un, celui-ci n’offrira que peu ou pas de 
garanties procédurales et partira d’une présomption de culpabilité – la 
présomption d’innocence n’étant pas valable – mettant le fardeau de 
preuve sur les épaules de celui qui veut faire valoir qu’il ne devrait pas 
être inclus dans le groupe. 
Enfin, la « lustration » peut être totale, c’est-à-dire viser toutes les 
personnes ayant participé, de près ou de loin, tant de façon passive 
qu’active aux violations des droits de la personne, ou ne viser que les 
initiateurs ou les personnes ayant participé activement à ces violations. 
Jusqu’à présent, l’histoire nous a démontré que les États ayant adopté 
des lois de « lustration » sont ceux pour lesquels la transition vers la 
démocratie s’est effectuée avec le plus de succès : 
« A fine natural experiment is provided by Czechoslovakia, which 
enacted harsh lustration laws in 1991. These laws were inherited 
by the Czech Republic but not Slovakia when the two nations split. 
[T]here is no doubt that [the lustration law] did keep a number of 
highly compromised persons out of public life in Czech lands, 
while such persons remained to do much damage in Slovakia. […] 
Indeed, these persons re-established an authoritarian regime in 
Slovakia, one that has only recently begun to thaw, while in the 
Czech Republic the transition to a liberal democracy has been 
smooth and steady. […] In Poland there was initially no lustration 
law but after a series of scandals involving high officials who were 
believed to have been collaborators – one such scandal cause the 
fall of the government – a lustration law was created in 1998. […] 
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The optimistic view there that a thick line could be drawn between 
present and past was initially supported by the public but has since 
been repudiated, and the new lustration law enjoys popularity […] 
The other success stories – the former GDR and Hungary – also 
enacted lustration laws, although after much delay and milder than 
the Czech Republic’s. By contrast, the failures and partial failures 
– Russia and its satellites – had no significant lustration laws. This 
pattern must disappoint those who believed that Spain’s smooth 
purge-free transition would provide the model for the successful 
transitions after 198965. » 
II. LE PROCESSUS DE « LUSTRATION » DES JUGES MIS EN PLACE 
EN SERBIE PAR LA LOI SUR LA RESPONSABILITÉ POUR LES 
VIOLATIONS DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE 
Les derniers événements qui se sont déroulés en Serbie, plus 
particulièrement l’assassinat du Premier ministre Zoran Djindjic le 12 
mars 2003, ont incité les autorités serbes à prendre de nouvelles initiatives, 
notamment dans le domaine judiciaire, pour assurer la transition vers la 
démocratie. Ces initiatives se traduisent entre autres par l’adoption d’une 
loi de « lustration » ou, pour reprendre les termes exacts, d’une Loi sur la 
responsabilité pour les violations des droits de la personne66. 
A. Les paramètres généraux de la loi 
1. La notion de violation des droits de la personne selon la Loi sur 
la responsabilité pour les violations des droits de la personne 
La loi de « lustration » serbe indique tout d’abord que la notion de 
droits de la personne réfère aux droits établis et protégés par le Pacte 
international relatif aux droits civils et politiques67, signé et ratifié par la 
République fédérale socialiste de Yougoslavie, aux droits et libertés 
prévus par la Constitution de la République fédérale socialiste de 
Yougoslavie de 1974, par la Constitution de la République fédérale de 
                   
65  Éric A. POSNER et Adrian VERMEULE, op. cit., note 54, p. 34. 
66  Accountability for Human Rights Violations Act, précitée, note 17. 
67  Précité, note 43. 
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Yougoslavie de 1992 et par la Constitution de la République de Serbie de 
199068. 
La loi mentionne également son application rétroactive, couvrant 
toutes les violations des droits de la personne survenues après le 23 mars 
1976, soit le jour de prise d’effet du Pacte international relatif aux droits 
civils et politiques69. 
Par la suite, la loi définit, dans son article 5, ce qu’est une violation des 
droits de la personne de façon très générale70, puis en prévoit, aux articles 
6, 7 et 9, des formes plus spécifiques qui couvrent le droit à la vie privée71, 
                   
68  Loi sur la responsabilité pour les violations des droits de la personne, précitée, note 
17 : 
« Human Rights in Terms of this Law 
Article 3 
Human rights for the purpose of this Law are the rights set out in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed and ratified by the Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, rights and liberties of man and citizen as set 
out in the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia; 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1992 and the 
Republic of Serbia Constitution from 1990. » 
69  Id., art. 4. 
70  General Forms of Human Rights Violations 
« Article 5 
Violation of human rights for the purpose of this Law is every action undertaken 
by a person specified in this Law in discharge of duty and/or task, which: 
represents a criminal offence or other punishable act which is prosecuted ex 
officio, which has fallen under the statute of limitations for criminal or other penal 
prosecution, in whose commission the person specified under this Law participated 
as a perpetrator, instigator, accomplice, abettor, organiser of criminal conspiracy 
or whose commission such person failed to prevent in accordance with his/her 
legal powers. 
has as its aim to deprive a person of his/her lawful rights or to hinder exercise of 
such rights, or to enable a person to acquire a right or benefit to which such person 
is not entitled under law; or 
has as its aim to influence a state body, organisation, enterprise or other legal 
entity to take a decision or undertake an act which brings citizen into an unequal 
position. » 
71  Special Forms of Human Rights Violations through Infringement of the Right to 
Privacy 
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le droit à l’égalité72 et le droit à des procédures judiciaires ou extra-
judiciaires exemptes de toute motivation politique73. 
 
« Article 6 
Violation of human rights for the purpose of this Law is any act of a person 
specified herein which infringes the right to privacy of another, undertaken with 
the aim to acquire information relevant to such person or in his/her possession in 
order to deliver such information to the Security Information Agency or the 
preceding and/or other corresponding service.  
Violation of human rights occurs also when the act specified in paragraph 1 of this 
Article is committed on orders from a superior and also when such act was not in 
contravention of domestic regulations in force at the time of commitment but was 
in contravention of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. » 
72  Special Forms of Human Rights Violations through Infringement of Equality 
under Law 
« Article 7 
Violations of human rights for the purpose of this Law is also every act undertaken 
by a person specified by this Law, which in court proceedings or a proceeding 
before other state body, or in a proceeding before an organisation exercising public 
authority, or during conclusion of legal business and other forms of legal 
transactions by a state body or organisation exercising public authority: 
grants unwarranted privileges to a person in respect of another or other persons, by 
processing cases outside of the order of their submission, or by concluding legal 
transactions under privileged conditions, unless otherwise specified by law; 
discriminates against a person in respect of another or others, in contravention of 
the principle of equality under law regardless of sex, age, race, colour, nationality, 
political views or other personal traits even when discrimination is not a criminal 
offence, or rendering of public service is refused in contravention of the principle 
of equality under law; or 
fails to undertake measures it ensure equality of persons when so stipulated by 
law. 
Violation of human rights also occurs when the act specified in paragraph 1 of this 
Article is committed on orders of a competent person or body, or a superior, and 
also when such an act was not in contravention of domestic regulations at the time 
of commitment but was in contravention of the provisions of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. » 
73  Participation in Politically Motivated Judicial or Extra-Judicial Proceedings 
Article 9 
Violation of human rights for the purpose of this Law occurs also when a person 
specified under this Law, acting in official capacity in court proceedings or a 
proceeding before a state body or organisation where another person is being 
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 L’article 10 de la loi prévoit ensuite 21 catégories de fonctions pour 
lesquelles les personnes ne doivent jamais avoir commis de violation des 
droits de la personne telle que définie précédemment74. Cet article a une 
portée très vaste et englobe pratiquement tous les postes de la fonction 
publique, dont ceux reliés au pouvoir judiciaire, prévus dans la 12e 
catégorie de l’article 10 : 
« Persons accountable for Human Rights Violations 
Article 10 
12. President and judge of the Constitutional Court of Serbia 
(hereinafter: Constitutional Court), president and judge of courts of 
general jurisdiction and special courts, member of the High 
Judicial Council, public prosecutors and their deputies, 
administrator of misdemeanor court and misdemeanor judges. »  
Cette catégorie à elle seule est très large, couvrant les présidents et les 
juges de toutes les cours, les procureurs, les administrateurs de cours et les 
membres du Conseil de la magistrature serbe, de même que les candidats à 
ces postes. 
 
deprived of certain rights, or such rights are restricted, or an obligation is imposed 
to do or abstain from doing or to endure, or other punitive or other enforceable 
measure is pronounced against him/her, if such person was aware that the 
proceeding was being conducted for the sole purpose of applying political attitudes 
and criteria that are overtly or covertly represented as legal rules or criteria. 
74  L’article 8 de la loi prévoit toutefois trois cas d’exemption de responsabilité pour les 
violations des droits de la personne :  
« There shall be no culpability for human rights violations specified under Articles 
6 and 7 of this Law if the act: 
was committed by a person under 18 years of age; 
was committed under duress, threat, blackmail or other prohibited pressure; or 
was committed through information supplied to the Security Information Agency 
or its predecessor and/or other corresponding service, in a statement during 
questioning by the police and/or during detention by the police, in prison or 
custody. » 
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2. Le processus de « lustration » tel qu’appliqué aux juges 
La loi prévoit que tant les candidats qui postulent pour un poste de 
juge que ceux déjà en place doivent être soumis au processus de 
« lustration » et ce, selon des modalités différentes.  
Il convient de mentionner les modalités du processus de « lustration » 
préalable, mais de façon très brève seulement puisqu’elle ne touche pas au 
principe d’inamovibilité, principe qui nous occupe ici en tant que garantie 
d’indépendance de la magistrature. 
Essentiellement, ce qui distingue la « lustration » préalable de la 
« lustration » appliquée aux juges déjà en poste sont les organes chargés 
d’initier le processus et la sanction en cas de violation des droits de la 
personne, alors que le processus de « lustration » proprement dit est le 
même dans les deux cas. 
Pour l’examen préalable à la nomination, le High Judicial Council, le 
Council for Court Administration Issues ou l’Assemblée nationale75 
doivent, sans délai et pour chaque candidat à un des postes énumérés dans 
l’article 10 de la loi, initier le processus de « lustration » en faisant une 
requête d’examen devant la Commission d’enquête sur la responsabilité 
pour les violations des droits de la personne76.  
Un candidat pour lequel l’enquête a révélé une violation des droits de 
la personne doit retirer sa candidature du poste convoité, après avoir utilisé 
les moyens de contestation de la décision de la Commission d’enquête, le 
cas échéant77.  
                   
75  La loi prévoit, à l’article 14, que les autorités et organisations compétentes pour la 
nomination, la sélection ou l’embauche d’un candidat à un poste spécifié à l’article 10 
doivent initier les procédures d’examen de responsabilité. Or, c’est l’Assemblée 
nationale, sur recommandation du High Judicial Council, qui procède à toutes les 
nominations aux cours de Serbie, en vertu de l’article 46 de la Loi sur les juges, 
précitée, note 14. Par ailleurs, depuis les amendements du 19 mars 2003, c’est 
désormais le Council for Court Administration Issues qui procède aux nominations 
des présidents de cour. 
76  Loi sur la responsabilité pour les violations des droits de la personne, précitée, note 
17, art. 14(1) et (2). 
77  Pour la « lustration » préalable à la nomination au poste de juge, voir les articles 14 à 
17 de la Loi sur la responsabilité pour les violations des droits de la personne, id. 
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Quant au processus de « lustration » applicable aux juges déjà en 
poste, il est initié d’office par la Commission d’enquête sur les violations 
des droits de la personne78. 
Une fois la requête d’examen faite, un panel de la Commission 
d’enquête doit procéder à l’enquête à l’intérieur d’un délai de 60 jours79.  
Un juge pour qui l’enquête a révélé une violation des droits de la 
personne a le droit, dans les sept jours de la réception de l’avis écrit de 
violation, de vérifier tous les documents et dossiers sur lesquels le panel 
de la Commission s’est basé pour conclure à la violation des droits de la 
personne80. 
Après avoir vérifié les dossiers et les documents en question, le juge 
doit, dans les sept jours de la vérification ou de l’expiration du délai de 
vérification, informer le panel de la Commission d’enquête de sa décision 
de démissionner de son poste ou de contester la décision du panel devant 
la Commission81. 
Si le juge décide de contester la décision du panel devant la 
Commission d’enquête, celle-ci doit décider de l’objection en session, 
dans les trois jours de son dépôt82. 
Enfin, dans l’éventualité où la Commission rejetterait l’objection du 
juge à la décision du panel, celui-ci peut, en dernier recours, porter plainte 
devant la Cour suprême de Serbie dans les sept jours suivant la réception 
de la décision de la Commission83. 
                   
78  Id., art. 18. 
79  Id., art. 15(1). L’enquête consistera à vérifier les documents de la Security 
Information Agency ou du service qui l’a précédée, ou de tout autre service pertinent, 
les dossiers de cour et les dossiers gouvernementaux ou d’organisations ayant une 
autorité administrative (art. 15(2) de la loi).  
80  Id., art. 16(1). 
81  Id., art. 16(2). 
82  Id., art. 16(4). La Commission peut juger pertinent de tenir des auditions lorsque cela 
s’avère nécessaire pour recueillir certains témoignages (art. 11, 20, 29 et 30(2) 3o). 
83  Id., art. 16(5) et 29. Cette plainte ne doit toutefois porter que sur des faits nouveaux 
dont le juge faisant l’objet du processus de « lustration » n’a pu prendre connaissance 
qu’après la décision de la Commission sur l’objection à la conclusion du panel 
(art. 17). 
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Une fois le processus terminé et si la conclusion de violation des droits 
de la personne est maintenue, le juge doit démissionner de son poste, sans 
quoi la Commission d’enquête publiera des communiqués de presse 
dévoilant la participation de celui-ci aux violations des droits de la 
personne et son refus de démissionner du poste occupé84.  
Par la suite, la loi prévoit l’interdiction, pour toute personne trouvée 
responsable de violation des droits de la personne au terme du processus 
de « lustration », d’occuper un des postes énumérés à l’article 10 pour une 
période de cinq ans85.  
Il est important de mentionner que le processus de « lustration » serbe 
n’implique pas de procédures judiciaires. La Commission d’enquête doit 
simplement déterminer si les éléments préalables de responsabilité pour 
les violations des droits de la personne ont été rencontrés, conformément 
au Code criminel, au moment où les violations ont été commises86.  
Dans ce contexte, les règles applicables au processus de « lustration », 
notamment celles relatives à la représentation du juge faisant l’objet de 
l’enquête, au statut de celui-ci devant la Commission, à son droit à une 
défense et à la consultation d’un avocat sont celles du Code de procédure 
pénale serbe87. 
Jusqu’à présent, personne n’a fait l’objet du processus de « lustration » 
en Serbie88. 
B. Les garanties qui doivent être apportées au processus de 
« lustration » pour que celui-ci demeure conforme aux 
valeurs démocratiques 
Dans toute société en transition, un des objectifs prioritaires est 
l’établissement d’une saine magistrature, apte à se prononcer de façon 
                   
84  Id., art. 32. D’autres cas pour lesquels la Commission doit publier des informations 
concernant les auteurs de violations des droits de la personne sont également prévus 
par cette disposition. 
85  Id., art. 33. 
86  Id., art. 12(3). 
87  Id., art. 11(2) et 22. 
88  Cette information nous provient de Vladan Miladinovic, Agent politique, économique 
et attaché de presse de l’ambassade du Canada pour l’État de Serbie et Monténégro. 
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indépendante et impartiale sur les violations des droits de la personne 
commises sous l’ancien régime, et capable d’assurer le respect des droits 
fondamentaux pour le futur. 
L’indépendance judiciaire, assurée essentiellement par la garantie 
d’inamovibilité des juges, leur sécurité financière et leur indépendance 
administrative devient donc la voie vers une société libre et démocra-
tique89. 
Le Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l’Europe a d’ailleurs rappelé, 
dans l’exposé des motifs de la Recommandation sur l’indépendance, 
l’efficacité et le rôle des juges, que l’indépendance des juges […] est un 
des piliers sur lesquels repose l’État de droit90.  
Dans le noyau dur de ce que constitue l’indépendance de la 
magistrature se retrouve le concept d’inamovibilité qui permet à un juge, 
une fois nommé, de pouvoir remplir sa fonction en toute sérénité selon, 
pour suivre l’expression d’usage, bonne conduite, ce qui signifie tant et 
aussi longtemps que l’organisme habilité à le faire n’aura pas recommandé 
au gouvernement, à la suite d’une enquête, que ce juge soit destitué91.  
Selon le Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l’Europe, qui a prévu la 
garantie d’inamovibilité dans la Recommandation sur l’indépendance, 
l’efficacité et le rôle des juges92, le principe d’inamovibilité des juges 
                   
89  À ce sujet, voir notamment M.L. FRIEDLAND, op. cit., note 24. 
90  Exposé des motifs de la Recommandation Rec (1994) 12 sur l’indépendance, 
l’efficacité et le rôle des juges, Conseil de l’Europe, Comité des ministres : 
http://cm.coe.int/stat/F/Public/1994/fExpRep(94)12.htm, par. 3, 15 et 38. 
91  Au sujet de l’inamovibilité, voir notamment les arrêts suivants de la Cour suprême du 
Canada: Valente c. La Reine, précité, note 23; R. c. Beauregard, précité, note 23; 
Mackeigan c. Hickman, précité, note 23; R. c. Lippé, précité, note 23; R. c. Généreux, 
précité, note 23; Ruffo c. Conseil de la magistrature, précité, note 23; Renvoi relatif à 
la rémunération des juges de la Cour provinciale de l’Île du Prince Édouard, précité, 
note 23; Therrien (Re), précité, note 23; Moreau-Bérubé c. Nouveau-Brunswick 
(Conseil de la magistrature), précité, note 23; Mackin c. Nouveau-Brunswick 
(Ministre des Finances), précité, note 23; Rice c. Nouveau-Brunswick, précité, note 
23; Ell c. Alberta, précité, note 23. 
92  Recommandation (no R (94) 12) sur l’indépendance, l’efficacité et le rôle des juges, 
adoptée par le Comité des ministres du Conseil de l’Europe, 13 octobre 1994, 518e 
réunion des Délégués des Ministres : 
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« vise à garantir leur indépendance et a pour conséquence qu’un juge 
nommé de manière permanente ne peut être révoqué sans juste motif avant 
d’avoir atteint l’âge de la retraite obligatoire »93.  
Les juges serbes sont nommés à vie en vertu de la Loi sur les juges94. 
Par conséquent, ils ne peuvent être démis de leurs fonctions sans juste 
motif avant d’avoir atteint l’âge de la retraite.  
Toutefois, les activités antérieures pouvant constituer un juste motif au 
sens de la Charte européenne sur le statut des juges95 et de la Recom-
mandation sur l’indépendance, l’efficacité et le rôle des juges96, on peut 
affirmer que la Loi sur la responsabilité pour les violations des droits de 
la personne97, en prévoyant la destitution immédiate des juges ayant été 
trouvés responsables de violations des droits de la personne, ajoute un 
juste motif de dérogation à la règle de l’inamovibilité des juges98. 
 
Principe I – Principes généraux concernant l’indépendance des juges 
Les juges, qu’ils soient nommés ou élus, sont inamovibles tant qu’ils n’ont pas 
atteint l’âge obligatoire de la retraite ou la fin de leur mandat. 
93  Exposé des motifs de la Recommandation Rec (1994) 12 sur l’indépendance, 
l’efficacité et le rôle des juges, loc. cit., note 90. 
94  Loi sur les juges, précitée, note 14, art. 2. 
95  Charte européenne sur le statut des juges, Conseil de l’Europe, 8-10 juillet 1998 : 
http://www.cidadevirtual.pt/asjp/medel/novos/carte_europeene.html.  
« 3. Nomination, inamovibilité 
Le statut détermine les situations dans lesquelles les activités antérieures d’un 
candidat ou d’une candidate ou celles exercées par leurs proches font obstacle, en 
raison des doutes qu’elles peuvent légitimement et objectivement susciter sur leur 
impartialité ou leur indépendance, à une affectation à un tribunal. » 
96  Précitée, note 92 :  
« Principe VI – Exercice défaillant de responsabilité et fautes disciplinaires 
Les juges nommés à titre permanent ne peuvent être révoqués sans juste motif tant 
qu’ils n’ont pas atteint l’âge de la retraite obligatoire. Ces raisons, qui devraient 
être définies en termes précis par la loi, […] pourraient concerner les cas où le juge 
est incapable de s’acquitter de fonction judiciaire ou a commis des infractions 
pénales ou de graves violations des règles disciplinaires. » 
97  Précitée, note 17. 
98  Au Canada, l’arrêt Therrien (Re), précité, note 23, confirme la possibilité de destituer 
un juge pour ses activités antérieures. 
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Malgré que la loi de « lustration » serbe semble a priori contraire à la 
règle de l’inamovibilité, toutes deux visent en fait le même objectif, soit la 
constitution d’un corps de juges indépendants et légitimes, qui bénéfi-
cieront de la confiance du public. 
Certaines garanties devront cependant être apportées au processus de 
« lustration » afin de s’assurer que son usage n’engendre pas d’effet 
pervers, telle la création d’une magistrature dont les membres sont 
manipulés grâce à l’épée de Damoclès que peut constituer la Loi sur la 
responsabilité pour les violations des droits de la personne. 
1. La destitution des juges par une autorité indépendante des 
pouvoirs exécutif et législatif 
La création d’une instance totalement indépendante des pouvoirs 
législatif et exécutif, qui aura pour fonction de déterminer l’existence de 
motifs de cessation des fonctions judiciaires, à la suite d’une procédure 
d’enquête établie par la loi, constitue une des façons d’assurer 
l’indépendance institutionnelle des juges face aux différents organes de 
l’État et d’éviter ainsi leur corruption99. 
Le Statut universel du juge100, de même que la Charte européenne sur 
le statut des juges101 prévoient, à cet égard, que la gestion administrative 
                   
99  Au Canada, cette exigence a été reconnue notamment dans les arrêts Therrien (re), 
précité, note 23 et Moreau-Bérubé c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Conseil de la 
magistrature), précité, note 23. 
100  Statut universel du juge, approuvé à l’unanimité par le Conseil Central de l’Union 
Internationale des Magistrats lors de sa réunion à Taipei (Taiwan), le 17 novembre 
1999 : http://www.iaj-uim.org/FRA/07.html: 
« Art. 11 
Administration et principes en matière de discipline 
La gestion administrative et disciplinaire des membres du pouvoir judiciaire est 
exercée dans des conditions permettant de préserver leur indépendance, et se fonde 
sur la mise en œuvre de critères objectifs et adaptés. 
Lorsque cela n’est pas déjà assuré par d’autres voies résultant d’une tradition 
éprouvée, l’administration judiciaire et l’action disciplinaire doivent relever d’un 
organe indépendant comportant une part substantielle et représentative de juges. » 
101  Précitée, note 95. 
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des membres du pouvoir judiciaire doit s’exercer dans des conditions 
préservant leur indépendance, c’est-à-dire par un organe indépendant et 
comportant une part substantielle de juges. 
La loi de « lustration » serbe ne respecte pas cette exigence 
fondamentale d’indépendance de l’organe chargé de déterminer 
l’existence de motifs de cessation des fonctions judiciaires puisque 
l’exigence selon laquelle cet organe doit être composé d’une part 
substantielle de juges n’est pas respectée.  
En effet, la Loi sur la responsabilité pour les violations des droits de 
la personne précise d’abord que la Commission d’enquête sur les 
violations des droits de la personne, organe chargé d’administrer tout le 
processus de « lustration », est un organe indépendant et autonome financé 
par la République de la Serbie102. 
Mais la loi prévoit ensuite que la Commission est composée de neuf 
membres, soit trois juges de la Cour suprême de Serbie, trois éminents 
experts légaux, un représentant du procureur de la Couronne et deux 
députés de l’Assemblée nationale de Serbie détenant un diplôme en droit, 
élus à partir de différentes listes électorales103. Seulement le tiers des 
membres de la Commission étant des juges, on ne peut parler d’une une 
part substantielle de juges. 
Le Président de l’Assemblée nationale de Serbie doit d’abord dresser 
une liste de candidats pour chaque groupe de membres dont sera 
composée la Commission, puis les candidats sont élus démocratiquement 
par vote secret de l’Assemblée nationale. Un vote séparé est tenu pour 
chaque liste de candidats104. 
 
« Principes généraux 
Pour toute décision affectant la sélection, le recrutement, la nomination, le 
déroulement de la carrière ou la cessation de fonctions d’un juge ou d’une juge, le 
statut prévoit l’intervention d’une instance indépendante du pouvoir exécutif et du 
pouvoir législatif au sein de laquelle siègent au moins pour moitié des juges élus 
par leurs pairs suivant des modalités garantissant la représentation la plus large de 
ceux-ci. » 
102  Loi sur la responsabilité pour les violations des droits de la personne, précitée, note 
17, art. 22. 
103  Id., art. 23(1).  
104  Id., art. 23( 2), (3) et (4). 
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Enfin, le candidat ayant reçu la majorité des votes des députés présents 
est élu membre de la Commission105. 
Dans un souci de légitimité, la loi prévoit qu’aucun membre de la 
Commission ne doit être membre d’un parti politique106, ni avoir purgé 
une sentence non suspendue de plus de six mois ou une sentence pour 
toute infraction criminelle le rendant indigne de la confiance du public107.  
Le 17 juillet 2003, le Parlement de Serbie a élu huit membres de la 
Commission, mais a été incapable d’en nommer un neuvième puisque les 
partis de l’Opposition, qui devaient proposer le second député de 
l’Assemblée nationale, refusent de prendre part à la Commission 
d’enquête sur les violations des droits de la personne. Il est à noter que La 
Commission n’a d’ailleurs pas à ce jour commencé ses activités.  
Cette situation aura-t-elle des répercussions sur l’indépendance de la 
Commission? Sur la confiance que le public entretiendra à son égard? 
Créera-t-elle des problèmes du fait que la Commission ne pourra prendre 
de décision à la majorité des voix? Seul l’avenir pourra nous le dire. 
2. Le respect des règles fondamentales d’équité procédurale dans le 
processus de destitution 
Le processus de « lustration », indépendamment du fait qu’il respecte 
la garantie d’indépendance de l’organe chargé de l’administrer, frappe de 
plein fouet le principe d’inamovibilité des juges, principe qui, dans les 
démocraties bien établies comme au Canada, est inviolable et non 
négociable.  
Dans cette foulée, bien que l’inamovibilité des juges ne semble pas 
toujours un principe universellement reconnu, il est essentiel que dans le 
processus de destitution, les règles fondamentales d’équité procédurale 
soient respectées. C’est ce dernier point qui demeure, en bout de piste, non 
négociable. 
                   
105  Id., art. 23(5). Un minimum de deux candidats doivent être nommés pour chaque 
poste disponible (art. 23(2) de la loi). 
106  À l’exception des députés. 
107  Loi sur la responsabilité pour les violations des droits de la personne, précitée, note 
17, art. 27. 
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Le Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l’Europe recommande 
d’ailleurs qu’un juge faisant face à une procédure de destitution pour un 
motif autre que l’atteinte de l’âge de la retraite obligatoire bénéficie de 
toutes les garanties d’une procédure équitable, dont la possibilité de faire 
entendre ses arguments dans un délai raisonnable et d’avoir le droit de 
répondre à tout accusation portée contre lui108.  
En Serbie, la Charte des droits de la personne, des minorités et des 
libertés fondamentales prévoit que toute personne faisant face à des 
procédures criminelles a notamment le droit à une défense pleine et 
entière, le droit à l’avocat de son choix, le droit a un procès équitable et le 
droit d’en appeler de toute décision concernant ses droits109. 
                   
108  Recommandation (no R 94 (12) sur l’indépendance, l’efficacité et le rôle des juges, 
précitée, note 92, principe VI, 3. 
109  Charte des droits de la personne, des minorités et des libertés fondamentales, partie 
intégrante de la Constitution de l’État de Serbie et Monténégro, précitée, note 2 : 
« Special guarantees 
Article 16 
[…] 
Everyone has the right to a defence, including the right to take a defence counsel 
of his own choosing before the court or other authority competent for conducting 
the proceedings, to communicate without hindrances with his defence counsel and 
to have sufficient time and facilities for the preparation of his defence. 
[…] 
No person that is accessible to the court or other authority competent for 
conducting the proceedings shall be punished unless he has be given the 
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. 
No one shall be forced to testify against himself or to admit guilt. 
Right to a fair trial 
Article 17 
Everyone shall be guaranteed equal protection in proceedings before the courts, 
other state authorities and holders of public powers. 
Right to a legal remedy 
Article 18 
Everyone has the rights to a complaint or other legal remedy against the decision 
concerning his right, obligation or legally founded interest. » 
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À cet égard, la Loi sur la responsabilité pour les violations des droits 
de la personne respecte les règles d’équité procédurale en octroyant à 
toute personne faisant l’objet du processus de « lustration » les mêmes 
droits qu’une personne faisant face à des procédures criminelles, et en 
prévoyant que toute violation des droits procéduraux d’une telle personne 
représente une violation absolue de la procédure de « lustration »110. 
Enfin, le droit d’appel des décisions affectant les droits d’une 
personne, élément majeur de l’équité procédurale, est spécifiquement 
prévu par la Loi sur la responsabilité pour les violations des droits de la 
personne111.  
Ainsi, l’article 16 de la loi112 accorde d’abord aux juges confrontés à la 
conclusion de violation des droits de la personne d’un des panels de la 
Commission le droit de s’objecter à cette conclusion devant la 
Commission elle-même. 
                   
110  Loi sur la responsabilité pour les violations des droits de la personne, précitée, note 
17, art. 13(3) et (4). 
111  Id., art. 29. 
112  Id. : 
« Article 16 
(1) A candidate for office specified in Article 10 hereof shall be entitled to, within 
seven days of acceptance of notice on violation of human rights, inspect all files 
and documents on basis of which the Commission Panel has determined that said 
candidate has violated human rights. 
(2) The person specified in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be entitled to, within 
seven days following inspection and/or expiry of the deadline for inspection, 
inform the Commission Panel of withdrawing his/her nomination or to file an 
objection with the Commission. 
(3) If the person specified in paragraph 1 of this Article withdraws his/her 
nomination, the commission immediately so informs the body and/or organisation 
competent for nomination, selection, appointment and taking into service of the 
person. 
(4) If the person specified in paragraph 1 of this Article files an objection with the 
Commission, the Commission in session decides on the objection within three 
days of receiving the objection. 
(5) The person submitting the objection may file a complaint with the Supreme 
Court of Serbia against the Commission’s decision rejecting and/or refusing the 
objection, within seven days following delivery of the Commission’s decision. » 
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Puis, dans l’éventualité où la conclusion du panel est maintenue par la 
Commission, le juge peut, en dernier recours, faire appel de cette décision 
devant la Cour suprême de Serbie113. 
C. Les conséquences possibles de l’application de la loi  
 Bien que la Loi sur la responsabilité pour les violations des droits de 
la personne poursuive des objectifs importants et nécessaires est-il 
possible que son application entraîne des effets dommageables?  
1. L’application ciblée du processus de « lustration » 
En Serbie, il existe trois catégories de juges. D’abord, il y a les juges 
qui ont été démis de leurs fonctions sous le règne de Slobodan Milosevic 
pour leur implication dans des programmes d’éducation de la magistrature, 
notamment en collaboration avec le Canada, ou pour avoir signé une 
pétition demandant aux gens de s’insurger contre l’ancien régime. Ensuite, 
il y a les juges qui ont participé activement aux violations des droits de la 
personne, tels les juges qui, à la suite de la non-élection de Slobodan 
Milosevic, ont recompté les votes et l’ont déclaré élu. Enfin, il y a les 
juges qui n’ont commis aucun acte contraire à la loi, mais qui sont 
demeurés passifs face aux violations des droits de la personne.  
Dans ce contexte, la question qui se pose est : Convient-il d’appliquer 
le processus contre tous ceux qui ont participé aux violations, tant 
activement que passivement, ou convient-il plutôt de ne l’appliquer qu’à 
ceux qui ont commis les violations des droits de la personne les plus 
grossières?  
Doit-on demander à tous les juges d’être des héros et de réagir aux 
violations des droits de la personne portées à leur connaissance? Doit-on 
exiger de tous les juges qu’ils aient un passé totalement irréprochable? Les 
juges qui sont demeurés passifs sous l’ancien régime doivent-ils être 
trouvés responsables de violations des droits de la personne? Les textes 
permettent-ils une telle conclusion? Si oui, est-ce là le vrai but de la loi?  
                   
113  Id. Seuls les faits inconnus du juge qui fait appel de la décision de la Commission, au 
moment où la Commission a rendu sa décision sur l’objection à la conclusion du 
panel, peuvent être mis en preuve devant la Cour suprême (art. 17 et 20(6)). 
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La loi de « lustration » serbe couvrant toutes les violations des droits 
de la personne commises depuis 1976 permet d’aller chercher 
pratiquement tous les juges en fonction et risque de décimer la 
magistrature serbe à une époque où la réparation des violations passées et 
la prévention de leur répétition passe par une magistrature saine et 
efficace, composée de suffisamment de personnel. 
De là la nécessité d’un plan de « lustration » bien ciblé, permettant à la 
Commission d’enquête sur les violations des droits de la personne 
d’éliminer de la magistrature serbe la part de juges la plus critique, tout en 
faisant comprendre aux autres qu’aucune violation des droits de la 
personne ne sera tolérée de leur part.  
Afin de prévenir une éventuelle pénurie de personnel qualifié et 
compétent pour assurer les fonctions judiciaires, il pourrait être également 
envisageable de renommer les juges ayant été démis de leurs fonctions 
sous l’ancien régime pour leurs valeurs démocratiques, ou de prolonger le 
mandat de ceux toujours en place pendant que les futurs juges acquièrent 
formation et expérience. 
Ces juges, qui ont toujours eu à cœur le respect des droits 
fondamentaux, pourront effectivement apporter une précieuse 
collaboration à l’édification de l’État de droit en Serbie, d’autant plus 
qu’ils ont déjà l’expérience de la magistrature et sont en mesure de 
s’acquitter dès maintenant de leurs tâches judiciaires de façon efficace.  
2. Les programmes d’éducation judiciaire, complément indispensable 
dans l’édification de toute magistrature indépendante 
Il ne suffit toutefois pas de ne garder en poste que les juges n’ayant 
commis aucune violation des droits de la personne, encore faut-il que 
ceux-ci détiennent les connaissances et l’expérience juridiques nécessaires 
à leur fonction et ce, non seulement au moment de leur nomination, mais 
également tout au long de leur carrière. C’est pourquoi de nouveaux 
programmes d’éducation devront être mis en place en Serbie114. 
                   
114  À ce sujet, voir notamment GOUVERNEMENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE 
SERBIE, Project: Strategy for Judicial Reform in Serbia, Judicial Reform Council, 
République de Serbie, Ministère de la Justice, Belgrade, octobre 2002. 
316 THE NEW RULE OF LAW  /  LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
La Commission des droits de l’homme des Nations Unis est d’ailleurs 
d’avis qu’une des façons de prévenir la répétition des violations est 
d’assurer, de façon continue, la formation dans le domaine des droits de la 
personne de tous les agents chargés de l’application de la loi115. 
Le Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l’Europe abonde dans le même 
sens en affirmant en outre que la formation contribue à l’indépendance 
judiciaire116 : 
« La formation des juristes est un des éléments importants qui 
permettent d’assurer que les personnes les plus aptes soient 
nommées juges. Les juges professionnels doivent justifier d’une 
formation juridique appropriée. En outre, la formation contribue à 
l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire. En effet, si les juges 
possèdent les connaissances théoriques et pratiques suffisantes, 
ainsi que les compétences, ils pourront agir de manière plus 
indépendante face à l’administration […]. » 
Selon le Conseil de l’Europe, cette formation doit être prise en charge 
par l’État, de façon à garantir aux juges « l’entretien et l’approfondis-
sement des connaissances tant techniques que sociales et culturelles 
nécessaires à l’exercice de leurs fonctions »117.  
Alors que la formation initiale des juges devrait viser le dévelop-
pement des connaissances, habiletés et qualités nécessaires à l’exercice 
effectif des fonctions judiciaires, la formation continue devrait plutôt 
porter sur les nouveaux développements législatifs et jurisprudentiels, le 
tout dans l’objectif de former les juges à rendre une justice efficace et 
indépendante118. 
                   
115  (Projet de) Principes fondamentaux et directives concernant le droit à réparation des 
victimes des violations [flagrantes] des droits de l’homme et du droit international 
humanitaire, précité, note 34, principe 15(h). 
116  Exposé des motifs de la Recommandation Rec (1994) 12 sur l’indépendance, 
l’efficacité et le rôle des juges, précité, note 90, par. 16(6o). 
117  Charte européenne sur le statut des juges, précitée, note 95, art. 4.4. 
118 Au sujet de la formation des juges, voir notamment GOUVERNEMENT DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE DE SERBIE, op. cit., note 114 et M.L. FRIEDLAND, op. cit., note 
24. 
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Au Canada, la formation des juges est principalement assurée par 
l’Institut national de la magistrature119, dont le mandat est de promouvoir 
un niveau élevé de rendement chez les juges grâce à des programmes qui 
favorisent leur croissance continue aux plans professionnel et personnel. 
Les programmes mis en place par l’Institut touchent trois grands 
domaines, soit le droit substantiel, le perfectionnement des habiletés et les 
questions sociales120.  
Enfin, dans un souci de préserver l’indépendance de la magistrature, la 
formation devrait être supervisée par des membres de la magistrature et 
être dispensée sur une base volontaire seulement. 
CONCLUSION 
L’histoire contemporaine nous enseigne que les sociétés civiles qui se 
construisent à l’aune de la démocratie doivent non seulement accorder des 
réparations de nature économique aux victimes de l’ancien régime, mais 
encore doivent-elles faire la paix avec le passé : commissions de vérité, 
poursuites pénales, nationales ou internationales des dirigeants et 
collaborateurs de l’ancien régime, « lustration » même, c’est-à-dire 
processus qui oblige ceux qui ont transgressé les droits de la personne à 
quitter leurs fonctions, voilà donc quelques-unes des approches retenues 
par les pays en transition. La rétroactivité des moyens utilisés heurte de 
plein front la norme constitutionnelle et internationale de légalité. C’est 
donc au nom d’une loi supérieurement hiérarchique, au nom aussi des 
principes fondamentaux des droits de la personne qui constituent une 
coutume internationale que ces actions peuvent être menées dans un État. 
Mais comment concilier le principe premier de l’indépendance de la 
magistrature, soit celui de l’inamovibilité des juges, principe si cher aux 
yeux des juges canadiens et si bien articulé par la Cour suprême du 
Canada, d’ailleurs clairement reconnu par les instruments européens, avec 
la nécessité d’ainsi faire la paix avec le passé? 
                   
119  D’autres organismes sont également impliqués dans la formation judiciaire au 
Canada, notamment l’Institut canadien d’administration de la justice, le Western 
Judicial Educational Centre et le Conseil canadien de la magistrature.  
120  Voir le site Internet de l’Institut, à l’adresse suivante: http://www.nji.ca/Public/French 
/index.htm.  
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Si nous, juges canadiens, ne pouvons qu’applaudir l’attitude des juges 
Sud Africains, qui bien qu’appelés à le faire ont refusé de témoigner 
devant la Commission de vérité présidée par Desmond Tutu, à la fin des 
années 1990, force est de reconnaître que l’approche retenue par le 
gouvernement en Serbie est tout à fait différente, et que partant les juges 
n’auront pas la même marge de manœuvre. 
Nous avons longuement élaboré sur le processus de « lustration » qui 
prend place en Serbie. Il est essentiel que la Commission d’enquête soit un 
organe indépendant et autonome du gouvernement. Il faut aussi que, dans 
la réalité, les membres nommés soient effectivement indépendants. Il est 
essentiel de plus que les règles d’équité procédurale soient respectées, afin 
que ne soient ciblés que les juges qui ont commis des grossières violations 
des droits de la personne. Le processus de « lustration » doit se faire dans 
la transparence et doit être circonscrit dans le temps. 
En remontant jusqu’en 1976, la loi de « lustration » serbe fouille très 
loin dans le passé des juges. La plus grande rigueur sera donc de mise afin 
d’éviter que cette loi, dont le but ultime est de faciliter la transition vers la 
démocratie, ne devienne plutôt une loi dangereuse susceptible d’engendrer 
d’autres violations des droits fondamentaux. 
C’est un défi de taille auxquels nos collègues serbes font face : leur 
intelligence, leur énergie, et leur lucidité sont pour nous source 
d’inspiration.  
L’indépendance de la magistrature fonde la société civile. Si elle est 
difficile à atteindre, elle est aussi fragile et précieuse. C’est là une leçon 
que nous donnent nos collègues serbes dans le dialogue constant que nous 
avons avec eux. Les juges canadiens et les juges serbes parlent la même 
langue, celle de l’État de droit. 
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I live in Serbia and Montenegro, a country that was a part of ex-
Yugoslavia. It is in South East Europe on the Adriatic Sea. From one 
country Yugoslavia became smaller countries: Croatia, Macedonia, 
Slovenia, Bosnian Federation and Serbia and Montenegro Union. Part of 
Serbia is the province of Kosovo, which is now under international 
protection.  
In the last 12 years we have been witnesses to great historical and 
political changes: we have passed through civil war, the regime of 
Slobodan Milosevic, sanctions of the international community, NATO 
bombing, war crimes, political murders, growing poverty, refugees and the 
significant absence of the rule of law. Throughout this period the judiciary 
suffered a great deal, for the division of powers among the executive, the 
legislative and the judicial branches was destroyed. It was a very hard 
period from which all our society is recovering and trying to find the best 
way for progress.  
In order to understand the situation today, it is important to learn 
something about the position of the judiciary under the regime of 
Slobodan Milosevic. The basic problem of the judiciary in Serbia has been 
the lack of independence. All attempts to have an independent judiciary 
were suppressed. During the past ten years, the judiciary acted as a 
dispatcher of the will of the political centres. The executive branch 
imposed extensive control over the judiciary. The executive, through the 
presidents of the court, ensured that the judges who were “obedient” to the 
regime received significant cases and therefore the judges who remained 
                   
*  Judge, District Court of Belgrade and President of the Assembly of the Association of 
Judges of Serbia. 
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independent did not have the opportunity to exercise their independence 
with important cases. Any serious legislative reform was systematically 
blocked, especially the ones that would guarantee the true independence of 
the judiciary.  
Some judges took a different path to oppose the regime. The Milosevic 
regime had enacted laws to prevent freedom of the press and had used the 
courts to “win” the local elections which had actually been won in the 
large cities by the opposition. This manipulation of the electoral system 
through the judicial system brought thousands of people to the streets in 
nightly demonstrations that lasted for four months over 1996-1997. 
Among the marchers were judges. As a result, the Government recognized 
the opposition victory in the local elections. The presence of the judges 
meant a great deal to the marchers, including the students, and it was clear 
that we judges were marching not to be involved in politics, but to fight 
for the rule of law. 
While the Constitution1 proclaims independence of the judiciary, in 
reality the authorities have expressed great resistance toward the rule of 
law, the separation of powers, and respect for the fundamental human 
rights and freedoms. Politically significant cases, or those in which the 
interests of individuals from the governing parties were involved, were 
assigned to already chosen suitable judges. It was enough for every court 
to have one or two suitable judges, for the other judges in court never to 
have an opportunity to prove their independence and impartiality. 
Frequently, suitable judges were temporarily transferred to other courts, 
even to other towns, where they would deliver “correct” decisions under 
the instruction of the executive. Furthermore, the executive would obstruct 
or constrain the enforcement of legitimate decisions delivered by a court.  
Issues of financial autonomy and personal safety of judges depended 
also upon the will of the executive. They have never been resolved in a 
way to protect the independence of judiciary and its dignity. Not only did 
judges not receive salaries according to their position, but those salaries 
could not satisfy the basic minimum of existence at a subsistence level. 
This led to the inclination of corruption in the judiciary. The ruling parties 
were involved in most cases of corruption.2 They granted apartments, 
                   
1  Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 
No. 1/90 
2  Ruling parties are the Socialist Party of Serbia (SRS), United Left (JUL) and Radical 
Party of Serbia (SRS). 
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loans, and promotions to obedient and suitable judges. The material status 
and other problems in the judiciary have contributed to more than 1000 
experienced judges (1/3 of their total number in Serbia and 2/3 of judges 
from military courts) leaving the judiciary. Instead of experienced and 
qualified judges, young and inexperienced recruits came. The vast majo-
rity of them were elected on political grounds, as they were members of 
one of the ruling parties. 
Political suitability was of great importance in the procedure of 
electing judges. The presidency of the courts has consisted of members or 
high officials of the ruling parties. Elections and dismissal of the judges 
are governed by the Courts Act3; however, the implementation of this act 
in reality was distorted. The election and dismissal of judges has taken 
place in the National Assembly. The majority in the Assembly, as the 
ruling party, have decided on the election and dismissal of judges, making 
this act truly political. The Ministry of Justice played a significant role in 
the preparation of proposals by giving its opinion.  
Through this very bad period, the Association of Judges of Serbia 
played a significant role. The history of the Association of Judges is the 
history of the beginning of the serious fight for the judiciary. The 
Association of Judges of Serbia is a voluntary professional non-partisan 
and non-political association, established in 1997 by a group of judges 
from Serbia interested in the improvement of the judicial system and the 
independence of the courts. The grave violations of basic constitutional 
principles and the independence of the courts by the regime after the local 
elections in Serbia in November 1996 led to the establishment of the 
Association. Certain judges and court chambers, having succumbed to 
political pressure, had violated basic constitutional principles. Thus they 
failed in their role in the protection of rights and freedoms of citizens, 
causing the general deterioration of trust in courts, law and justice.  
The main purpose of the Association is to promote the rule of law and 
an independent and impartial judiciary. It hopes thereby to improve the 
separation of powers, the judiciary’s role in protecting freedoms and rights 
of citizens, and the organization of the judiciary. Its members also aim at 
returning dignity to their profession. From a total of 2,500 judges, 590 
judges from the Constitutional Court of Serbia, Supreme Court of Serbia, 
                   
3  The Courts Act, the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 46/91, 60/91, 
18/92, 71/92. 
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High Commercial Court of Serbia, and the district, commercial and 
municipal courts were the first members of the Association.  
Since its inception, because of the circumstances under which it was 
established, the Association has confronted various forms of opposition, 
primarily by the authorities. The Association has criticized the laws 
violating the Constitution and basic human rights, and has therefore been 
subjected to increased pressure by the authorities. Members of the 
Association have been harassed, and their persecution has been announced 
by certain members of the Serbian Government, by the Minister of Justice, 
the President of the Supreme Court, and presidents of district and 
municipal courts. The regime attempted to deter any public criticism 
addressed by the Association and caused by violations of the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, the rule of law, equality of citizens and human 
rights. Repeatedly, the ruling parties have publicly attacked the 
Association and accused its prominent members of being “traitors and 
foreign hirelings”. The authorities also threatened that the judiciary 
“would be put in order”, and judges re-elected, although the office of the 
judge is for life. Presidents of courts directly threatened the Association 
members, who were harassed in various forms, including sudden transfers 
and withdrawals from cases.  
A decision of the Supreme Court of Serbia on February 17, 1999 
prohibited in effect the work of the Association. This decision violated the 
freedom of association, which is guaranteed to judges by the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by Yugoslavia; by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms; and by point 9 of the Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary, from the Universal Declaration on the 
Independence of the Judiciary.  
On December 21, 1999, the National Assembly of Serbia dismissed 
three prominent members of the Association of Judges: one judge of the 
Constitutional Court of Serbia, one judge of the Supreme Court, and one 
judge of the Fifth Municipal Court in Belgrade. It was done without any 
legal procedure and in violation of the Constitution and laws. One of the 
dismissed judges was the President of the Association of Judges of Serbia, 
while the other two were members of its Governing Board. The dismissed 
judges were blamed for being politically active because they publicly 
criticized violations of the independence of judiciary, the rule of law and 
human rights. Furthermore, membership in the Association of Judges and 
its Governing Board was considered as political activity, and therefore a 
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violation of the constitutional provision4 that proscribes political activities 
of judges that are incompatible with their position. 
 In July 2000, twenty judges were dismissed in the same manner 
(among them, one from the Supreme Court of Serbia, one from the High 
Commercial Court and seven from the circuit courts); all remaining judges 
who were members of the Governing Board of the Association of Judges 
were among them. The direct motive for dismissal was an open letter 
which discussed the situation in the judiciary and the influence that the 
executive had over the judiciary. Hence, the principle of irremovability of 
judges was disregarded and the Association of Judges of Serbia was 
practically unable to operate.  
The members of the Association of Judges of Serbia believed, and still 
believe, that it is their duty to take part in the process of the democratic 
transition of the country, and to promote the independence of the judiciary 
in order to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens. Their activities have 
been professional and apolitical, aimed at pointing out the increasing 
influence of the organs of the executive on the election and removal of 
judges, an influence that essentially jeopardises the democratisation of 
society and the functioning of legislative powers. By fighting for an 
independent judiciary, the rule of law and respect for human rights the 
dismissed judges sacrificed their safety and financial existence, and 
showed true dedication to their honourable profession. On the other hand, 
the former regime in Serbia did everything to threaten the independence 
and dignity of the judiciary.  
The recent events after the fall of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic 
have completely changed the political scene, bringing democratically 
oriented parties and social groups to power. In that context, judges hope 
that the new ruling political parties will change the attitude toward the 
judiciary and will understand the essential need for the separation of 
powers. The transitional period effectively started two and a half years ago 
and the main focus is identified as the transformation of the judiciary. 
Many new laws have been enacted and many are awaiting enactment. It is 
big and complicated work, and influences all segments of life. For the 
judiciary the most important laws were ones concerning the organization 
of courts, the Law on Judges and especially the provisions of the Law of 
High Judicial Council, the new body in charge of proposing the election 
and dismissal of judges.  
                   
4  Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, supra note 1, arts. 100, 126(4). 
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In the transitional reform process, the role of judges is extremely 
important, in order to achieve and maintain a democratic system, and the 
judges must be better prepared to cope with this difficult task. But in the 
case of Eastern countries, the judges are not sufficiently prepared to carry 
out their duties for they are “victims” of the institutional weaknesses 
within which they work, or they are anchored to stereotypes of justice 
which came from a concept belonging to a State organisational system that 
does not exist any more.  
The basic democratic principles have been formally adopted, but there 
are still many difficulties in their application. The judges must learn how 
to best use the instruments at their disposal to defend their right of 
independence from the other national institutions. A few months ago 
Serbia and Montenegro became a member of the Council of Europe, and 
before that the Declaration of Union and Declaration on Human and 
Ethnic Rights with the new provisions that are in accord with international 
law, and human rights were enacted.  
The big ongoing process is the continual education of judges, which is 
helped considerably by the international community, and also by the 
Canadian Section of the International Commission of Jurists, with a 
special project to support the independence of judges in Serbia and 
Montenegro. One year ago, the Association of Judges together with the 
Ministry of Justice founded the first Judicial Training Centre which 
established a new program for the education of judges.  
Many things are to be done in Court organization and management, 
and computerization of courts, but still the main focus is on increasing 
judges’ awareness. Through many international meetings and travelling, 
we try to provide some international experience and a comparative way of 
thinking for our judges. The long isolation of our country caused great 
damage. Judges in Serbia are usually well educated but they lack 
knowledge of international law. The Association of Judges is still very 
active and has initiated many projects with domestic and international 
organisations. In today’s world there is a great need to develop 
international relations that are not limited only to economic exchanges, but 
that also involve a wide range of institutional activities among which are 
jurisdictional ones.  
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Organised crime, which we are fighting now, relies on a wide range of 
illegal activities which are developed, or elaborated, in a plurality of 
countries. The judiciary is faced now with many cases involving high 
organized crime. These judges have been trained by EU experts, and the 
cases that are going to trial soon will be a great task for the Serbian 
judiciary. 
 In Serbia now we have about 2,600 judges, for about 7 million 
inhabitants. There are 750 prosecutors. Under the new law we have 4 
appeal courts and one Supreme Court, 30 district courts and 138 municipal 
courts, which are of general jurisdiction, and 16 commercial courts, 1 high 
commercial court, and the new Administrative Court. There is also the 
Constitutional Court of Serbia, which has started to play an important role 
in our judiciary.  
The reform of the judiciary is still a live process, and there is still a 
long way to go. Judges must be aware of the power they have, the power 
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I. THE PLACE OF THE CORPORATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
PRIVATE CITIZEN OR PUBLIC ENTITY? 
For corporate law scholars, both doctrinal and theoretical research are 
taken from the starting point of the corporation as a separate legal 
personality, with perpetual existence, the ability to contract, an entity 
aimed solely at the generation of wealth through its economic activities. 
While viewed as largely engaged in private activity, the corporation, 
whether closely or widely held, private or an issuing corporation, is the 
beneficiary of a highly codified regime that enables it to operate in 
Canada. Similar enabling legislation in many jurisdictions allows 
corporations to operate internationally. Some of the debate in corporate 
law concerns the proper role of the law and the administration of justice 
with respect to the corporation and in particular, whether or not it is to be 
treated more as a private actor or as a legal construct granted certain rights 
and privileges in return for the socially desirable effects from its activities. 
There are also concerns about the special status granted to the persons who 
participate in its activity through the corporate form with respect to 
whether or not their privileges are being used in our society’s best 
interests. One question that arises is whether our legal regime is giving 
these corporate actors the right messages about socially desirable 
behaviour.  
The debates concerning these issues and the role of law and the 
administration of justice in providing the right messages are sufficiently 
complex when one is dealing with the role of domestic law in corporate 
social responsibility. However, once one must consider the issues in the 
context of a multinational enterprise (MNE) and the role of international 
law in providing appropriate incentives for socially responsible behaviour, 
the complexity expands. In addition, the change in the type of law from 
domestic law—which is primarily concerned with the regulation of a 
nation’s citizens—to international law—which concerns relations between 
sovereign nations, not the regulation of those nations’ citizens, including 
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its corporate citizens, requires a change in the way we think about the role 
of law and the administration of justice in the regulation of MNE activity. 
These changes are some of the reasons why a key question is the efficacy 
and limits of the rule of law in respect of the global activities of MNEs. 
II. CROSSING BORDERS: DOES THE MNE LEAVE THE RULE OF 
LAW BEHIND? 
This article will first discuss the corporate form and the domestic legal 
regime that supports its existence. Two of the more crucial aspects of that 
regime are the separation of ownership and control, and the limitation of 
individual liability for corporate actors when corporate activity causes 
harms. The issue of corporate social responsibility must be assessed in the 
context of the domestic regime. This part then briefly reviews three 
conceptions of the proper role of the corporation in respect of social 
responsibility. They range from those that consider the only legitimate 
social goal to be the maximization of shareholder wealth to those that 
consider a corporation has a public duty to act in a socially responsible 
fashion. One cannot participate in this discussion without also discussing 
the normative features of various interpretations of the appropriate role of 
law in corporate regulation, including those norms that reside in the most 
neutral and enabling language. 
Following this review, Part III then describes how the issues with 
respect to the corporate form are magnified when that corporation begins 
to operate in a multinational fashion. In a purely domestic system, the 
problem of limited liability for the corporation’s agents is a problem of 
proper incentives for individuals in their management of the corporation. 
The vulnerability of the corporation’s assets still serves as a constraint on 
decision-making by corporate managers, even under the strictest 
shareholder wealth maximization conception. If directors and officers 
subject the corporation’s assets to legal liability through reckless or 
negligent acts, they may face personal liability for breach of their fiduciary 
duty. However, corporate affairs in a multinational operation can be 
arranged so that this risk is greatly reduced. The combination of the 
limited liability of the corporate form, and the general understanding of 
international law as inapplicable to an MNE’s operations dramatically 
reduce the constraints on their managers in regard to respecting the 
environment, human, political or social rights in their operations outside 
the “home” country. The combination of these factors leads to at least four 
problems in this area: the problem of unlimited subsidiaries; the problem 
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of the reluctant host; the “Who, Me?” problem; and the problem of the 
race to the bottom of the market. 
Finally, Part IV discusses the challenges for the administration of 
justice in the context of a global economy. Three issues appear to be 
relevant to this inquiry. Where can the voice of Corporate Social 
Responsibility for MNEs be heard in International Law? How can it be 
heard? Is there any remedial avenue available that can create appropriate 
incentives for the MNE’s management to adhere to some form of 
corporate social responsibility in their conduct of the MNE’s operations?  
While there are not yet any final answers to these questions, one 
possible solution is enacting legislation that grants extra-territorial 
jurisdiction and creates enforceable remedies for harms caused by 
domestically registered corporations in their activities internationally. This 
could involve expanding the notion of corporate law fiduciary duty to 
encompass international law norms in respect of the environment, human, 
social and political rights. Any intentional or negligent breach of these 
norms would subject the MNE manager involved to sanctions similar to 
those imposed for breaches of fiduciary duty in a domestic setting. The 
missing element in the multinational context is the threat to corporate 
assets from legal liability that gives force to the claim the director 
breached the duty to act in the best interests of the corporation in a 
domestic context. The question is whether it can be replaced by a 
combination of consumer markets, markets for socially responsible 
investment and incentives from home countries to MNE’s to report on 
social responsibility factors, and to host countries to enter international 
accords that have a social responsibility element. The administration of 
justice is implicated in this potential regime as the forum in which failures 
to abide by international norms can be identified, and breaches of 
fiduciary duty declared and remedied.  
A. The Corporate Form and the Domestic Legal Regime 
The Canadian domestic legal regime delimits the rights and responsi-
bilities of the corporation’s agents, offers some remedial protection and 
default control rights to its investors, and generally facilitates capita-
lization transactions of the corporation. In terms of shareholder investment 
and managerial control, some key features are that the statutes assign 
directors oversight and control of the operations of the corporation. 
Shareholders can exercise episodic voice in corporate affairs, but only 
indirectly, through the election of directors, advisory shareholder 
340  THE NEW RULE OF LAW  /  LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
 
resolutions, voting on management’s resolutions and super-majority votes 
on changes to capital structure that affect the existing shareholders. In 
terms of the limited liability regime, a key feature is that shareholder 
liability is limited to the shareholder’s total investment. Managers control 
the corporation’s activity, but they have no general personal liability for 
harms caused by its activity. There are some exceptions, such as statutory 
liability for wages, domestic environmental damage and some torts, as 
well as liability under oppression remedy and derivative suits. 
Hence the study of corporate law has been a study of the scope and 
limit of the corporation’s activities, its efficiency in facilitating the 
generation of wealth, its capital and governance structure, its relationships 
with investors and other stakeholders, and consideration of the ex ante 
incentive effects created by particular policy choices in corporate and 
securities law. Unlike other jurisdictions, in Canada, there is remarkably 
little scholarship regarding corporate social responsibility.  
B.  Corporate Social Responsibility in the Domestic Context 
As a result, there is considerable disconnect between Canadian 
corporate law scholarship and the scholarship that engages issues of the 
corporation’s role in a global society, including issues of international 
human rights protection and global sustainability. This disconnect is more 
significant than merely difference in scholarship focus. It concerns 
fundamental normative disagreements about the role of law and legal 
processes in corporate activity and markets generally, and disagreement 
regarding the economic and social objectives of corporate activity. A brief 
review of the various competing conceptions will be helpful in setting the 
context. 
1. The Neutral Market and the Political Regulation of Social 
Responsibility 
Much corporate law scholarship is premised on the view that it is not 
grounded in any particular normative view of the corporation, but rather, 
involves observations about the effects of legislative intervention on the 
functioning of perfect markets, corrected for any outliers. Scholarship is 
also based on a notion of investors as rational actors, who are not socially 
situated individuals, with wealth maximization as their sole objective. 
Hence corporate law scholarship explores the law’s role as enabling and 
efficiency enhancing. While this approach is clearly one that has made 
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normative choices regarding the role of the corporation and its investors, 
with all the attendant distributive effects, the scholarship rarely 
acknowledges that these are normative choices. 
The result is that there is a separation in the discourse, in terms of both 
the laws that regulate corporate conduct and the judicial forum in which 
these issues are determined. Domestic human rights, labour law, 
community control of land and resource use issues are generally matters 
determined through the administrative law system. While administrative 
agencies and tribunals bring considerable expertise to their determination 
of these issues, the scope of the inquiry and the remedies ordered are 
subject to the limits of the statutory regime from which they derive their 
authority. Thus while standards have been set, the remedies are frequently 
aimed at addressing a particular individual harm, and only in a few 
instances are comprehensive remedies considered. The law’s role in this 
respect is also to create incentives to restrain particular conduct. Statutory 
standards are coupled with the threat of sanction for violation of the 
standards and remedies for specific harms such as toxic spills, failure to 
pay minimum wages or provide healthy and safe working conditions and a 
host of other standards that reflect domestic public policy. While 
deterrence is frequently an objective of domestic remedial legislation, 
rarely does the law impose systemic preventive programs on corporate 
entities. Moreover, the remedial legislation is aimed at domestic harms 
and remedies, although in some cases, tribunals and courts draw their 
analysis of the scope of the rights protected from international norms and 
treaties. 
In the domestic context, high deference to business judgments by the 
courts helps to foster economic activity and enhance the ability of 
corporations to compete in global capital and products markets. Public 
policy aimed at these objectives is evident in both the enabling structure of 
corporations statutes and the express aims of securities laws.1 However, 
such deference can also facilitate ex post effects in terms of externalization 
of social and economic harms. The broadly accepted Anglo-American 
normative conception of the corporation is that shareholder wealth 
maximization is the sole objective of corporate activity and the measure 
against which directors and officers will be adjudged as to whether they 
                   
1  See for example, the purpose clause of the Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, 
s. 1.1. 
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are acting “in the corporation’s best interests”.2 Thus, aside from 
compliance with minimum standards set by environmental, social welfare, 
human rights and labour legislation, corporate conduct that results in 
harms to individuals and communities is considered within the range of 
“acceptable” corporate decision making. Moreover, some contractarian 
theorists have suggested that the corporation need not be engaged in 
socially responsible activity, because as a legal fiction, corporations are 
incapable of acting “morally”. Hence not only should the corporation’s 
activities be solely governed by its contractual relations, but if parties are 
unable to bargain protections, the corporation can engage in whatever 
activity it chooses.3 The “social” value that corporations are to contribute 
is that in generating wealth for shareholders, the aggregate social welfare 
will increase.4 While legal scholars acknowledge that corporate activity 
affects the interests of other stakeholders, they suggest that these interests 
should be protected either by contractual bargains, enforcement of implicit 
contracts or public laws that expressly limit the activities of corporations. 
Yet this approach ignores the problem of information asymmetries, lack of 
bargaining power and inability to enforce either explicit or implicit 
contracts.  
While there is merit in the suggestion that remedial legislation be used 
as the policy instrument for advancing social equality and social justice, 
this ignores the persuasive economic and normative power that corpo-
rations can exercise over the political process and hence the development 
or retention of public laws that may protect corporate stakeholders from 
particular harms. Elsewhere, I have suggested that the normative 
underpinnings for this conception of the corporation, both residual rights 
theory and the nexus of contractual relations approach to corporate law, 
                   
2  The principal argument for this is that shareholders are the residual claimants to the 
value of the corporation’s assets, and hence, corporate decisions should be made in 
their interests. 
3  F. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of the Law (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1991); M.C. Jensen & W.H. Meckling, “Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 
Journal of Financial Economics 305; J. Macey & G. Miller, “Corporate Stakeholders: 
A Contractual Perspective” (1993) 43 U.T.L.J. 401. 
4  H. Hansmann & R. Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2001) 89 
Geo. L.J. 439.  
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ignore the economic and social interests in the corporation that run along a 
continuum.5 
2. Three Conceptions of the Corporation and Social Responsibility 
In the United States, the debate regarding corporate social responsi-
bility has been protracted, with corporate law scholars positioning 
themselves at extreme ends of a debate regarding the normative role of the 
corporation. The genesis of the debate commenced in the 1930s in a 
debate conducted regarding for whom are corporate managers trustees.6 
The debate centred on whether corporations were purely private entities, 
or whether they were to be considered quasi-public, and thus whether 
managers have public as well as private obligations in their governance of 
the corporation. Anglo-American scholarship has primarily, although not 
exclusively, concluded that the sole objective of the corporation is to 
generate value, and that it is inappropriate for corporations to engage in 
any activities that can be broadly classified as socially responsible, as it 
detracts from its primary profit-making objectives. Scholars have 
suggested that while profit making solely for the benefit of shareholders 
should be undertaken within the confines of the law, that is the sole social 
obligation of corporate decision makers.7 This view arises from a 
normative conception of the corporation as engaging in purely private 
activity. The market mechanism is viewed as the only appropriate means 
of determining the allocation of scarce resources to alternative uses.8 It 
                   
5  J. Sarra, “Corporate Governance Reform, Recognition of Workers’ Equitable 
Investments in the Firm” (1999) 32 Canadian Business Law Journal 384. 
6  A.A. Berle, “For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees: A Note” (1932) 45 
Harvard Law Review 1365; E.M. Dodd Jr., “For Whom are Corporate Managers 
Trustees” (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1145. 
7  See for example, M. Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase 
Its Profits” New York Times Magazine (13 September 1970) 122 at 122 [hereinafter 
“The Social Responsibility of Business”]. Friedman suggests that the whole 
justification for shareholders electing corporate directors is that the executive is an 
agent serving the interests of his or her principals, the shareholders. See also M. 
Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 
where he suggests that social responsibility is fundamentally a subversive doctrine in 
a free society, and that the one and only social responsibility of business is to use 
resources to increase profits, as long as it engages in open and free competition 
without deception or fraud. 
8  Friedman argues that if corporate officers were to expand resources for social 
purposes, they would become civil servants while remaining employees of a private 
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also arises from the notion that corporations cannot serve as moral or 
social entities because their fundamental nature is a nexus of contractual 
relations with individuals entering multiple contracts, both implicit and 
express contracts, in their self-interests, and that corporations as inanimate 
objects are incapable of having moral or social obligations.9  
This conception of the corporation fails to situate the corporation 
socially. Corporate activity is implicated in all aspects of economic, social 
and political activity. As citizens, we are exposed to corporate activity in 
every aspect of our lives. Health care is influenced by the choices made by 
corporations about research and development and the costs of services and 
equipment designed by corporations for health care providers. Accessi-
bility to food and consumer goods is influenced by the pricing and import 
decisions of corporations. Most people in North America are either 
directly employed by corporations or by the spin-off businesses that 
support corporate activity. The safety of products such as cars, cleaning 
materials, construction materials, food and medication are all outputs of 
corporate decisions about risk and reward in their production decisions. 
Decisions to engage in production activity that is harmful to the local 
environment or to the health of the corporation’s workers are frequently 
decisions assessing the cost and benefits of production, the risk of sanction 
by the state for non-compliant activities and the risk that any sanction will 
be upheld and enforced by the courts. Moreover, the current system allows 
corporations to externalize many of the costs of these decisions, thus 
redistributing the risk and costs of any harms on those employees, 
consumers or residents who engage with the corporation in all aspects of 
their daily lives. Hence while the generation and dissemination of profit 
may be a private activity, corporate conduct has a direct impact on a wide 
range of daily social activities by citizens and by communities. While 
there are legitimate issues of finite resources and questions of allocation, 
to leave those decisions solely to corporations ignores the distributive 
effects of those decisions. Quite aside from the questionable ability of the 
market to operate efficiently such that it can send the appropriate signals 
 
enterprise, and that the doctrine of social responsibility involves acceptance of the 
socialist view that political, not market, mechanisms are the appropriate means of 
determining the allocation of scarce resources to alternative uses: “The Social 
Responsibility of Business” ibid. at 123.  
9  D. Fischel, “The Corporate Governance Movement” (1982) 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259 at 
1273-1274. 
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regarding allocation of resources, the way in which harms are not costed 
within the corporation skews any information on what precisely is the 
optimal allocation of those resources. The public policy regime that ena-
bles corporations to operate needs to take better account of the corporation 
as socially situated. 
Daniel Ostas has observed that leaving compliance for corporate 
conduct to public regulators encourages corporate officers to disregard the 
effect of behaviour that would engage their concern if they were acting 
purely as individuals.10 He uses the example of a pharmaceutical company 
where the sole medical doctor on the research team refused to endorse a 
new drug that she believed was unsafe, citing ethical obligations under her 
professional code of ethics.11 The company removed her from the research 
team and she claimed wrongful discharge. The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey, in endorsing the corporation’s actions, defined corporate social 
responsibility solely as the duty to follow the law; it held that it is for 
public authorities, in this case the FDA, to provide the independent check 
on the corporation’s activities.12 Ostas observes that law’s indeterminacy 
means that managerial discretion becomes unavoidable and that the courts 
increasingly defer to managerial judgment. Hence positive legal formalism 
provides an impractical guide to corporate social responsibility.13 
Managers both follow but also shape legal rules in respect of acceptable 
norms of corporate conduct, in their risk assessment, their litigation 
strategies and their capture of political processes that would seek to 
regulate or limit their activities.14 Ostas suggests that these factors should 
lead to more ambitious thinking about corporate social responsibility in 
that corporate officers could work with governments to focus on long-term 
profitability achieved through improvement in the law in respect to such 
conduct, rather than on short-term gains promised by circumventing it. He 
also suggests that corporate managers need a vision of the law that guides 
                   
10  D. Ostas, “Deconstructing Corporate Social Responsibility: Insights from Legal and 
Economic Theory” (2001) 38 Am. Bus. Law Journal 261. 
11  Ibid. at 266-267, discussing Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corp. 417 A.2d 505 
(N.J. 1980). 
12  The trial court found for the corporation, the appellate court reversed and the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey reinstated the trial judgment. Ostas, ibid. at 266.  
13  Ibid. 
14  Ibid. at 269-270, citing the work of free market economists with respect to the capture 
theory of regulation. 
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their exercise of discretion where socially responsible behaviour is not 
clearly specified at law. 
The dominance of the current normative approach to corporate 
behaviour is giving way to a more nuanced and socially situated view of 
corporate activity. Yet even with this shift, the shareholder wealth 
maximization model continues to dominate choice of policy objectives 
and instruments in Anglo-American scholarship. 
i. Synergies between Social Responsibility and Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization 
There are three main streams of thought in the corporate law literature 
that depart from the dominant model. First, there may be synergies in 
creating long-term shareholder wealth maximization and engaging in 
socially responsible behaviour as the latter may produce value for 
shareholders in the long term from reduced liabilities, better consumer 
goodwill and fewer environmental remediation costs. This is a valid 
observation and one that has facilitated the development of socially 
responsible investment (SRI) funds, such as ISIS, primarily operating out 
of the U.K. and continental Europe.15 These funds utilize particular social 
and economic benchmarks as signs of effective governance. They have 
policy analysts sitting on the trading floor with the financial experts, 
making decisions on ethical investments against criteria of environmental 
compliance, compliance with labour, employment and human rights 
standards and local securities law, as measures of effective stewardship of 
corporations and hence long term value maximization potential. In the US 
alone, it is estimated that SRI funds hold $2 trillion in assets.16 Those 
advocating SRI and its ethical screening view SRI as the primary vehicle 
through which to achieve corporate social responsibility, by ultimately 
positively influencing stock prices. The premise is that shareholders will 
simultaneously profit and through their investments promote social 
objectives, the notion of doing well financially by “doing social good”. In 
                   
15  ISIS Asset Management, http://www.isisam.com. 
16  Report on Socially Responsible Investing, http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/research/ 
trends/2001-trends.htm. Cynthia Williams reports that by 1999, 9% of all assets under 
management in the US were in screened funds. C. Williams, “The Securities and 
Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency” (1999) 112 Harvard Law 
Review 1197.  
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Canada, such funds are at a nascent stage, although some of the labour 
sponsored investment funds engage in similar social and environmental 
auditing prior to investing. These are important developments, because 
they link effective stewardship of the corporation with norms such as 
long-term sustainability and human rights that arguably can be broadly 
supported as norms that we as a society want to support. It also indicates 
that there is a market for SRI funds, in terms of investor preferences. 
There are, however, a number of critiques regarding the efficacy of SRI. 
There are problems of transparency in terms of the information base on 
which these decisions are being made and different conceptions of what it 
means to be in compliance with such norms.  
Scholars have also challenged the notion that SRI means that investors 
will “do well by doing good”. Michael Knoll tracks SRI to turn of the 
century Quaker and other Christian initiatives screening investment for 
“sin” related activities, the shift through the 1960s to avoiding investment 
in war related activities, the 1980s in respect of screening for investment 
in the then repressive regime in South Africa to modern day screening 
which primarily screens for tobacco.17 He examines the two principal 
claims by SRI proponents. The first is that SRI is at least as profitable and 
prudent an investment strategy and hence not more risky than strategies 
without a socially conscious component. In respect of this claim, he 
suggests that it may be true where markets are efficient, although this does 
not indicate that all SRI programs are costless.18 The other claim is that 
through SRI, investors are improving society by disciplining unethical 
corporations.19 Knoll suggests that whether or not ethical screening has a 
direct impact on targeted firms depends on the steepness of the demand 
curve for the corporation’s securities, and that there is a lack of empirical 
                   
17  M. Knoll, “Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets: The Conflicting Claims 
Underlying Socially Responsible Investment” (2002) 57 Bus. Law 681 at 695. See 
also, the Social Investment Forum, as of 2001, http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/ 
research/trends/2001-trends.htm (last accessed May 2002).  
18  Referring to situations where market prices accurately reflect available information 
and prices are unbiased predictors of future prices. He also observes that one must 
adjust for risk and that the screened portfolio must produce a higher return that an 
unscreened one in order to compensate for the added risk of not having a fully 
diversified portfolio. Knoll argues that where markets are inefficient, there is a lack of 
empirical support for these claims; ibid. at 694, 698. 
19  Ibid. at 642, 704. 
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evidence that it has a substantial impact on targeted firms’ stock price and 
thus on their activities.20 
According to the Social Investment Forum, as of 2001, 96% of all 
screened assets screened for tobacco, whereas less than 50% screen for 
human rights or labour standards.21 This indicates that there are different 
conceptions of what it means to socially screen. Investors may or may not 
be aware of the scope of the screens that their funds utilize. While a screen 
may be avoiding investment in one type of activity, it may be directing 
additional investment dollars to firms that engage in repressive labour or 
human rights practices. Since many of the social screening agencies sell 
the screening as a commodity, there is little transparency in the scope of 
the screening and in the weights given to particular corporate conduct. 
An approach that focuses solely on the synergies between shareholder 
wealth maximization and corporate socially responsible conduct highlights 
a troubling part of the debate about corporate social responsibility. In 
North America we have constructed an incentive and compensation 
system that ties bonus and earnings of senior executives to short-term 
earnings. Hence, the decision makers of the corporation are focused on 
short-term returns, which frequently diverge with long-term wealth 
maximization either for the corporation or the shareholders. Enron’s 
conduct was evidence of this, prior to its self-implosion. As long as the 
corporation was generating generous short-term returns to its shareholders, 
no one, including its directors who were the beneficiaries of these returns, 
was scrutinizing the officers’ conduct too closely. How we construct the 
economic incentives in the system determines the outcomes, in this case, a 
narrowing of the corporate focus to short-term wealth maximization.  
ii. The Corporation’s Obligation to Take into Account All Stakeholder 
Interests 
The second broad approach is that in acting in the best interest of the 
corporation, directors and officers should take account of the interests of 
all those with investments or interest in the corporation. While scholars 
                   
20  Although in cases such as South Africa, he concedes that there was a correlation, but 
suggests that this is quite different from causation, i.e. causing South Africa to end its 
apartheid practices. Ibid. at 710. 
21  Social Investment Forum, supra note 17 at 710. 
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differ on whether this should be a direct fiduciary obligation to corporate 
stakeholders or an obligation to balance multiple interests or prejudice, the 
idea is to take account of these interests.22 Some scholars advocating this 
broad approach suggest that the corporation must act as a moral 
community of interests and that managers should assume responsibility for 
a set of moral principles that facilitate economic activity by taking account 
of multiple interests, not privileging one group of interests over all 
others.23 Recognition of such a moral obligation would necessitate the 
establishment of processes whereby basic principles of justice are 
developed with all relevant stakeholder groups, which then govern 
corporate decision making as an overall guide to the corporation’s 
activities.24 This view suggests that taking account of stakeholder interests 
is an imperative, rather than a discretionary power that is characteristic of 
                   
22  M. O’Connor, “Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a 
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers” (1991) 69 N.C.L. Rev. 1189; L.E. 
Mitchell, “Co-operation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry into 
the Causes of Corporate Morality” (1995) 73 Texas Law Review 477 at 501-502; 
D. Millan, “Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform 
Strategies” in L.E. Mitchell, ed., Progressive Corporate Law (1991). T. O’Neill, 
“Employees’ Duty of Loyalty and the Corporate Constituency Debate” (1993) 25 
Conn. L. Rev. 681 suggests that employers hold a unique power to inflict harm on 
their employees and hence they should owe a duty of loyalty to them. Scholars debate 
whether corporations should expend corporate resources either for philanthropic acts 
or acts that reduce harms to the community. Others have suggested a team production 
theory of the firm, recognizing employees and others who contribute firm-specific 
inputs such that the corporation must consider them constituents of the firm; M.M. 
Blair & L. Stout, “A Team Production Theory of the Corporation” (1999) 85 Va. L. 
Rev. 247. Consideration of multiple interests in corporate decision making, while not 
the accepted paradigm in North America, is central to a number of continental 
European and Asian countries, balancing objectives of generation of wealth with the 
interests of those diverse groups that contribute inputs to that generation of wealth. 
J. Cioffi, “Restructuring ‘Germany Inc’: The Politics of Company and Takeover Law 
Reform in Germany and the European Union” (2002) 24 Law & Policy 355; J. Sarra 
& M. Nakahigashi, “Balancing Social and Corporate Culture in the Global Economy: 
The Evolution of Japanese Corporate Culture and Norms” (2002) 24 Law & Policy 
299. 
23  C.D. Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behaviour (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1975) at 103. 
24  M. Clarkson, “The Moral Dimension of Corporate Social Responsibility” in R.M. 
Coughlin et al., eds., Morality, Rationality and Efficiency: New Perspectives on 
Socio-Economics (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1991) at 188; N. Bowie, “The Firm as a 
Moral Community” in R. Coughlin et al., ibid. 169. 
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US constituency statutes that do not allow any process or remedies to hold 
corporate officers accountable for the exercise of this discretion.25  
In taking into account all stakeholder interests, presumably the 
corporation would be concerned with negative externalities from its 
activities, including those that cause social and economic harms. This 
approach is also helpful in that it seeks to internalize all costs of 
productive activity, including long term sustainability costs, adjustment 
costs for labour shedding and harms from consumer torts. The premise is 
that if these costs were internalized, the corporation would be more likely 
to engage in decisions that foster long term job skills development instead 
of labour shedding, human rights practices instead of harms caused by 
discrimination and environmentally sound practices to avoid the costs of 
harm and remediation that would be internalized to the corporation. The 
approach also has its challenges, one of which is how to ensure that 
corporate decision makers are accountable, given that they could justify 
any decision based on an expressed concern for the interests of a particular 
group.  
Moreover, even though the current statutory language that requires 
directors and officers to act “in the best interests of the corporation” 
allows for this broader understanding of consideration of all interests 
implicated in the corporation, it is unclear as to who would have standing 
to advocate this interpretation before Canadian domestic courts and 
whether, given the entrenchment of shareholder primacy in the common 
law interpretation of this language, courts would be willing to revisit these 
notions absent legislative intervention. Interestingly, this is most likely to 
                   
25  Even where the US courts have recognized the ability of corporate directors and 
officers to consider stakeholder interests, they have generally found that this 
consideration must have a rational relationship to the maximization of shareholder 
value: Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986); Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d. 34 (Del. 1994). 
Carol Greenhouse has posed the question of how globalization has affected corporate 
culture, the explicit set of values that are capable of being consciously created by 
corporate managers as one element of human resource management and corporate 
wealth seeking activity. She suggests that rethinking the “local” in the context of 
global conditions raises new challenges for understanding notions of “scale” and that 
law’s network of jurisdictional boundaries limits our ability to use common law as a 
tool to analyze global versus local tensions. C.J. Greenhouse, “Figuring the Future: 
Issues of Time, Power and Agency in Ethnographic Problems of Scale” in B.C. Garth 
& A. Sarat, eds., Justice and Power in Sociological Studies, (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1998) at 108. 
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occur in the insolvency law context as the Supreme Court of Canada has 
granted leave on a case in which it will consider director and officer 
fiduciary obligation under corporations statutes when the corporation is 
financially distressed.26 Under residual rights theory, at the point of 
insolvency, creditors, including employees, government claimants in 
respect of environmental remediation and tort claimants are the residual 
claimants to the firm’s assets and hence there is likely a duty to consider 
their interests, or not to prejudice their interests, in acting in the best 
interests of the corporation.27 Arguably, such an interpretation of best 
interests of corporation should occur much earlier in the corporation’s 
financial life cycle. While the stakeholder conception of the corporation 
would formally recognize all those with an investment or interest in the 
corporation, it leaves unresolved the larger issue of whether or not 
corporations should be allowed to determine social and economic policy 
through their activities. 
iii. The Corporation as Public Entity 
The third broad approach is that corporations are public creatures, 
even where privately held, and that they should be required by legislation 
to act in a socially responsible manner, with that standard to be set by 
reference to domestic or international human rights and other treaties and 
norms. There is little support for this conception of the corporation in 
Canada, but it forms some of the normative basis for conceptions of the 
corporation in Japan and some continental European and Pan-Pacific 
countries. Even within these jurisdictions, there is convergence pressure 
by Anglo-American capital for adoption of a shareholder-centric corporate 
model as a condition of further investment.28 
                   
26  Peoples Department Stores Inc. (trustee of) v. Wise, [2003] Q.J. No. 505 (C.A.), 
online: QL (QJ), overturning Peoples Department Stores Inc. v. Wise, [1998] Q.J. No. 
3541 (Sup. Ct.), online: QL (QJ), application for leave to appeal granted without 
reasons [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 133, online: QL (SCCA). 
27  For a discussion, see J. Sarra, “Wise People, Fiduciary Obligation and Reviewable 
Transactions; Directors’ Duties to Creditors” in Annual Review of Insolvency Law 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2004) 67.  
28  J. Gordon, “Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps on the Road to 
Shareholder Capitalism in Germany” (1999) 5 Columbia J. Eur. L. 219; Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 4; J. Coffee, “The Future as History: The Prospects for Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications” (1999) 93 Northwestern 
University Law Review 641 at 650.  
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The recent efforts by community coalitions to call for revocation of 
corporate charters where the MNE has engaged in environmental and 
human rights harms raises this notion of the corporation as a public 
good.29 Cohan has pointed out that in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, American corporations were chartered with the 
integral purpose of serving public interests, that the public interest purpose 
was the quid pro quo in exchange for the limited liability corporate 
status.30 He suggests that there is a growing movement that is 
rediscovering that the interests of corporations historically go beyond the 
shareholder wealth-maximization paradigm that dominates today. 
3. How Can You Tell If the Corporation Is Socially Responsible? 
With the move to global capital markets, these issues have become 
more complex, engaging a host of new challenges for thinking about 
corporate governance, and ultimately, for thinking about any role of social 
responsibility. The increased access to capital through global financial 
markets and the ease with which corporate charters can be transferred to 
new jurisdictions has allowed corporations to increase their bargaining 
power in respect of where they locate. They bargain in both the home and 
host nations for tax concessions and relaxing of environmental and labour 
standards. Their bargaining power lies in the ease with which many MNEs 
can relocate some or all of their operations to jurisdictions with low cost 
human capital, lower labour and human rights standards and few if any 
environmental protections. As noted in the introduction, the general 
understanding of international law as an inappropriate means to limit 
MNE operations means that the constraints normally imposed on 
corporate decision makers in respect of their conduct are largely absent, 
creating a serious lack of accountability for their actions internationally. 
The challenge is thus to explore the scope and limits of any social 
responsibility corporations can or should have, the link this may have to 
                   
29  T. Linzey, “Awakening a Sleeping Giant: Creating a Quasi-Private Cause of Action 
for Revoking Corporate Charters in Response to Environmental Violations” (1995) 13 
Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 219. See also CorpWatch, http://www/corpwatch.org/trac/ 
headlines/2000/313.htm.  
30  J.A. Cohan, “Environmental Rights of Indigenous Peoples under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, the Public Trust Doctrine and Corporate Ethics, and Environmental 
Dispute Resolution” (2002) 20 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Policy 133 at 169. 
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effective governance and the legal processes that should be devised to 
serve as constraints on particular MNE activity.  
Effective governance has a number of elements that are loosely linked 
to a corporation being socially responsible. For example, the prohibitions 
on officer self-dealing conduct or the need for independence and 
transparency in audit procedures benefit the shareholders, but also the 
public in terms of increasing confidence in capital markets and the spin off 
positive social benefits that such an active market may bring. In this sense, 
there is a social or public component to effective governance. 
Yet the current social responsibility debate within corporate law 
scholarship raises additional public policy issues. Specifically, the debate 
is whether corporate directors and officers have the ability to engage in 
conduct that promotes social, economic, gender and racial equality or 
whether this is somehow a breach of their fiduciary obligation to the 
corporation. Just as we as citizens are socially situated, so too is a 
corporation as a separate legal personality. This is not to suggest that the 
corporation has or should have attributes similar to personhood. However, 
it is necessary to acknowledge that with the introduction of the limited 
liability regime and notions of legal personality, the corporation derives 
considerable benefits from public policies facilitating its activities and 
limiting the scope of liability that can be placed on either its investors or 
its decision makers. Of course, one of the means by which the law 
exercises control over the social responsibility of these decision makers 
and thus, the corporation they control, is through the contours of the limits 
to limited liability. The law’s power to credibly impose personal liability 
on the decision-makers directly is one of the contours. The other is the 
indirect imposition of liability when the decision-maker unreasonably 
subjects the corporation’s assets to legal liability as a result of, for 
example, environmental damage.31  
Christopher Stone has suggested that the threat of legal liability is 
highly conscripted because of the nature of the limited liability 
corporation.32 He observes that law is primarily reactive and hence there is 
a time lag between harms caused by corporate conduct and the law’s 
                   
31  R. v. Bata Industries Ltd. (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 329 (Prov. Div.) at 362, remedy varied 
on appeal (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 354 (Gen. Div.), varied (1995), 25 O.R. (3d) 321 
(C.A.).  
32  Stone, supra note 23 at 104. 
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ability to react, often too late to remedy the harms. By encouraging 
corporate officers to rely solely on compliance with minimum legal 
standards, it creates incentives for managers to ignore a whole range of 
production and policy choices that may contribute to harms because they 
come within technical compliance of the law as it existed at the time the 
decision was made.  
With respect to measuring corporate social responsibility in environ-
mental protection, Douglas Kysar suggests that part of the dynamic of the 
move to international markets has been an underlying notion that the 
world has an unlimited supply of material inputs and an infinite natural 
capacity to absorb waste outputs.33 He suggests that sheer growth in 
economic activity will face an ecological limit, and hence, in addition to 
efficient allocation of resources and the equitable distribution of wealth, 
economists need to be concerned with the sustainable maintenance of 
scale. By incorporating scale effects into legal analysis, Kysar argues that 
one can also rethink the existing distributive rules that tend to be discoun-
ted in current macro-economic analysis, using the issue of sustainability to 
address problems of unequal distribution of wealth. 
4. Going Global 
The foregoing discussion highlights the current challenge. Corpo-
rations engage in wealth generating activity because of public laws and 
policies that act as enabling devices in this activity. Yet corporations also 
have the ability to contribute to political parties and hence to influence the 
political process regarding not only corporate law, but other laws that 
touch on their liabilities, such as labour or environmental law. Hence 
while it is argued that corporate law should not address social policy 
issues and that this is best left to legislatures and social welfare legislation, 
corporations are not prohibited from engaging in lobbying, political con-
tributions and other measures that ensure these issues are not addressed in 
public policy. Moreover, some of the current challenges to sovereign 
nations and protection of domestic human rights and environmental norms 
are the result of political lobbying and consequent domestic adoption of 
policies of free trade, deregulation and dismantling of particular social 
safety nets.  
                   
33  D. Kysar, “Sustainability, Distribution and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law” 
(2001) [unpublished, on file with author]. 
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Increasingly, globalization poses particular challenges to the ability of 
domestic governments to enforce specific normative standards, parti-
cularly where corporations headquartered in the nation state have their 
economic activity elsewhere. It is increasingly evident that domestic law is 
incapable in itself of controlling the activities of MNEs, a concern where 
exportation of particular production activities creates harms in terms of 
human rights, health and safety or environmental standards.34 It is this 
contradiction that must be exposed in order to determine the proper scope 
of corporate activity. If conceptually, the corporation is not a moral or 
social being within the construct of the separate legal personality, then 
arguably it should not have any ability to influence the election of the 
decision makers in respect of these issues and how these decisions are 
made. If on the other hand, the corporation is socially situated and should 
have a role in these normative debates, then how does one construct a 
paradigm that tempers the exercise of such powerful interests to the 
detriment of those with fewer resources, bargaining power and infor-
mation? Are domestic attempts at regulating these activities ultimately 
futile given the mobility of capital and of the MNEs themselves? What 
will be the long term impact of “regulatory chill” in terms of both the 
willingness of MNEs to situate themselves in jurisdictions with few 
environmental standards and the inability of host or home nations to 
devise laws that protect their citizens from the harmful effects of 
unregulated environmentally harmful activity?35 Moreover, how can one 
make adequate policy determinations in the absence of comprehensive 
                   
34  A.C. Cutler, “Private Authority and International Affairs” in C. Cutler et al., eds., 
Private Authority and International Affairs (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1999); S. Sassen, “The Spatial Organization of Information Industries: 
Implications for the Role of the State” in J.H. Mittelman, ed., Globalization: Critical 
Reflections (1996); R.B. Davis, “Investor Control of Multi-national Enterprises: A 
Market for Corporate Governance Based on Justice and Fairness?” in J. Sarra, ed., 
Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2003); C. Taylor, “A Modest Proposal: Statehood and Sovereignty in 
a Global Age” (1997) 18 Penn. J. Int’l Econ. Law 745; A. Aman Jr., “Proposals for 
Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Globalization, Democracy and the 
Furtherance of a Global Public Interest” (1999) 6 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 397. 
Moreover, the ability of domestic jurisdictions to tax corporations to in turn provide 
social services to ameliorate the harms is limited by the multinational nature of the 
corporate activity. 
35  The WTO has suggested that regulatory chill hinders the competition for capital 
globally, where some nations attempt to enact stronger domestic environmental 
protection policies. World Trade Organization, Trade and Environment (1999). 
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data that documents the impact of deregulated production activity 
globally? 
C. How Do Those MNEs Do It Internationally  
The issues are complex and at first glance appear daunting. MNEs 
have been implicated in nations that engage in repressive human right 
policies or police repression in order to engage in productive activity.36 
The historical atrocities in South Africa were one of the most glaring 
examples of this, but only one of many. MNEs have engaged in alleged 
human rights violations, activities harmful to the environment, child 
labour, anti-unionization activity, slavery and dangerous health and safety 
conditions.37 While there may be normative disagreements about the scope 
of any of these activities that should be countenanced, it is fair to suggest 
that in the absence of a mechanism that allows for democratic 
development of public policy, there may be a role for home nations in 
ensuring that MNEs do not export the worst of environmental and labour 
practice where the host nation is incapable of setting its own policy.  
At the same time, one has to confront the issue of arrogance of 
developed nations reflected in their wish to import wholesale their 
normative conceptions of human rights or environmental sustainability. 
While these debates vigorously occur among the international NGO 
communities and among nation states, corporations continue to engage in 
global activity, relatively unchecked and unscathed by these debates. 
Hence the question is whether there ought to be internally generated 
norms that could potentially complement the public policy debates of 
international comparative law scholars. 
These issues become even more pressing as corporations move 
outward into other capital and production markets. It is estimated that 
                   
36  B. Freeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, “Human Rights and 
Labour” (Speech to the Third Warwick Corporate Citizenship Conference, June 10, 
2000),http://www.state.gov.www.policy_remarks/2000/00710_freeman_warwicku.ht
ml. See also Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 226 F.3d. 88 (2nd Cir. 2000), that 
dealt with allegations that Shell Nigeria utilized police and military to quash 
opposition to its development activity; and Doe v. UNOCAL Corp. 248 F.3d 915 
regarding alleged use of force to coerce residents to construct an oil pipeline. 
37  Ibid. 
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there are currently over 50,000 multinational enterprises.38 A company 
like Unilever-Best has annual production and sales that exceed the GDP of 
50 sovereign nations.39 While foreign direct investment is heavily skewed 
towards developed countries, international capital is moving into 
developing and transitional countries at a rapid pace, often replacing more 
official development sources of capital into developing countries that 
carry with it minimum standards regarding labour or environmental 
protection.40 Unlike developed countries, where there exists a framework 
for tempering the unchecked activities of corporations through employ-
ment standards, human rights and environmental law, many developing 
and transitional countries do not have the infrastructure to develop or 
enforce laws to address the multinational enterprise. Moreover, initiatives 
such as the OECD corporate governance guidelines are aimed primarily at 
creating legal and enforcement structures in these nations for equity 
capital investors.41 Corporate codes of conduct are aimed at ensuring 
transparency of governance and financial reporting, and securities and 
credit enforcement regimes offer effective remedies for investors.42 While 
these are essential to fostering investor confidence and thus healthy capital 
markets, they ignore the need for a host of other public policy measures 
that are needed to provide the appropriate balance in wealth creation and 
protection of those with interests in the corporation. That interest might be 
a direct one, in terms of investments made in labour or local infrastructure, 
or it may be an interest in the environmental and social impact of 
corporate activities on the local community and the environment. The 
OECD corporate governance guidelines advocate respecting domestic law 
                   
38  R.B. Davis, supra note 34; G. Yaron, “Canadian Institutional Shareholder Activism in 
an Era of Global Deregulation” in Sarra, ed., supra note 34, 111; L. Mabry, 
“Multinational Corporations and US Technology Policy: Rethinking the Concept of 
Corporate Nationality” (1999) 87 Geo. L.J. 563; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 
(New York, 1995). 
39  D.M. Branson, “The Very Uncertain Prospect of ‘Global’ Convergence in Corporate 
Governance” (2001) 34 Cornell International Law Journal 321. 
40  C. Williams, “Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization” 
(2002) U.C. Davis Law Review 705.  
41  OECD Principles for Corporate Governance, http://www.oecd.ca.  
42  The convergence pressure in respect of these property protections is facilitated by the 
importation of US experts in the design of systems and considerable pressure to have 
transition and developing nations adopt Anglo-American norms and legal structures 
without consideration of the other types of remedial protections that exist as a 
counterbalance in Anglo-American jurisdictions. 
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commitments to other stakeholder interests, but are silent on these issues 
where the domestic jurisdiction does not already have a developed notion 
of the corporation as socially situated. The growth of MNE activity across 
multiple jurisdictions and international trade law that facilitates free trade 
and limits use of principles such as the national treatment principle has 
diminished the domestic regulatory capability of the nation-state, raising 
troubling social and distributional issues.43 The following part examines 
the specifics of the regulatory diminution. 
1. Home, Host and the Four Problems of MNE Accountability 
MNEs are organizations which, while created in one state, operate in 
several states through subsidiary corporate entities created in each country 
of operation, through contractual links in supply and delivery chains, 
and/or through licensing and franchise agreements. As private entities, 
MNEs are subject to the national law of the states in which they operate, 
and may also have been granted certain rights under treaties between 
states, rights that can be enforced in the courts of the applicable state. 
Certain treaties also provide for protection of investor rights against state 
action through binding international arbitration. Arbitration provides a 
dispute resolution mechanism for claims against the state by investors 
claiming the state regulatory or legislative actions harmed their 
investments. Thus a forum exists for private actors to hold public state 
actors accountable for decisions that harm equity investments. In contrast, 
however, there is no international forum in which these enterprises can be 
held accountable for their actions in breach of fundamental international 
law and conventions concerning human rights, the environment and 
                   
43  K. Van Wezel Stone, “Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to 
Transnational Labor Regulation” (1995) 16 Mich. J. Int’l L 987. See also Workers in 
the Global Economy Project, “Report on Labor Rights—Women’s Rights Advocacy 
Dialogue: Women’s Rights and Labor Rights in Global Trade”, September 1999; D. 
Weinberg, “Current Population Reports, A Brief Look at Post-War US Income 
Inequality”; “The State of Working America, 1998-99”, http://epinet.org/books/ 
swa.html; J. Burbank & R. Scott, “What the WTO means for Working Families”, 
Seattle Times (December 2, 1999); F. Jameson, “Notes on Globalization as a 
Philosophical Issue” in F. Jameson & M. Miyoshi, The Cultures of Globalization 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); F.L. Ansley, “Rethinking Law in 
Globalizing Labor Markets” (1998) 1 U. Penn. J. Emp. & Labor Law 2; F. Moccio, 
“On the Impact of Independent Contracting and Misclassification of Employees on 
New York State’s Working Women and Families” (2000) Fineman Workshop, 
[unpublished, on file with the Feminist Legal Theory Project at Cornell Law School]. 
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social/political rights. International law assigns this function to the courts 
of the various states, exercising their national jurisdiction over activities of 
the corporations that originate in or affect their territory. 
Problems arise because of a number of factors, including the chal-
lenges posed by unlimited subsidiaries, reluctant host nations and the use 
of prudential doctrines such as forum non conveniens to fail to take 
jurisdiction for corporate harms internationally. 
2. Unlimited Subsidiaries 
There are two issues that arise when subsidiaries are involved. The 
first is that a subsidiary is provided with its own “legal personality”. Thus 
if a subsidiary is created to mine asbestos in South Africa, then that is the 
legal entity to which liability will attach in the first instance. If asbestos 
mining causes harm, then nothing automatically attaches liability on to the 
parent corporation for the acts of the subsidiary, irrespective of the 
ownership structure. Given this situation, the incentive on the parent is to 
leave as few assets in the subsidiary as possible. This leaves the miners 
with the unenviable task of establishing direct liability through a claim the 
parent failed to properly supervise the subsidiary or vicarious liability for 
the acts of one’s subsidiary.44 Thus, parent corporations may be 
encouraged to transfer all of the subsidiaries’ surplus assets to themselves 
in order to limit the loss to the MNE overall. If they are successful in 
doing so, they will have lessened constraints on decisions to breach 
international norms. 
Second, the use of unlimited subsidiaries as the vehicle for corporate 
activities internationally means that directors and officers of controlling 
parent corporations are not directly liable for the actions of the subsidiary 
even where they are the controlling mind of the subsidiary. The 
construction of domestic liability regimes, judicial reluctance to draw 
aside the corporate veil and the practice of shifting corporate assets from 
the subsidiary to the parent to shield the assets from remedial claims in the 
host nation, create considerable barriers to MNE accountability for 
international activities. 
                   
44  Lubbe v. Cape, [2000] 4 All E.R. 268 (H.L.) at 271. 
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3. The Reluctant Host 
There is frequently reluctance of home and/or host governments to 
take action against MNEs because of their importance to the country’s 
economy or their complicity as investors in or beneficiaries of the 
company’s activities.45 Hence while a separate legal entity has been 
formed for purposes of economic activity in the host nation, the host 
nation may be reluctant to enact standards that may protect its citizens 
during the subsidiary’s value generating activity in the host nation. Those 
who may be harmed by its activities frequently do not have access to 
standards within their own nation or an enforcement mechanism in order 
to redress or prevent harms. 
4. Who, Me? 
Even where remedial laws are in place in the host nation, there is an 
inability of the host country to impose the full sanctions of its law on the 
responsible parties because the corporate structure insulates the controlling 
corporation (domiciled in the home country) from adverse consequences 
of regulatory action in the host country.  
The home country may be unable to impose the full sanctions of its 
laws on the corporation controlling the MNE for harms arising in the host 
country because the MNE’s corporate structure creates a separate 
corporation in the host country. That corporation is not ordinarily subject 
to the jurisdiction of the home country’s courts for its actions in the host 
country. In some instances, there is the likelihood that the home country 
court, even where it finds it has the legal jurisdiction to hear a case against 
the MNE for the actions of its subsidiaries in another country, will 
exercise its discretion not to hear the case on the grounds of one or more 
of the prudential doctrines, such as forum non conveniens, state action, 
comity or public policy.  
Finally, there is the difficulty of the lack of a forum capable of 
exercising jurisdiction over the MNEs on the basis of universality 
jurisdiction, other than under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) in the 
United States federal courts.46 The Alien Tort Claims Act grants federal 
                   
45  Branson, supra note 39. 
46  28 U.S.C.S. s. 1350 (1994). There is also the Torture Victim Protection Act, H.R. 
Rep. No. 367 (1992), establishing a cause of action for torture. This statute is not 
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jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”. It is largely 
a jurisdiction granting procedural statute, providing a federal forum in 
which foreign complainants can bring a tort action against a US based 
MNE for torts arising from violations of customary international law.47  
However, in considering a claim under the Alien Tort Claims Act in 
the federal courts of the United States of America, plaintiffs would once 
again face the problems of subject-matter jurisdiction and forum non 
conveniens, with the additional problem of establishing personal juris-
diction over a foreign corporation in the US.48 Subject matter jurisdiction 
has been taken under ATCA with respect to the actions of corporations 
“only for the most egregious violations of civil and political rights and for 
violations of international humanitarian law”.49 Thus while the ATCA 
specifies that US courts will take jurisdiction over alien tort claims arising 
from a violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States, the 
courts have held that the “law of nations” is a vague concept and that it 
 
discussed here, however, to date, this has not proven an effective vehicle for 
redressing the claims of torture victims. 
47  A. Rosencranz & R. Campbell, “Foreign Environmental and Human Rights Suits 
against US Corporations in US Courts” (1999) 18 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 145.  
48  If a Canadian corporation has no contacts in the United States, or those contacts are 
conducted through subsidiaries, there may not be sufficient presence to establish 
jurisdiction—Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter 
Unocal] although in another case, establishing an investor relations office in New 
York was sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction—Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Wiwa), cert. denied, 69 
U.S.L.W. 3628 (US Mar. 26, 2001) (No. 00-1168). J. Cohan, supra note 30, who 
argues for a collaborative community focused process between governmental, 
indigenous and corporate entities to try to find a common ground of information and 
mutual interest in the protection of human and environmental rights. H. Osofsky, 
“Environmental Human Rights under the Alien Tort Statute: Redress for Indigenous 
Victims of Multinational Corporations (1997) 20 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 
335 who argues that claims that environmental human rights are part of the law of 
nations under the ATCA are very strong in the context of indigenous peoples. He 
argues that these norms are at least as strong as torture and that while human rights 
norms will evolve over time, claims of extreme harm to indigenous peoples should be 
recognized and pursued now; ibid. at 382, 395. 
49  The Editors, “Developments in the Law—International Criminal Law: Part V 
Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law” (2001) 114 
Harvard Law Review 2025 at 2037. Cohan, ibid. observes that most cases granting 
jurisdiction are for violation of jus cogens norms, such as rape, torture, genocide and 
slave trading. 
362  THE NEW RULE OF LAW  /  LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
 
may include international norms of such fundamental importance, such as 
the right not to be tortured or to be subjected to slavery or cruel and 
inhuman punishment.50 To date, there has been no remedy awarded 
against a US based MNE under the ATCA. Generally, the courts have 
refused to recognize environmental harms as a tort within the meaning of 
the statute, frequently dismissing such claims for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction absent jus cogens abuses.51  
John Christopher Anderson has documented how complicity between 
an MNE and a host nation creates harms.52 He analyses the activities of 
US based Unocal, which entered into a joint venture gas drilling project in 
Burma (Myanmar) with SLORC, the ruling military body, and highlights 
ongoing alleged human rights abuses, forced labour, rape and acts of 
torture.53 In contrast to other MNEs that have exited the country because 
of the repressive regime, Unocal has argued that it is staying to ameliorate 
the human rights violations.54 Yet Anderson documents the scope and 
extent of human rights abuses being condoned by Unocal. A class action 
lawsuit by citizens of Burma against Unocal and two executives has been 
sanctioned to proceed under the US Alien Tort Claims Act, on the basis 
that Unocal has been complicit in human rights violations, including 
alleged violence, torture, rape and forced relocation in connection with the 
                   
50  Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995). Breed suggests that the Kadic 
judgment eliminated the state action requirement in certain cases when it found that 
the ATCA could be used against private individuals in certain circumstances of 
egregious harms: L.M. Breed, “Regulating Our 21st Century Ambassadors: A new 
Approach to Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations Abroad” (2002) 42 Va. 
J. Int’l L. 1005 at 1016. He calls for a model in the United States that would allow the 
federal Department of Justice to bring actions against US corporations for 
international human rights abuses, similar to prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practice Act which allows it to bring actions against corporations utilizing bribery to 
influence foreign officials; Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 
Stat. 1494 (1977), as am. by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 15 
U.S.C. 78. 
51  Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 47 at 155.  
52  J.C. Anderson, “Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out” 
(2000) 2 U. Pa. J. of Labor & Emp. Law 463 at 474-490. 
53  State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), established when the military in 
Burma seized control in 1988 and changed its name to Myanmar. Anderson 
documents a series of repressive acts engaged in by the SLORC: ibid. at 463-465, 
474-496. 
54  Unocal, “Our Position”, http://www.unocal.com/responsibility/humanrights/hr1.htm 
(last accessed July 2003). 
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pipeline project.55 While the US government has now banned business 
operations in Burma, the ban applies only to new business and not existing 
business, thus excluding Unocal.56 Anderson observes that to date, no US 
corporation has ever been held liable under the ATCA for benefiting from 
human rights abuses.  
However, one case is currently pending that raises the possibility that 
environmental claims constitute a tort recognized under international law. 
This is a class action on behalf of 30,000 Indigenous people and farmers in 
the Ecuadorian Amazon Basin and 25,000 downstream residents of Peru 
for personal and environmental damages from Texaco for alleged toxic 
discharges that caused air, soil and water harms and considerable human 
health harms. It is the first case in which a US court granted jurisdiction to 
foreign indigenous peoples seeking damages for environmental tort 
claims.57 
In Canada and other jurisdictions, there is no legislation similar to the 
ATCA and hence such a policy instrument, as limited as it is, does not exist 
to provide extra-territorial jurisdiction to hold MNEs accountable for their 
foreign harms.58 The “Who, me” problem thus poses several critical 
challenges. The first is that there are no legal mechanisms in Canada that 
would allow Canadian citizens to challenge the harmful activities of our 
domestically registered MNEs internationally. Where there are no legal 
processes in the host nation for seeking either remedial or preventive 
remedies for corporate harms, those harmed are left without remedies and 
without any legal vehicle to seek to alter the corporation’s conduct. Sheer 
                   
55  Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
56  Anderson, supra note 52 at 469. 
57  Aguida v. Texaco, Inc. 142 F.Supp.2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  
58  Canada recently enacted the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 
2000, c. 24, aimed at implementing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court in respect of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, that grants 
extra-territorial jurisdiction to Canadian courts to hear and decide cases. This statute 
does not address the corporate conduct described in this paper. This act may be 
applicable to the most egregious harms. Crimes against humanity are defined in s. 7 
as acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any 
civilian population, including murder, enslavement, forcible transfer of population, 
torture, rape, persecution against any identifiable group on grounds of race, culture, 
gender or nationality, apartheid… Hence it covers some of the same acts as the ATCA. 
However, there have been no published cases to date under this legislation and hence 
its scope vis-a-vis corporations is unknown. 
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distance from the jurisdiction can give rise to a particular apathy or 
unwillingness among the citizens of the home nation to investigate or be 
concerned about child labour or dangerous working conditions in the host 
nation. The “Who, me” problem extends beyond the issue of exercise of 
consumer preference in dealing with products of the impugned 
corporation, it goes to the heart of the scope and limits of democratic 
processes and the willingness of domestic citizens to engage their 
legislators in pressure to implement legal mechanisms to govern the 
harmful activities of MNEs abroad.  
5. Racing to the Bottom of the Market 
The absence of easily accessible methods of enforcing international 
law norms has seen some evidence that MNEs are exploiting the release of 
social responsibility constraints to the maximum. Recently, there have 
been a number of instances where individuals and groups are collaborating 
internationally to exert some pressure on corporations in terms of their 
accountability to larger groups in society. For example, in the manufac-
turing sector, the export of production and assembly work has carried with 
it issues regarding payment of living wages and working conditions that 
are hazardous to the health and safety of the workers. While the standards 
in respect of these concerns are relatively rigorous in developed countries, 
within a range of norms that protect basic health and safety, minimum 
wages and prohibitions against racial, gender and other discrimination, 
these standards either do not exist or are not enforced in many host 
nations. There are serious consequences both for the workers in the host 
nations, in terms of their long term health and well being, and for workers 
in developed countries where labour shedding has led to a downward 
spiral of economic and social harms.  
The beneficiaries of these trends are the MNEs. The liberalization of 
labour markets has meant that in the home state, the MNE can exert 
considerate economic pressure to dismantle standards and make the home 
nation “more competitive” in a market in which the MNE has generated 
the competition. Failure to accede to these demands results in plant and 
industry closures and exportation of the economic activity elsewhere, 
where the host nation is so anxious for jobs and economic activity, that it 
undertakes to allow the corporation to operate relatively unfettered. This 
undermines the effective power of nations to regulate domestic labour law 
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and social policy.59 This trend is complicated enormously by free trade 
treaties and the limits of national treatment doctrines in providing some 
balance to stakeholder interests engaged in corporate value generating 
activity. 
Scholar Cynthia Williams has observed that particular features of 
globalization accentuate the problem of relying on law as an external 
constraint in addressing the relation of corporations to society, in 
particular, sovereign nations are unable to impose substantive limits on 
international economic actors.60 She suggests that where there are laws in 
place, the high mobility of capital and the lack of an international 
sovereign means that there is a diminished capacity to tax and hence to 
spend money on social welfare programs that address the distributive 
harms caused by corporate activities.61 
III. THE CHALLENGE OF MNE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
A. Where Can You Hear the Voice of Corporate Social 
Responsibility? 
There are corporations in Canada and elsewhere that have adopted 
codes of corporate conduct and/or human rights codes for their operations 
in host nations, based on the domestic norms of their home jurisdiction or 
international norms. For example, Nexen Inc. helped to develop an 
International Code of Ethics for Canadian Business as a template for 
Canadian businesses to follow when conducting business domestically and 
abroad.62 The Code suggests that business should take a leadership role 
through establishment of ethical business practices; and that while national 
governments have the prerogative to conduct their own affairs in 
accordance with their sovereign rights, all governments should comply 
                   
59  UN ESCOR Division for Social Policy and Development, Report on the World Social 
Situation, 1999, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss97c0.htm.  
60  Williams, supra note 40 at 724. In this, she is addressing both MNEs and capital 
market participants. 
61  Ibid. 
62  Nexen Inc., http://www.nexeninc.com/Our_Commitment/Corporate_Governance (last 
accessed October 2003). 
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with international treaties and other agreements that they have committed 
to, including the areas of human rights and social justice. Its code also 
suggests that its business activities internationally should be consistent 
with its practices in Canada. The Code specifies that it values human 
rights and social justice; wealth maximization for all stakeholders; ope-
ration of a free market economy; public accountability by governments; a 
business environment that militates against bribery and corruption; 
equality of opportunity; protection of environmental quality and sound 
environmental stewardship; community benefits; good relationships with 
all stakeholders; and stability and continuous improvement within its 
operating environment. The Code further specifies that the corporation 
will engage in meaningful and transparent consultation with all stake-
holders and attempt to integrate corporate activities with local 
communities as good corporate citizens; ensure activities are consistent 
with sound environmental management and conservation practices; 
provide meaningful opportunities for technology cooperation, training and 
capacity building within the host nation; support and respect the protection 
of international human rights within the corporation’s sphere of influence; 
ensure the health and safety of workers is protected; strive for social 
justice and respect freedom of association and expression in the 
workplace; and ensure consistency with other universally accepted labour 
standards related to exploitation of child labour, forced labour and non-
discrimination in employment.63 
Clearly, the establishment of such codes of conduct by some MNEs is 
an important effort at corporate social responsibility by some domestically 
registered corporations, tied to standards that are set by democratic 
processes in the home nation. Their value may be in creating a climate in 
which corporate social responsibility is given voice. However, such codes 
continue to be voluntary and unenforceable, although they may give rise to 
reasonable expectations of investors concerning the conduct of the 
corporation that may provide grounds for an oppression application or 
other action for failure to implement the code in the home state. There is 
generally neither a requirement of mandatory disclosure concerning 
whether or not the codes are being complied with nor any internal or 
external monitoring of compliance. One question is whether or not inves-
tor markets or consumer markets will recognize and encourage such 
initiatives. 
                   
63  Ibid. 
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While these codes are voluntarily generated, many of them commit 
corporations to adhering to international standards developed by interna-
tional organizations. For example, signatories to the Global Compact are 
committed to complying with the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, which calls for the abolition of child 
labour, the elimination of employment discrimination and the recognition 
of the right to collectively bargain working conditions.64 The ILO itself 
plans an ambitious progress assessment and annual monitoring strategy, 
although the potential success of this as a strategy to create normative 
pressure on MNEs is not yet known, since the Declaration has only 
recently come into force.65 Adoption by corporations of these principles 
may also create some normative pressure on them to comply with these 
principles. As will be discussed below, perhaps it is these codes that 
MNEs should be required to comply with in the preliminary stages of 
trying to enforce international standards for MNEs. 
Concerns have been raised about voluntary codes of conduct and 
whether they are window dressing designed to appeal to consumer or 
investor preferences or to give the impression of social responsibility 
without any real commitment. Such charges have been aimed at corpo-
rations such as sportswear manufacturer Nike, in its hiring of a former 
United Nations ambassador to investigate its international operations and 
assess whether operations comply with the corporation’s internal code of 
conduct.66 This initiative was both lauded as socially responsible beha-
viour and criticized as a marketing technique. While there was disclosure 
of findings from this investigation, another report by an external auditor 
that indicated that the code was not being enforced in Nike’s international 
operations was not disclosed until it was leaked to the media.67  
                   
64  International Labour Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards (last accessed October 
2003). 
65  Ibid. 
66  Levi Strauss & Co., Social Responsibility, Sourcing Guidelines (2001), 
http://www.levistrauss.com/responsibility/conduct (last accessed October 2003).  
67  S. Greenhouse, “Nike Shoe Plant in Vietnam is Called Unsafe for Workers” The New 
York Times (November 8, 1997) A1, reported that Ernst & Young Inc. had found 
unsafe conditions and illegal wages rates in Nike’s Vietnamese shoe factory. Nike 
had failed to comply with its own code.  
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Hence, while there are some voluntary initiatives aimed at the social 
responsibility of MNEs, there is a continuing problem of disclosure and of 
enforceability that must be addressed even where one hears the voice of 
corporate social responsibility. Monitoring of compliance with voluntary 
codes is also a challenge, both internally for the MNE in respect of its 
subsidiary operations and externally in terms of access to information for 
investors, consumers and other interested parties. Unless such standards 
are enforceable, corporations can opt in or out of their own voluntary 
standards without any consequences, creating incentives to do so 
whenever it is convenient.  
Another issue is what corporations have called the political and 
cultural sensitivities of the host nation. An example would be nations 
where women or particular racial groups are not given access to employ-
ment, or if they are, their compensation reflects highly discriminatory 
practices. Respecting the cultural norms of the host jurisdiction in such a 
case runs contrary to international human rights and is offensive to 
Canadian law regarding equality rights. The MNE’s continued investment 
in the host nation that supports inequitable employment practices results in 
further dollars being invested to perpetuate gender and race discrimi-
nation. While it is important not to impose Western norms on other 
nations, it is appropriate to hold those nations to international norms set 
through democratic international efforts. The socio-cultural differences 
cannot be used, as they are now, to justify discriminatory and repressive 
labour practices and unaccountable environmental harms. 
B.  How Can the Voice Be Heard? 
If markets punish the MNE, then actions that trigger that punishment 
will become breaches of fiduciary duty. The problem is that reliable 
information about MNE activity is not available. As has been pointed out 
with respect to the attempts to control MNEs through the consumer 
market, meaningful standards of behaviour and reliable information about 
the compliance of the MNE with those standards in all aspects of its 
operations are extremely scarce.68 This makes it harder for markets to 
                   
68 N. Roht-Arriaza, “Private Voluntary Standard-Setting, the International Organization 
of Standardization and International Environmental Lawmaking” (1995) 6 Yearbook 
of International Environmental Law 10 at 152-153, points out that the ISO 14000 
standard requires neither public information on performance nor adherence to any 
particular standard, merely the implementation of certain management systems. 
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function efficiently. In addition, some of the lessons from the financial 
markets would indicate the need for international standards and credible, 
consistent reporting on compliance in order for a corporate governance 
market to work. As Stéphane Rousseau has pointed out, a regime of 
voluntary disclosure of corporate governance information makes it 
difficult to distinguish between accurate reporting and window dressing, 
and this may lead to an adverse selection problem.69 That is, if the 
information that the investors have about the quality of corporate 
governance does not enable them to distinguish the corporations with good 
corporate governance from those with problematic governance, this 
difference will not be reflected in their prices.70  
Corporate law tries to mitigate the problems for financial markets 
caused by asymmetric information by mandating regular disclosure of 
relevant financial information and regulating insider trading. However, in 
the area of corporate governance, and especially with respect to 
compliance with international norms of human rights, environmental, 
political and social rights, there is no highly developed regulatory scheme 
of disclosure and verification to mitigate the inability of investors to judge 
corporate quality. 
C. Designing Incentives to Be Responsible Through Remedies 
One possible initiative is to require corporate reporting of a range of 
corporate activities that now need to be reported only where they affect the 
financial statement of the corporation. By enhancing the definition of 
materiality, corporations could be required to disclose transactions interna-
tionally and domestically that create particular social and environmental 
harms. While these may not affect the short term financial reporting of the 
MNE, they do have long term potential downside risks that investors and 
the public generally should be able to assess. While expression of investor 
preference is not an adequate mechanism in itself to temper the conduct of 
 
M. Shaughnessy, “The United Nations Global Compact and the Continuing Debate 
About the Effectiveness of Corporate Voluntary Codes of Conduct” (2000) Col. J. 
Int’l Environmental Law & Policy 159 has reported the problem of voluntary codes 
lacking a legal mechanism through which to enforce compliance.  
69  S. Rousseau, “Canadian Corporate Governance Reform: In Search of a Role for 
Public Regulation” in Sarra, ed., supra note 34 at 3. 
70  G.A. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism” (1970) 84 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 488 at 490-491. 
370  THE NEW RULE OF LAW  /  LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
 
MNEs internationally, it could provide one tool in beginning to influence 
these corporate activities. 
Scholar Faith Kahn has reflected on silence and power in corporate 
and securities law, analyzing the legislature, courts and the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the development of corporate philan-
thropy.71 She observes that while the law and economics movement 
highlighted the private law contractual aspect of corporate law and its 
normative notions of efficiency, modern philanthropy law deals with how 
the corporation as a social institution engages with the culture and 
community that surrounds it, performing a distributive role. While corpo-
rate law has accommodated the notion of the socially active corporation, 
securities and corporate law fail to provide investors with the right to have 
disclosure about the social activities, positive and negative, of corporate 
activity, including corporate charitable and political contributions, and 
many employment and environmental practices. Kahn observes that 
limited social disclosure has signalled to investors that they are free to 
disregard the social effects of corporate practices. 
Hence, the lack of disclosure creates problems for a consumer market 
for socially responsible behaviour, both in making investment determi-
nations and in creating incentives to consider these issues as an investment 
or consumer criteria. Douglas Kysar has suggested that with very few 
exceptions, consumer product manufacturers are only ever legally required 
to disclose health and safety risks or other material attributes that inhere in 
the end product itself and that therefore threaten to harm or mislead the 
purchaser directly.72 He observes that increasingly, consumers are deman-
ding specific information about the manner in which goods are produced, 
such as whether they were developed using sweatshop labor, animal 
cruelty, unsustainable harvesting practices, genetically engineered ingre-
dients, or other processes about which consumers express strong views 
and strong preferences.  
                   
71  F. Stevelman Kahn, “Legislatures, Courts and the SEC: Reflections on Silence and 
Power in Corporate and Securities Law” (1997) 41 New York School Law Review 3.  
72  D.A. Kysar, “Preferences for Processes: The Process-Product Distinction and the 
Regulation of Consumer Choice” [unpublished, draft paper on file with author], cited 
with permission. 
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However, Kysar notes that the impetus to regulate access to such 
information is taking the form of a conceptual distinction between pro-
cesses and products in which the former are not considered a legitimate 
basis for distinction by either consumers or regulators, at least so long as 
such processes do not manifest themselves significantly in any physical 
characteristics of the actual end products.73 Kysar notes that the common 
justification for these efforts to manage the consumer’s information 
environment is a belief that lay individuals lack sufficient knowledge or 
cognitive capacity to evaluate the scientific, economic, or political signifi-
cance of process information. He suggests that the growing impulse of 
policy-makers has been to restrict the decisional matrix of consumers to 
information concerning products only, both because such information is 
thought to bear more directly than process information on the risk and 
utility to be expected from the end product.74 Joseph Spoerl has observed 
that preferences are not exogenous, derived from the nature of the 
individual. Rather, markets and individuals are co-dependent and prefe-
rences shape markets but these markets shape preferences. Hence 
corporate managers are shaping consumer preferences in the way in which 
they promote particular product choices and shape disclosure.75 Another 
consideration is whether we wish to continue to have a system in which 
equity investor preferences or consumer preferences determine socially 
responsible behaviour. Kellye Testy has observed that there is a risk of 
                   
73  Kysar suggests that the process-product distinction has appeared most prominently in 
international trade negotiations, as member nations of the World Trade Organization 
have struggled to determine the extent to which foreign imports may be conditioned 
on compliance with domestic regulatory standards for processes and production 
methods, including rules regarding the voluntary or mandatory disclosure of process 
information by product manufacturers. Part of the issue is whether there is sufficient 
state interest to force or otherwise strictly regulate disclosure of information by 
manufacturers concerning production processes. Ibid. See also J.C. Anderson, 
“Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out” (2000) 2 U. Pa. J. 
Lab. & Emp. Law 463; C. Stone, supra note 23 who observes that consumer 
preferences as able to influence corporate social responsibility assumes that 
consumers know of the harms created by particular corporate practices, that they 
know where to apply pressure and are capable of applying pressure and that any 
pressure is translated into warranted changes in the corporation’s behaviour. These 
assumptions are contestable. 
74  Ibid. He then considers arguments for and against the use of product labels and other 
means of down-streaming information regarding production processes to aid 
consumer decision-making. 
75  J. Spoerl, “The Social Responsibility of Business” (1997) 42 Am. J. Juris. 277 at 295-
297; Ostas, supra note 10. 
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commodification of corporate social responsibility in pursuit of 
shareholder wealth, with these commodity preferences easily retracted if 
consumer preferences change.76 Thus, mandating expanded reporting 
requirements alone may be insufficient to ensure greater corporate social 
responsibility since the preferences of consumers or investors for greater 
social responsibility will still govern the outcome, rather than the public 
policy in favour of compliance with international law norms of human 
rights, environmental protection and respect for social and political rights. 
D. Tempering the Conduct of MNEs 
Arguably, the challenge of MNE activity and socially responsible 
behaviour globally, while daunting, is not insurmountable. There may be a 
role for stakeholders, for collaborative initiatives that foster broader 
consensus on the meaning of corporate socially responsible behaviour, and 
a role for administrative justice in home nations taking responsibility for 
the global activities of their MNEs. I give three examples as illustration: 
1. Stakeholder Initiatives 
Recently, there have been a number of instances where individuals and 
groups are collaborating internationally to exert some pressure on 
corporations in terms of their accountability to larger groups in society. An 
example is the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, comprised of 
religious groups, labour unions, environmental and human rights groups 
committed to promoting socially responsible corporate practices in labour 
and human rights along the Mexican—US border.77 
Legal scholar Claire Dickerson has suggested that the behaviour of 
multinational corporations indicates a growing willingness to recognize 
the rights of stakeholders other than shareholders.78 She tracks this as a 
shift from the West-North focus on the norms of the individual to an East-
South focus necessitated by globalization, with a growing emphasis on 
                   
76  K.Y. Testy, “Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social 
Movements” (2002) 76 Tulane Law Review 1227. 
77  J. Perez-Lopez, “Promoting International Respect for Workers’ Rights Through 
Business Codes of Conduct” (1993) 17 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1. 
78  C. Dickerson, “Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate Social 
Responsibility” (2002) 76 Tulane Law Review 1431. 
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collective human rights. Dickerson uses the example of world wide 
negative publicity in 2001 aimed at the pharmaceutical companies when 
they resisted lowering the sale price of anti-HIV/AIDS drugs to ameliorate 
the pandemic that has taken over 16 million lives and infected an 
additional 33 million people in South Africa. Consumer groups, the United 
Nations and other organizations mounted sufficient pressure that the 
pharmaceutical countries agreed to lower their prices and to withdraw 
their suit regarding the South African law permitting manufacture of 
generic drugs.79 In turn, Dickerson suggests that corporate behaviour casts 
its own social influence on society at large; thus when the behaviour 
conforms to international human rights norms, it reinforces those norms 
with all members of the community, including developed-country 
consumers. Dickerson observes that the emergence of norms in this 
unstructured, more broadly based process is being bolstered by the more 
formal codification process. 
Broadly based movements such as the World Social Forum may also 
ultimately have an impact on corporate conduct.80 Its focus is not on 
building global consensus or engaging in concerted efforts to enforce 
international norms through existing legal institutions. Rather it is aimed 
at creation of an international forum to allow discussion among broad 
groups of social, political and NGO actors; its strategy is one of 
information dissemination and policy debate, encouraging a climate for 
support of more individualized domestic and international enforcement 
strategies.  
There is a valid critique of corporate responses to collective 
stakeholder pressure. This stems from the notion that corporations have as 
their objective the generation of surplus value and that any means of 
externalizing costs to generate this value is legitimate. Only external 
constraints temper this activity, and as discussed above, the mobility of 
capital has meant that external constraints are increasingly being 
diminished. Corporations respond to specific pressure regarding their 
                   
79  Ibid. See also Joint Communiqué from Secretary-General and Seven Leading 
Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies on Access to HIV/AIDS Care and 
Treatment, SG/SM/7982, AIDS/34 (October 4, 2001), http://www.un.org/News/Press/ 
docs/2001/sgsm7982.doc.htm; B. Barber, “Global Groups Seek AIDS Drugs for Poor 
Patients: Drug Firms Back Off from Patents” Washington Times (March 19, 2001) 
A13. 
80  World Social Forum, http://www.wsf (last accessed September 2003). 
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international activities only as far as they need to. Corporations may also 
adopt codes of conduct as a means of attracting capital from socially 
responsible investment funds, without a stronger normative commitment 
to implement these practices. Finally, the issue is whether such codes are 
adopted to facilitate the entry of corporations into new markets, where the 
host nation may be looking for a commitment to particular practices. 
Dickerson offers an optimistic response to this critique by suggesting that 
the motives of multinationals in their adoption of codes of conduct are 
irrelevant to the impact that such adoption entails, because the norms 
emerge through an unstructured process akin to democracy; and that as 
corporate behaviour begins to recognize the human rights of a collective 
whose individuals are relatively powerless, these will become norms.81 
2. Collaborative Initiatives 
There is also some potential for collaboration across government, 
corporations, financial institutions and NGOs. There are recent initiatives 
that may improve the quality and comparability of information available 
about an MNE’s operations. The Coalition of Environmentally 
Responsible Economies (CERES) and the United Nations Environment 
Project (UNEP) have jointly convened an ambitious project, funded by 
UNEP, entitled the “Global Reporting Initiative” (GRI). The GRI has 
developed “Sustainability Reporting Guidelines” to be used by MNEs to 
provide information with respect to their economic, environmental and 
social performance globally. The purpose of the guidelines is summarized 
as follows: 
This will encourage the creation of markets that can then punish 
breaches. 
The GRI seeks to make sustainability reporting as routine and credible 
as financial reporting in terms of comparability, rigour, and verifiability. 
… 
A generally accepted framework for sustainability reporting will 
enable corporations, governments, NGOs, investors, labour, and other 
stakeholders to gauge the progress of organizations in their 
                   
81  Dickerson, supra note 78 at 231, citing Levi Strauss & Co. code of conduct that 
purports to regulate suppliers’ labour practices. See Levi Strauss & Co., supra note 
66. 
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implementation of voluntary initiatives and toward other practices 
supportive of sustainable development. At the same time, a common 
framework will provide the basis for benchmarking and identifying the 
best practices to support internal management decisions.82 
GRI is creating a permanent organization to promote and develop the 
guidelines. The members of the permanent organization include the repor-
ting corporations themselves, UNEP, non-governmental organizations, 
and some national government agencies. Although the present Guidelines 
provide for self-reporting, the GRI is attempting to obtain consensus on an 
appropriate set of rules addressing independent “verification” or 
“assurance” concerning any reports generated using the GRI Guidelines.  
There are more than 2,000 companies currently voluntarily publishing 
environmental, social or sustainability reports.83 The GRI’s Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines are the result of a broad-based consultative process 
with multinational corporations, environmental groups, human rights, 
labour and government stakeholders. The GRI reports that it has consulted 
with more than 10,000 stakeholders in developing the Guidelines. It also 
reports that 194 corporations in the auto, utility, consumer products, 
pharmaceutical, telecommunication, energy and chemical sectors have 
adopted all or part of the guidelines. 
Intuitively, the influence is likely to be interactive. With a growing 
number of Canadian corporations becoming signatories to the Global 
Reporting Initiative, there will be some normative pressure domestically to 
import similar standards of social and environmental reporting and 
accountability. Recent changes to corporations statutes in Canada may 
have created an enhanced means for investors to express preferences in 
terms of corporations adopting governance standards that take account of 
environmental protection, human rights and other basic standards. 
However, reporting under these guidelines, as with many other such 
initiatives, is entirely voluntary. In addition, the reports themselves do not 
provide any standards against which to judge the types and levels of 
activities reported. They provide information about the trends in the 
various activities reported, and leave it to the individual investor to 
                   
82  “Global Reporting Initiative Overview” http://www.Globalreporting.Org/AboutGRI/ 
Overview.htm (last accessed August 5, 2003). 
83  http://www.globalreporting.org/about/faq.asp. 
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determine whether sufficient progress is being made and whether the level 
of activity reported is acceptable or not. For example, the engineering 
reports concerning the state of environmental controls could be reported as 
an investment in environmental engineering by the parent corporation. 
There does not appear to be any mechanism that would require the 
corporation to link the commissioning of the report to its willingness to 
follow the report’s recommendations.  
Similarly, the initiatives of the UN Global Compact are aimed at 
encouraging voluntary corporate citizenship supporting nine principles 
drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development.84 The objective is to create 
partnerships with private and public actors, premised entirely on voluntary 
compliance and notions of responsible corporate citizenship, including the 
protection of international human rights and greater environmental 
responsibility. Fifty MNEs committed themselves to the Global Compact 
when it was launched in 1999, although the commitment to stewardship is 
voluntary and there are no enforceable standards. Environmental groups 
and human rights organizations have viewed the Global Compact with a 
degree of skepticism because of its voluntary nature.85  
It is not yet clear what the long-term impact of these collaborative 
efforts will be. Cooperation by MNEs may in many cases be contingent on 
the non-mandatory nature of participation. Yet the lack of enforceable 
standards and remedies for violations of codes of corporate conduct results 
in those harmed by MNE conduct not being able to seek redress for those 
harms. Moreover, it can sometimes be difficult to identify “international 
norms”, for example, the Rio Declaration is a “soft law” instrument and 
with a few exceptions, its principles are non-legally binding. While the 
line between hard law and soft law does not detract from my argument, it 
                   
84 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/content/AboutTheGC/TheNinePrinciples/thenine.htm 
(last accessed October 1, 2003). Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 
217 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71, which 
provides human rights standards, including the rights of life, liberty, security of 
person, assembly and association, the right to vote, freedom of movement, freedom 
from unjust labour practices, etc. The Rio Declaration specifies that human beings are 
at the centre of concern for sustainable development and that they are entitled to a 
healthy and productive life in harmony with nature, Rio Declaration, Principle 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (vol. 1). 
85  Shaughnessy, supra note 68 at 171-172. 
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may pose additional challenges for recognition and enforcement of 
universally accepted norms.86 At the same time, the substance of these 
voluntary codes suggests that some MNEs have, at least on paper, 
outpaced their domestic governments in their willingness to accept 
international principles as the basis of their conduct. While a more 
pessimistic view might suggest that voluntary adoption has been driven in 
part by a strategy of MNEs to reduce the likelihood of legislated 
standards, the public adoption of corporate codes endorsing international 
human rights standards and environmental norms, sets the stage for more 
formal codification of these standards. 
3. The Role of the Administration of Justice in Home Nations in Taking 
Responsibility for Global Activities of their MNEs  
This is a more contested notion. Ideally, there would be international 
mechanisms developed that would offer enforceable standards that would 
control particular corporate activity that violates internationally accepted 
norms of social responsibility. There would also be international consen-
sus on a tribunal that could hear and decide cases alleging harms by MNEs 
for their activities in host nations, with processes designed to generate 
meaningful access for both those harmed and NGOs or other groups 
recognized by the tribunal as having amicus curiae or actual standing to 
seek remedies for particular harms. This is not likely to occur in the 
immediate future as there is not international consensus that an 
international mechanism to hold MNEs accountable is required or desired, 
nor is there consensus on the standards to which they should be held 
accountable for actions in host nations.  
In the interim, there is the issue of a role for domestic legal processes 
in enforcing international standards for the activities of domestically 
registered MNEs abroad. Initial strategies could include enacting legisla-
tion that allows the home nation to take jurisdiction and to award remedies 
for MNE harms internationally; imposing fiduciary obligations on 
corporate directors and officers in respect of the corporation’s interna-
tional activities; or expanding the scope of materiality in corporate 
disclosures of their activities domestically and abroad. 
                   
86  Thanks to my colleague Professor Karin Mickelson for making this observation. 
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4. Would Domestic Legislation Aimed at Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Assist? 
If in going global, MNEs have left much of the rule of law behind, 
perhaps there should be domestic legislation aimed at imposing some level 
of responsibility on MNEs for their actions in foreign jurisdictions. As 
noted in Part III, the US Alien Tort Claims Act has proven an inadequate 
remedial tool because of subject matter jurisdiction and doctrines such as 
forum non conveniens. In designing a statutory regime, one can draw on 
failures of the US regime to conceptualize a framework that may address 
the problems raised in this paper. 
I would propose a new domestic statute that grants Canadian courts 
extraterritorial jurisdiction for the international activities of domestically 
registered MNEs in respect of human rights, labour standards and 
environmental protection. Provisionally titled the Canada MNE Standards 
of Global Conduct Act (MSGCA), it would set up a mandatory disclosure 
and compliance regime, measured against both international treaties and 
norms and the standards voluntarily adopted by the corporation.87 Rather 
than a focus on torts with its attendant problems in terms of thresholds of 
causation and harm, the focus would be on enacting enforceable standards 
of corporate conduct. Ideally, there would be a democratically, nationally 
set standard of conduct that engaged standards such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Declaration of Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development. MNEs with their home jurisdiction in Canada would be 
required to comply with these international standards.  
The statute would contain language that would allow for the 
development of new international norms of conduct. In the context of the 
US ATCA, Hari Osofsky has suggested a standard for judging new norms 
as they emerge, specifically, that there must be wide declaratory 
recognition that the norm exists, such as uncontroversial UN resolutions, a 
preponderance of scholarly or judicial opinion or incorporation of the 
                   
87  I note parenthetically that corporations operating solely domestically should also be 
required to adopt codes of conduct, but in this paper do not address the legislative 
design problems associated with corporations that vary considerably in size and 
sophistication. 
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norms in many nations’ statutes.88 Allowance for recognition of new 
norms means that the courts are less likely to narrowly interpret the 
statutes.  
Under the proposed MNE Standards of Global Conduct Act, MNEs 
would also be required to comply with standards that they have set in their 
own codes of conduct. While the statute would require adoption of a 
corporate code of conduct for any MNE registered in Canada regarding 
both its domestic and international conduct, the content of that code would 
be voluntary as long as it raised standards above the international norms 
referred to above. This requirement would have two effects. First, there 
would be a level of consistency and fairness in the standards set, with the 
international human rights, labour and environmental standards setting the 
baseline of conduct that is in turn enforceable in the home jurisdiction. 
Corporations would also be required to abide by the codes of conduct that 
they have adopted. This will create ex ante incentives for corporations to 
devise codes that they are prepared to adhere to, thus addressing the 
problem of codes being adopted purely for marketing purposes or to 
satisfy perceived investor preferences. The corporation would always be 
free not to adopt standards above the international baseline of human 
rights, environmental and labour standards, but even in those circums-
tances, there would be mandatory disclosure, monitoring and enforceable 
remedies for violation of the baseline standards. While directors and 
officers as agents of the corporation would still have due diligence 
defences available, there would be remedies against the corporation for 
failure to meet standards and for harms caused due to this failure. In some 
cases, where the directors and officers failed in their duties, liability could 
be imposed on them personally, a point discussed in the next section. 
In order for such legislation to work, the MNE Standards of Global 
Conduct Act would specify a statutory pulling aside of the corporate veil 
for the limited purpose of hearing and deciding complaints concerning 
MNE activities in host nations in respect of human rights, labour standards 
or environmental harms. Otherwise, the problem of the unlimited 
subsidiaries would defeat any such legislative initiative. Canadian courts 
have already developed doctrines for such a pulling aside of the veil, but 
the legislation would have to go further in order to properly hold MNEs 
                   
88  Osofsky, supra note 48 at 368. Osofsky suggests that lack of geographical 
comprehensiveness, weak enforcement mechanisms or non-conforming state 
behaviour would not be a bar to recognition of new norms. 
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accountable for the actions of their subsidiaries. This would also address 
the problem of subsidiaries in host countries shifting assets continually to 
the parent to insulate themselves from claims for harms in the host 
country, as the MNE would be treated as one entity for the purpose of 
assessing the complaints and remedying any harms. It would still leave the 
problem of subsidiaries that are joint ventures of corporations registered 
domestically in several jurisdictions, but in such a case, the domestically 
registered corporation that is a joint partner or shareholder could be 
prohibited from investing or engaging in joint ventures where such 
standards are not being met, and held to a good faith and due diligence 
standard in determining whether or not it has fulfilled its obligations.  
The MNE Standards of Global Conduct Act would of necessity have to 
have a liberal definition of who should be able to bring a claim against the 
corporation. As has been evident with the Alien Tort Claims Act in the 
United States, standing to bring claims is problematic, as is the issue of 
resources to pursue claims, particularly in light of the resources of the 
MNE. Under the MNE Standards of Global Conduct Act, any party that is 
directly implicated or harmed by the corporation’s activities would have 
standing to bring a complaint, including citizens of the home or host 
nation. This would include investors, employees, in some cases creditors, 
and communities in host nations suffering the harms of the foreign 
activities of the domestically registered MNE. While the legislation should 
provide for intervenor status for human rights, environmental or labour 
groups or NGOs, either as parties with an interest or in an amicus curiae 
role, there would need to be at least one complainant with a direct interest 
in the MNE’s activities. While the cost of pursuing such proceedings is 
likely to deter NGOs and advocacy groups pursuing frivolous claims, on 
balance, it would seem that there should be an least one directly involved 
complainant, in terms of due process and fairness. A key balance to this 
limitation would be a very liberal definition of “interest” in the 
corporation’s activities, with the courts giving such remedial legislation an 
expansive, as opposed to narrow interpretation of “complainant”. If 
“complainant” is defined and interpreted liberally, a major hurdle to 
enforcing the standards of the statute will be overcome.  
Moreover, there should also be a mechanism for a public body to bring 
a complaint against a domestic corporation for its activities internationally. 
Similar to a privacy ombudsperson or a human rights commissioner, there 
could be a Director of MNE Standards of Conduct that would have 
standing to investigate and bring complaints under the MNE Standards of 
Global Conduct Act. This would ensure that resources and standing were 
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not a bar to enforcement of the legislation. Such positions have also 
historically acted as a normative check on the activities of corporations, 
because corporate officers understand that there are standards specified in 
the legislation and that there is an enforcement mechanism in place aimed 
at holding them accountable to such standards.  
The Director of MNE Standards of Conduct could also engage a 
variety of dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve complaints and try to 
move those engaged in a complaint into a proactive and collaborative 
resolution. In this sense, pursuit of the complaints through the courts 
would be the mechanism utilized when it is evident that the corporation is 
unwilling to meet the legislative standards. In the absence of enforceable 
remedies, upheld by the courts, any legislation would not have the 
persuasive power necessary to temper the conduct of domestically 
registered MNEs internationally. Claire Dickerson has suggested that there 
be a good faith norm that is reflected in consultation and dialogue with 
developing country workers such that they can work towards some sort of 
consensus on working conditions and labour standards that reconcile the 
legitimate interests of workers and the corporations.89 This notion of 
preventive mediation of interests is highly appealing. Yet there are serious 
barriers to such a process posed by information asymmetries, inequitable 
bargaining power and the lack of international enforceable norms. The 
statute would have to expressly address these barriers to effective 
resolution of disputes and to pursuing claims for remedies under the 
statute. 
Enacting the MNE Standards of Global Conduct Act also raises the 
question of whether domestically registered MNEs would exit Canada. Is 
there a risk of exit? Of course, just as there is also a risk of exit with 
existing Canadian labour, human rights and environmental standards. 
However, Canadian registered corporations are also beneficiaries of a 
highly codified enabling regime, including a generous tax regime, 
securities legislation that encourages active capital markets, a corporate 
law regime that enables corporate activity and protects agents of the 
corporation in their good faith and duly diligent efforts to oversee and 
manage the corporation. These publicly regulated features of private 
wealth generating activity make Canada an attractive domestic jurisdiction 
                   
89  C. Dickerson, “Transnational Codes of Conduct Through Dialogue: Leveling the 
Playing Field for Developing Country Workers” (2001) 53 Fla. L. Rev. 611 at 616. 
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for corporations. These features are not compromised by holding 
corporations accountable to international standards.  
Resistance to enactment of legislation would of course be expected; 
the objective of corporate activity is to generate wealth efficiently, 
including lobbying politically for conditions that are most advantageous 
for the corporation. However, the objective of democratic processes is that 
as citizens, we are engaged in an ongoing challenge of finding the 
appropriate balance between various economic and social objectives and 
activities. Wealth creation is only one of many competing policy objec-
tives, in addition to the health, safety, security and equality of Canadian 
citizens and a whole host of other public policy initiatives. Clearly, the 
move to global capital and products markets has shifted that balance, 
causing a redistribution of wealth away from citizens, both in terms of 
access to the benefits of global activities and in terms of harms to health 
and environment from those activities. The MNE Standards of Global 
Conduct Act would serve as a corrective device. It would have some 
distributive consequences, but the current policy choice not to enforce 
international standards also has distributive consequences. The propor-
tional harms to citizens of host nations from the current imbalance that is 
the result of unaccountable corporate behaviour far exceeds any potential 
“harm” to corporate activity in imposing such standards and creating 
enforceable remedies. However, if numerous Canadian based MNEs have 
already adopted and are promoting the Global Compact, they have at least 
voluntarily already committed to these international standards. The 
legislation would codify these standards, raise other corporations up to 
these minimum standards and more importantly, provide a mechanism 
whereby the corporations would be held accountable to such standards. 
Finally, there is likely to be the efficiency critique of such proposed 
legislation. Essentially, this critique would suggest that the MNE 
Standards of Global Conduct Act is unnecessary interference in the 
market, creating ex ante incentives for corporations to relocate in different 
domestic jurisdictions and to dismantle their existing voluntary codes of 
conduct because of the fear of being held accountable for these standards. 
However, if one analyses these arguments, they are claims that the 
legislation would impair efficiency because corporations that adopt 
standards of conduct do not want to be accountable for failing to 
implement them nor do they want to be accountable if they violate 
international law norms. Thus, the efficiency critique brings us back to 
first principles, which are the normative constraints we wish to impose on 
international corporate activity. In essence the critiques are normative 
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claims that the present lack of any real constraints on this activity is a 
preferable situation.  
E. Imposing Fiduciary Obligations 
Instead of enacting my proposed statute, corporate law fiduciary duty 
could be expanded to encompass international law norms in respect of the 
environment, human, social and political rights. If these protections were 
considered baseline standards for corporate conduct in the home state of 
the corporation, it might act as a temper on breach of such standards by 
corporate managers in their decisions regarding corporate conduct in the 
host nations. Any intentional or negligent breach of these norms would 
subject the MNE manager involved to sanctions similar to those for 
breaches of fiduciary duty in a domestic setting. This may create the 
appropriate incentives for corporate directors and officers to engage in 
conduct that would meet the standards of the home nation in the 
corporation’s dealings internationally. It would address the current 
missing element, that there is no threat or risk to corporate assets from 
conduct internationally that would be a breach of the duty to act in the best 
interests of the corporation domestically. 
In addition to rethinking concepts of fiduciary obligation, or enacting 
extraterritorial legislation there are other strategies to be considered to 
address the challenges of corporate social responsibility globally. 
F. Mandatory Reporting on Social and Environmental Activities 
One interim strategy is to mandate social, environmental and human 
rights reporting similar to that undertaken by GRI and CERES, instead of 
it remaining voluntary. While shareholder activism in respect of 
international human rights or labour norms was effectively quashed by 
corporate law language that prohibited expression of shareholder 
preference for any political or social cause, the 2001 amendments to the 
Canada Business Corporations Act now allow greater possibility for 
resolutions that address issues related to the corporation’s activities. Some 
recent shareholder activity has also focused on human rights issues and a 
push for greater transparency in corporate decision making in respect of 
foreign labour practices.90 A recent proposal regarding sweatshop 
                   
90  SHARE, “Labour Investors Gather Broad Support in Anti-Sweatshop Vote” 1 
(Spring/Summer 2001) Prospectus 4, online: SHARE http://www.share.ca (under 
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employment practices garnered 36% of shareholder support at the 
corporation’s annual meeting, the largest vote ever recorded in support of 
a social resolution submitted to a Canadian corporation.91  
G. Supporting International Codes of Conduct Through Trade 
Preferences 
Another strategy that has found favour in the European Union is to 
encourage host nations to require socially responsible corporate behaviour 
from MNEs in their country through treaties incorporating this strategy. In 
this respect, the Commission of the European Union issued two 
communications dealing with globalization. The first is a communication 
setting out its approach to the issue of social governance and promotion of 
core labour standards in its trading relations with other states (“Core 
Labour Standards Communication”).92 In the communication, the 
Commission rejects sanctions as the appropriate method for promoting 
such standards. Instead, the Commission prefers strengthening the role of 
the ILO and its complaint mechanisms by providing technical assistance to 
the ILO.93 The communication also approves of denying preferential 
access to EU markets to products from countries that permit violations of 
the ILO’s core conventions.94  
 
“Newsletters”, last accessed: June 1, 2003). Similarly, Real Assets Investment 
Management Inc. and Meritas Mutual Funds recently jointly filed a shareholder 
resolution with Calgary-based Enbridge Inc. calling on it to adopt a human rights 
policy. The shareholder proposal was withdrawn after Enbridge agreed to adopt the 
US-U.K. Voluntary Initiative on Security and Human Rights, and to engage in 
discussions with shareholders and human rights groups on how it will be 
implemented. 
91  SHARE, News Release, “Record Numbers Support Shareholder Resolution at The 
Bay on Sweatshops” (May 23, 2002), online: SHARE http://www.share.ca (under 
“News Releases”, last accessed: June 1, 2003). 
92  Commission of the European Communities, Promoting Core Labour Standards and 
Improving Social Governance in the Context of Globalization, Communication to the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, 
Communique COM (2001) 416 final (18/7, 2001). 
93  Ibid. at 14. 
94  Ibid. at 16-17. 
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The Commission also published a “Green Paper” on corporate social 
responsibility (“CSR”).95 The Green Paper envisions the role of the 
European Union as that of promoting CSR through provision of a 
“framework” that provides transparency, coherence and best practices, and 
by assisting in the development of the appropriate evaluation and 
verification tools. The Green Paper does not discuss the European 
Parliament’s 1998 resolution concerning a model code of conduct for 
MNEs and the creation of a Monitoring Platform. The potential for the 
creation of such a model code is present in the proposed “framework” and 
it could arguably result from the consultation process following the 
issuance of the Green Paper.96 However, the Commission was expressly 
refraining from making any concrete proposals in the Green Paper because 
the discussions concerning the role of the EU in corporate social 
responsibility were only at the preliminary stage.97 
Following the consultation, the Commission issued a Communication 
to European Institutions and Member States setting out a proposed 
strategy on CSR for the Commission (“EU Communication”).98 The EU 
Communication presented a definition of corporate social responsibility 
that emphasized its voluntary nature, its intimate links with sustainable 
development and its dimension of exceeding minimum legal standards.99 It 
also recognized the global dimensions of CSR by referring to the need to 
develop an effective system of “global governance” including social and 
environmental dimensions. The EU Communication then went on to refer 
to globalization bringing “increased exposure to transboundary economic 
criminality, requiring an international response”.100 However, the 
international response envisioned by the Commission is to follow the 
strategies of encouraging compliance with international standards, and 
using trade preferences to encourage compliance outlined in the Core 
                   
95  Commission of the European Communities, Promoting a European Framework for 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Green Paper COM (2001) 366 final (18/7, 2001). 
96  Ibid. at 22. 
97  Ibid. at 23. 
98  Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission 
Concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business Contribution to Sustainable 
Development, Communication to European Institutions, Member States, Social 
Partners and other concerned parties COM(2002) 347 final (July 2, 2002). 
99  Ibid. at 5. 
100  Ibid. at 6. 
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Labour Standards Communication discussed above, and extending it to all 
areas of Corporate Social Responsibility.101 The Commission also 
identified problems with transparency and comparability of standards for 
measuring CSR and, in response to this and other problems, created an EU 
Multi-stakeholder Forum on CSR which is to report in the summer of 
2004 on a number of topics, including: the effectiveness and credibility of 
codes of conducts, to be based on internationally agreed principles, in 
particular the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises; the 
development of commonly agreed guidelines and criteria for CSR 
measurement, reporting and assurance; the definition of commonly agreed 
guidelines for labeling schemes, supporting the ILO core conventions and 
environmental standards; and disclosure of pension and retail funds SRI 
policies.102 
Thus, the issue is not only how international norms may play a role in 
domestic enforcement of particular codes of conduct, but whether 
investment and trading policy can be deployed to require particular 
standards of conduct in other jurisdictions regarding human rights and 
other protections that conform to Canadian understandings of essential 
freedoms. Is there likely to be compliance with such international 
standards in the absence of either domestic standards or an international 
forum that holds corporations accountable for particular kinds of harms? 
H. Domestic to International, International to Domestic Norms— 
Potential Synergies 
It would seem that multiple strategies are required to develop a model 
of corporate governance that addresses the full range of issues highlighted 
above. This requires engagement in international fora, with both govern-
mental and NGO organizations and domestically in terms of laws that 
engage corporate activity. 
The role of the judiciary is a challenging one. While limited by the 
scope of legislation or domestic jurisdiction, the courts do have a role in 
both domestic and international norms. For example, in insolvency law, 
there are growing numbers of cross-border insolvency restructurings and 
Canadian courts have recognized the need for co-operation and comity 
                   
101  Ibid. at 22-25. 
102  Ibid. at 17-18. 
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among jurisdictions. This presents a challenge in balancing domestic 
standards aimed at particular public policy objectives and the principle of 
comity, as well as consideration of the implications for access to justice 
for those who do not have the resources to enforce their claims in another 
jurisdiction.  
CONCLUSION 
One of the primary objectives of the Canadian Institute for the 
Administration of Justice, which helpfully provided the research funding 
for this paper, is to foster debate and collaboration on the administration of 
justice. Too frequently, corporate law dismisses the issue of the 
administration of justice as a “public law issue” that does not engage the 
“private law” of corporate activity, capital markets and international trade 
and competition law. It is important to guard against the identification of 
international law norms with increasing shareholder wealth. It is important 
to recall that they are first and foremost public law norms that vindicate 
important human values, irrespective of their impact on shareholder 
wealth. A new vision of corporate law may include wealth redistribution, a 
reduction in subordination and discrimination based on race and gender, 
environmental justice and enhanced social democracy. The private 
law/public law distinction in the corporate law area is becoming 
increasingly blurred as corporate activities impose social and economic 
costs on individuals and communities. Similarly, the remedies available 
through the justice system to redress these harms or encourage particular 
standards of conduct increasingly engage both public and private law 
aspects of corporate governance. We need to enhance our understanding 
of these trends and begin to develop a corporate law regime more broadly 
responsive to the issues raised by increasingly global activity. 
It is hoped that such an endeavour will also provide insights for how 
conflicts in norms would be resolved within the Canadian administrative 
justice system. This involves investigation into aspects of Canadian 
corporate law that may generate efforts by Canadian investors, workers 
and community members to import international norms or standards into 
Canadian corporate conduct. This would require not only consideration of 
recent statutory changes, but also some investigation into whether the 
courts or other dispute resolution fora are being utilized to place this on 
the public agenda. It also requires further conceptualization of the 
relationship between the courts as arbiters of public law and the increasing 
predominance of private arbitration, domestic and international, where 
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private binding dispute resolution impinges on or bypasses public law 
standards. This in turn necessitates deeper inquiry into the design of a 
dispute resolution framework within Canadian legal processes that may 
allow consideration of international norms and their impact on corporate 
activity domestically. It is only through an explicit vindication of the 
public law norms concerning basic human, social, environmental and 
political rights expressed in our international law in decisions concerning 
the governance of our domestic MNEs that the appropriate balance will be 
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La conférence de cette année s’intéresse à l’impact de la 
mondialisation de l’économie sur le contenu et l’évolution du droit. Ce 
thème revêt une connotation inquiétante, voire même dramatique, lorsque 
appliqué au domaine du travail. En effet, l’effectivité du droit du travail 
traditionnel – le droit positif canadien en ce domaine en est un exemple 
typique – menace de se dégrader dans un contexte économique de plus en 
plus mondialisé. Certains voient dans le droit international du travail une 
façon de diminuer la gravité de cette menace. La réflexion proposée dans 
ce texte porte sur cette question, en prenant le droit canadien comme sujet 
d’observation. 
Le droit international du travail ne peut représenter une avenue 
intéressante que dans la mesure où il est susceptible d’être effectivement 
reçu et appliqué dans les différents droits nationaux des États auxquels il 
est destiné. Malgré l’existence de plusieurs normes internationales 
impératives en la matière, l’expérience canadienne démontre que le droit 
interne du travail peut s’avérer bien peu perméable à leur influence. C’est 
dans ce contexte que le rôle des tribunaux domestiques est névralgique : 
ils peuvent significativement contribuer à la réception du contenu et des 
valeurs du droit international du travail en droit interne. 
La première partie de cet exposé décrit les défis et les difficultés que la 
mondialisation de l’économie représente pour le droit du travail et la 
protection qui en découle pour les travailleurs. Le contenu du droit 
international du travail est déjà riche, et son application effective serait 
certes susceptible de limiter les effets les plus néfastes de la mondia-
lisation de l’économie sur la protection sociale des travailleurs. La 
deuxième partie de l’exposé analyse le contenu et les caractéristiques des 
principaux instruments internationaux auxquels le Canada est lié. L’effet 
de ces instruments sur le contenu du droit canadien du travail est toutefois 
compromis par les mécanismes qui, au Canada, pourvoient à leur 
réception en droit interne. Ces mécanismes sont décrits dans la troisième 
partie de l’exposé. L’analyse démontre que malgré tout, le droit canadien 
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évolue à ce sujet, et que les tribunaux font une place grandissante aux 
valeurs et aux normes qui émanent du droit international du travail.  
Quelques mots s’imposent auparavant sur le phénomène de la mondia-
lisation actuelle de l’économie. Ce phénomène, que certains appellent 
aussi « globalisation », se situe dans un processus continu d’interna-
ionalisation du capitalisme, celui-ci ayant par nature une vocation 
internationale. Ce qui caractérise la phase actuelle de la mondialisation, ce 
sont autant les transformations dans l’organisation internationale de la 
production des biens et services que le développement d’instruments 
nouveaux qui supportent les échanges commerciaux internationaux. Les 
auteurs s’accordent généralement pour observer non seulement une 
augmentation sans précédent de ces derniers, mais aussi une transfor-
mation dans les stratégies, tant financières que productives, des entreprises 
multinationales, un accroissement de l’investissement étranger direct, une 
mobilité jusqu’ici inégalée des capitaux et des activités productives, le tout 
selon une logique de plus en plus déterminée par les marchés financiers 
internationaux. Ces transformations favorisent les entreprises multina-
tionales qui en retirent les plus grands bénéfices et qui constituent le 
principal vecteur de cette mondialisation. 
I. LES DÉFIS DE LA MONDIALISATION POUR LE DROIT DU 
TRAVAIL TRADITIONNEL (NATIONAL)  
La mondialisation récente de l’économie risque d’affecter 
sérieusement le cours du droit du travail. Ce risque découle surtout du 
pouvoir accru dont jouissent, grâce à la mondialisation, les entreprises 
multinationales face aux deux autres acteurs des systèmes nationaux de 
relations industrielles1. En effet, alors que la mobilité des activités 
productives des entreprises multinationales s’exerce bien au-delà des 
frontières nationales, l’action des syndicats et celle de l’État demeurent 
pour l’instant essentiellement nationales. Il en résulte un avantage qui 
pourrait permettre aux entreprises multinationales de provoquer une 
diminution significative du niveau de protection que le droit national du 
                   
1  Cette question a déjà été étudiée dans Marie-Ange MOREAU et Gilles TRUDEAU, 
« Le droit du travail face à la mondialisation de l’économie », (1998) 53 Relations 
industrielles – Industrial Relations, no 1, 55–89, dont une partie de l’analyse est 
reprise ici. Voir aussi Patrick MACKLEM, « Labour Law Beyond Borders », (2002) 
5 Journal of International Economic Law (à paraître). 
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travail assure aux salariés. Deux phénomènes se conjuguent pour 
produire un tel risque : l’un est externe au droit du travail, l’autre lui est 
interne. 
II. LA MONDIALISATION, UNE MENACE EXTERNE AU DROIT 
DU TRAVAIL 
Du point de vue externe, le droit du travail fait désormais partie de la 
compétition que se livrent les territoires nationaux et les États pour attirer 
l’investissement et l’emploi. La réglementation du travail dans un 
territoire national, avec son caractère propre, contribue à le particulariser 
comme lieu d’investissement. Les entreprises multinationales, jouissant 
d’une mobilité accrue de leurs activités et de la libéralisation des 
conditions du commerce international, peuvent jouer les États les uns 
contre les autres quant aux conditions de leur implantation. Cela risque 
d’entraîner la réglementation sociale étatique dans une spirale vers le bas 
qui pourrait être significative quant à l’évolution future du droit du travail. 
Il ne faut pas voir dans ce risque la perte de tout pouvoir des États 
nationaux face aux entreprises multinationales. Il suggère simplement que 
celles-ci jouissent d’un pouvoir accru face à l’État, et aussi face aux 
syndicats, ce qui leur permet d’exiger des conditions qu’elles jugent plus 
favorables à l’investissement.  
La scène canadienne foisonne d’exemples récents du phénomène. 
Ainsi, le patronat s’est opposé vivement aux réformes que le 
gouvernement québécois entendait apporter au Code du travail en 2001, et 
à la Loi sur les normes du travail, en 2002. Dans les deux cas, le discours 
était le même : ajouter des contraintes aux entreprises en augmentant le 
niveau des conditions de travail imposées par la loi, ou en en créant de 
nouvelles, nuit à la position concurrentielle des entreprises québécoises 
aux niveaux national, continental et mondial. Une intervention accrue de 
l’État en ce domaine ne peut que décourager l’investissement direct en sol 
québécois et la création d’emplois. Le même scénario s’était déroulé sur la 
scène fédérale, lors de la révision du Code canadien du travail en 19982.  
                   
2  Ainsi, en réponse au mouvement syndical qui revendiquait l’inclusion d’une 
disposition prohibant l’embauche de salariés occasionnels pour remplacer les 
grévistes au cours d’une grève légale, le groupe de travail que le ministre fédéral du 
Travail avait institué pour formuler des propositions de réforme écrivit ceci: « Les 
employeurs prétendent que l’adoption d’une loi anti-briseurs de grève créera un 
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Ces exemples illustrent comment la mondialisation de l’économie 
donne au monde patronal un puissant outil de lobbying face à l’État. 
Quant à ce dernier, il risque d’être sensible à ce lobby et, dans un contexte 
de mondialisation, de percevoir son champ d’action dans le domaine des 
relations du travail comme étant plus limité.  
III. LA MONDIALISATION, UNE MENACE INTERNE AU DROIT 
DU TRAVAIL 
La mondialisation de l’économie menace le droit du travail aussi sur le 
plan interne, risquant ainsi de porter atteinte à son effectivité. Ce droit, 
dont l’application est limitée au territoire national d’où il est issu, ne 
dispose pas des outils nécessaires pour appréhender toutes les activités des 
entreprises multinationales établies sur ce même territoire3. Il s’agit ici 
d’une autre conséquence d’un phénomène déjà mentionné : l’entreprise 
multinationale est supranationale dans son action, alors que l’effet du droit 
du travail est essentiellement national. Un droit national peut difficilement 
prendre en compte les activités qu’exerce une entreprise à l’étranger 
même si celles-ci ont un impact sur le territoire national. En d’autres 
termes, une entreprise multinationale ne peut, à partir d’un droit national 
donné, être tenue responsable de l’ensemble de ses actions, celles de 
toutes ses composantes, devant une seule juridiction. Elle est plutôt 
responsable de façon morcelée, devant chaque juridiction nationale, pour 
la part limitée de ses activités qui se déroule sur le territoire national 
considéré. Cette effectivité tronquée du droit du travail national face aux 
actions de l’entreprise multinationale confère un avantage considérable à 
cette dernière. Ainsi, il n’est pas imaginable pour l’instant que le droit 
puisse imposer à une entreprise multinationale de reconnaître un syndicat 
à l’échelle de l’ensemble de ses opérations, et de négocier avec celui-ci 
une convention collective de travail « globale ». De la même façon, aucun 
instrument juridique ne favorise le déclenchement d’une grève 
transnationale commensurable à l’étendue des activités d’un employeur 
 
environnement hostile aux investissements et les privera de sources de capitaux, ce 
qui entraînera des pertes d’emplois et affaiblira la sécurité d’emploi [...]. » 
Voir : Andrew C.L. SIMS, Rodrigue BLOUIN et Paula KNOPF, Vers l’équilibre, 
Ottawa, Ministre des travaux publics et services gouvernementaux du Canada, 1996, 
p. 126. Le professeur Blouin fut dissident sur cette question.  
3  Sur cette question, consulter : Pierre VERGE et Sophie DUFOUR, « Entreprises 
transnationales et droits du travail », (2002) 57 Relations industrielles – Industrial 
Relations, no 1, 12-47. 
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multinational : un tel mouvement serait plutôt assujetti aux conditions 
de légalité définies par le droit de chaque territoire national où il pourrait 
se manifester. 
Idéalement, le droit du travail international devrait compléter les 
différents droits nationaux et limiter l’impact des risques que la mondia-
lisation fait peser sur le droit du travail. En effet, en établissant des normes 
internationales communes et contraignantes, le droit international devrait 
permettre d’éviter la compétition entre les États à partir de la réglemen-
tation sociale et de limiter les risques d’une spirale vers le bas à cet égard. 
De plus, en favorisant l’harmonisation de la réglementation sociale 
applicable à l’entreprise, partout où elle s’implante, le droit international 
peut contribuer à contraindre les entreprises multinationales à répondre de 
tous leurs actes, quel que soit l’endroit où elles les posent. 
IV. LES PRINCIPAUX INSTRUMENTS DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
DU TRAVAIL LIANT LE CANADA 
Le droit international du travail n’est ni monolithique ni issu d’une 
source unique. Il a vu le jour dès le début du 20e siècle, dans la foulée de 
la première phase d’industrialisation, et s’est développé au cours des 
décennies suivantes, à la faveur de l’évolution de la conjoncture écono-
mique4. Plusieurs sources, dont chacune correspond à une logique et à des 
objectifs différents, l’alimentent aujourd’hui. La première, la plus 
ancienne et la plus importante, est sans contredit constituée des différents 
instruments émanant de l’Organisation internationale du travail (O.I.T.). A 
celle-ci s’ajoutent les dispositions pertinentes de la Charte internationale 
des droits de l’Homme adoptée par l’Organisation des Nations Unies 
(ONU) après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Enfin, une autre source du 
droit international du travail est apparue beaucoup plus récemment, cette 
fois au niveau continental ou régional. Il s’agit notamment des 
dispositions à caractère social incluses dans les traités internationaux de 
commerce, comme celles rattachées à l’ALÉNA. Cette section présente 
succinctement certains des principaux instruments qui composent le droit 
international du travail et qui lient le Canada. 
                   
4  Le lien entre les différentes phases de l’internationalisation du capitalisme et 
l’évolution du droit international du travail a été exploré dans Marie-Ange MOREAU 
et Gilles TRUDEAU, « Les normes du droit du travail confrontées à l’évolution de 
l’économie : de nouveaux enjeux pour l’espace régional », (2000) 127 Journal de 
Droit international, no 4, 915-948. 
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V. LES CONVENTIONS DE L’ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE 
DU TRAVAIL (O.I.T.) 
Créée en 1919, l’O.I.T. a, au fil des ans, élaboré une œuvre normative 
considérable qui forme le cœur du droit international du travail. Cette 
œuvre se concrétise dans des normes internationales du travail qui 
prennent généralement la forme de conventions et de recommandations. 
La convention est toutefois le seul instrument de l’O.I.T. qui crée des 
obligations juridiques à l’égard d’un État dès lors que celui-ci l’a ratifiée. 
Il faut aussi mentionner la Déclaration de l’OIT relative aux principes et 
droits fondamentaux au travail et son suivi, adoptée en 1998 pour 
répondre à certains des problèmes les plus criants que la mondialisation de 
l’économie pose pour la protection sociale des travailleurs5. Les principes 
et droits fondamentaux qu’énonce la Déclaration sont obligatoires et lient 
les États-membres même s’ils n’en ont pas ratifié les conventions 
afférentes6.  
Des quelques 180 conventions que l’O.I.T. a adoptées à ce jour, le 
Canada n’en a ratifiées que 30, dont 28 sont encore en vigueur. Il s’agit là 
d’une réalisation fort modeste en comparaison du Mexique, par exemple, 
qui en a ratifiées 77 (67 en vigueur). Par contre, l’autre partenaire du 
Canada au sein de l’ALENA, les États-Unis, ne s’est formellement lié 
qu’à 13 conventions (11 en vigueur). Comme il sera souligné dans la 
prochaine section, le caractère fédéral du système constitutionnel canadien 
n’est pas étranger à cette timide performance7. 
                   
5  Sur l’origine et le contenu de la déclaration, consulter Hilary KELLERSON, « La 
Déclaration de 1998 de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux : Un défi pour 
l’avenir? », dans J. TWAITHES (dir.), La mondialisation, origines, développement et 
effet, Québec et Paris, Les Presses de l’Université Laval et l’Harmattan, 2000, p. 261-
267. 
6  Selon l’article 2 de la Déclaration, il s’agit des droits suivants : a) la liberté 
d’association et la reconnaissance effective du droit de négociation collective 
(conventions 87 et 98); b) l’élimination de toute forme de travail forcé ou obligatoire 
(conventions 29 et 105); c) l’abolition effective du travail des enfants (convention 138 
et 182); d) l’élimination de la discrimination en matière d’emploi et de profession 
(conventions 100 et 111). 
7  Pour une analyse des motifs à la base de la non-ratification d’un grand nombre de 
conventions par le Canada, voir Brian LANGILLE, « Canada’s Unratified Core ILO 
Conventions—A New Look », document non publié du 28 octobre 1996. 
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On peut classifier les conventions de l’O.I.T. auxquelles le Canada 
est lié en trois catégories. La première, comprenant les conventions les 
plus anciennes en fait, concernent des conditions de travail minimales, 
comme la durée du travail, l’âge minimum pour le travail dans certains 
secteurs, le repos hebdomadaire et les méthodes de fixation des salaires 
minima. La deuxième catégorie comprend le plus grand nombre de 
conventions et vise des normes très spécifiques pour des industries 
particulières, surtout celle du transport maritime. Enfin, la dernière 
catégorie représente les cinq conventions fondamentales du travail que le 
Canada a ratifiées8. 
VI. LES INSTRUMENTS INTERNATIONAUX ÉTABLISSANT LES 
DROITS DE L’HOMME  
Comme la très grande majorité des pays de la communauté interna-
tionale, le Canada est partie prenante aux grands instruments juridiques 
internationaux élaborés au sein de l’Organisation des Nations Unis 
(ONU), dans les années qui suivirent la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, pour 
assurer la reconnaissance et la protection des droits fondamentaux de la 
personne humaine9. Parmi leurs dispositions y figurent des droits et 
libertés qui sont à la base même du droit du travail contemporain. 
La Charte internationale des droits de l’Homme est un ensemble 
constitué de quatre instruments : la Déclaration universelle des droits de 
l’Homme, le Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et 
culturels, le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques et le 
Protocole facultatif se rapportant au Pacte international relatif aux droits 
civils et politiques. Même si d’autres textes adoptés sous l’égide de l’ONU 
et garantissant aussi des droits fondamentaux de la personne s’ajoutent à 
ces quatre textes, c’est dans ces derniers que figurent les dispositions les 
plus pertinentes au droit du travail.  
                   
8  Il s’agit des conventions no 87, 100, 105, 111, et 182. Le Canada n’a pas ratifié la 
Convention no 98 sur le droit d’organisation et de négociation collective. 
9  Voir, de façon générale, Claude EMANUELLI, Droit international public, Montréal, 
Wilson et Lafleur Ltée., 1998, p. 369 et suiv.; William A. SCHABAS, International 
Human Rights Law and the Canadian Charter, 2e éd., Scarborough, Carswell, 1996, 
p. 55 et suiv. 
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La Déclaration universelle des droits de l’Homme, adoptée en 1948 
par l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU présente les droits de l’Homme 
comme un idéal commun à atteindre par tous les peuples et toutes les 
nations. Elle inclut dans les droits universels et fondamentaux de la 
personne plusieurs droits à connotation sociale et économique dont la 
liberté syndicale, la sécurité sociale, de même que des conditions de 
travail et une rémunération équitables et satisfaisantes10. 
 La Déclaration ne contient aucune disposition concernant sa mise en 
œuvre sur le plan national ou le contrôle de son application. Elle a une 
valeur déclaratoire et promotionnelle, mais aucune force obligatoire11. 
Bien qu’ayant voté en faveur de l’adoption de la Déclaration à l’ONU, le 
Canada ne l’a pas formellement mise en œuvre en droit interne. Par 
contre, elle est à la base du développement législatif considérable quant 
aux droits de la personne au Canada et est même expressément 
mentionnée dans le préambule de quelques lois en la matière12. 
Les principes énoncés dans la Déclaration sont repris de façon plus 
contraignante dans les deux Pactes adoptés ultérieurement par l’ONU. 
Dans le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, voté par 
l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU en 1966, plusieurs droits et libertés 
fondamentaux ayant application de le domaine du travail sont énoncés, 
dont la prohibition du travail forcé (article 8), la protection de la vie privée 
(article 17), le droit d’association (article 22) et la prohibition de la discri-
mination à partir de certains facteurs énumérés (article 26). Le Pacte est 
complété par le Protocole facultatif se rapportant au Pacte international 
relatif aux droits civils et politiques, qui instaure un mécanisme supplé-
mentaire de mise en application.  
Le Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et 
culturels, aussi adopté en 1966 par l’ONU, reprend de façon plus détaillée 
les droits de nature sociale et économique que la Déclaration universelle 
des droits de l’Homme contient, et vise à leur donner une force 
                   
10  Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, art. 22 à 25. 
11  On peut par contre soutenir qu’en dépit de l’absence d’un aspect contraignant 
directement issu de ses dispositions, la déclaration a acquis une force coutumière sur 
le plan international, et, à ce titre, lie tous les États. Voir John P. HUMPHREY, « La 
nature juridique de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme », (1981) 12 
Revue générale de droit, 397. 
12  Jacques-Yvan MORIN, Francis RIGALDIES et Daniel TURP, Droit international 
public, 3e éd., t. 1, Montréal, Éditions Thémis, 1997, p. 671. 
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obligatoire. Ceux-ci sont énumérés dans une formulation un peu plus 
détaillée. L’État adhérant au Pacte ne s’engage toutefois pas à une 
obligation de résultat mais plutôt, selon les termes de l’article 2, « […] à 
agir, tant par son effort propre que par l’assistance et la coopération 
internationales, notamment sur les plans économique et technique, au 
maximum de ses ressources disponibles, en vue d’assurer progressivement 
le plein exercice des droits dans le présent Pacte par tous les moyens 
appropriés, y compris en particulier l’adoption de mesures législatives ».  
Le Canada a adhéré au Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et 
politiques et au Protocole s’y rapportant en 1976. Il a aussi ratifié la même 
année le Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et 
culturels. Ces instruments n’ont cependant pas été directement introduits 
dans la législation canadienne13. 
Il faut ici souligner le double emploi mais aussi la complémentarité 
des grands instruments internationaux des droits de l’Homme avec 
plusieurs conventions de l’O.I.T. qui reconnaissent aussi des droits fonda-
mentaux reliés au travail. A cet égard, la Déclaration de l’OIT relative aux 
principes et droits fondamentaux au travail et son suivi est particu-
lièrement significative. Elle permet en effet que ces droits fondamentaux 
bénéficient de tout le système de mise en application déployé par 
l’Organisation internationale du travail qui, par sa nature tripartite, revêt 
un caractère tout à fait particulier14. Par ailleurs, ce rapprochement des 
droits de l’Homme et du droit du travail qui survient sur le plan 
international ne sera pas sans influencer le cours des droits du travail 
nationaux, comme l’exemple canadien décrit plus loin le suggère. 
VII. LES INSTRUMENTS CONTINENTAUX ET RÉGIONAUX 
Le processus d’intégration commerciale des Amériques soulève 
plusieurs préoccupations quant à l’évolution des droits relatifs au travail 
dans les différents pays impliqués. Celles-ci se reflètent notamment dans 
plusieurs traités, protocoles et déclarations adoptés récemment au sein des 
Amériques15 qui reconnaissent explicitement les droits fondamentaux du 
                   
13  Id., p. 277.  
14  Id. 
15  Pour une description et une analyse de ces différents instruments, voir Pierre VERGE, 
« La place des droits relatifs au travail dans le projet d’intégration des Amériques », 
(2003) 44 Les Cahiers de Droit, no 1, 53-73. 
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travail. Bien que le Canada soit partie à ces instruments, il n’est pas utile 
de les analyser davantage ici, ceux-ci se rapprochant sensiblement des 
traités et conventions énumérés plus haut, tant dans le contenu des droits 
du travail reconnus que dans les effets juridiques qui y sont rattachés. 
L’Accord nord-américain de coopération dans le domaine du travail 
(ANACT), qui constitue en fait la clause sociale16 de l’Accord de libre-
échange nord-américain (ALÉNA) conclu entre le Canada, les États-Unis 
et le Mexique et entré en vigueur le 1er janvier 1994, mérite une analyse 
plus approfondie17. Il s’agit là de la première clause de cette nature insérée 
dans un traité multilatéral de commerce. Sous certaines conditions, 
l’Accord permet d’imposer des sanctions commerciales à l’État partie qui 
ne respecterait pas ses engagements de nature sociale.  
Il faut voir dans l’ANACT un accord de coopération avant tout. Les 
trois pays ont résolument misé sur la coopération dans le domaine social 
afin de favoriser l’épanouissement des droits sociaux reconnus dans le 
texte de l’Accord et l’amélioration des niveaux de vie dans chacun des 
territoires nationaux. La dimension contraignante de l’Accord porte sur 
                   
16  On entend par « clause sociale » les dispositions portant sur des normes minimales du 
travail qui sont incluses dans un traité régional ou multilatéral de libéralisation des 
échanges commerciaux. Par une telle clause, les États parties au traité s’engagent à 
respecter ces normes sous peine de la perte des avantages commerciaux découlant du 
traité. Pour l’état du débat sur la question, voir notamment : Robert O’BRIEN, « The 
Varied Paths to Minimum Global Labour Standards », dans J. HARROD et 
R. O’BRIEN (dir.), Global Unions, Londres et New-York, Routledge, 2002, p. 221. 
17  Le contenu de l’ANACT a fait l’objet de plusieurs analyses. Voir notamment : Roy 
ADAMS et Singh PARBUDYAL, « Workers’ Rights under NAFTA: Experience with 
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation », dans BLOUIN et GILES, 
op. cit., supra 177-199; Pierre VERGE, « Les dilemmes de l’ANACT; ambiguïtés ou 
complémentarité », (1999) 54 Relations industrielles – Industrial Relations, no 2, 223-
244; Rodrigue BLOUIN et May MORPAW, « L’Accord nord-américain de 
coopération dans le domaine du travail », dans R. CHAYKOWSKI, P.-A. 
LAPOINTE, G. VALLÉE et A. VERMA, (dir.), La représentation des salariés dans 
le contexte du libre-échange et de la déréglementation, Actes du XXXIIIe Congrès de 
l’Association canadienne des relations industrielles, Québec, Dépar-tement des 
relations industrielles, Université Laval, 1997, p. 85-96; Emmanuelle MAZUYER, Le 
traitement juridique des normes du travail dans les intégrations régionales 
(Communauté Européenne – ALENA), thèse de doctorat en droit, Florence, Institut 
universitaire européen, 2002; Marie-Ange MOREAU et Gilles TRUDEAU, « La 
clause sociale dans l’accord de libre-échange nord-américain », (1995) Revue 
Internationale de Droit Économique, no 3, 393-406; Patrick STAELENS, Droit du 
travail, intégration économique et « clause sociale » à la lumière de l’expérience 
nord-américaine, thèse de doctorat en droit, Saint-Etienne (France), Université Jean 
Monnet, 1997. 
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une partie seulement des droits sociaux énoncés, alors que les sanctions 
commerciales ne sont possibles qu’en cas de violation d’un nombre encore 
plus restreint de droits. Une telle caractéristique a permis de présenter 
l’ANACT comme une entente de coopération plutôt que comme une 
véritable clause sociale. Cette idée est d’ailleurs renforcée par l’absence 
complète d’une législation supranationale imposée aux trois pays ou de 
toute perspective d’harmonisation en matière sociale. 
En effet, l’article 2 énonce une des caractéristiques majeures de 
l’ANACT en ces termes : « ... [Chaque Partie reconnaît] le droit des 
Parties d’établir leurs propres normes du travail ainsi que d’adopter ou de 
modifier en conséquence leurs lois et réglementations en matière de 
travail, [...]. » Chaque pays conserve donc sa pleine souveraineté quant au 
développement de sa législation du travail. L’Accord oblige simplement 
chaque pays à promouvoir l’observation de sa propre législation nationale 
et d’en assurer l’application efficace et transparente (articles 3 à 7 de 
l’ANACT). Par contre, les trois pays ont inscrit dans l’Accord l’objectif 
« de faire prévaloir, dans toute la mesure du possible, les principes relatifs 
au travail énoncés à l’Annexe 1 » (article 1(b) de l’ANACT). Ces 
principes visent la liberté d’association et la protection du droit 
d’organisation, le droit de négociation collective, le droit de grève, 
l’interdiction du travail forcé, la protection accordée aux enfants et aux 
jeunes gens en matière de travail, des normes minimales d’emploi telles 
un salaire minimum et la rémunération du temps supplémentaire, 
l’élimination de la discrimination en matière d’emploi, l’égalité de 
rémunération entre hommes et femmes, la prévention des accidents du 
travail et des maladies professionnelles, l’indemnisation en cas d’accidents 
du travail et de maladies professionnelles ainsi que la protection des 
travailleurs migrants. Il faut toutefois souligner que cet engagement 
demeure au niveau des objectifs et ne revêt aucun caractère contraignant.  
Quant aux aspects plus contraignants, ils ne portent que sur quelques-
uns des 11 principes énumérés dans l’Annexe 1 de l’Accord. Les 
questions de relations du travail, soit le droit d’association, le droit à la 
négociation collective et celui à la grève en sont exclues. De plus, les 
parties ont élaboré une procédure très lourde et très longue de 
consultation, d’enquête et d’arbitrage pour déterminer si un cas constitue 
une violation de l’Accord. D’éventuelles sanctions commerciales ne 
pourront s’appliquer que si un des trois pays a « [...] omis de façon 
systématique d’assurer l’application efficace de ses normes techniques du 
travail concernant la santé et la sécurité au travail, le travail des enfants ou 
le salaire minimum [...] » (article 33 (3) de l’ANACT). En fait, tout est en 
402 THE NEW RULE OF LAW  /  LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
 
place pour favoriser au maximum un règlement des litiges par voie 
diplomatique. Il serait d’ailleurs surprenant qu’une telle procédure mène 
un jour à l’imposition d’une sanction commerciale réelle.  
Le Canada n’est lié à l’ANACT que pour les provinces qui ont adhéré 
à l’Accord intergouvernemental canadien concernant l’Accord nord-
américain de coopération dans le domaine du travail18. Jusqu’à 
maintenant, seuls le Québec, le Manitoba, l’Alberta et l’Île du Prince 
Édouard ont signé l’Accord et sont formellement liés par l’ANACT. 
Enfin, le Canada a conclu avec le Chili un accord qui est calqué en 
tous points sur l’ANACT, sauf en ce qui concerne la question des 
sanctions commerciales. Cet accord complète l’Accord de libre-échange 
intervenu entre les deux pays. Il est entré en vigueur en juin 1997. 
VIII.  LA RÉCEPTION ET L’IMPACT DES TRAITÉS 
INTERNATIONAUX EN DROIT INTERNE CANADIEN 
Ce n’est pas parce que le Canada s’est juridiquement engagé à 
respecter toutes ces normes internationales du travail qu’elles font 
automatiquement partie du droit interne canadien. En effet, en vertu du 
droit constitutionnel canadien, un traité international conclu par le 
gouvernement canadien n’a pas d’application directe en droit domestique. 
Pour lui donner effet, le traité doit faire l’objet d’un acte de transformation 
ou d’incorporation, généralement une loi qui introduira ou transposera ses 
dispositions en droit domestique. C’est que le Canada est un État dualiste 
au sens strict, c’est-à-dire un État traitant les accords internationaux dans 
un système de droit différent de celui du droit domestique. Il en est 
autrement dans les États monistes : le traité international, une fois dûment 
conclu, devient partie intégrante du droit interne, et peut être invoqué 
directement devant les tribunaux domestiques19. 
                   
18  Annexe 46 de l’ANACT. Voir infra note 28. 
19  Entre ces deux formes extrêmes interviennent toutes les nuances intermédiaires 
possibles. Voir John H. JACKSON, « Status of treaties in domestic legal systems: a 
policy analysis », (1992) 86 The American Journal of International Law 310. 
D’ailleurs le Canada présente en fait un système hybride de réception du droit 
international puisque, s’il est dualiste en ce qui concerne les traités, il incorpore 
directement le droit coutumier international dans son propre droit commun. Cette 
dernière règle est du moins applicable dans les provinces anglophones car elles ont 
toutes incorporé la Common Law britannique : Gibran VAN ERT, « Using Treaties in 
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IX. LA RÉCEPTION DES TRAITÉS INTERNATIONAUX EN 
DROIT INTERNE CANADIEN 
Au Canada, le pouvoir de conclure un accord international est dévolu 
exclusivement au gouvernement fédéral. En fait, il découle de la pré-
rogative royale et appartient formellement au gouverneur général. Le 
gouvernement fédéral n’a donc aucune obligation de consulter le pouvoir 
législatif pour être autorisé à négocier, conclure et ratifier un accord 
international. En d’autres termes, le Canada peut se lier à des obligations 
juridiques sur le plan international sans qu’une intervention législative ne 
soit nécessaire. Par contre, le pouvoir législatif doit intervenir si le traité 
conclu exige une modification du droit interne pour être mis en œuvre. 
Il est intéressant de noter que ces principes, qui s’appliquaient dans 
tout l’Empire britannique, furent rappelés avec force à l’égard du Canada 
en 1935, dans une affaire où il s’agissait de mettre en œuvre les 
obligations internationales contractées par le gouvernement fédéral, celui-
ci ayant ratifié trois conventions de l’O.I.T. (portant respectivement sur les 
heures de travail, le repos hebdomadaire et les mécanismes de 
détermination du salaire minimum). Pour rencontrer ses engagements 
internationaux, le gouvernement s’adressa au Parlement fédéral, qui 
adopta trois lois en conséquence. La validité constitutionnelle de ces lois 
fut contestée jusque devant le Comité judiciaire du Conseil privé à 
Londres. Concernant la formation d’un traité par opposition à son 
exécution en droit interne, lord Atkin écrivit :  
« [TRADUCTION] Il est essentiel d’avoir présente à l’esprit la 
distinction entre (1) la formation et (2) l’exécution des obligations 
qui découlent d’un traité, ce mot s’appliquant à toute entente entre 
deux ou plusieurs États souverains. Dans les pays constituant 
l’Empire britannique, il y a une règle bien établie qui veut que la 
conclusion d’un traité soit un acte qui relève de l’Exécutif, tandis 
que l’exécution de ses obligations, si elles entraînent une modifi-
cation aux lois du pays, exige l’intervention du pouvoir législatif. 
Contrairement à ce qui a lieu ailleurs, les stipulations d’un traité 
dûment ratifié n’ont pas dans l’Empire, en vertu de ce traité même, 
force de loi. Si l’Exécutif national, le gouvernement du jour, 
décide d’assumer les obligations d’un traité qui entraînent des 
modifications aux lois existantes, il doit demander au Parlement 
 
Canadian Courts », dans D.M. MCRAE et A.L.C. DE MESTRAL, The Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law, vol. 38, 2000, p. 3, aux pages 4-6. 
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son assentiment, toujours aléatoire, aux modifications proposées. 
Afin d’être sûr de ce consentement, il s’efforcera très souvent 
d’obtenir, avant la ratification finale, l’approbation expresse du 
Parlement. Mais on n’a jamais soutenu, et la loi n’est pas à cet 
effet, que pareille approbation a force de loi ou qu’en droit elle 
empêche le Parlement du jour, ou son successeur, de refuser sa 
sanction à toute mesure législative proposée dont il pourra plus 
tard être saisi. Sans aucun doute le Parlement, comme le fait 
remarquer le juge en chef, possède un contrôle constitutionnel sur 
l’Exécutif; mais il est indiscutablement du ressort de l’Exécutif de 
créer des obligations stipulées dans les traités et de les sanctionner 
quant au fond et à la forme20. » 
Cette attitude dualiste se retrouve dans les décisions judiciaires 
canadiennes contemporaines. Par exemple, parce que le Pacte sur les 
droits civils et politiques n’a pas été incorporé en droit interne, la Cour 
supérieure du Québec a refusé de se saisir de celui-ci afin de déclarer 
inopérantes certaines dispositions de la Charte de la langue française et de 
la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne21. D’une façon identique, la 
même juridiction a conclu que l’ALÉNA ne peut donner ouverture à un 
recours direct devant les tribunaux nationaux en cas de violations de 
certaines de ses dispositions22. 
Il est donc bien clair qu’aucune disposition d’un acte international 
auquel le Canada est partie, dans le domaine du travail comme en d’autres, 
ne peut créer d’obligations pour les individus et fonder un recours direct 
devant les tribunaux domestiques, à moins qu’il n’ait été incorporé 
explicitement dans une loi par l’autorité législative compétente23. Dans 
                   
20  Attorney-General for Canada c. Attorney-General for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326, 347 
et 348. La traduction française du passage cité provient de la décision de la Cour 
suprême du Canada dans l’affaire Opération Dismantle Inc. c. La Reine, [1985] 1 
R.C.S. 441, dans laquelle le passage de la décision du Conseil privé est reproduit avec 
approbation (à la p. 484). 
21  Les Immeubles Claude Dupont Inc. c. Procureur général du Québec, [1994] R.J.Q. 
1968. Dans cette affaire, le Comité des droits de l’Homme de l’ONU avait déclaré 
que les dispositions de la Charte de la langue française en matière d’affichage 
commerciale violaient la liberté d’expression garantie par le pacte. 
22  Les Entreprises de rebuts Sanipan c. Procureur général du Québec, [1995] R.J.Q. 
821. 
23  C. EMANUELLI, op. cit., note 9, p. 89 et suiv.; Sylvie SCHERRER, « L’effet des 
traités dans l’ordre juridique interne canadien à la lumière de la jurisprudence récente 
», dans Service de la formation permanente, Barreau du Québec, Développements 
récents en droit administratif, Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2000, p. 57. 
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l’arène judiciaire, les accords internationaux eux-mêmes sont en 
conséquence d’une utilité fort réduite, pouvant à l’occasion servir comme 
outil d’interprétation des lois qui auraient été adoptées pour les mettre en 
œuvre sur le plan domestique. La question est discutée en détail plus bas. 
Il faut par contre souligner dès maintenant que l’ANACT pourrait jusqu’à 
un certain point contourner cette conséquence de l’approche dualiste 
prévalant au Canada, puisque son essence même est l’engagement, par 
chacun des trois États partenaires, de respecter et d’appliquer sa propre 
législation interne du travail, sans référence à des dispositions substantives 
supranationales. 
Au Canada, la procédure d’exécution des traités internationaux est 
compliquée par la distribution des pouvoirs législatifs entre les niveaux 
fédéral et provincial au sein de la fédération. La décision du Conseil privé 
mentionnée plus haut24 constitue le précédent en la matière : la loi de mise 
en œuvre d’un traité international relève de l’autorité législative qui a 
compétence sur le sujet faisant l’objet du traité. Même si cette décision est 
aujourd’hui remise en cause par certains25, elle représente toujours la règle 
applicable. Ceci expliquerait d’ailleurs l’attitude fort prudente du 
gouvernement fédéral à l’égard de la ratification des conventions de 
l’O.I.T.26. La plupart d’entre elles relèvent de l’autorité exclusive des 
provinces quant à leur mise en œuvre27. 
Lorsque le traité que le gouvernement canadien envisage de ratifier 
contient une clause à cet effet, l’État fédéral canadien ne s’engagera pour 
des matières provinciales qu’à l’égard des provinces qui auront été 
identifiées nommément et formellement par le gouvernement fédéral aux 
autres États parties au traité. C’est une clause de cette nature qu’on trouve 
à l’Annexe 46 de l’ANACT, par laquelle le Canada s’engage à lister « 
[…] dans une déclaration toutes provinces pour lesquelles il devra être lié 
                   
24  Attorney-General for Canada c. Attorney-General for Ontario, précité, note 20.  
25  Voir notamment Robert HOWSE dans « Proceedings of the Seminar on International 
Treaties and Constitutional Systems of the United States, Mexico and Canada: 
Laboring in the Shadow of Regional Integration », (1998/99) 22 Maryland Journal of 
International Law and Trade, No 2, 185, 264 à 268; VAN ERT, loc. cit., note 19, aux 
p. 67 à 79. 
26  Voir LANGILLE, loc. cit., note 7, 13-17. 
27  Le précédent judiciaire à cet égard est la décision du Conseil privé dans Toronto 
Electric Commissioners c. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396. 
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sur les questions relevant de leur compétence »28. Par contre, lorsqu’une 
telle clause n’est pas incluse dans le traité à signer, le Canada sera très 
prudent avant de s’engager à modifier un droit qui relève exclusivement 
du pouvoir des provinces. Ainsi, dans le cas des conventions de l’O.I.T. – 
celles-ci ne contiennent pas une clause particulière pour les États fédéraux 
–, le Canada a toujours attendu l’accord unanime des provinces avant de 
les ratifier29. 
X. LE STATUT ET LE RÔLE DES INSTRUMENTS INTERNATIONAUX 
DU TRAVAIL DEVANT LES TRIBUNAUX DOMESTIQUES 
CANADIENS 
Les règles constitutionnelles décrites plus haut expliquent pourquoi les 
dispositions d’un traité international auquel le Canada est partie ne sont 
pas incluses directement à l’intérieur du droit domestique. Il faut un acte 
d’introduction, généralement une loi, pour ce faire. Dès lors, en droit 
domestique, les tribunaux n’appliquent pas les dispositions du traité, mais 
plutôt celles de la loi introductive. Celle-ci pourra reprendre textuellement 
les dispositions du traité, en y faisant une référence directe par exemple, 
ou s’en inspirer dans le droit substantif qu’elle définit. Ce faisant, 
toutefois, la loi introductive peut s’écarter, plus ou moins significative-
ment, des dispositions du traité qu’elle met en œuvre30. Dans ce contexte, 
le contenu du traité demeure-t-il pertinent? 
                   
28  ANACT, Annexe 46, art. 1. Le Canada doit aussi notifier aux autres États parties les 
modifications apportées à sa déclaration. Jusqu’à maintenant, cette déclaration 
identifie les provinces suivantes : Québec, Manitoba, Alberta et Île du Prince 
Édouard. Le Canada s’engage de plus à l’article 7 de l’Annexe à s’efforcer « […] de 
rendre [l’Accord] applicable au plus grand nombre de provinces possible ». L’Annexe 
46 établit enfin tout un système pour identifier quand et à l’égard de quelles provinces 
canadiennes une plainte pourra être formulée à partir de l’accord, de même qu’au nom 
de quelles provinces le Canada pourra lui-même formuler une plainte à l’endroit de 
l’un ou l’autre des deux autres États partenaires. 
29  Voir Ton ZUIJDWIJK dans « Proceedings of the Seminar on International Treaties 
and Constitutional Systems of the United States, Mexico and Canada: Laboring in the 
Shadow of Regional Integration », (1998/99) 22 Maryland Journal of International 
Law and Trade, no 2, 185, aux p. 259 à 263. 
30  C. EMANUELLI, op. cit., note 9, p. 89. 
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La jurisprudence est unanime sur le point suivant : lorsque la loi qui 
met en œuvre un traité international en droit interne est en soi ambiguë, le 
juge peut recourir aux dispositions du traité pour l’interpréter et ainsi 
clarifier l’ambiguïté. De plus, le juge doit s’efforcer de résoudre 
l’ambiguïté de façon compatible avec les dispositions de la convention 
internationale pertinente. La jurisprudence récente de la Cour suprême du 
Canada admet même que le recours à la convention internationale est 
possible pour interpréter les dispositions de la loi introductive sans pour 
autant que celles-ci ne soient intrinsèquement ambiguës31.  
Par ailleurs, le recours à la norme internationale est possible même 
lorsque celle-ci n’est pas incorporée explicitement dans la loi à inter-
préter32. En effet, de façon générale, il faut interpréter le droit domestique 
à la faveur des obligations internationales du Canada, car il est présumé 
que le législateur n’entend pas légiférer de façon incompatible avec celles-
ci. Il s’agit là d’une présomption inhérente au droit commun applicable au 
Canada, une présomption qui permet à la magistrature de conférer un rôle 
actif, même si indirect, au droit international dans le développement du 
droit domestique33. Traditionnellement, deux conditions sont nécessaires 
pour donner ouverture à cette présomption : un texte de droit interne 
ambigu et des indices suggérant que le législateur entendait appliquer la 
norme internationale. La jurisprudence récente de la Cour suprême 
marque toutefois une certaine évolution à l’égard de ces conditions, et 
l’application que la Cour en a faite dernièrement permet d’entrevoir un 
recours plus ouvert aux dispositions du droit international34. En ce qui 
concerne les conditions de travail et les relations industrielles, c’est cette 
présomption qui permettra au droit international de pénétrer le droit 
domestique, car il est très rare que les lois canadiennes en ce domaine 
n’incorporent explicitement les conventions internationales ratifiées par le 
Canada.  
                   
31  Voir notamment National Corn Growers Association c. Canada, [1990] 2 R.C.S. 
1324; C. EMANUELLI, id., p. 94. 
32  Voir SCHERRER, loc. cit., note 23, à la page 72 et suiv. 
33  Sur ce point, voir généralement VAN ERT, loc. cit., note 19, aux pages 28-43. 
34  Cette évolution, encore hésitante, soulève plusieurs questions fondamentales, 
notamment sur le rôle du pouvoir exécutif et sur celui de la magistrature dans le 
régime constitutionnel canadien. Ces questions font l’objet du texte que présente la 
professeure France Houle à ce congrès. Voir France HOULE, « La réception du droit 
international des droits de la personne en droit interne canadien : de la théorie de la 
séparation des pouvoirs vers une approche fondée sur le droits fondamentaux ». 
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Une revue des décisions pertinentes récentes de la Cour suprême du 
Canada révèle toutefois des résultats mitigés quant au recours aux disposi-
tions du droit international du travail pour interpréter le droit domestique 
du travail. Dans tous les cas, il s’agissait de dispositions législatives, 
fédérales ou provinciales, contestées à partir de la Charte canadienne des 
droits et libertés35. Celle-ci, qui ne s’applique qu’à l’action gouverne-
mentale, garantit notamment la liberté d’association : l’État ne pourra la 
restreindre que dans les limites de ce qui est raisonnable dans une société 
libre et démocratique36. Il n’est dès lors pas surprenant qu’on ait invoqué 
les obligations internationales du Canada pour influer sur le contrôle 
judiciaire fait de certaines lois domestiques en matière de travail à partir 
de la Charte canadienne. Par ailleurs, l’évolution à l’égard du recours aux 
dispositions du droit international évoquée au paragraphe précédent 
semble avoir marqué les plus récentes décisions de la Cour en ce domaine. 
La première décision à considérer, et certes la plus importante, est 
celle rendue en 1987 dans l’affaire Re Public Service Employee Relations 
Act (Alberta)37. Il s’agissait de trois lois albertaines qui interdisaient la 
grève et imposaient l’arbitrage obligatoire pour dénouer les impasses 
survenant dans la négociation collective des conditions de travail des 
salariés du secteur public de la province. Ces lois étaient contestées au 
motif qu’elles violaient la liberté d’association garantie par la Charte 
canadienne. La décision de la Cour suprême fut partagée, les juges 
majoritaires concluant que les droits de négocier collectivement les 
conditions de travail et de faire grève n’étaient pas inclus dans la liberté 
d’association. Aucun des juges majoritaires ne référa aux instruments 
internationaux pertinents en la matière qu’aurait ratifiés le Canada. Ils 
adoptèrent une définition restrictive de la liberté d’association, précisant 
que celle-ci ne s’étend qu’aux droits qu’une personne détient indivi-
duellement. En d’autres termes, l’activité de l’association n’est pas 
constitutionnellement protégée lorsque cette activité ne peut être aussi 
exercée individuellement. Il faut insister sur le fait que tous les juges 
majoritaires soulignèrent que ni la négociation collective des conditions de 
                   
35  La Charte fait partie de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982. Celle-ci est contenue à 
l’Annexe B de la Loi de 1982 sur le Canada, R.U. 1982, c. 11 et est codifiée dans 
L.R.C., app II, no 44, Annexe B, Partie I. Pour une analyse exhaustive de la 
jurisprudence canadienne sur cette question, voir SCHABAS, op. cit., note 9. 
36  Art. 2(d) (liberté d’association) et 1 (limites raisonnables) de la Charte. 
37  [1987] 1 R.C.S. 313. 
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travail ni la grève n’étaient des droits fondamentaux au Canada. Parlant 
du droit de grève, le juge McIntyre écrivit : 
On ne peut dire qu’il soit devenu à ce point partie intégrante de nos 
traditions sociales et historiques au point d’acquérir le statut d’un droit 
immuable et fondamental, fermement enraciné dans nos traditions et dans 
notre philosophie politique et sociale. Il n’existe donc aucun motif, 
comme on le propose dans la quatrième conception de la liberté d’asso-
ciation, de présumer l’existence d’un droit de grève constitutionnel.38 
Dans cette affaire, le juge en chef Dickson, auquel s’associa la juge 
Wilson, inscrivit une forte dissidence dans laquelle il étudie longuement le 
contenu du droit international quant à la liberté d’association. Voici dans 
quels termes il y décrit le rôle du droit international dans l’interprétation 
de la Charte canadienne :  
« Le droit international nous donne un bon aperçu de la nature et 
de la portée de la liberté d’association des travailleurs. Depuis la 
fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, la protection des droits et 
libertés fondamentaux collectifs et individuels est devenue une 
question d’intérêt international. Il existe maintenant un droit 
international des droits de la personne constitué d’un ensemble de 
traités (ou conventions) et de règles coutumières, en vertu duquel 
les nations du monde se sont engagées à adhérer aux normes et aux 
principes nécessaires pour assurer la liberté, la dignité et la justice 
sociale à leurs ressortissants. La Charte est conforme à l’esprit de 
ce mouvement international contemporain des droits de la 
personne et elle comporte un bon nombre des principes généraux 
et prescriptions des divers instruments internationaux concernant 
les droits de la personne. Les diverses sources du droit interna-
tional des droits de la personne – les déclarations, les pactes, les 
conventions, les décisions judiciaires et quasi judiciaires des 
tribunaux internationaux, et les règles coutumières – doivent, à 
mon avis, être considérées comme des sources pertinentes et 
persuasives quand il s’agit d’interpréter des dispositions de la 
Charte. […] 
                   
38  Id., 413. 
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En outre, le Canada est partie à plusieurs conventions inter-
nationales sur les droits de la personne qui comportent des dispo-
sitions analogues ou identiques à celles de la Charte. Le Canada 
s’est donc obligé internationalement à assurer à l’intérieur de ses 
frontières la protection de certains droits et libertés fonda-mentaux 
qui figurent aussi dans la Charte. Les principes généraux 
d’interprétation constitutionnelle requièrent que ces obligations 
internationales soient considérées comme un facteur pertinent et 
persuasif quand il s’agit d’interpréter la Charte. […] Je crois qu’il 
faut présumer, en général, que la Charte accorde une protection à 
tout le moins aussi grande que celle qu’offrent les dispositions 
similaires des instruments internationaux que le Canada a ratifiés 
en matière de droits de la personne.39 » 
Par la suite, le juge Dickson passe en revue les divers instruments 
ratifiés par le Canada et qui traitent de la liberté d’association : le Pacte 
international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, le Pacte 
international relatif aux droits civils et politiques et la Convention sur la 
liberté syndicale et la protection du droit syndical, 1948 (No C-87) de 
l’O.I.T. En reconnaissant le droit d’association, ces instruments protègent 
également les activités essentielles des syndicats. À l’égard de la 
Convention no 87 en particulier, le juge Dickson note que les organes 
décisionnels de l’O.I.T. considèrent que la liberté de former et d’organiser 
des syndicats inclut celles de négocier collectivement des conditions de 
travail et de faire grève. Il souligne aussi le fait que le Comité de la liberté 
syndicale et le Conseil d’administration de l’O.I.T. aient étudié un certain 
nombre de plaintes formulées contre le Canada par des syndicats 
canadiens à partir de la Convention no 87. Certaines de celles-ci 
contestaient les dispositions des mêmes trois lois de l’Alberta qui étaient 
l’objet du pourvoi devant la Cour suprême. Or, les instances de l’O.I.T. 
avaient condamné unanimement le Canada, en ce que les prohibitions du 
droit de grève contenues dans ces lois étaient beaucoup trop larges, de 
telles prohibitions ne devant s’appliquer qu’aux employés exerçant 
vraiment des services essentiels.  
                   
39  Id., 348 et 349. Selon SCHABAS, même s’il s’agit d’une dissidence, cette opinion du 
juge Dickson n’a jamais été remise en question depuis et constitue aujourd’hui l’état 
du droit sur la question. Voir SCHABAS, op. cit., note 9, p. 35. 
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La décision de la Cour suprême de 1987 a fait jurisprudence. En 
1990, la Cour rendait une autre décision dans laquelle elle réitérait ses 
conclusions antérieures quant à la liberté d’association40. La Cour suprême 
jugeait encore en 1999 que la liberté d’association reconnue par la Charte 
canadienne n’obligeait pas le législateur à doter un groupe donné de 
travailleurs d’un régime syndical particulier ou à lui permettre de former 
un type particulier d’association défini lui-même par une loi particulière41. 
Dès lors, l’exclusion des membres de la Gendarmerie Royale du Canada 
du régime du Code canadien du travail42 et de la Loi sur les relations de 
travail dans la fonction publique43 n’enfreint pas la Charte canadienne. 
Les juges majoritaires ont rendu cette décision sans référence aucune aux 
instruments internationaux ratifiés par le Canada. Seuls les deux juges 
minoritaires, les juges Cory et Iacobucci, l’ont fait. Pour eux, l’objet 
même de la loi, qui était d’empêcher les membres de la G.R.C. de former 
une association d’employés, constituait une violation flagrante de la 
liberté d’association garantie par l’article 2(d) de la Charte. Au soutien de 
leur raisonnement, ils ont invoqué divers instruments internationaux 
ratifiés par le Canada44 qui reconnaissent tous « …la liberté fondamentale 
des employés de s’associer pour défendre leurs intérêts à titre d’employés 
»45. Les deux juges ont toutefois précisé qu’il n’était pas nécessaire de 
discuter de l’interaction entre la liberté d’association de l’article 2(d) de la 
Charte et le droit à la négociation collective pour décider de l’affaire. 
Cette jurisprudence sur la liberté d’association a subi une évolution 
certaine tout récemment, lorsque la Cour suprême a dû se pencher sur la 
validité constitutionnelle de l’exclusion des travailleurs agricoles de la Loi 
sur les relations de travail de l’Ontario46. Cette exclusion empêchait dans 
les faits ces travailleurs particulièrement vulnérables de bénéficier de la 
                   
40  L’Institut professionnel de la fonction publique du Canada c. Le commissaire des 
Territoires du Nord-Ouest et la Northwest Territories Public Service Association, 
[1990] 2 R.C.S. 367. 
41  Gaétan Delisle c. Le procureur du Canada, [1999] 2 R.C.S. 989. 
42  L.R.C. (1985), c. L-2. 
43  L.R.C. (1985), c. P-35. 
44  Notamment, la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, le Pacte international 
relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, le Pacte international relatif aux 
droits civils et politiques et la Convention sur la liberté syndicale et la protection du 
droit syndical, 1948 (N° C-87) de l’O.I.T. 
45  Affaire Delisle, précitée, note 41, 1039. 
46  Dunmore c. Ontario (Procureur général), [2001] 3 R.C.S. 1016. 
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protection de la loi pour former un syndicat, et négocier collectivement 
leurs conditions de travail. La Cour a cette fois jugé que la reconnaissance 
de la liberté d’association exigeait dans certains cas que le législateur 
mette en place un mécanisme spécifique pour en promouvoir l’exercice 
effectif. Dans cette affaire, on avait en effet réussi à démontrer que les 
travailleurs agricoles étaient incapables d’exercer leur droit constitutionnel 
de s’associer sans la protection de la loi. Dans ses motifs, la Cour suprême 
affirma que sa décision était conforme au droit international de la 
personne. Elle référa non seulement à la Convention no 87 de l’O.I.T., 
ratifiée par le Canada, mais aussi à une autre, la Convention sur le droit 
d’association (Agriculture) (No 11), qui n’était pourtant pas ratifiée. Ces 
instruments constituaient à ses yeux un fondement normatif pour 
l’interdiction de toute forme de discrimination dans la protection de la 
liberté syndicale. La Cour n’a toutefois pas jugé bon revenir sur ses 
décisions passées et inclure le droit à la négociation collective et à la grève 
dans la liberté d’association, comme les instruments internationaux ratifiés 
par le Canada le prescrivaient. Elle s’est limitée à statuer que certaines 
catégories de travailleurs devaient bénéficier de la protection de la loi pour 
exercer effectivement leur droit de former un syndicat et contrer les 
pratiques patronales déloyales. 
Les instruments internationaux ratifiés par le Canada ont par ailleurs 
orienté la lecture que certains membres de la Cour suprême ont faite de la 
notion de liberté comprise dans l’article 7 de la Charte canadienne47. Dans 
l’affaire Michèle Godbout c. La Ville de Longueuil48, il s’agissait de déter-
miner si l’obligation de résider dans les limites de la Ville pour y détenir 
un emploi de fonctionnaire enfreignait le droit à la liberté garanti par 
l’article 7. Trois des sept juges formant le banc dans cette affaire ont 
décidé d’inclure dans ce droit celui de choisir son lieu de résidence49. Pour 
eux, le fait que le Canada ait ratifié le Pacte international relatif aux 
droits civils et politiques, un instrument qui protège expressément le droit 
de choisir un lieu pour établir sa demeure (article 12 du Pacte) « étaye 
cette opinion ». Au nom de ces magistrats, le juge La Forêt ajoute :  
                   
47  L’article 7 de la Charte canadienne se lit ainsi : « Chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté 
et à la sécurité de sa personne; il ne peut être porté atteinte à ce droit qu’en conformité 
avec les principes de justice fondamentale. » 
48  [1997] 3 R.C.S. 844. 
49  Les quatre autres juges ont plutôt estimé qu’il n’était point nécessaire de se prononcer 
sur cette question. 
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« Comme notre Cour a reconnu la valeur de persuasion des 
pactes internationaux dans la définition de la portée des droits 
garantis par la Charte [références à l’Arrêt Slaight 
Communications (infra) et à l’affaire Re Public Service Employee 
Relations Act (Alberta) (supra)], je considère que l’article 12 
renforce ma conclusion voulant que le droit de décider où établir sa 
demeure fasse partie de la sphère irréductible d’autonomie 
personnelle protégée par la garantie de liberté énoncée à l’article 
7.50 » 
Ce passage du juge La Forêt renvoie à une autre décision de la Cour 
suprême du Canada51 qui, dès 1989, ouvrait une perspective intéressante 
pour l’utilisation des instruments internationaux en droit domestique 
canadien. Cette fois, il s’agissait d’appliquer le test de l’article 1 de la 
Charte canadienne à l’ordonnance d’un tribunal administratif qui limitait 
la liberté d’expression de l’employeur visé. Un arbitre nommé par le 
gouvernement fédéral sous l’article 61.5 du Code canadien du travail52 
avait conclu au caractère injuste du congédiement imposé au salarié. 
Parmi les mesures de réparation ordonnées à la suite de cette conclusion, 
l’employeur devait rédiger une lettre de référence indiquant certaines 
données objectives concernant l’emploi du salarié congédié. La Cour 
suprême décida que cette mesure de réparation enfreignait la liberté 
d’expression de l’employeur telle que garantie par la Charte canadienne. 
La Cour décida toutefois que la mesure demeurait acceptable dans le cadre 
de l’article 1 de la Charte qui reconnaît qu’une liberté garantie peut être 
restreinte « …dans les limites qui soient raisonnables et dont la 
justification puisse se démontrer dans le cadre d’une société libre et 
démocratique ». Pour ce faire, la Cour dut considérer l’objectif poursuivi 
par la mesure qui était contestée. Les juges majoritaires, s’exprimant cette 
fois sous la plume du juge en chef Dickson, référèrent aux instruments 
internationaux ratifiés par le Canada pour en juger l’importance. La 
citation suivante, tirée de la décision majoritaire, est explicite à cet égard :  
« Étant donné la double fonction de l’article premier que l’on a 
identifiée dans l’arrêt Oakes, les obligations internationales du 
Canada en matière de droits de la personne devraient renseigner 
                   
50  Précitée, note 48, 895. 
51  Slaight Communications Inc. c. Davidson, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 1038. 
52  A l’époque : S.R.C. 1970, c. L-1. Aujourd’hui, il s’agit de l’article 240 du Code 
canadien du travail, L.R.C. (1985), c. L-2. 
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non seulement sur l’interprétation du contenu des droits garantis 
par la Charte, mais aussi sur l’interprétation de ce qui peut 
constituer des objectifs urgents et réels au sens de l’article premier 
qui peuvent justifier la restriction de ces droits. De plus, aux fins 
de cette étape de l’examen de la proportionnalité, le fait qu’une 
valeur ait le statut d’un droit de la personne international, soit 
selon le droit international coutumier, soit en vertu d’un traité 
auquel le Canada est un État partie, devrait en général dénoter un 
degré élevé d’importance attaché à cet objectif. Cela est en accord 
avec l’importance que la Cour attribue à la protection des 
employés en tant que groupe vulnérable dans la société.53 » 
Pour atteindre cette dernière conclusion, la Cour avait invoqué la 
ratification par le Canada du Pacte international relatif aux droits écono-
miques, sociaux et culturels. Considérant cet instrument, les juges 
majoritaires affirmèrent ne pas douter de la très grande importance pour le 
Canada de l’objectif de protéger le droit de travailler sous ses différents 
aspects et d’assurer la dignité du travailleur. La Cour suprême dans 
l’affaire Keegstra54 a de nouveau confirmé la grande importance à 
accorder aux instruments internationaux ratifiés par le Canada lorsqu’il 
s’agit, dans le cadre de l’article 1 de la Charte canadienne, d’apprécier 
l’importance de l’objectif poursuivi par le législateur en adoptant la loi 
contestée. 
Un développement significatif est survenu en 1999 dans la juris-
prudence de la Cour suprême alors que celle-ci a rendu dans l’affaire 
Baker55, une décision qui donnera certainement une nouvelle visibilité aux 
instruments internationaux dans le droit domestique canadien56. Même si 
les faits de la cause ne portent pas sur une question liée au travail, il est 
évident que l’arrêt aura un impact en droit du travail interne. Dans cette 
affaire, la Cour devait définir les critères applicables au contrôle judiciaire 
d’une décision de nature discrétionnaire rendue par le ministre canadien 
de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration. Celui-ci (ou son représentant) peut, en 
vertu de la Loi sur l’immigration et de la réglementation applicable, 
                   
53  Slaight Communications Inc., précité, note 51, 1056 et 1057. 
54  La Reine c. Keegstra, [1990] 3 R.C.S. 697. 
55  Baker c. Le ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration, [1999] 2 R.C.S. 817. 
56  Consulter à cet égard : Gerald P. HECKMAN, « Unfinished Business: Baker and the 
Constitutionality of the Leave and Certification Requirements under the Immigration 
Act », (2002) 27 Queen’s Law Journal 683. 
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faciliter l’admission au Canada d’une personne pour des raisons huma-
nitaires. La Cour, dans son opinion majoritaire, pose le principe suivant : 
« […] il faut que le pouvoir discrétionnaire soit exercé conformément aux 
limites imposées dans la loi, aux principes de la primauté du droit, aux 
principes du droit administratif, aux valeurs fondamentales de la société 
canadienne, et aux principes de la Charte »57. Appliquant ce principe, et 
considérant notamment les valeurs fondamentales de la société 
canadienne, les juges majoritaires ont conclu que, dans une telle décision 
discrétionnaire d’ordre humanitaire, le ministre devait porter une attention 
particulière aux besoins et aux intérêts des enfants. Pour la Cour, les 
instruments internationaux ratifiés par le Canada, bien que ne faisant pas 
partie en tant que tels du droit canadien, devaient constituer une considé-
ration importante dans la détermination des valeurs de la société 
canadienne. Le rôle névralgique des instruments internationaux dans leur 
décision ressort des propos suivants : 
Un autre indice de l’importance de tenir compte de l’intérêt des 
enfants dans une décision d’ordre humanitaire est la ratification par le 
Canada de la Convention relative aux droits des enfants et la reconnais-
sance de l’importance des droits des enfants et de l’intérêt supérieur des 
enfants dans d’autres instruments internationaux ratifiés par le Canada.58 
A l’aide des instruments internationaux ratifiés par le Canada, la Cour 
suprême en arrive à décider qu’une décision de nature discrétionnaire d’un 
ministre est déraisonnable parce que contraire à la tradition humanitaire 
canadienne. C’est conférer là un rôle fort important à des instruments 
internationaux non incorporés en droit interne : ils contribuent à baliser 
l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire conféré par la loi à un ministre du 
gouvernement. L’importance de cet avancé se mesure par les propos lapi-
daires suivants exprimés par le juge Iacobucci dans sa courte dissidence :  
« […] le résultat sera que l’appelante pourra parvenir 
indirectement à ce qu’elle ne peut faire directement, c’est-à-dire 
donner effet dans le système juridique interne à des obligations 
internationales assumées par le pouvoir exécutif seul et qui n’ont 
pas encore été soumises à la volonté démocratique du 
Parlement.59 » 
                   
57  Baker, précité, note 55, 855. 
58  Id., 860 et 861. 
59  Id., 866. 
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Ce survol de la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada démontre 
que si les instruments internationaux ratifiés par le Canada en matière de 
travail ont été invoqués à l’occasion, leur impact dans les décisions de la 
Cour a été fort mitigé jusqu’à maintenant. Ainsi, les obligations interna-
tionales du Canada n’ont pas amené la Cour à lire le droit de négociation 
collective et le droit de grève dans la notion de liberté d’association, du 
moins lorsqu’ils agissaient comme interprète de la Charte canadienne. Il 
demeure que la Cour suprême a récemment émis des signaux selon 
lesquels elle est prête à donner une plus grande importance aux instru-
ments internationaux ratifiés par le Canada dans l’interprétation du droit 
interne canadien. Ses décisions dans les affaires Dunmore et Baker sont 
explicites à cet égard. 
CONCLUSION 
Même si le Canada a été timide dans la ratification des normes 
internationales du travail existantes, il demeure que les obligations qu’il a 
contractées au plan international forment un corpus juridique imposant. 
Au-delà du rôle persuasif qu’il peut jouer dans l’arène politique, cet 
ensemble de règles et de principes n’a malheureusement pas eu un impact 
déterminant dans l’interprétation et l’application que font les tribunaux 
domestiques de la législation canadienne du travail. Les risques que fait 
peser la mondialisation de l’économie sur le droit du travail interne, de 
même que le rôle essentiel que le droit international doit jouer dans ce 
contexte, exigent une remise en cause des principes de réception du droit 
international en droit canadien. 
Il faut rappeler que le droit international du travail a évolué 
récemment, favorisant certainement de la sorte une meilleure réception de 
ses prescriptions en droit interne. L’ANACT, par exemple, est un 
instrument continental, plus décentralisé et plus proche de la réalité 
canadienne, que les conventions de l’O.I.T. De plus, au lieu d’établir de 
nouvelles normes supranationales, étrangères au droit domestique, 
l’ANACT insiste simplement sur la mise en œuvre transparente et 
rigoureuse du droit interne canadien. Par ailleurs, la reconnaissance du 
caractère fondamental, universel et inaliénable de certaines normes du 
travail au plan international apparaît aussi une avancée considérable. 
Ainsi, en 1998, l’O.I.T. a élevé au rang de droits fondamentaux quatre 
principes contenus dans huit conventions, dont celui de la liberté 
d’association et du droit à la négociation collective. Ces principes lient 
tous les États membres de l’O.I.T., qu’ils aient ou non ratifié les huit 
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conventions en question. En dépit de la conception dualiste prévalant au 
Canada, ces principes devraient recevoir un écho particulier en droit 
interne, et s’imposer aux tribunaux comme une référence incontournable. 
C’est ainsi qu’il serait certainement plus difficile aujourd’hui à la Cour 
suprême du Canada de soutenir, comme elle l’a fait en 1987, que le droit à 
la grève n’a pas encore atteint le statut de droit fondamental au Canada.  
L’impact fort discret des normes internationales sur le contenu et 
l’évolution du droit canadien du travail s’explique en grande partie par la 
structure constitutionnelle canadienne. Celle-ci rend particulièrement 
difficile la mise en œuvre des engagements internationaux contractés par 
Ottawa en droit interne. Elle limite aussi certainement le nombre de ratifi-
cations que le gouvernement fédéral est prêt à concrétiser.  
Il n’appartient pas aux tribunaux de modifier la constitution 
canadienne et le partage des compétences législatives au sein de la 
fédération. Reste que le principe établi par le Conseil privé en 1937, selon 
lequel seule l’autorité législative compétente sur l’objet du traité peut 
adopter une loi de mise en œuvre d’un traité international, limite la marge 
de manœuvre canadienne à l’égard de la ratification de traités interna-
tionaux, et affecte la crédibilité du Canada sur la scène internationale. Il 
est grandement temps que l’opportunité de ce principe soit remise en 
question parce que son application mène à des résultats aberrants. Par 
exemple, comment le Canada peut-il, d’une façon crédible et convain-
cante, exiger l’insertion d’une clause sociale dans un éventuel accord sur 
la Zone de libre-échange des Amériques (ZLEA) qui est actuellement en 
négociation, alors que l’ANACT ne s’applique toujours pas à la Nouvelle–
Écosse, au Nouveau-Brunswick, à Terre-Neuve, à la Saskatchewan et à la 
Colombie-Britannique?  
La solution à cet égard est difficile à imaginer, et il est loin d’être 
évident qu’elle doit relever de l’initiative des tribunaux. Il n’est pas 
réaliste d’envisager une centralisation des pouvoirs législatifs liés au 
travail dans la conjoncture politique qui prévaut actuellement au Canada. 
Certains croiront tout de même que l’initiative appartient ici au gouver-
nement fédéral qui devra soit rechercher plus activement la coopération et 
l’adhésion des provinces, soit oser agir unilatéralement, particulièrement 
lorsque des droits fondamentaux de la personne sont en cause. A l’inverse, 
est-il imaginable de doter les provinces d’une véritable personnalité 
internationale relativement à des matières qui relèvent de leur compétence 
législative exclusive?  
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Malgré l’approche dualiste prévalant au Canada, la jurisprudence de la 
Cour suprême démontre que le contenu du droit international auquel le 
Canada est lié peut avoir un impact significatif en droit interne. Il est à 
espérer que la tendance amorcée par la Cour suprême, grâce à laquelle le 
droit international reçoit une plus grande visibilité, se poursuive et 
s’affermisse. Les droits fondamentaux du travail, aujourd’hui objet d’un 
vaste consensus international, ne peuvent demeurer dans l’antichambre du 
droit domestique canadien. Les instruments internationaux, surtout ceux 
établissant des droits fondamentaux de la personne, devraient tous avoir 
un caractère persuasif dans l’application et l’interprétation du droit interne 
canadien. En effet, comment justifier un écart du droit canadien à la norme 
internationale lorsque celle-ci fait l’objet d’un vaste consensus au plan 
international? Les traités ratifiés par le Canada devraient recevoir une 
considération supplémentaire, compte tenu de l’engagement juridique dont 
ils sont l’objet en droit international. À une époque où le droit interna-
tional doit réussir à s’imposer davantage, il n’est pas acceptable que l’acte 
d’engagement du Canada auprès de la communauté internationale n’ait 
aucun écho particulier en droit interne. Il faut en arriver à conférer une 
signification déterminante à la ratification d’un instrument juridique 
international en droit interne. Toute évolution significative à cet égard 
exige une remise en cause de l’équilibre et de la séparation des pouvoirs 
entre les différentes branches de l’État. Comme les possibilités qu’une 
telle remise en cause ne survienne rapidement apparaissent très minces, il 
faut souhaiter qu’entre-temps, les juges osent incorporer davantage les 
instruments internationaux ratifiés par le Canada dans la lecture qu’ils font 
de la législation canadienne. 
Un tel mouvement a été amorcé principalement grâce à l’entrée en 
vigueur de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. La jurisprudence y 
a vu la consécration en droit canadien de plusieurs droits fondamentaux de 
la personne reconnus en droit international. Cela a permis à l’occasion de 
lire le contenu de la Charte à la lumière du droit international. Il faut 
espérer que les juges n’hésitent pas à faire de même à l’égard de la 
législation ordinaire. C’est particulièrement important dans le domaine du 
travail puisque c’est la législation ordinaire, généralement provinciale, qui 
met en œuvre les prescriptions du droit international ratifié par le Canada. 
Le droit canadien a récemment laissé entrevoir une certaine ouverture à 
une telle tendance. Pour qu’elle se concrétise, il est impératif que les 
membres de la magistrature et les plaideurs soient sensibilisés au rôle et au 
contenu du droit international. Par leur action, ils peuvent contribuer à 
faire en sorte que le contenu du droit canadien du travail soit davantage 
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conforme aux obligations internationales qui lient le Canada. Ce 
faisant, ils contribuent aussi à protéger les travailleurs canadiens contre 
certains des effets négatifs de la mondialisation de l’économie sur leurs 
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Insolvency is a condition which is inherently chaotic. With the 
effluxion of time and no stabilization of distracting factors, value 
evaporates. Resources are not fully utilized—indeed in some instances, the 
scarce resources are completely discarded. Often these resources are 
intangibles—namely the goodwill which is built up in a business 
organization and its workforce. This is not the goodwill that enhances the 
value of a business by its location, say a newsstand in a subway station. 
Rather it is the goodwill which a business has arising out of a trained 
workforce, with established ties to suppliers and to customers and with an 
organized distribution system. Time, experience and capital have been 
spent in building up such an organization. While this organization has 
become insolvent, and therefore there will have been a combination of 
internal and external factors contributing to this condition, it would be a 
waste to have the business shut down and its tangible assets liquidated on 
a piecemeal basis. That result would not maximize value for the creditors 
of the company (nor for its shareholders); it would throw its employees 
out of work requiring them to seek jobs for which they may not be readily 
qualified; it would require anyone purchasing piecemeal assets to rebuild 
the goodwill discussed. 
There is now general recognition that the sale (or other reorganization 
disposition) of an insolvent but viable business is the option which should 
be first explored so as to conserve the scarce resources. That may take the 
form of compromise of debt (restructuring the balance sheet) with 
creditors exchanging part of the money owed to them into equity, possibly 
with existing management continuing and possibly with the original 
shareholders maintaining a (reduced) equity participation. At the other end 
                   
*  Justice, Superior Court of Justice, Toronto, Ontario. 
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of the spectrum, the company may be taken over by a new equity investor 
who will require new management and the original creditors may have 
sold their debt position to entrepreneurial “vulture funds”, the managers of 
which may be counting on a reorganization plan leaving them with a 
return of more pennies on the dollar than they paid the original creditors, 
with or without an equity kicker. Existing management may survive if it is 
perceived that the troubles which beset the enterprise were unexpected by 
the industry generally; if, however, existing management were not alert, 
then their chances of survival are minimized. 
If productivity is a fundamental problem, then a balance sheet restruc-
turing will only be a temporary band-aid doomed to failure. Productivity 
issues require a complete rethinking of the business organization/operation 
so that the restructured enterprise may be competitive. There must also be 
a recognition that the “successful restructuring” of an enterprise may only 
increase the pressure on its domestic competitors which may then find 
themselves next in line for insolvency proceedings. That is, there may be 
overcapacity in an industry sector which cries out for reduction 
rationalization. The equation may be more difficult to handle with foreign 
competition. 
Can every insolvent enterprise be successfully reorganized/ 
rehabilitated? No. In some instances, technological innovation will have 
overcome some industries. Amalgamated Buggywhip Inc. may have been 
a darling of the stock markets in the 1880’s but with the advent of the 
automobile its role as a survivor would be as a small niche player catering 
to horse fanciers. Some businesses transition themselves—for example, as 
did Studebaker in shifting manufacturing from wagons to automobiles—
only to succumb to competition from other vehicle manufacturers a half a 
century later.  
Today, with the tariff barriers eliminated or virtually non-existent, 
foreign imports create increasing pressure on domestic industries. Witness 
the traditional Big Three vehicle manufacturer: worldwide capacity in the 
vehicle manufacturing business of some twenty percent virtually assures 
that at some stage, one or more of the Big Three will disappear. 
The economic doctrine of comparative advantage in the long run 
means that everyone in the world, no matter what country they live in, will 
be better off if there is specialization in particular businesses in which a 
nation or a region has a comparative advantage (taking into account 
transportation costs). Simply put, if China is more efficient than Canada 
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both in the production of clothing and of automobiles, but relatively more 
efficient at making clothing than automobiles, then both countries would 
benefit if China produced all the clothing for both countries and Canada 
all the autos. However, we do not live in a perfect world and governments 
decide for public policy reasons that they wish to support a variety of 
businesses. But in doing so, these governments subsidize relatively 
inefficient industries and the worldwide consumer is penalized. We do, 
however, live in the short run, not in the long run. It is not easy, nor indeed 
possible, to readily change a textile mill into an operation which produces 
carburetors. Industries which prospered under a cheap Canadian dollar 
may have difficulty adjusting to its newfound strength (or conversely, the 
newfound weakness of the US dollar), especially when the change was 
generally unanticipated and so rapid. Many businesses are capital 
intensive and require many years to emerge from the planning stage to that 
of full-scale production; a commitment to such an enterprise requires 
assumptions about exchange rates, government policy (including 
taxation), inflation and interest rates. 
Developing nations may not find it desirable to rely upon one or two 
primary industries where they have a comparative advantage. For instance, 
sisal may be cyclical as to production/harvest and as to price competition 
on a worldwide basis—and it may be under functional competition with, 
say, plastic rope. Further these developing nations may feel that they need 
to protect local inefficient industry for a period of time to allow these 
industries to achieve a critical mass with which to withstand international 
competition. Short-term subsidies for this purpose may be acceptable, but 
if they go beyond a legitimate short-term boost, then they become a 
hidden tax upon the consumer and a direct burden on the taxpayer, 
meanwhile they signal hope and expectation to other industries that they, 
too, should benefit from a hand-up which is in truth a handout. 
Business on a worldwide basis is increasingly becoming more and 
more competitive. At the same time the world economy is becoming 
increasingly more interdependent. To enjoy the higher standard of living 
which goes with that interdependence, we have to be flexible and 
adaptable to keep up with that competition. We really do not have a choice 
of standing still; for if we did, we would be opting out and so becoming 
poorer. 
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Canada is a good example of how foreign trade (which is 80% of our 
Gross National Product on a gross value) benefits a country’s economy. 
NAFTA substantially integrated our economy with that of the United 
States. Foreign trade with the US represents approximately two thirds of 
our Gross National Product. Canada and the US are each other’s largest 
trading partner. Each has substantial investments in the other. 
This has been a short and simplistic economic analysis to set the stage 
for the legal concerns involved in cross-border insolvencies. In essence, 
when things go wrong in a business enterprise, there are much more likely 
to be implications in various countries, including Canada (and likely at 
least the US). As Bruce Leonard and I observed about the globalization of 
business and reorganizations and restructurings in a paper to the 
Turnaround Management Association Conference in 2001 entitled Co-
ordinating Cross-Border Insolvency Cases:1 
“The tremendous advances in information technology within the 
last fifteen years have made it possible for businesses to operate in 
a variety of different countries at the same time and to link all of 
these operations as if they were right next door. A multinational 
business operating profitably and internationally can make deci-
sions quickly that affect its global operations; it can allocate 
resources internationally in a manner which best suits its objectives 
and it can utilize its going-concern values to augment the value of 
its underlying operating assets on the basis that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts. 
The onset of an insolvency case, however, stops all that and turns 
the business into a series of disconnected segments in several 
different countries. In a typical international insolvency, different 
sets of creditors assert different kinds of claims to different assets 
under different rules in different countries. The international busi-
ness that was once carried on comes to an end and separate, 
unconnected remnants of the organization attempt to continue until 
they either starve or implode. It is almost as if a cross-border 
insolvency system had been set up deliberately to promote failures 
and liquidations. 
                   
1  (West Palm Beach, Florida, October 15, 2001) [unpublished, paper on file with the 
author]. 
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The structural framework for dealing with multinational and cross-
border businesses that encounter financial difficulties has hardly 
evolved from the state it was in several decades ago although our 
recent experience and developments that are on the horizon hold 
the promise of significant improvements and the prospect of the 
domestic adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law is becoming 
more and more encouraging. There have been initial and limited 
domestic legislative initiatives into the area of co-operation in 
international insolvencies and restructurings but until the 
UNCITRAL Model Law is widely enacted, however, the legal 
structure internationally for enterprises in financial difficulty can 
best be described as compartmentalized. When insolvency or 
financial failure affects a multinational business, it is still most 
commonly dealt with through a variety of independent, separate 
and often-unconnected administrations, most often for different, if 
not conflicting, purposes.” 
For reason of simplicity, I will only refer to a two country model, 
specifically Canada and the United States; however, in many instances 
there will have to be more than two countries involved—for example, 
ranging from three, Canada, US and England, in the Olympia & York 
insolvency to scores in BCCI (Bank of Commerce and Credit Interna-
tional) to over 150 in Singer. 
What happens when things go awry in a business that operates and/or 
has investments on both sides of the border? Usually there will be filings 
under both Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code and usually the 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) in Canada. If the activity 
in the US is primarily derivative of what might be described as a main 
centre of activities in Canada, then likely, a section 304 US Code ancillary 
proceeding will be brought in the US to stay proceedings there and 
coordinate them with the main Canadian proceedings. In the reverse 
situation, the section 18.6 1997 amendments to the CCAA (or indeed Part 
XIII of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA)) may be utilized to the 
same effect. As a side note, historically and now, the US is used to having 
a Chapter 11 stay respected essentially on a worldwide basis because so 
many foreign enterprises have US investments or their principals travel to 
the US. In contrast many foreign enterprises may be willing to run the risk 
of ignoring a stay order emanating from a Canadian or other non-US court 
on the basis of having no tangible connection with the country whose 
court has issued the stay. An example of this would be the seizure of 
Canada 3000 planes in Europe by creditors notwithstanding Ground J.’s 
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CCAA order. In those circumstances, Canadian CCAA applicants would 
have to obtain foreign recognition of the Canadian order usually on a 
comity basis to allow for practical enforcement. That process may take 
some time and the horse will have been taken from the barn before the 
Canadian order is recognized, as illustrated by Canada 3000. However, at 
present, it is not unusual for foreign-retained counsel to be waiting by the 
fax machine for a copy of the CCAA order so that they may obtain a 
recognition order within a few hours from the US or other major trading 
partner court, with that recognition order having effect for the whole of the 
day of issue. The Courts of Canada and the US are very cognizant of the 
doctrine of comity and the increased volume of proceedings traffic across 
the 49th parallel has resulted in a familiarity allowing for significant 
streamlining of applications. 
Given that the insolvency condition is inherently chaotic, most of the 
proceedings are manifestly “real time litigation”. However, part of a case 
may evolve into what might be termed “autopsy litigation”. An example of 
autopsy litigation would be where none of the parties is arguing that a 
particular segment of the enterprise not be disposed of; as a result, the 
business may be transferred to the new owner without dispute in exchange 
for value; however, autopsy litigation may take place, say, a year later to 
determine how that consideration is to be divided up. The important thing 
with real time litigation is not to get bogged down in procedural issues, but 
rather that coordination between the jurisdictions be promoted to the 
maximum degree. The fundamental cornerstone of that coordination is to 
have effective and timely communication between the courts of the two 
(or more) jurisdictions. How is that to be accomplished? 
Communication between courts—is that not a radical step? Are there 
no fundamental issues of procedural fairness involved? The answer is “no” 
to the first question and “yes” to the second, but that procedural fairness 
questions have been well addressed over the past decade. There has 
always been communication between courts—in the past this has usually 
been through one court issuing an order accompanied by reasons and the 
other court responding in kind with communications being through 
counsel in either jurisdiction. However, this is rather time consuming and 
it does not lend itself to brainstorming problems/solutions in real time. 
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The need for better, that is more efficient, communications was well 
illustrated by the Maxwell Communications case of the early 90s. The US 
and English judges, Brozman and Hoffmann respectively, sensed that the 
information they were receiving in their respective courts was askew. 
They independently raised with their respective counsel that a protocol 
between the two courts would be helpful, not only to resolve an impasse, 
but also to facilitate better and more timely exchange of information. 
Interestingly enough with the protocol in place which provided for an 
intermediary, these two distinguished judges never spoke directly to each 
other until they met for the first time at an international insolvency 
conference shortly after the successful conclusion of the Maxwell case. 
Needless to say that they have become fast personal friends. 
About the same time in the Olympia & York proceedings, there was a 
problem involving governance of the O&Y US subsidiaries. Again a 
protocol was worked out and accepted by Chief Judge Lifland of the New 
York Bankruptcy Court and Justice Blair of the Ontario Court. It involved 
the introduction of another intermediary, the distinguished US diplomat 
Cyrus Vance who was able to facilitate a modus vivendi. 
The Maxwell and O&Y protocols were what might be described as 
single purpose limited in scope arrangements between the courts. With the 
appreciation that protocols could, if carefully thought out and responsive 
to each jurisdiction’s needs, eliminate value evaporating wastage of time, 
practitioners in several countries including Canada thought that it would 
be helpful to provide an acceptable building block menu of principles to 
assist those involved in transborder insolvencies to finalize “general” 
protocols. The philosophy was that good fences/good bridges make good 
neighbours. Under the auspices of the International Bar Association, a 
working group of teams from more than a score of countries reviewed the 
commonalities of their insolvency regimes. This project involved major 
jurisdictions whose insolvency laws and procedures were based upon 
common law, civil code and mixed or other principles. While English was 
the working language, there was recognition that the principles had to be 
expressed in an absolutely neutral language readily translatable into other 
tongues and legal concepts, thereby avoiding any actual or perceived bias 
towards the common law. The threat of unintentional bias was quite real 
since the judiciary in common law jurisdictions, especially the US, 
England and Canada, had considerably more experience in international 
judicial cooperation and in this respect had generally utilized the common 
law philosophy that if something was not forbidden and it made sense to 
do it, then it was judicially permitted. Key also to the working group 
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success was the participation of judges along with practitioners from the 
outset of the project. The IBA project culminated with that body’s 
adoption in September 1995 of the principles under the title of 
“Concordat”. The international insolvency community benefitted not only 
from the availability of the Concordat principles, but also from the 
working sessions which allowed the various persons involved to discuss 
the underlying concerns and commonalities, engage in give-and-take 
discussions based upon the experience gained in previous cases and to 
“get to know the other fellows”. 
Two months after the adoption of the Concordat, a new proceeding, 
Everfresh, came along. Bruce Leonard, a Toronto lawyer and part of the 
Canadian team, was involved in this case wherein Everfresh operated 
legally and functionally intertwined in both Canada and the US by 
“coincidence”, the case came before Judge Lifland and myself and both of 
us had also been involved in developing the Concordat. It should then be 
no surprise that the judges on either side of the border enthusiastically 
supported the concept of developing a more general protocol based on the 
Concordat principles. While other functional work was progressing, a 
protocol was developed in a few weeks by the practitioners. Based upon a 
general consensus of those involved, each court approved the protocol. 
Matters were proceeding more quickly in Canada than in the US. The 
protocol was therefore utilized to hold what was the first cross-border joint 
hearing to co-ordinate the pace of proceedings on each side of the border. 
The hearing was by way of conference telephone with counsel 
participating. Given the rather limited scope of the problem, the telephone 
facility did not constitute any particular problem. However, I would 
strongly recommend that joint hearings be conducted through a video-
conference facility to take advantage of what should be better two-way 
communication (speakerphones are generally one way) and the ability to 
“see” and react to the other side of the proceedings. Justice Forsyth of the 
Alberta Court and Judge McFeeley of the New Mexico Bankruptcy Court 
in the Solv-X case in 1996 persevered against significant technological 
difficulties in their telephone conference hearings. But beware—make 
certain the videoconference connection is workable a day or two in 
advance on a wet run (not dry run) basis. 
After the Everfresh case finished (in about a half year), counsel on all 
sides were canvassed as to their satisfaction with the process. They 
estimated that as a result of the more timely and efficient dealing with 
matters, value was enhanced/preserved by a factor of some 40%. This was 
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particularly significant when one appreciates that Everfresh was a fairly 
small insolvency involving some $50 million of value. 
Other protocols followed in short order. These included ones outside 
the US—Canadian ambit, including Re Commodore Business Machines 
(US–Bahamas), Re AIOC Corp. (US—Switzerland), and Re Nakash 
(US—Israel), the latter two being of specific interest because they 
involved common law and civil code jurisdictions and Nakash had its 
protocol approved by the courts notwithstanding the objection of the most 
major party. An extensive list of protocols and their actual texts are 
available on the website of the International Insolvency Institute (III): 
www.iiiglobal.org. The protocols have become more and more compre-
hensive and procedures have become streamlined, improved and 
standardized. Counsel should have no difficulty in any future case in 
developing a readily acceptable protocol tailored to the specific needs of 
their case based upon these templates. Judges will be able to appreciate 
that the judiciary in other cases has been satisfied with the form, content 
and workability of these protocols. Indeed in many instances the very 
presence of a protocol has eliminated direct court involvement as the 
parties merely proceed smoothly according to the principles involved in 
the protocol. As discussed in the earlier mentioned Turnaround Manage-
ment Association paper: 
“Protocols are intended to reflect the harmonization of procedural 
rather than substantive issues between jurisdictions. Protocols 
typically deal with such items as co-ordination of court hearings in 
the two or more jurisdictions, co-ordination of procedures dealing 
with the financing or sale of assets, co-ordination in pursuing 
recoveries for the benefit of creditors generally, equality of 
treatment among the general body of unsecured creditors, co-
ordination of claims filing processes and, ultimately, co-ordination 
and harmonization of plans in different jurisdictions. Procedurally, 
recent cases have tended to use Cross-Border Insolvency Protocols 
from the early stages of a case. Indeed in 2000, Re Loewen Group 
Inc. (Canada—US), there was a protocol actually entered into as a 
“first day” order. Protocols, however, are invariably expressed to 
be effective only upon their adoption and approval by each of the 
Courts involved in accordance with the local law and practice of 
each local jurisdiction.” 
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There seem to be many threads which have been developing over the 
past decade, all with a view to making a suit to fit the requirements of 
international insolvency. Another example of this would be the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. The Turnaround paper observed:  
“UNCITRAL began a study of the feasibility of achieving higher 
levels of co-operation in the international insolvency area in April 
1994, as a result of an international insolvency colloquium in 
Vienna sponsored with Insol International. The objective in 
developing the Model Law was to establish a set of uniform 
principles that would deal with the requirements which a foreign 
insolvency representative would need to meet in order to have 
access to the courts of other countries in cross-border cases. The 
Model Law Project, however, evolved into a much broader work 
and ultimately became an agreed-upon international model for 
domestic legislation dealing with cross-border insolvencies that 
could be adopted anywhere in the world with or without variations 
that would reflect the local domestic practices and procedures. The 
Official Text of the Model Law has now been published and 
widely disseminated and is available on UNCITRAL’s web site at 
http://www.UNCITRAL.org and on the International Insolvency 
Institute web site at www.iiiglobal.org (at ‘Organizations—
UNCITRAL’). 
The primary goal of the Model Law is to facilitate domestic 
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and to increase 
international co-operation in multinational cases. Foreign insol-
vency proceedings are divided into two categories in the Model 
Law, i.e., ‘main’ proceedings and ‘non-main’ proceedings. A main 
proceeding is one which takes place in the country where the 
debtor has its main operations. If the foreign proceeding is 
recognized as a main proceeding, the Model Law provides for an 
automatic stay of proceedings by creditors against the debtor’s 
assets and the suspension of the right to transfer, encumber or 
otherwise dispose of the debtor’s assets. The scope and terms of 
the stay of proceedings are subject to the normal requirements of 
domestic law.” 
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The Model Law contemplates a high level of co-operation between 
courts in cross-border cases. Domestic courts are directed to co-operate 
“to the maximum extent possible” with foreign courts and foreign 
insolvency representatives in the Model Law: article 26. The courts may 
communicate directly with each other and may request information or 
assistance directly from the foreign court or from the foreign insolvency 
representative: article 25. Co-operation can, for example, consist of 
appointing someone to act on the direction of the court, communicating 
information by any means considered appropriate by the court and co-
ordinating the administration of the debtor’s assets and affairs in both 
jurisdictions: article 27. The courts may also approve or implement 
agreements concerning the co-ordination of concurrent proceedings 
involving the same debtor: article 30.  
The UNCITRAL Model Law was being formulated at the time of 
Canada’s 1997 amendments to the CCAA and BIA. Many of the signi-
ficant concepts of the Model Law are therefore present in our present 
legislation, although not expressed in the language of the Model Law. The 
current review of our insolvency legislation will determine whether to 
keep the present form and incorporate the additional concepts by 
supplementary language or to delete the present form of section 18.6 of 
the CCAA and Part XIII of the BIA, replacing that with the specific 
language of the Model Law, possibly with some amendment. While 
Canadian courts prior to 1997 relied on their inherent jurisdiction and the 
principles of comity, specific authorization to engage in court to court 
communication is now found in section 18.6(2) of the CCAA and section 
268(3) of the BIA. 
Mexico, Eritrea, South Africa and Japan have passed legislation to 
enact the Model Law. Unfortunately its adoption in the US has stalled as a 
result of lobby pressure directed at another portion of the US Code 
overhaul; as part of that overhaul, the proposed Chapter 15 of the Code 
would be added to the Code to enact the Model Law which has been 
variously approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives 
over the past several years, but not within the same bill. As a result, it 
remains in limbo. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law is a procedural initiative. There is 
another UNCITRAL initiative to develop a menu of substantive law 
presently underway. It is anticipated that the working group will be able to 
finalize its work on this project (a menu of alternatives, with a review of 
considerations to be taken into account with each possible selection and 
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observations on the harmonization of the constituent parts) either at this 
September’s Vienna session or at the next session to take place within a 
half year. Developing countries will be able to tailor their insolvency 
regimes to fit their own requirements—an improvement over past 
initiatives where consultants from a developed jurisdiction would 
essentially recommend the adoption of the insolvency regime from the 
consultant’s home jurisdiction—for example, US financial consultants 
invariably recommended that the post-Communist countries adopt what in 
essence was the US Bankruptcy Code. In many of these instances, these 
countries have gone back to the drawing board after appreciating that such 
a wholesale incorporation of foreign law did not address their business, 
social and cultural requirements. (I have previously cautioned against 
wholesale adoption of provisions of the US Code concepts into Canadian 
jurisprudence given that the US Code has evolved to meet specific US 
conditions which may not be present in Canada.) In the remainder of those 
countries, problems continue since their recently enacted legislation based 
on the US Code is not suitable for their particular legal, business and 
social cultures and infrastructures. This is completely unsatisfactory, given 
that a workable insolvency law and regime is essential to a viable 
economy and especially necessary in order to attract foreign capital (loan 
and equity) on any reasonable basis, if at all! This Model Menu will allow 
developed countries to conduct a checkup on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of their present insolvency regimes and will therefore assist 
in recognizing the need for any change. The World Bank is also engaged 
in a complementary program to upgrade the insolvency regimes in 
countries around the world. 
There is a further initiative by INSOL International, an international 
organization comprised of insolvency practitioners with an emphasis on 
practitioners from the accounting and lending sectors. Aside from the 
biennial Judicial Colloquium sponsored jointly by INSOL and 
UNCITRAL (1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2003), INSOL has 
developed an INSOL Lenders Group. This Group has developed a 
statement of principles for cooperation among financial institutions during 
multinational reorganizations. Maximization of value, preservation of 
viable enterprises and jobs and the avoidance of inefficient cratering have 
been the guidelines for the Statement Principles for a Global Approach to 
Multi-Creditor Workouts. Key to the underlying foundation is that the 
parties involved can negotiate “within the shadow of the law; that is, that 
the insolvency regimes in the various countries be predictable with 
certainty and fairness so that negotiations can take place with a minimum 
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of guesswork as to what would be the outcome if the courts were resorted 
to on any minor or major point along the way. 
Additionally, there has been an American Law Institute (ALI) project 
on NAFTA Insolvency Law. The Restatement Paper of substantive laws 
of the US, Mexico and Canada was the first international program 
undertaken under the supervision of this prestigious US body with major 
international connections. Once that paper had been completed and 
accepted, it was thought helpful to see if there could be agreement on 
procedural matters so that there could be harmonization and coordination 
of the insolvency proceedings in cases which involved more than one of 
the NAFTA jurisdictions. This aspect was completed by the tripartite 
country teams and accepted by the ALI in 2000. One of the most 
important elements of this was the preparation of the Guidelines Appli-
cable to Court Communications in Cross-Border Cases. These guidelines 
were largely based upon examples of actual cross-border cases involving 
protocols. The Guidelines may also be accessed through the III website. 
As indicated in the Turnaround paper: 
“The Guidelines recognize that one of the most essential elements 
of co-operation in cross-border cases is communication among the 
administrating authorities of the countries involved. Because of the 
importance of the courts in insolvency and reorganizational 
proceedings, it is essential that the supervising courts be able to 
coordinate their activities to assure the maximum available benefit 
for the stakeholders of financially troubled enterprises. (This 
summary is largely derived from Prof. L. Westbrook’s very elo-
quent Introduction to the topic in the ALI’s Transnational 
Insolvency Project Statement.) 
It is reasonable to expect that many jurisdictions, including most 
common law jurisdictions, have prohibitions against ex parte 
communications with a Court by one party to a proceeding in the 
absence of the party to the proceeding. In some jurisdictions, by 
contrast, the prohibition may be milder and may not even exist at 
all. Arrangements for court-to-court communications in cross-
border cases must not promote or condone any contravention of 
domestic rules, procedures or ethics. The Guidelines in fact 
specifically mandate that local domestic rules, practices and ethics 
must be fully observed at all times. 
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The Guidelines are intended to enhance coordination and 
harmonization of insolvency proceedings that involve more than 
one country through communications among the jurisdictions in-
volved. Communications among courts in cross-border cases, 
however, is both more important and more sensitive than in 
domestic cases. The Guidelines are intended to encourage such 
communications and to permit rapid co-operation in a developing 
insolvency case while ensuring due process to all concerned. The 
concept of court-to-court communications is better seen as a 
linking of two concurrent court hearings, all conducted in 
accordance with proper systems and procedures. The only change 
form a purely domestic hearing is the technological link to the 
other Court. 
… 
The Guidelines are intended to be adopted following the 
appropriate notice to the parties and counsel as would be given 
under local procedures with regard to any important procedural 
decision under similar circumstances. If communication with other 
courts is urgently needed, the local procedures, including notice 
requirements, that are used in urgent or emergency situations 
would be employed, including, if appropriate, an initial period of 
effectiveness, followed by further consideration of the Guidelines 
at a later time. Questions about the parties entitled to such notice 
(for example, all parties or representative parties or representative 
counsel) and the nature of the court’s consideration of any 
objections (for example, with or without a hearing) are governed 
by the Rules of Procedure in each jurisdiction and are not 
addressed in the Guidelines.” 
One of the issues that a communication linkage may raise however, is 
the issue of whether the participation by a party in one country in 
arguments or submissions being made in the hearing in the other country 
constitutes a form of attornment to the jurisdiction of the other Court. The 
Guidelines attempt to anticipate that difficulty by indicating that such 
participation will not constitute an attornment to the jurisdiction of the 
other Court unless the party who participates in the hearing in the other 
Court is actually seeking relief from that Court. This is consistent with 
article 10 of the UNCITRAL Model Law which indicates that an 
application by a foreign representative does not subject the foreign 
representative or the foreign assets or the affairs of the debtor to the 
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jurisdiction of the domestic Court for any purpose other than the actual 
application. 
These guidelines have been incorporated into protocols—for example, 
Re Matlack Inc.; Re PSINet Limited; and Re Systech Retail Systems Inc.2 
The United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2002 decision 
Re Lernout & Hauspie had a number of very direct and pointed 
observations on the need for international cooperation between courts in 
cross-border cases.3 It indicated: 
“We strongly recommend, in a situation such as this, that an actual 
dialogue occur or be attempted between the Courts of the different 
jurisdictions in an effort to reach an agreement as to how to 
proceed or, at the very least, an understanding as to the policy 
considerations underpinning salient aspects of the foreign laws… 
While we do not know whether the cooperation [in Maxwell] was 
initiated by the court or the parties, there is no reason that a court 
cannot do so, especially if the parties (whose incentives for doing 
so may not necessarily be as great) have not been able to make 
progress on their own. 
… [W]e urge that, in a situation such as this, communication from 
one court to the other regarding cooperation or the drafting of a 
protocol could be advantageous to the orderly administration of 
justice.” 
I believe that the watchword for any of the protocols and procedures to 
be tested is as follows: would the informed objective observer say that 
what was adopted by the Courts after receiving all submissions was fair 
and reasonable in the circumstances—and indeed, why has this not been 
adopted before as it is truly common sense. 
                   
2  Re Matlack Inc. (2001), 26 C.B.R. (4th) 45 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (containing the text of the 
Guidelines); 01 CL 4109 April 19, 2001 (Toronto Commercial List) & US 
Bankruptcy Court Delaware 01-01114 (May 24, 2001). Re PSINet and Re Systech are 
unreported endorsements adopting the Guidelines: Re PSINet 01 CL 4155 July 10, 
2001 (Tor ComList) and US Bankruptcy Court (SDNY) 01-13213 (July 10, 2001); Re 
Systech 03 CL 4836 January 30, 2003 (Tor ComList) and US Bankruptcy Court 
(EDNC, Raleigh Div.) 03-00142-5 January 30, 2003. 
3  Stoningham Parnters, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods. N.V. 310 F.3d 118 
(3rd Cir. Del. 2002). 
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When one looks back ten or twelve years, it is truly amazing what 
strides have been made in improving how to deal with cross-border 
insolvency cases. Waiting for the negotiation and adoption of international 
treaties was simply not feasible; by the time that would have happened, 
likely another century would have passed. I gave the following report on 
behalf of the 1997 UNCITRAL/INSOL Judicial Colloquium: 
“Under the auspices of INSOL and UNCITRAL 50 judges from 30 
different countries were involved in the Second Judicial Collo-
quium over the previous two days. The judicial regimes repre-
sented were common law, civil law, a combination thereof, and 
from other traditions besides these. It is not surprising that judges 
may vary in their approach to matters to reflect different concerns 
in different parts of the world. However, given that the judicial 
perspective is to ensure that justice is done in the cases before the 
court, it is also not surprising that, despite these differences, there 
is a general consensus of thoughts on international judicial co-
operation and communication. The Colloquium has allowed the 
judges to explore these matters and to appreciate that we have a 
common interest over a wide variety of subjects. 
Of course, law cannot operate in isolation and insulation from the 
society and economy in which it is to function and regulate 
conduct and activities. The economy is not merely a domestic one, 
as it will be influenced by foreign trade and investment going both 
ways. Therefore, no country’s legal system can operate without 
having regard for the activity of neighbouring states. Given the 
high degree of internationalism in trade and investment, the world 
has, in this respect, become a very small place; I believe we must 
regard each and every state as being neighbours. 
… 
Judges at the Colloquium were of the consensus that it was 
important to avoid these problems. This could be achieved not only 
through agreement to co-operate, but they were also of the view 
that, in essence, where there are concurrent proceedings it should 
be determined whether deferment to the other court on material 
issues more directly affecting that jurisdiction may be possible and 
with reciprocal treatment. We must, of course, recognize the 
sensitivity of the situation—countries will have concerns about the 
integrity of their jurisdiction, including substantive and procedural 
concerns. These must be accommodated and on a two or multiple 
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way basis. In addition, there is the aspect that, through improved 
communication, there could be a timely exchange of valid 
information amongst the concerned courts. … 
… 
… INSOL and UNCITRAL will continue to hold a Judicial 
Colloquium, and INSOL will initiate a separate section for the 
judiciary to deal with these matters on a continuing basis between 
Colloquia.” 
How do the bar and insolvency practitioners fit into this equation? 
1. The judiciary rely upon you as professionals—skilled practitioners 
in the field—to implement these proposals and generally to assist in these 
matters. 
2. As a result of this initiative you will know what is expected of you 
and how to implement it through building on the Concordat and the 
UNCITRAL model law and other valuable initiatives from time to time. 
There will be the desirability of your taking the opportunity during the 
immediate stabilization period provided by stays to see whether by using 
the Concordat and the draft UNCITRAL model there can be 
harmonization between the various concurrent proceedings—both as to 
procedures and timing. This hopefully will lead to the timely and cost-
effective development of a protocol to be entered into amongst affected 
parties and thereafter submitted for consideration and approval by the 
respective courts. Once you review the Concordat and the UNCITRAL 
draft you will see that there is a fertile field of possible steps to consider 
and adopt with suitable changes into a protocol. It is expected that you will 
be significantly advanced on the learning curve through the use of 
Concordat and UNCITRAL so that you will be able to “shortcut” the 
negotiating time required to table a protocol. It will be helpful to the 
parties concerned and the legal system generally to make every effort to 
effect this protocol harmonization. 
The courts will rely on you to carry their message of co-operation and 
communication as expressed in formal orders and accompanying reasons 
to the other courts—reliably and faithfully. 
3. In this regard we in the judiciary may need your assistance to 
ensure that where transcripts are not a regular feature of the domestic court 
a transcript to the extent desired by the judge can be made available 
forthwith. We will also need your assistance with respect to excellence of 
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translation (not mere words but concepts—the opposite to legal research 
by computer which is based upon word identification and not concept 
analysis). 
4. You will be expected to advise the local court of what procedures 
are taking place in other jurisdictions, and to maintain an update of that 
situation. 
5. The courts will recognize the need for you to return to them to 
obtain appropriate relief from time to time, including adjustment of any 
initial order or orders which may have been deployed in the immediate 
emergency circumstances. 
We, as judges, will rely upon counsel and insolvency practitioners to 
take the lead in providing the conduit for judicial co-operation and 
communication. We are confident that we can rely upon you as 
professionals to ensure that justice is done. 
“The key in this Colloquium is that the participating judges have 
reached consensus about being outward-looking—rather than 
inward-looking. International insolvencies are truly international; 
they are not local, with merely local solutions. We have progressed 
beyond national interests; we are now clearly looking at 
international concerns. As we approach the next millennium, we 
must not be looking backwards toward the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries; rather, we must be forward looking to solve 
our problems.” 
Allow me to conclude by observing that what I have been describing is 
the way by which courts and the practitioners have dealt with cross-border 
insolvency matters. However, the general principles and approaches 
involved here are not restricted to the insolvency arena. Indeed, colleagues 
who have been engaged in class actions and other general litigation cross-
border matters have begun to ask “Why not our sector?”, appreciating that 
there is a need for harmonization and coordination in their fields across 
provincial and national boundaries. Why not indeed! 
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A subject that has recently been consuming a substantial portion of my 
professional time is the rule of law and its impact on British Columbia’s suit 
against the tobacco industry for the recovery of health care costs associated 
with tobacco use. About seven years ago my law firm was retained as 
counsel for Philip Morris to defend it in proceedings that were anticipated 
pursuant to legislation that was being passed by the government of British 
Columbia. Since then, the legislation, which borrowed heavily from similar 
legislation in Florida, has undergone two further substantial revisions in an 
attempt to bring it into compliance with Canada’s constitutional requirements 
and at the same time preserve the potential success of the province’s claim. 
The first revision occurred before the legislation was proclaimed and the 
second, after the British Columbia Supreme Court found the Act was 
unconstitutional because it exceeded constitutionally imposed territorial 
limitations. The third version of the legislation has recently been rejected on 
the same ground, that the legislation is extraterritorial. 
Two Philip Morris companies found themselves named as defendants in 
the latest proceedings brought by the British Columbia government. Philip 
Morris International was incorporated in 1986 and does not manufacture, 
market or sell cigarettes anywhere. It supplies management services to sister 
companies. The second company, Philip Morris USA, manufactures 
cigarettes in the United States. Marlborough is its best known brand. It is the 
company that started in the cigarette business and is now a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Altria, a large multinational company which owns companies 
such as Kraft General Foods. Philip Morris’ history in Canada began in the 
1950s with the acquisition of Benson & Hedges. This company amalgamated 
with Rothmans Canada in 1986 and Philip Morris was left with a 40% 
interest in Rothmans, Benson & Hedges. 
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The government has based its actions solely upon the British Columbia 
Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act. No claims are made 
under the common law. Although the Act does have some generic provisions 
such as the removal of limitation periods, it primarily creates a cause of 
action for the benefit of the government against tobacco manufacturers. 
There are three tobacco manufacturers in Canada whose products are 
available in British Columbia. The cause of action created by the Act does 
not follow the traditional requirements of a tort, particularly with respect to 
causation and damages. The Act provides special evidentiary rules which 
benefit the government in the action. From the perspective of a Defendant, 
the Act is designed to significantly improve the government’s prospects of 
success on liability and minimize potential problems with proving the 
damages to be awarded, which could potentially total many billions of 
dollars.  
This legislation raises fundamental constitutional concerns. As part of our 
application urging the British Columbia court to decline jurisdiction over the 
claim, we led expert evidence from leading constitutional scholars in Europe, 
the United States and Japan, each of whom stated that the application of the 
British Columbia legislation would be taken to fundamentally violate the 
constitutions of each of those jurisdictions. We also led opinion evidence that 
because of those violations, a judgment based upon the Act would not be 
enforced in those jurisdictions. The government countered with differing 
opinions, but it is clear that this legislation would be controversial from a 
constitutional perspective in those jurisdictions. Most legally trained people 
would find this legislation offensive, although some seem prepared to 
overlook this, perhaps because of the general unpopularity of the targeted 
defendants.  
The Philip Morris portion of the constitutional challenge to the legislation 
focussed on the rule of law. It was based upon a series of Supreme Court of 
Canada cases where unwritten principles of the Constitution, including the 
rule of law, were formally recognized as Canadian constitutional standards.1 
There has been a great deal of scholarly writing and debate on the rule of law 
and its breadth. Dicey’s early formulation of the principle was exceedingly 
narrow but modern scholarly analysis of the rule of law examines how it has 
played a fundamental underlying role in modern western constitutional 
democracies. The scholars attempt to distill the broadly accepted principles 
that have been generally applied in the constitutions, legislation and common 
                   
1  Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721; Re Provincial Court Judges 
Reference, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.  
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law of developed western nations. There is also some case law on the 
meaning of the rule of law in Europe. The difficulty is that, although the 
Supreme Court of Canada has said that the rule of law is one of the “pillars” 
of our constitution and that together with the other unwritten principles it 
forms the “... grand entrance hall to the castle of the Constitution”,2 the Court 
has not fully defined the nature and extent of the rule of law as it applies in 
the Canadian Constitutional context and the law respecting the availability of 
remedies is still being developed. 
One of the issues in the British Columbia tobacco litigation is how the 
courts will define the rule of law. The parties argued two very different 
conceptions of this principle. The Attorney General took the position that the 
rule of law is comprised solely of the following principles: 
1. There must be a basis in law for any action on the part of the state 
or its officials which limits individual freedoms.3 
2. The law must be equally applied to all those to whom the law by 
its terms applies4. 
3. If the effect that declaring legislation invalid on the basis that it 
violates a provision of the Constitution of Canada would be to 
destroy the institutions of government within the jurisdiction in 
question, and thereby produce a state of legal chaos, the 
declaration of invalidity should be suspended for such time as is 
necessary to permit the remedying of the problem that gave rise 
to the constitutional violation.5 
4. All action on the part of governments in Canada must be 
consistent with the provisions of the Constitution of Canada and 
any government action that is found by the courts to be 
“inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, of no force and effect”, in accordance 
with the provisions of section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 
                   
2 Provincial Court Judges Reference, ibid. at para. 109. 
3 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: 
Macmillan, 1897) at 85 ff; Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R.121. 
4 Dicey, ibid. 
5 Re Manitoba Language Rights, supra note 1. 
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(this principle, known as the principle of constitutionalism, often 
stands on its own as an independent principle).6 
In contrast, our argument respecting the content of the rule of law as it 
applies to this legislation was diametrically opposed to the Attorney 
General’s position. We focussed upon what we submitted were five 
violations of the rule of law using a much broader formulation. We were 
much like two ships passing in the night. The Government’s conception of 
the rule of law would clearly provide our clients with no basis for relief. If 
the position we advocated was accepted, there remained the question of what 
relief was available. This case may ultimately provide some definition of the 
role that the rule of law is going to assume in the Canadian constitutional 
context. 
A brief review of the aspects of the rule of law that we asserted were 
violated by the Act follows.  
I. THE REQUIREMENT OF GENERALITY IN THE LAWS 
Here we relied upon the proposition that ‘generality’ in the law is a 
central requirement of the rule of law. This requires that a legal rule take the 
form of “a ... command that is directed to unknown people and that is 
abstracted from all particular circumstances of time and place and refers only 
to such conditions as may occur anywhere and at any time.”7 To conform 
with this principle, legal norms should represent “... a hypothetical judgment 
of the state regarding the future conduct of its subjects...” Rousseau’s 
formulation was as follows: 
“When I say that the object of law is always general, I mean that the 
law considers subjects en masse and actions in the abstract, and never 
a particular person or action. Thus the law may indeed decree that 
there shall be privileges, but cannot confer them on anybody by 
name... In a word, no function which has a particular object belongs 
to the legislative power.”8 
                   
6 Refence re Quebec Secession, supra note 1. 
7 Quoted in R. Flathman, “Liberalism and the Suspect Enterprise of Political 
Institutionalization: The Case of the Rule of Law” in I. Shapiro, ed., The Rule of Law 
(New York: New York University Press, 1994) 297 at 305. 
8 F.L. Neumann, “The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society”, in W.E. 
Scheuerman, ed., The Rule of Law under Siege: Selected Essays of Franz L. Neumann & 
Otto Kirchheimer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) 101 at 106-107. 
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We argued that to achieve “generality” in the sense required by the rule 
of law, legislators should not in enacting laws “foresee what will be their 
effects on particular people... [S]pecific ends of action, being always 
particulars, should not enter into general rules.”9 
Generality is violated by laws which single out particular groups or 
individuals for special treatment. One author has said in this connection that: 
“Only when such interferences [with liberty and property] are 
controlled by general laws is liberty guaranteed, since in this manner 
the principle of equality is preserved. Voltaire’s statement that 
freedom means dependence on nothing save law refers only to 
general laws. If the sovereign is permitted to decree individual 
measures, to arrest this man or that one, to confiscate this or that 
piece of property, then the independence of the judge is extinguished. 
The judge who has to execute such individual measures becomes a 
mere policeman. Real independence presupposes the rule of the state 
through general laws.”10 
Absent this form of “generality” the law ceases to be a system of norms, and 
instead permits government to engage in the kind of arbitrary behaviour 
which is the “single greatest antagonist” of the objectives underlying the rule 
of law.11 
The British Columbia legislation at issue in our case is not directed to 
“unknown people” but instead targets a finite and relatively small group of 
tobacco manufacturers. Nor is it directed to future and hypothetical 
conditions but is instead directed to known or supposed past events. It 
attaches entirely new consequences to those past events. This is done for the 
sole benefit of the Government as claimant in a specific action. Our argument 
was that this constituted a violation of the requirement under the rule of law 
of generality in the laws, so that the Government was obliged to justify the 
legislation on an analysis similar to that under section 1 of the Charter.  
                   
9 Flathman, supra note 7 at 306-307, quoting from F. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960) at 152. 
10 Neumann, supra note 8 at 118; see also A.C. Hutchinson & P. Monahan, “Democracy 
and The Rule of Law” in A.C. Hutchinson & P. Monahan, eds., The Rule of Law: Ideal 
or Ideology (Toronto, Calgary, Vancouver: Carswell, 1987) 97 at 122; G. de Q. Walker, 
The Rule of Law: Foundation of a Constitutional Democracy (Carlton: University Press, 
1988) at 25. 
11 Walker, ibid.; Flathman, supra note 7 at 303-304. 
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Justice Holmes, in dealing with this argument, found that generality as we 
had presented it was not a constitutionally entrenched rule and could not 
therefore assist.12 
II. THE REQUIREMENT THAT LAWS SHOULD BE PROSPECTIVE 
AND NOT RETROACTIVE 
The second aspect of the rule of law we relied upon was the requirement 
that laws should be prospective and not retroactive. In order to conform with 
the rule of law, legislation must, absent reasonable justification, be 
prospective in nature. This aspect of the rule of law serves to protect the 
reasonable expectations of those bound by the laws enacted by legislature: 
“The acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a 
citizen, before committing himself to any course of action, should be able to 
know in advance what are the legal consequences that will flow from it.”13 
Conversely, retroactive legislation, which would alter the law which was 
applicable to acts at the time of their commission, violates the rule of law: 
“Because a retroactive law applies to past events, its practical effect 
is to change the law that was applicable to those events at the time 
they occurred. To change the law governing a matter after it has 
already passed violates the rule of law. In fact, it makes compliance 
with the law impossible. As Raz points out, the fundamental tenet on 
which the rule of law is built is that in order to comply with the law, 
or rely on it in a useful way, the subjects of the law have to know in 
advance what it is. By definition, a retroactive law is unknowable 
until it is too late. 
No matter how reasonable or benevolent retroactive legislation may 
be, it is inherently arbitrary for those who could not know its content 
when acting or making their plans. And when retroactive legislation 
results in a loss or disadvantage for those who relied on the previous 
law, it is not only arbitrary but also unfair. Even for persons who are 
not directly affected, the stability and security of law[s] are 
                   
12 HMTQ v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 2003 BCSC 877 at para. 133 [hereinafter Imperial 
Tobacco].  
13 Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke A.G., [1975] A.C. 591 (H.L.) at 638 
(emphasis added); see also Reclamation Systems Inc. v. Rae (1996), 27 O.R. (3d) 419 
(Gen. Div.) at 431-435.  
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diminished by the frequent or unwarranted enactment of retroactive 
legislation. 
In short, retroactive legislation is undesirable because it is arbitrary 
and because it tends to be unfair. It upsets plans and undermines 
expectations and it may impose penalties or other disadvantages 
without fair warning.”14 
The British Columbia tobacco legislation abolishes limitation defences 
and revives any actions which have been dismissed in the past on the basis of 
limitation defences. Under section 10 of the Act, “… a provision of [the] Act 
has the retroactive effect necessary to give the provision full effect for all 
purposes including allowing an action to be brought under section 2(1) 
arising from a tobacco-related wrong, whenever the tobacco-related wrong 
occurred.” The result is that the Act imposes on tobacco manufacturers 
substantial new consequences for past acts. This initial proposition was 
accepted by the Court but it went on to adopt the Attorney General’s 
argument that because the Act simply attaches new consequences to past 
wrongs it is not retroactive in a manner that offends the rule of law.15 In other 
words, since the manufacturers knew it was wrong to breach a duty when 
they breached it, all the legislation does is to extend the consequences of 
those wrongful acts to include liability to the Government for health care 
costs. This explicitly raises the question of the extent to which new 
consequences can be retroactively attached to past wrongs under the rule of 
law. 
III. THE REQUIREMENT OF EQUALITY IN THE LAW AS BETWEEN 
SUBJECTS 
Our third argument was that the rule of law requires equality in the law as 
between subjects. The complaint under this heading was that members of the 
tobacco industry are, under the British Columbia legislation, treated 
differently from similarly situated product manufacturers who are not 
members of the tobacco industry and that the distinction could not be 
constitutionally justified.  
                   
14 R. Sullivan, ed., Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3d ed. (Toronto, Vancouver: 
Butterworths, 1994) at 513; Re Indian Residential Schools, [2000] A.J. No. 638. (Q.B.), 
online: QL (AJ) at para. 29. 
15 Imperial Tobacco, supra note 12 at paras. 111, 122-125. 
448 THE NEW RULE OF LAW  /  LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
It is well established that the rights to equality before the law and equal 
protection of the law are central aspects of the rule of law. In its modern 
formulation, this requires that there should be equality not only in the 
application of the laws, but in the substance of the laws themselves. This has 
been recognized by acknowledged legal scholars including Chief Justice 
McLachlin. 
The substantive right to equality in the laws is also an unwritten 
“fundamental right” under European Community law. Anti-discrimination 
provisions found in the EC Treaty are regarded merely as “specific 
enunciation[s]” of this fundamental principle of substantive equality, which 
has broader and more general application. This fundamental principle in 
European Community law requires that Community legislation must be such 
that “… similar situations shall not be treated differently unless 
differentiation is objectively justified”.16 
The reason this principle of equality must be “entrenched beyond the 
reach of simple majority rule [i.e. legislature]” was articulated as follows in 
the Quebec Secession Reference: 
“... a constitution may provide an added safeguard for fundamental 
human rights and individual freedoms which might otherwise be 
susceptible to government interference. Although democratic 
government is generally solicitous of those rights, there are occasions 
when the majority will be tempted to ignore fundamental rights in 
order to accomplish collective goals more easily or effectively. 
Constitutional entrenchment ensures that those rights will be given 
due regard and protection.”17 
The effect of the Act is to abrogate the elements of a traditional common 
law claim against a manufacturer—and to replace it with a regime under 
which a defendant who has committed no actionable wrong against the 
plaintiff (or, for that matter, anyone else) may be found liable to a 
government which has suffered no loss. We argued that this is a classic 
illustration of “the majority [through the legislature] ... ignor[ing] 
fundamental rights in order to accomplish collective goals more easily or 
effectively”—the danger cited by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
                   
16 S.A. de Smith et al., Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th ed., (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1995) at 577-578; Weiser v. Caisse nationale des barreaux français, C-37/89, 
[1990] E.C.R. I-2395 at I-2420-2421 (E.C.J.); Ruckdeschel v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-
St.Annen, C-117/76 & C-16/77, [1977] E.C.R. I-1753 at I-1769 (E.C.J.). 
17  Reference re Quebec Secession, supra note 1 at para. 74. 
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Quebec Secession Reference as demanding the constitutional entrenchment 
of equality before the law beyond the reach of majority rule.18 
We also argued that the Government’s singling out of tobacco 
manufacturers alone for this arbitrary and “unequal” treatment must be 
subject to much more rigorous scrutiny in circumstances where the 
underlying object is to generate revenue for the Government itself. Mr. 
Justice Holmes rejected this argument on the basis that treating all 
participants in the tobacco industry equally was sufficient compliance with 
the rule of law.19 This is another aspect of the rule of law which may require 
further judicial definition. 
IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF EQUALITY AS BETWEEN SUBJECTS 
AND THE CROWN 
Our fourth argument raised the issue of equality between subjects and the 
Crown. We argued that the Act gives the Government, in advancing this 
claim, special and unprecedented exemptions and privileges to which no 
other claimant is entitled at common law, and that the rule of law analysis 
requires that such special exemptions and privileges in favour of government 
be objectively justified. 
The central element of this aspect of the rule of law is that, with limited 
exceptions, the same laws should be applied to government as to private 
parties. This principle operates to control the coercive powers of the state 
which might otherwise be used to oppress private parties. Professor Hogg (as 
he then was) has stated: “In that way, government is denied the special 
exemptions and privileges that could lead to tyranny”.20 Once again this 
aspect of the rule of law has been the subject of extensive scholarly writing 
which points out the dangers of allowing government to afford itself special 
privileges in its relations with private citizens.  
                   
18 Ibid.  
19 Imperial Tobacco, supra note 12 at para. 141. 
20 P.W. Hogg & P. Monahan, Liability of the Crown, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2000) at 
1-2, 156; E.C.S. Wade & A.W. Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 10th ed. 
(London and New York: Longman, 1985) at 92; Ontario Law Reform Commission, 
Report on The Liability of the Crown (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, December 15, 1989) at 
2-3. 
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The British Columbia Court held that the Crown’s right to recover from 
tobacco companies did not have to be identical to that of an individual 
smoker, because to do so ignores the nature of an aggregate action, the nature 
of the loss and who sustained it.21 However, this analysis, which focusses 
exclusively on the aggregated aspect of the claim, does not take into account 
other features of the Act, such as the abrogation of limitation periods, the 
presumptions in favour of the government regarding causation, the provision 
for the calculation of health care costs, which enable it to potentially recover 
this amount without taking into account the taxes which it collected on the 
sale of the cigarettes, or explain how the government is able to justify these 
features of the Act in a legal system which respects the rule of law.  
V. THE REQUIREMENT OF A FAIR TRIAL 
The last aspect of the rule of law that we raised was the requirement of a 
fair trial. We argued that a “fair trial” requires that parties to the proceeding 
must have a reasonable opportunity of presenting their case under conditions 
which do not place any party under a “substantial disadvantage”. This right 
has been aptly described in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights as the right to “equality of arms”. The effect of the Act, we 
submitted, is to change the “rules of engagement” to favour the Government 
in its action against the tobacco industry. The Act imposed specific changes 
in the law directed solely to the Government’s action against the tobacco 
industry which were selectively designed to minimize problems, defences, 
and gaps in proof that have posed obstacles to the success of similar litigation 
in the past. The Act was in other words designed to ensure to the extent 
possible that this specific litigation was “unwinnable” by the defendants. The 
Court in dealing with this issue concluded that there was nothing inherently 
unfair in an aggregate action and accordingly found no violation of the rule 
of law. 
In summary the Court held with respect to the five alleged violations of 
the rule of law, they either were not violations or were not recognized as 
carrying constitutional consequences.  
                   
21 Imperial Tobacco, supra note 12 at para. 150. 
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VI. GOVERNMENT JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLATIONS OF THE RULE 
OF LAW 
Obviously, the requirements of the rule of law, however it is ultimately 
defined by the courts, cannot be regarded as absolute, but instead must be 
balanced against other constitutional values. The courts have not yet 
formulated a clear test on this issue, but Chief Justice McLachlin has said 
that in societies governed by the rule of law, the exercise of public power is 
only appropriate where it can be justified in terms of “rationality and 
fairness”.22 In Mackin, a strong majority of the Supreme Court of Canada 
said that where there is an infringement of an unwritten constitutional 
principle which plays a vital role in the Canadian constitutional structure (in 
that case, the principle of judicial independence), the onus on the 
Government to justify the infringement is a “more demanding” one than 
(even) that imposed under section 1 of the Charter. In connection with issues 
relating to the financial security of the judiciary, the example cited by the 
Supreme Court of Canada as being a potentially appropriate justification for 
infringement was “… cases of dire and exceptional financial emergencies 
caused by extraordinary circumstances such as the outbreak of war or 
imminent bankruptcy.”23  
The Government faces two significant difficulties in justifying its 
legislation. The first arises out of the Supreme Court of Canada’s recognition 
in the Mackin case that section 1 of the Charter provides the appropriate 
framework for the more demanding justification analysis required in the case 
of an infringement of fundamental unwritten constitutional principles 
(para. 73). Under section 1 of the Charter, enumerated rights are guaranteed 
“…subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. We argued that a 
retroactive law cannot be regarded as a limit “prescribed by law” for the 
purpose of justifying a breach of fundamental rights.  
The issue of justification of interference with fundamental rights has been 
considered under the European Convention on Human Rights which requires 
in identical terms that a restriction on rights must be “prescribed by law”. It 
has been consistently held in the European cases decided in this connection 
(which the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged as being “a very 
                   
22 B. McLachlin, “The Roles of Administrative Tribunals and Courts in Maintaining the 
Rule of Law”, (1998)12 C.J.A.L.P. 171 at 174. 
23 Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance) (2002), 209 D.L.R. (4th) 564 (S.C.C.) at 
paras. 71-73 [hereinafter Mackin]. 
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valuable guide” in connection with constitutional issues implicating the rule 
of law24) that the phrase “‘prescribed by law’ ... refers to the quality of the 
law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, a principle which is 
expressly mentioned in the preamble to the Convention”. It is considered 
implicit in this latter requirement that a restriction on fundamental rights can 
only be regarded as being “prescribed by law” where it meets the 
requirements of: 
•  accessibility: “the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen 
must have an indication which is adequate in the circumstances of 
the legal rules which are applicable to the given case”; and 
• foreseeability: the law must be formulated with sufficient precision 
to enable a person affected to regulate his or her conduct and to 
foresee with reasonable certainty the consequences that a given 
action will entail.25 
Assuming that the Act violates numerous precepts of the rule of law, then 
by virtue of its retroactivity it also fails to meet these requirements of 
accessibility and foreseeability which are essential to the rule of law. We 
argued that the Act cannot for this reason be characterized as a “reasonable 
limit prescribed by law” within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter in 
order to justify the numerous violations of the rule of law nor, as any form of 
legitimate justification under the “more demanding” analysis required in the 
case of a violation of fundamental unwritten constitutional principles. 
The second difficulty the government faces on this issue is that although 
one may be able to justify one or the other of the five violations of the rule of 
law to some meaningful standard, it is a much greater challenge to justify the 
violations when viewed in combination.  
What precisely is required to justify legislation that violates the unwritten 
principles of our constitution remains to be clarified by the higher courts. 
Justice Holmes did not deal with this issue in light of his findings that there 
were no constitutional violations of the rule of law.  
                   
24 R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 at 636-637, 640-643. 
25 R. Clayton et al., The Law of Human Rights (Oxford University Press) at 321-324; 
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1979), 2 E.H.R.R. 245 (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights) at 
paras. 46-50; Malone v. United Kingdom (1984), 7 E.H.R.R. 14 (Eur. Ct. of Human 
Rights) at paras. 66-67, 79-80. 
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VII. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A VIOLATION OF 
THE RULE OF LAW? 
The existing decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, dealing with the 
effects of the unwritten principles underlying the constitution, have received 
differing interpretations by Canadian trial courts and our courts of appeal. 
Understandably, as a trial judge, one would be hard pressed to strike down 
legislation in circumstances where the meaning of the rule that you are 
applying has not been clearly defined by any court in Canada, is the subject 
of extensive scholarly debate, and where no Canadian court has expressly set 
aside legislation on this particular ground alone. 
VIII. LEGISLATION VIOLATING UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLES IS INVALID 
We argued and the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada support the 
view that if the violations of the rule of law are not properly justified by the 
Government, then the legislation must be struck down as being uncons-
titutional.26 Although the authority on this point has been developing as the 
tobacco litigation has proceeded, it is arguably not yet definitive. Further 
support for our position is found in section 52 of the Constitution Act which 
provides in section 52(1) that “… any law that is inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no 
force or effect.” The question then reverts to one of whether there are 
unwritten principles which form part of our constitution and if so, what are 
they? 
In the constitutional sphere, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized 
that the adoption of the Charter had the effect of transforming the Canadian 
system of government to a significant extent “from a system of Parliamentary 
supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy”, with the proviso that 
Parliament and the legislatures retain their supremacy to the extent that they 
can still exempt themselves from the Charter and the Constitution can, at 
least in theory, be amended under the amending formula.  
                   
26 Babcock v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 57; Hunt v. T&N, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 
289; Mackin, supra note 23; Provincial Court Judges Reference, supra note 1; Rice v. 
New Brunswick (1999), 181 D.L.R. (4th) 643 (N.B.C.A.); Re Manitoba Language Rights, 
supra note 1; Reference re Quebec Secession, supra note 1. 
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Since our trial court’s most recent decision was rendered, the Supreme 
Court of Canada handed down its reasons in Ell v. Alberta27 where it dealt 
with the unwritten principle of judicial independence as it applies to justices 
of the peace in Alberta. In that case the court concluded that the unwritten 
principle of judicial independence applied and was violated, but it also held 
that the violation was justified in the circumstances by the important 
legislative purpose of improving the quality of justice in the Province of 
Alberta, in particular by independently setting minimum qualifications of 
presiding justices of the peace and assigning unqualified justices of the peace 
to other responsibilities. It is clear from the court’s reasons, however, that the 
legislation would have been struck down for a violation of an unwritten 
constitutional principle had the violation not been found to have been 
justified. This case provides strong support for our argument that, in proper 
circumstances, legislation can be struck down for a violation of unwritten 
constitutional principles.  
Given his findings on violations of the rule of law, Mr. Justice Holmes 
did not have to consider the question of justification. He did, however, 
conclude that the rule of law cannot be used to strike down legislation. He 
also concluded that the rule of law could not be “invoked to give freestanding 
rights to individuals” and he went on to concur with Madam Justice Allan’s 
earlier opinion28 that violations of the rule of law may be used to inform the 
interpretation of legislation, but not to strike it down.29 
IX. THE GOVERNMENT’S CONDUCT IN COMMENCING ACTION 
UNDER THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Our argument under this heading was that, even if the courts lack 
jurisdiction to strike down the Act itself for violation of the rule of law, the 
court clearly has jurisdiction to invalidate the Government’s action in 
commencing litigation under the Act. In the Quebec Secession Reference, a 
unanimous Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that fundamental unwritten 
constitutional principles, which include the rule of law, may “… constitute 
substantive limitations upon Government action”, and that they operate to fill 
gaps in the constitutional text. These principles, the court said are “… 
                   
27 Ell v. Alberta, 2003 SCC 35. 
28 Johnson v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), 67 B.C.L.R. (3rd) 145 (S.C.C.) at 
para. 25. 
29 Imperial Tobacco, supra note 12 at para. 164. 
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invested with a powerful normative force, and are binding upon both courts 
and governments.” With particular reference to the unwritten principle of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law, the court said: 
“Simply put, the constitutionalism principle requires that all govern-
ment action comply with the Constitution. The rule of law principle 
requires that all government action must comply with the law, 
including the Constitution... The Constitution binds all governments, 
both federal and provincial, including the executive branch... They 
may not transgress its provisions; indeed, their sole claim to exercise 
lawful authority rests in the powers allocated to them under the 
Constitution, and can come from no other source.”30 
These passages were quoted by the Ontario Divisional Court in a case 
involving a challenge to “directions” issued by a Hospital Services Commis-
sion, which would have destroyed the ability of Ontario’s only francophone 
hospital to provide truly francophone medical services and training. The 
applicants contended that the directions were unconstitutional for violation of 
their entitlement to “protection of minority rights”—which, together with 
“constitutionalism and the rule of law” had been identified in the Quebec 
Secession Reference as being a “fundamental [albeit, unwritten] organizing 
principle” of the Canadian Constitution. The court rejected the respondent’s 
argument that a violation of these unwritten principles gave rise to no 
remedy, and struck down the impugned directions as being uncons-
titutional.31 
An appeal from this decision was dismissed by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, which expressly affirmed the distinction drawn by the Divisional 
Court between the validity of legislation and the constitutionality of conduct 
under the legislation.32 
While there may be controversy (at least in the lower courts) about the 
jurisdiction of the courts to strike down legislation for violation of funda-
mental unwritten constitutional principles, we argued that the courts clearly 
have jurisdiction to invalidate other government conduct which violates these 
fundamental precepts. Mr. Justice Holmes rejected this argument, 
                   
30 Reference re Quebec Secession, supra note 1 at paras. 54, 72. 
31 Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de restructuration des services de santé) (1999), 48 
O.R. (3d) 50 (Div. Ct.) at 66-68, 83-84. 
32 Lalonde v. Ontario (Commission de restructuration des services de santé) (2001), 208 
D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Ont. C.A.). 
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distinguishing the Lalonde decision on the basis that the underlying 
legislation in that case required the Government to take into account the 
“public good” when making decisions.33  
X. DECLARATION THAT THE LEGISLATION VIOLATES THE RULE 
OF LAW 
Finally, we argued in the alternative that if legislation cannot be set aside 
for violation of the rule of law, then the applicants would be entitled to a 
declaration that the Act violates the rule of law. Such a declaration lacks 
coercive effect, but it is responsive to contemporary notions of the courts’ 
role as critical participants in a constitutional “dialogue” with the legislative 
and executive branches of government, and indeed, to the obligation of the 
courts as “trustees” of our constitutional rights and freedoms. Another 
unsuccessful submission! 
SUMMARY 
In summary, the Supreme Court of Canada has, through its clear 
recognition of unwritten constitutional principles, apparently opened the door 
to the grand entrance hall of the Constitution. The subject is intriguing but it 
is also complex and uncertain. In the context of the rule of law, answers to 
the following questions require substantial clarification by the courts: 
What principles are encompassed by the rule of law in the Canadian 
constitutional context? 
Do different aspects of the rule of law carry different weight in the 
constitutional context? 
What is the test that must be satisfied by government to justify violations 
of the rule of law?  
Does the test vary depending upon the manner in which the rule of law is 
violated? 
                   
33 Imperial Tobacco, supra note 12 at para. 168. 
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What are the consequences of a violation of the rule of law? 
Finally, will the idea of unwritten constitutional principles continue to 
develop and become a defined and entrenched part of our constitutional law 
or will the complexities and uncertainties this theory raises force the Court to 
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I think it appropriate to begin by telling you that I was invited to 
participate in this panel because of a concern on the part of the conference 
organizers that, since there are obviously two sides to the dispute between 
a number of major Canadian and foreign companies engaged in the 
manufacture of tobacco products and the Government of British Columbia 
about the constitutionality of British Columbia’s Tobacco Damages and 
Health Care Costs Recovery Act,1 it would be better for you to hear from 
representatives of both sides rather than just one. Ross Clark, counsel for 
one of the foreign companies, Philip Morris Inc., has succinctly 
summarized the position taken by his client on the issue with which it has 
been primarily concerned, which is whether the Act should be struck down 
because it offends the rule of law.2 I have been involved on the 
Government’s side of this dispute for a number of years now, in fact since 
the enactment of the current Act’s predecessor in 1997, and can therefore 
appropriately be viewed today as the representative of that side. In that 
capacity, I will attempt to summarize equally succinctly the position the 
Government has taken in response to Philip Morris’ submissions on that 
issue. 
It is important at the outset to note, as Mr. Clark has done in his paper, 
that the rule of law is not the only basis upon which the tobacco 
manufacturers are attacking the constitutionality of British Columbia’s 
legislation. They are also attacking it on the basis of the principle of 
judicial independence and federalism grounds, specifically in the latter 
regard on the ground that the Act exceeds the territorial limitations under 
which provincial legislatures are constitutionally permitted to legislate. 
While the manufacturers have so far not prevailed on their rule of law and 
judicial independence arguments, they have prevailed—in relation to both 
                   
1  S.B.C. 2000, c. 30 
2  D.R. CLARK, “British Columbia Tobacco Litigation and the Rule of Law” in this 
volume. 
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the current statute and its predecessor—on their federalism argument.3 I 
am not going to speak today to the other grounds advanced by the 
manufacturers in their attack; I am going to limit myself, as Mr. Clark has 
done, to the rule of law ground. In respect of that ground, I should also 
note that Philip Morris’ rule of law argument differs somewhat from the 
rule of law argument advanced by the Canadian companies involved in the 
litigation. While some of what I say has application to both lines of 
argument, I am going to limit myself to the line of argument advanced by 
Philip Morris, since it is that line of argument that Mr. Clark has 
summarized for you today. 
I also want to alert you to the fact that, while I have a representative 
function to perform here today, I am not going to limit what I say to a 
statement of the Government’s position on the issues raised by Mr. Clark. 
This is obviously not an appropriate forum for a dry run of part of the 
appeal that is scheduled to take place in late November in the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal.4 Moreover, it would be impossible in the short 
time available to me to do justice to the lengthy and multifaceted set of 
arguments that the Government will be making on that appeal on the rule 
of law issues that have been raised by Philip Morris.  
While I am going to provide you with an outline of the Government’s 
position on those issues, I am also going to make some general comments 
about what seems to me to be the most important and most interesting of 
the questions raised by the rule of law-based challenge to the validity of 
British Columbia’s legislation, at least from an academic standpoint. That 
question is whether the so-called organizing and underlying principles of 
Canada’s constitution—like the rule of law—can be used as independent 
bases to strike down otherwise valid federal and provincial legislation. 
While nothing I say in the course of making these comments will be 
inconsistent with the position the Government of British Columbia is 
taking on this question in our case, it is important to note that I make them 
not in my capacity as a representative of that government, but as a legal 
scholar who has for some time had and continues to have a genuine 
academic interest in the issue. 
                   
3  See JTI—Macdonald v. B.C. (A.-G.) (2000), 184 D.L.R. (4th) 335 (B.C.S.C.) and 
HMTQ v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 2003 BCSC 877. 
4  The Court heard the appeal in November 2003 and reserved judgment. 
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I. THE RULE OF LAW AND THE TOBACCO LITIGATION IN B.C. 
I begin then, wearing my representative hat, with an outline of the 
position the Government of British Columbia has taken in response to the 
rule of law arguments that Philip Morris has been advancing in its attack 
on the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act. Those 
arguments have been summarized in some detail by Mr. Clark in his 
paper, and I do not propose to repeat that summary here, beyond noting 
that the arguments generally are to the effect that (a) the rule of law as a 
legal principle should be understood to mean certain things—for example, 
that legislation must be general in its application, that it must be 
prospective in its application, and that it must treat all subjects equally and 
provide for fair trials; (b) the Act fails to meet these requirements; and (c) 
for that reason, it should be declared unconstitutional and struck down. 
The position the Government has taken in response to these arguments 
varies somewhat, of course, as one moves from one of the proposed 
meanings of the rule of law to another. For example, the Government has 
responded to the equality and fair trial branches of the argument on their 
merits—that is, by contending that the fact that the Act deals only with 
claims against the tobacco industry can be easily explained and justified, 
and that any trial of the aggregate cause of action for which the Act 
provides satisfies the fair trial standard. However, the Government’s 
position does incorporate a number of general propositions, and for the 
purposes of this paper, I am going to limit myself to them. 
Those general propositions can be summarized as follows: 
(1) The Supreme Court of Canada, in cases like the Manitoba 
Language Rights Reference,5 has defined the rule of law for legal 
purposes (and apart from the related but distinct principle of 
constitutionalism) in terms that suggest it has three and only three 
elements, namely  
(a) a requirement “that the law [be] supreme over the acts of 
both government and private persons”6—or, in terms that express 
this principle more broadly, that the law applies equally to all those 
to whom by its terms it applies; 
                   
5  [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721. See also Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
6  Reference re Secession of Quebec, ibid. at 258. 
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(b) a guarantee “to the citizens and residents of the country [of] 
a stable, predictable and ordered society in which to conduct their 
affairs,”7 reflecting what in the Manitoba Language Rights 
Reference the Court referred to as “the more general principle of 
normative order”;8 and  
(c) the need for a basis in law for any action on the part of the 
state or its officials which limits individual liberty, or the 
requirement that “the relationship between the state and the 
individual must be regulated by law,”9 
none of which elements, properly understood, is engaged in this 
case. 
(2) While it may be the case, as Mr. Clark contends, that there is 
considerable support in the scholarly writings of political, social 
and legal theorists for an expanded understanding of the rule of 
law—one that might well sustain some if not all of the 
interpretations of it advanced by Philip Morris—and some support 
for such an understanding in the jurisprudence of other nations,10 
there is very little if any meaningful support for such an expanded 
understanding in our own jurisprudence. 
(3) If accepted as valid, and given the effect contended for, most of the 
extended meanings of the rule of law advanced by Philip Morris—
notably those grounded in concerns about the right to equality, the 
right not to be subjected to retrospective laws and the right to a fair 
trial—would render superfluous provisions of the Charter that 
provide explicit textual recognition of such rights. 
(4) At the same time, these extended meanings, if accepted and given 
the effect contended for, would provide constitutional protection to 
interests that the drafters of the Charter for the most part very 
deliberately chose not to protect—the economic interests of 
corporations. 
                   
7  Ibid. at 257. 
8  Supra note 5 at 749. 
9  Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 5 at 257. 
10  Mr. Clark’s contentions in this regard are summarized in his paper. 
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(5) Not only would the acceptance of these arguments render a number 
of Charter provisions redundant and provide constitutional protec-
tion to interests deliberately left unprotected by the drafters of the 
Charter, it would—because of the “higher standard of justifi-
cation” aspect of these arguments—produce the anomalous result 
that the “unwritten” rights contended for would receive a higher 
level of protection than the rights spelled out in the Charter are 
entitled to receive. 
(6) Even if the rule of law can be understood in the broad terms 
advanced by Philip Morris, our constitutional jurisprudence 
overwhelmingly supports the proposition that the rule of law 
cannot be used as an independent basis upon which to attack the 
validity of federal or provincial legislation.11 
Most of these propositions are, I hope, self-explanatory. However, two 
of them, I acknowledge, are not, and I would like to add a gloss to the 
mere statement of them to make their meaning clearer. One is the first, 
which sets forth the Government’s position with respect to the content and 
scope of the rule of law as a legal principle under Canada’s constitution. 
That position is that the content and scope have been authoritatively 
determined to include three distinct elements. The first of these elements, 
which was featured prominently in Professor Dicey’s classic 19th century 
formulation of the rule of law,12 is that the law must be applied equally to 
all those to whom by its terms it applies. The equality with which this 
element of the rule of law is concerned, important as it is, is limited to the 
manner in which laws are applied. It does not reach the content of the 
laws—that is, it does not provide a standard against which the content of 
the laws can be measured, and, if found wanting, struck down. Putting it 
slightly differently, this conception of equality takes the content of the law 
as given. It is for this reason that the Government is asserting that this 
conception of equality—and hence this element of the rule of law—can be 
of no assistance to Philip Morris and the other tobacco manufacturers in 
                   
11  See e.g. Bacon v. Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corp., [1999] 11 W.W.R. 51 (Sask. 
C.A.) (leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed June 1st, 2000); Johnson v. B.C. 
(Securities Commission) (1999), 67 B.C.L.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.); Westergard-Thorpe v. 
Canada (A.-G.) (2000), 183 D.L.R. (4th) 453 (F.C.A.D.); JTI-Macdonald Corp. v. 
B.C. (A.-G.), supra note 3; Samson Indian Nation and Band v. Canada, [2003] F.C.J. 
No. 1238. 
12  A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London 
Macmillan, 1897)  at 85ff. 
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our case. Their complaint is not with the manner in which British 
Columbia’s legislation is being or might be applied, but with the content 
of that legislation. 
The second of the elements of the rule of law said by the Government 
to form part of the meaning of that principle—the need for a “normative 
order”—is of even more limited scope than the first. It was endorsed by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in a case in which the Court had concluded 
that every statute that the legislature of Manitoba had enacted since the 
early 1890s—including statutes relating to the constitution, maintenance 
and operation of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of 
government—was unconstitutional because it had been enacted in English 
only. The Court recognized that, were it to issue a simple declaration to 
that effect, most if not all of the institutions of government in that province 
would disappear and a state of legal chaos would result. Not surprisingly, 
that was not a result that appealed to the Court, which decided instead to 
suspend its declaration of invalidity for a “reasonable period of time” to 
give the government of Manitoba time to translate its legislation into 
French. In support of taking this remedial route, which guaranteed the 
people of Manitoba the continuing existence of their institutions of 
government and kept the existing statutory law in place for at least a 
while, the Court invoked the rule of law, and in particular the notion that 
the rule of law required a basic level of “normative order”. It is clear—and 
I do not think the tobacco manufacturers are contesting this—that this 
understanding of the rule of law cannot provide them with any assistance 
in their attack on British Columbia’s legislation. The enactment of that 
legislation can hardly be said to put at risk the existence of a basic level of 
normative order in that province. If anything, the situation they confront is 
one of too much, not too little, normative order. 
The last of the three elements of the rule of law that the Government 
contends comprises the accepted scope and content of that principle in 
Canada is the requirement that the state be able to provide a basis in law 
for any action its agents and officials take that threatens individual liberty. 
In the Government’s submission, it is clear that the tobacco manufacturers 
can derive no assistance from this element either. Their complaint is not 
that there is no basis in law for the Government’s action against them—the 
bringing of the special kind of lawsuit for which the Act provides—but 
that they do not like the law that provides the Government with its basis 
for taking that action. 
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The second proposition from the above list that requires some 
elaboration is the third, that relating to the implications of Philip Morris’ 
rule of law arguments for some of the provisions of the Charter, notably 
sections 7 and 15. I limit myself here to the implications of the equality 
branch of Philip Morris’ arguments for the latter of these provisions. 
Section 15 of the Charter has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of 
Canada to provide a very limited form of protection to the right to 
equality. Under the analytical framework established in 1999 in Law v. 
Canada, the governing authority on section 15, claimants invoking that 
provision have to establish (a) that the impugned legislation results in 
differential treatment either because by its terms it creates a formal 
distinction or because it has a disparate impact on a disadvantaged group; 
(b) that that differential treatment is based on one or more of the grounds 
enumerated in section 15 (e.g. sex, race, age, etc.) or a ground analogous 
thereto; and (c) that that differential treatment constitutes discrimination, 
in the sense that it offends human dignity.13 The courts have also held—
and this is implicit within the Law framework—that section 15 can only be 
relied upon by natural persons.  
In essence, the Government’s position is that, if the much broader 
conception of the right to equality advanced by Philip Morris were to be 
accepted, the limitations on that right as it is expressed in section 15 would 
be easily circumvented. Under that conception, corporations would be 
entitled to impugn the validity of legislation, they would be able to do so 
regardless of the ground on which the differential treatment complained of 
was based, and without any need to establish that that differential 
treatment offended human dignity. In fact, section 15 would very quickly 
become redundant. A conception of equality that would have this effect 
hardly seems plausible, let alone appealing.  
The Government of British Columbia’s position in relation to Philip 
Morris’ rule of law based attack was, as Mr. Clark has acknowledged, 
accepted by Justice Holmes, the trial judge in both of the constitutional 
actions that they have launched against the 1997 and the 2000 versions of 
the legislation. By the time this article is published, we will know whether 
the Court of Appeal of British Columbia has also accepted it. At least to 
this point, however, the Government’s position has prevailed. 
                   
13  [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 at para. 88. 
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II. THE LARGER ISSUE 
Having set out in summary form the Government’s position on the rule 
of law arguments advanced by Philip Morris, let me turn now, wearing my 
academic hat, to a consideration of the larger issue that those arguments 
raise: whether or not one can use the organizing or underlying principles 
of our Constitution as independent bases to impugn the validity of federal 
and provincial legislation. That issue is, of course, raised in a very direct 
way by Philip Morris’ rule of law arguments and I have explained in 
proposition (6) above, the manner in which the Government has dealt with 
it in that specific context—essentially on the basis of the existing 
jurisprudence. I now wish to address it in a more general way—general 
both in the sense of being concerned about not just one of these principles 
but all of them, and in the sense of discussing the issue at a level of some 
abstraction. This issue is obviously a complex one, and one which cannot 
be dealt with fully in the time remaining to me this morning. But I can, I 
think, set out in summary form my own views with respect to it.  
That summary begins with the observation that, in thinking about this 
issue, it is important to remember that the list of these organizing 
principles is a long one. According to recent pronouncements by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in cases like Reference re Remuneration of 
Provincial Court Judges14 and the Quebec Secession Reference, it 
includes, at the very least—and in addition to the rule of law—judicial 
independence, democracy, federalism, protection of minorities, separation 
of powers, interprovincial comity, and freedom of political expression. 
That list may become even longer with the passage of time. In fact, as I 
pointed out in an article I wrote on this issue a few years ago,15 support 
can already be said to exist within the body of our constitutional 
jurisprudence for a number of other principles being included as well, 
notably the special role of our superior courts and the integrity of the 
nation state. To ask whether the organizing principles of our constitution 
can be used as independent bases for striking down legislation is not, 
therefore, to ask whether one or two or even three such principles can be 
so used. It is to ask whether a relatively large number of them—at least ten 
by my count already—can be so used. For that reason alone, the issue 
                   
14  [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3. 
15  R.M. Elliot, “References, Structural Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of 
Canada’s Constitution” (2004) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 67. 
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must be seen to be one not of minor but of major proportions, and to 
warrant very careful consideration. 
The issue of whether these organizing principles of our constitution 
can be used to strike down legislation must be said to raise issues of 
fundamental theoretical importance, issues that go to the heart of both our 
system of democratic self-government and the principle of constitu-
tionalism. One of the features of that system that is clearly engaged by this 
question is the legitimacy under our constitution of judicial review—that 
is, the legitimacy of the use by our courts of the power to hold of no force 
or effect legislation that has been enacted by our democratically elected 
representatives at either the federal or provincial level of government. As 
traditionally understood, and as traditionally defended, the legitimacy of 
judicial review in this country has been grounded in, and seen to be 
dependent on, a reliance by the courts on some part of the text of what I 
like to call our capital “C” Constitution—what is now made up of the 
Constitution Acts, 1867-1982 and a few other enactments of special 
constitutional significance such as the Statute of Westminster, 1931 (such 
grounding, it is worth noting, being a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of the legitimacy of judicial review in particular contexts). For 
the courts to use this power without being able to rely on some textual 
provision of the Constitution must, on a traditional understanding, be said 
to be illegitimate, or at least to require a new justification. Such a new 
justification, I should note, I have not yet seen, either in the growing body 
of jurisprudence surrounding these organizing principles, or in the 
academic literature commenting thereon. 
It might be thought that this traditional approach to the legitimacy of 
judicial review would lead inexorably to the conclusion that it is 
illegitimate for the courts to strike down legislation on the ground that it 
offends one or more of the organizing or underlying constitutional prin-
ciples. Such a view would be based on the assumption—a not 
unreasonable assumption, I might add, at least at first blush—that these 
principles are derived from sources external to the text of the Constitution. 
Is that assumption valid? I do not believe that it is. In my view, there is 
good reason to believe that some at least of these principles can be 
grounded, not in considerations that lie completely outside the text of the 
Constitution, but in that text. I would give as an example of such a 
principle that of judicial independence, at least within the superior courts 
of this country. In my view, so confined, that principle can be said to be 
implicit in the combined effect of sections 99 and 100 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867, particularly when those provisions are read in light of the 
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admonition in the preamble of that instrument that Canada is to have “a 
Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom”. Read in 
that light, sections 99 and 100, protecting, as they do, two of the “core 
elements” of judicial independence, 16 can and should be seen to 
constitute an attempt by the drafters of the Constitution Act, 1867 to 
entrench that principle within our Constitution. (Such a reading of those 
provisions would make it possible for someone to challenge on the basis 
of that principle legislation that, for example, required superior court 
judges to get the approval of a government official before releasing their 
reasons for judgment in civil cases involving the government. Neither 
section 99 nor section 100 could be said to speak directly to the obvious 
problems with such legislation. Nor, for that matter, could sections 7 and 
11(d) of the Charter.) 
The critical point from the standpoint of constitutional theory is that, if 
the existence of a particular principle can, applying generally accepted 
principles of constitutional interpretation, be said to be implied by, or 
implicit within, one or more provisions of the text of the Constitution, then 
the invocation of that principle as a basis for striking down legislation is 
legitimate because it is ultimately the text of the Constitution that is being 
relied upon. By contrast, however, if an organizing or underlying principle 
cannot be said to be implied by, or implicit within, one or more provisions 
of the text of the Constitution—as would be true in my view of a principle 
that is solely derived from the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867—
then it cannot be legitimate for the courts to rely upon it, and it alone, to 
strike down legislation (although it may well be legitimate for the courts to 
rely upon it for a number of other purposes, including shedding light on 
the manner in which provisions of the text of the Constitution should be 
interpreted). 
One of the important implications of this way of approaching this 
question—some elements of which, I should note, can be found in Justice 
La Forest’s reasons for judgment in the Provincial Court Judges case17—
is that it obliges us to ask, not whether any and all of the organizing or 
underlying principles can be used as distinct bases upon which legislation 
can be struck down, but whether a particular such principle can be so 
used. In fact, under this approach it is not only unhelpful but confusing 
and potentially misleading to ask the more generally worded question. 
                   
16  S. 99 protects security of tenure and s. 100 financial security. 
17  Supra note 14. 
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So much for the theory. What about the practice? Based on the 
jurisprudence to this point, I think it is clear that our courts—and I would 
include here the Supreme Court of Canada—are still struggling to come to 
grips with the question of how the organizing principles of our cons-
titution are to be used. I attribute much of the difficulty they are having to 
the fact that there is an unfortunate tendency on the part of some of them 
when they discuss this question to lump all, or at least several, of the 
principles together, on the apparent assumption that the answer must be 
the same in respect of all of them. The Supreme Court did this in both the 
Reference re Remuneration of Provincial Court Judges and the Quebec 
Secession Reference (and, I am obliged to confess, in both it asserted, or at 
least implied, that they could all be used to strike down legislation). But 
part of the difficulty must be attributed to the fact that there is also an 
equally unfortunate reluctance to acknowledge and confront the legitimacy 
issue that the use of these principles to strike down legislation raises. That 
reluctance, it must be said, is also in evidence in those two references. 
Only La Forest J., in his minority reasons in the Reference re 
Remuneration of Provincial Court Judges, addresses the issue, and he 
adopts the same position as I have taken in this paper—that judicial review 
is only legitimate if it is based on the text of the Constitution. I cannot help 
but think that, if that issue were addressed more often, the erroneous 
nature of the assumption that the principles are all of a kind would become 
apparent, and the jurisprudential picture would become, both for the courts 
and for us, a good deal clearer. 
Fortunately, at least from my standpoint, we now have a growing body 
of jurisprudence dealing with the use to which particular principles can be 
put. Such a body of jurisprudence exists, for example, with respect to the 
use to which the rule of law can be put (with the answer generally being, 
as I noted above, that it cannot be used to strike down legislation), another 
with respect to the use to which judicial independence can be put (with the 
answer generally—perhaps even consistently—being that it can be so 
used, even when the courts in question are not superior courts).18 In my 
view, it is in the process of dealing with claims based on particular 
principles—as the courts in British Columbia are now doing in the case 
brought by the tobacco manufacturers against the Tobacco Damages and 
Health Care Costs Recovery Act—that progress is going to be made. And 
the fact that the courts to this point have shown themselves willing to treat 
                   
18  See e.g. Mackin v. New Brunswick (Min. of Finance), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405 and Ell v. 
Alberta, [2003] S.C.C. 35, online: QL (SCC). 
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two of these principles—the rule of law and judicial independence—very 
differently means that we might well end up with an approach to this issue 
that bears at least some resemblance to the one for which I have argued 
here today.  
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This paper focuses on the logistics, coordination, recognition and 
enforcement of cross-border litigation in the context of today’s global 
economy. Cross-border transactions between suppliers and consumers 
have become commonplace and their cross-border nature has become 
largely transparent. 
A typical example of litigation which is likely to arise in this context is 
the “hypothetical” that was posited in Compensating Large Numbers of 
People for Inflicted Harms1 by Senior United States District Judge 
Weinstein: 
“Assume a popular unregulated herbal supplement is being 
manufactured by companies in many states and countries. Some 
produce and sell only locally. Others operate nationally and 
internationally. Distributors use worldwide Internet, television, and 
other forms of merchandising. Some foreign companies (and their 
holding companies) sell in very small quantities in each of many 
states in the United States [and internationally]. Purchases can be 
made online directly from the manufacturer and in almost any drug 
store. Brand names are used, but ‘The Product’ is generic. 
Telephone, Internet, and credit card orders utilize satellites, and 
electronic bank transfers settle accounts, mainly through New 
York, London, Zurich, and Tokyo. Suddenly, there are indications 
that the product has serious adverse effects.”  
Disputes are inevitable, yet multilateral international conventions or 
treaties that govern such litigation are rare. The absence of treaties and 
conventions is further complicated by the frequency of litigation involving 
multiple corporate (and government) defendants, some of them multi-
national corporations with subsidiary corporations located in various 
                   
1  11 Duke J. of Comp. & Int’l L. 165 at 169 
476  THE NEW RULE OF LAW / LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
 
countries, and multiple plaintiffs located in different countries, each of 
them with different rights, protections and litigation options. Where 
multiple plaintiffs are resident citizens in different nations and they want 
to combine their litigation efforts, their choice of forum may allow them to 
gain significant substantive or procedural juridical or personal advantages. 
When these complexities are combined with the perspectives emerging 
from different political, economic, social and religious systems to 
emerging or new technologies; scientific and medical developments with 
inherent bio-ethical considerations; and different legal systems and 
different laws; cross-border litigation is certain to increase in complexity 
over the next several decades.  
There are also new trends emerging which will further change the 
landscape of cross-border litigation. They include: 
1. the use or threat of litigation as an alternative to political action by 
citizens frustrated by what they perceive as a reluctance of 
governments to take action to regulate or curtail the effects that 
huge multinational corporations operating around the globe have 
on human rights, labour practices, the environment, etc.;  
2. the potential of a new Hague Convention to address the issues of 
assumption of jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments; and  
3. the pre-emptive settlement of claims by defendants who fear the 
cost and resource drain that large-scale (especially US-originated 
class action) litigation may have on their enterprise or government. 
The balance of this paper is divided into two sections: conflict of laws 
jurisprudence and large scale litigation, which includes class actions and 
group litigation. The primary focus will be on the Canadian legal 
environment, but the nature of the subject dictates that the legal 
environments of other countries be examined, too, albeit to a lesser degree. 
I. CONFLICT OF LAWS JURISPRUDENCE 
As this conference’s focus is on cross-border disputes, my primary 
focus in the conflict of laws jurisprudence section will be on issues that 
arise in international litigation. However, because of the manner in which 
the law has developed in Canada, I have included a brief review of 
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interprovincial law2 because some academic authorities and courts have 
opined on the applicability of principles used in interprovincial conflicts to 
international disputes. Accordingly, my discussion will begin by looking 
at conflict of laws jurisprudence in interprovincial disputes and will then 
discuss the uneasy application of these principles to international 
litigation. 
Since Canadian law is only half the equation governing cross-border 
disputes, I have included a brief overview of the comparable principles 
that exist in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European 
Union (EU). 
A. Assuming Jurisdiction—Jurisdiction Simpliciter 
The Ontario Court of Appeal in Muscutt v. Courcelles (2002), 60 O.R. 
(3d) 20 (“Muscutt”) outlined the development of jurisdiction simpliciter. 
Historically, there were three methods by which jurisdiction simpliciter 
could be asserted against a foreign defendant: 
1. consent—this includes the foreign defendant’s voluntary consent 
to the forum, consent by prior arrangement, e.g., a forum selection 
clause contained in a contract that requires the parties to submit to 
a particular jurisdiction, or by attornment to the jurisdiction by 
appearance and defence; 
2. presence, i.e., the foreign defendant is present in the jurisdiction; 
and  
3. assumed jurisdiction, which is initiated by service ex juris. 
The latter of these, service ex juris, codified by most provinces in the 
Rules of Court, specifies when service outside the jurisdiction may be 
ordered. It is these codified Rules which are now “subject to the principles 
articulated in Morguard regarding the need for a real and substantial 
connection and the need for order, fairness and judicial restraint”: Muscutt 
at page 31. 
                   
2  My focus will be on the common law, not on the provincial legislation that deals with 
interprovincial litigation. 
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1. Jurisdiction Simpliciter in Interprovincial Litigation 
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De 
Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (“Morguard”), an interprovincial mortgage 
dispute. It signaled the first of a number of developments in the principles 
governing conflict of laws jurisprudence in Canada. La Forest J.’s 
judgment reviewed the historical principles that gave rise to a reluctance 
by one state to exercise jurisdiction over matters that take place in another 
state’s sovereign territory (and presumably over its subjects). At page 
1095 of the decision he states: 
“Modern states, however, cannot live in splendid isolation and do 
give effect to judgments given in other countries in certain 
circumstances. [...] This, it was thought, was in conformity with 
the requirements of comity, the informing principle of private 
international law, which has been stated to be the deference and 
respect due by other states to the actions of a state legitimately 
taken within its territory.” 
However, he concluded that the true meaning of comity is more than 
respect and deference. In his view it is a “necessity in a world where legal 
authority is divided among sovereign states...” [at page 1096]. Specifically 
at page 1098 he comments: 
“The business community operates in a world economy and we 
correctly speak of a world community even in the face of 
decentralized political and legal power. Accommodating the flow 
of wealth, skills and people across state lines has now become 
imperative.” 
In recognition of this reality, the Court concluded that new principles 
were required. It determined that a “real and substantial connection” with 
the forum was necessary before a Canadian court could exercise 
jurisdiction over a foreign matter. The Court also established that order 
and fairness to the defendant required that the court act with properly 
restrained jurisdiction [at page 1104]. The corollary of this development 
was that other Canadian courts were required to recognize and enforce 
sister provinces’ judgments. 
Three years later, in Hunt v. T & N, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, the Supreme 
Court gave the principle of real and substantial connection constitutional 
force by holding that the provinces are required to “respect the minimum 
standards of order and fairness addressed in Morguard” [at page 324]. 
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What that meant, however, was not delineated by the Court beyond its 
finding that the principle was neither rigidly defined nor meant to be 
rigidly applied. In Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 (“Tolofson”), 
the Supreme Court conceded at page 1049 that the term “real and 
substantial connection” was “a term not yet fully defined”. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently provided guidance on what 
constitutes a real and substantial connection. In Muscutt at page 21, the 
Court summarizes the relevant factors to consider: 
1. the connection between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim, 
because every forum has an interest in protecting the legal 
rights of its residents; 
2. a connection between the forum and the defendant, which may 
arise where it was reasonably foreseeable that the defendant’s 
conduct would result in harm within the jurisdiction or where 
the defendant has done something within the jurisdiction that 
bears upon the plaintiff’s claim; 
3. unfairness to the defendant in assuming jurisdiction; 
4. unfairness to the plaintiff in not assuming jurisdiction; 
5. the involvement of other parties to the suit, which includes 
concerns about avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings and the 
risk of inconsistent results; 
6. the Court’s willingness to recognize and enforce an extra-
provincial judgment rendered on the same jurisdictional basis; 
7. whether the case is interprovincial or international in nature, 
the assumption of jurisdiction being more easily justified in 
interprovincial cases; and 
8. comity and the standards of jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement prevailing elsewhere. 
As a result of these cases (Morguard, Hunt, Tolofson, Muscutt), it 
seems that there is now a Canadian framework in place for a Canadian 
court’s assumption of jurisdiction in interprovincial litigation. The 
Muscutt decision was recently cited with approval by Justice Bastarache, 
writing on behalf of three members of the Court, in his dissenting opinion 
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in Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia [2003] 
2 S.C.R. 63, 2003 SCC 40 at paragraphs 125-127. 
2. Jurisdiction Simpliciter in International Litigation 
i. At Common Law 
Morguard and the cases that followed established the constitutional 
imperative that there be a real and substantial connection between the 
matter and the forum as the test for establishing jurisdiction simpliciter in 
an interprovincial matter. 
Whether or not the Morguard principles should be applied more 
broadly to questions of jurisdiction simpliciter in international matters 
was, until recently, the subject of some debate. J.-C. Castel notes at page 
2-4 in the context of applying the test to the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments that: “The constitutional requirement would not seem to 
apply to foreign judgments but the new rule has been applied to them.” 
Castel also notes at page 14-2 that: “... Canadian courts have extended 
the application of the Morguard principles to foreign judgments and, in so 
doing, have eliminated much, if not all, practical distinction between the 
regard shown for foreign judgments with respect to questions of 
jurisdiction and that shown for Canadian judgments.” 
In Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. American Mobile Satellite Corp., [2002] 4 
S.C.R. 205, 2002 SCC 78 (“Spar”), the Supreme Court was required, inter 
alia, to consider, in the context of Quebec’s Civil Code and a cause of 
action that occurred in the United States, whether: 
“(a) a ‘real and substantial connection’ between the action and the 
province of Quebec needed to be established before a Quebec court 
could assert jurisdiction over international litigation, and  
(b) jurisdiction should be declined on the basis of the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens.” 
The Supreme Court unanimously confirmed both the lower courts’ 
decisions confirming the jurisdiction of the Quebec courts. In arriving at 
its decision, the Supreme Court undertook an extensive analysis of the 
principles of private international law. At paragraph 20 it held that the 
objective of comity is order and fairness, and that order is the preeminent 
of these. It then noted at paragraph 21: “The three principles of comity, 
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order and fairness serve to guide the determination of the principal private 
international law issues: jurisdiction simpliciter, forum non conveniens, 
choice of law and recognition of foreign judgments.” 
However, in response to the appellants’ arguments that the respondents 
were required to meet the “real and substantial connection” test, the 
Supreme Court noted at paragraph 51 that: 
“[...] it is important to emphasize that Morguard and Hunt were 
decided in the context of interprovincial jurisdictional disputes. In 
my opinion, the specific findings of these decisions cannot easily 
be extended beyond this context.” 
The Supreme Court also noted at paragraph 53 that it came to a similar 
conclusion in its earlier decision in Hunt, i.e., that interprovincial litigation 
principles “should [not] necessarily be subject to the same rules as those 
applying to international commerce”. The Court then specifically stated at 
paragraph 54: “In my view, there is nothing in these cases that supports 
the appellants’ contention that the constitutional “real and substantial 
connection” criterion is required [to be applied in an international context] 
in addition to the jurisdictional provisions [in the legislation].” 
However, in the recent case of Beals v. Saldanha [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, 
2003 SCC 72 (“Beals”), the Supreme Court seemed to endorse the 
application of the Morguard test to questions of jurisdiction simpliciter in 
the international context. While the parties in that case had conceded that 
the Florida court had jurisdiction and the Supreme Court was not, 
therefore, required to make a decision on the point, Major J., speaking for 
the majority, indicated at paragraph 17 that the parties’ concession of 
jurisdiction was appropriate: “It was properly conceded by the parties, as 
explained below, in both the trial court and Court of Appeal, that the 
Florida court had jurisdiction over the respondents’ action pursuant to the 
‘real and substantial connection’ test set out in [Morguard].” 
This comment, coupled with the readiness of trial and appellate courts 
to apply the Morguard test to international questions of jurisdiction 
simpliciter, seems to have settled the law in Canada in respect of this 
issue. 
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ii. Statutory Authority Pursuant to the Hague Convention 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, before the 
development of the Morguard principles (real and substantial connection, 
order and fairness and jurisdictional restraint) the determination of 
whether jurisdiction could be assumed over a foreign defendant was 
determined by the provinces’ Rules of Court. Under these Rules, service 
ex juris might be ordered when the subject matter of the litigation was 
property within the jurisdiction, when there had been a breach of contract 
within the jurisdiction, when damage had been sustained in the 
jurisdiction, when a tort had been committed in the jurisdiction and in 
other, less common circumstances. 
When the foreign defendant is located outside of Canada, the rules for 
service ex juris are largely derived from the Hague Convention on the 
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, to which Canada became a signatory in 1988, and 
which came into force in 1989. As of June, 2004, there were 52 member 
states that were parties to that Convention. 
As Castel writes in Canadian Conflict of Laws at page 11-26.3, the 
Convention is intended to provide uniform procedures to effect service of 
legal documents in a timely manner and to improve mutual judicial 
assistance.  
B.  Declining Jurisdiction Doctrine of Forum (Non) Conveniens 
1. Forum Non Conveniens in Interprovincial Litigation 
Once a Canadian court has assumed jurisdiction, there is the additional 
and discrete matter of whether it should exercise its discretion to decline 
jurisdiction on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. A court 
may decline jurisdiction on the basis that the action may be more 
appropriately and justly tried elsewhere. 
In Muscutt, the Court reviewed the list of factors a court must consider 
when determining whether it is the most clearly appropriate forum [pages 
34-35]: 
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• the location of the majority of the parties; 
• the location of key witnesses and evidence; 
• contractual provisions that specify applicable law or accord 
jurisdiction; 
• the avoidance of a multiplicity of proceedings; 
• the applicable law and its weight in comparison to the factual 
questions to be decided; 
• geographical factors suggesting the natural forum; 
• whether declining jurisdiction would deprive the plaintiff of a 
legitimate juridical advantage available in the domestic court. 
Although there is some overlap between the factors that a court may 
consider in its determination of jurisdiction simpliciter and in its 
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the two are separate 
and discrete inquiries. The Supreme Court explained in Tolofson, at page 
1049: “[The real and substantial connection] test has the effect of 
preventing a court from unduly entering into matters in which the 
jurisdiction in which it is located has little interest. [T]hrough the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens a court may refuse to exercise jurisdiction where 
... there is a more convenient or appropriate forum elsewhere.” 
In summary, there is a two step inquiry for a Canadian court in the 
context of an inter-provincial matter: 
1. Can it assert jurisdiction over a foreign defendant where 
jurisdiction is assumed and initiated by service ex juris? To 
determine this, the court uses the real and substantial connection 
test. 
2. Should it decline jurisdiction because, as claimed by the 
defendant, there is a more appropriate forum elsewhere? The Court 
uses the doctrine of forum non conveniens to determine this.  
Once the Court takes jurisdiction, there exists a constitutional 
imperative that the resulting judgment be recognized and enforced 
by other Canadian jurisdictions. 
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2. Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is widely accepted in most 
common law countries including Canada (Spar, Amchem Products Inc. v. 
British Columbia (Workers Compensation Board), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897 
(“Amchem”)), the United Kingdom (Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. 
Cansulex Ltd., [1987] A.C. 460 (“Spiliada”), Lubbe v. Cape, [2000] 4 All 
E.R. 268 (“Lubbe”)), and in the United States (Piper Aircraft Co. v. 
Reynolds, 454 U.S. 235 (U.S.S.C.). 
The law governing European member states is somewhat different. In 
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, the 
governing principle is lis pendens, not forum non conveniens. This means 
that if the court first seized establishes jurisdiction simpliciter, then the 
matter is at an end. Article 27 specifies: 
1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and 
between the same parties are brought in the courts of different 
Member States, any court other than the court first seized shall of 
its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the 
jurisdiction of the court first seized is established. 
2. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seized is established, any 
court other than the court first seized shall decline jurisdiction in 
favor of that court. 
The following discussion focuses primarily on the Canadian law as it 
pertains to the issue of when a court should decline jurisdiction in favour 
of the defendant’s proposed forum in an international matter. 
i. Declining Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum Only Done Exceptionally 
Although in Spar the Supreme Court was specifically considering the 
application of the Quebec Civil Code, it approached the problem by first 
reviewing the general principles of private international law, including 
common law and academic commentary. LeBel J. confirmed the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Amchem, that the court should decline jurisdiction only 
exceptionally; that is, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should be declined in 
favour of the defendant’s choice of forum in exceptional circumstances. 
To do otherwise could create uncertainty in private international law. He 
emphasized at paragraph 81 that “such uncertainty could seriously 
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compromise the principles of comity, order and fairness, the very 
principles the rules of private international law are set out to promote.” 
This accords with the English law. In Spiliada, the House of Lords 
noted at page 476 that where a plaintiff has founded jurisdiction as of right 
in England, the “court hesitates to disturb the plaintiff’s choice of forum 
and will not do so unless the balance of factors is strongly in favour of the 
defendant.” 
Contrasting this with EU law, where the court must decline 
jurisdiction in favour of the court first seized, Canada, United States and 
United Kingdom law will not always favour the party who won the race to 
the courtroom. 
ii. Proposed Forum must be “Clearly More Appropriate” 
In Amchem, which preceded Spar by almost 9 years, Sopinka J. 
identified three variables which often mean that there is no single 
appropriate forum: the increase in the number of multinational (and 
multiple) defendants; the corresponding emergence of the potential of a 
large class of plaintiffs residing in different jurisdictions; and the difficulty 
of pinpointing the place where the transaction giving rise to the action 
took place.  
He concluded at page 912 by stating that in these circumstances “the 
best that can be achieved is to select an appropriate forum since no one 
forum is clearly more appropriate than others.” He also confirmed that the 
parochial attitude exemplified by older cases is no longer appropriate and 
that “courts have had to become more tolerant of the systems of other 
countries.” 
He confirms at page 931 that in order to exercise its discretion to 
decline to hear a matter in the plaintiff’s choice of forum, the Court must 
find that there is a forum that is clearly more appropriate. 
In summary, a defendant’s application for a stay in proceedings should 
be granted by the court’s exercise of forum non conveniens only when the 
defendant’s proposed forum is “clearly more appropriate” than the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum. This is a difficult hurdle because in the context 
of litigation in a globalized business environment, several different fora 
may be “appropriate,” and the plaintiff’s choice carries great weight. This 
will be illustrated by the cases in the large-scale litigation section. 
486  THE NEW RULE OF LAW / LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
 
iii. Factors to Consider in Assessing Forum Non Conveniens 
The rule in Canada is that the party seeking to rely on the doctrine 
must bring an application for dismissal, i.e., the party that is seeking to 
have the court which has assumed jurisdiction simpliciter exercise its 
discretion to stay the matter must prove that the proposed jurisdiction is 
clearly more appropriate. However, it seems that Canadian courts have 
routinely emphasized that the burden will rarely affect the outcome of 
their determination as this will usually depend on the Court’s assessment 
of the relevant factors: Canadian Conflict of Laws at pages 13-12. 
In Spar, the Supreme Court quotes with approval from the Quebec 
Court of Appeal decision in Lexus Maritime v. Oppenheim Forfait 
GmBH., [1998] Q.J. No. 2059, online: QL (QJ), which held that the 
following ten factors were relevant, but not individually determinant: 
1.  The parties’ residence, that of witnesses and experts; 
2.  the location of the material evidence; 
3.  the place where the contract was negotiated and executed;  
4.  the existence of proceedings pending between the parties in 
another jurisdiction; 
5.  the location of Defendant’s assets; 
6.  the applicable law; 
7.  advantages conferred upon Plaintiff by its choice of forum, if 
any; 
8.  the interests of justice; 
9.  the interests of the parties; and 
10.  the need to have the judgment recognized in another 
jurisdiction. 
Each of these factors has been the subject of extensive commentary 
and case law. It will be apparent that the factors to consider in an 
international matter are very similar to those considered in an 
interprovincial matter. 
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iv. Forum Shopping 
As the House of Lords in Spiliada (still the leading English decision 
on forum non conveniens) stated at 465: “Any dispute over the appropriate 
forum is complicated by the fact that each party is seeking an advantage 
and may be influenced by considerations which are not apparent to the 
judge or considerations which are not relevant for his purpose.” 
One forum may give one party a personal or substantive and 
procedural juridical advantage, and will generally cause its opponent an 
offsetting disadvantage. Advantages of a certain forum for the plaintiff 
may include: more favorable limitations periods or time bars; the 
availability of legal aid or contingency-type fee arrangements; the 
likelihood of a higher quantum of damages; the possibility of punitive 
damages; the court’s power to award interest; the availability and extent of 
discovery procedures; and, the availability of class or group litigation 
actions.  
The Supreme Court in Amchem discouraged forum shopping and 
concluded that a defendant or potential defendant has two remedies for 
countering a plaintiff’s attempt to forum shop: 
1. The defendant may seek an application for a stay of 
proceedings, which, as discussed above, will be determined by a 
court’s exercise of its discretion using the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. Procedurally, the defendant will raise this in the forum 
where the plaintiff brought its cause of action.  
2. Alternatively, the defendant may apply for an anti-suit 
injunction which may be granted by a domestic court in a foreign 
suit. Procedurally, the defendant will seek the injunction in the 
jurisdiction where it claims the action should be heard. If granted, 
it enjoins the plaintiff from bringing its action in the court of its 
choice. Although the injunction is an in personam remedy, it has 
the effect of restraining the foreign court, and “therefore raises 
serious issues of comity” [at page 913] 
v. Anti-Suit Injunctions 
Justice Sopinka in Amchem outlined the circumstances under which a 
domestic court might grant an anti-suit injunction. He noted that these 
occasions would be rare, because such an action would be necessary only 
when the foreign court did not stay the proceedings in its application of 
488  THE NEW RULE OF LAW / LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens as pleaded by the defendant to the 
suit. As mentioned earlier, the courts in the United States and the United 
Kingdom also follow the doctrine, albeit with different results, as will 
become apparent in the large-scale litigation section of this paper. 
After he reviewed forum non conveniens, Sopinka J. then set out the 
law in Canada with respect to anti-suit injunctions. At page 932 he 
indicates that to maintain comity, a domestic court should consider 
granting an anti-suit injunction only if:  
“1. the applicant (the defendant in the action) has failed in its 
attempt to obtain a stay of proceedings, i.e., the foreign court has 
not declined to hear the matter by its exercise of discretion to stay 
or dismiss the action there; and  
2. the domestic court is alleged to be the most appropriate forum.”  
If these conditions are met, then a domestic court must consider 
whether it is either clearly the most appropriate forum, or, if no single 
forum is clearly more appropriate, whether it is the natural forum (i.e., it 
has the closest real and substantial connection with the action and the 
parties), in which case it would “win out by default.”  
As part of this analysis, the Court must, as a matter of comity, take 
into consideration that the foreign court has itself determined that it is the 
forum conveniens, i.e. it has turned its mind to the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens and has not declined jurisdiction. If the domestic court applies 
the Canadian forum non conveniens factors and finds that the foreign court 
could reasonably have concluded that there was no clearly more 
appropriate forum, then that decision should be respected, and the 
application for injunction should be dismissed. 
Where the foreign court’s assumption of jurisdiction is contrary to 
Canadian principles of private international law as embodied in the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, then the domestic court must consider 
whether the party whose suit would be enjoined would suffer an injustice 
if it were deprived of the personal or juridical advantages associated with 
its choice of foreign court. In other words, would the plaintiff suffer an 
injustice if the domestic court ordered the anti-suit injunction? The court 
makes this determination in the context of all the factors, including those 
previously outlined in forum non conveniens and in “real and substantial 
connection.” 
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The following process can be extracted from Sopinka J.’s summary 
comments on page 933:  
1. having considered the advantages of the foreign jurisdiction to 
the plaintiff bringing the action and any inherent injustice that 
would arise if it were deprived of that jurisdiction; 
2. and the corresponding disadvantage and injustice (if any) to the 
defendant of that foreign jurisdiction, then  
3. if the jurisdiction of the foreign court would constitute an 
injustice, then the assumption of jurisdiction by the foreign court 
will be inequitable, and the party invoking the foreign jurisdiction 
can be restrained.  
Granting an injunction to prevent such an injustice would not disregard 
the rules of comity, because “the foreign court, not having, itself, observed 
the rules of comity, cannot expect its decision to be respected on the 
grounds of comity” [page 934]. 
vi. Coordination Between Two Fora 
In Amchem, the Supreme Court discusses the possibility that both 
jurisdictions refuse to decline jurisdiction as neither is clearly more 
appropriate than the other and parallel proceedings result. In that case: “... 
the consequences would not be disastrous. If the parties chose to litigate in 
both places rather than settle on one jurisdiction, there would be parallel 
proceedings, but since it is unlikely that they could be tried concurrently, 
the judgment of the first court to resolve the matter would no doubt be 
accepted as binding by the other jurisdiction in most cases. [at page 914].” 
C. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
To ensure that there is no confusion between what is meant by a 
foreign judgment, I will use the term “Canadian judgment” for judgments 
rendered by Canadian courts and “foreign judgment” for judgments 
rendered by courts outside of Canada. 
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1.  At Common Law 
i. Canadian Judgments 
As noted previously, jurisdiction simpliciter and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments are correlatives. This means that a Canadian 
court must recognize and enforce a judgment rendered by a federal court 
or by a court in a sister province. This is a constitutional imperative.  
ii. Foreign Judgments 
As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court of Canada in Beals indicated, 
albeit in obiter, that the real and substantial connection test applies to 
questions of jurisdiction simpliciter in international matters. However, the 
primary issue in that case was whether the same test governs questions of 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in the international context. 
In this respect, too, Beals represents the culmination of a line of Supreme 
Court of Canada case law. 
The Supreme Court noted in Spar at paragraph 64 that assuming 
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement were separate issues. As the 
issue before the Court was the former, it declined to rule on the latter: “As 
this case concerns the initial assumption of jurisdiction by a court, it 
would be premature to enter into any discussion of the application of the 
“real and substantial connection test” in respect of the recognition and 
enforcement...” 
In Canadian Conflict of Laws, Castel notes at pages 2-4, 2-5: “If the 
Supreme Court confirms the application of the real and substantial 
connection test to foreign judgments, thereby permitting the enforcement 
of foreign default judgments, it would seem appropriate to revise the 
defences to enforcement in order to safeguard defendants from the 
particular kinds of unfairness that can arise in crossborder litigation.” 
The kinds of “unfairness” referred to are well illustrated by Beals, 
where the defendants appealed a judgment awarded against them in a 
Florida court. The Beals, who were Florida residents, purchased a lot in 
Florida owned by the defendants for $8,000. They commenced an action 
in Florida alleging that they were induced by fraudulent 
misrepresentations to purchase the wrong lot. The Saldanhas and the 
Thivys, all of whom were Ontario residents, chose not to defend the action 
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in Florida and, ultimately, a default judgment of USD260,000 was 
awarded against them.  
The Canadian trial judge dismissed the Beals’ action to enforce the 
Florida Court’s judgment, holding that the Florida judgment had been 
obtained by fraud and that public policy precluded its enforcement in 
Ontario. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the defences of fraud or 
public policy did not have any application in this case and that the 
correctness of the decision was irrelevant to the enforcement of the 
judgment. There were no newly discovered facts that could not have been 
discovered prior to the foreign judgment and presented by the defendants 
had they chosen to appear and defend the action. The defendants were not 
entitled to relitigate the claim under the guise of an allegation of fraud. 
There was no public policy reason not to enforce the judgment. Florida 
was the appropriate court for the determination of the issues. 
Among the issues heard on appeal to the Supreme Court were:  
• whether Canadian courts should, as a matter of public policy, 
refuse recognition of a foreign judgment where, on the facts, 
the judgment does not conform to Canadian views of 
fundamental justice; 
• whether section 7 of the Charter applies to shield a Canadian 
resident from the enforcement of a foreign judgment; 
• whether Canadian courts should give a broader interpretation to 
the defences of fraud, public policy and natural justice, as 
raised in Morguard, which referred to “fairness to the 
defendant through fair process” and remedies being available 
to foreign default judgments in certain cases where public 
policy issues are raised; and 
• whether the failure of the defendants to appear in foreign 
proceedings stops them from seeking redress for failings in the 
processes of the foreign court, which ultimately results in a 
denial of fundamental justice. 
The majority of the Supreme Court held at paragraph 19 that the 
Morguard “real and substantial connection” test, which is applied to 
interprovincial judgments, should apply equally to the recognition of 
foreign judgments. In coming to that conclusion, Major J., writing for the 
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majority, discussed the importance of comity and held at paragraph 27 that 
the doctrine “... must be permitted to evolve concomitantly with 
international business relations, cross-border transactions, as well as 
mobility.” The Supreme Court referred to the judgments in Morguard and 
Hunt as follows at paragraph 28: 
“International comity and the prevalence of international cross-
border transactions and movement call for a modernization of 
private international law. The principles set out in [Morguard] and 
further discussed in [Hunt] can and should be extended beyond the 
recognition of interprovincial judgments, even though their 
application may give rise to different considerations interna-
tionally. Subject to the legislatures adopting a different approach 
by statute, the ‘real and substantial connection’ test should apply to 
the law with respect to the enforcement and recognition of foreign 
judgments.” 
The Supreme Court then went on to discuss the application of various 
defences, commenting as follows at paragraphs 40-41: 
“The defences of fraud, public policy and lack of natural justice 
were developed before Morguard, supra and still pertain. This 
Court has to consider whether those defences, when applied 
internationally, are able to strike the balance required by comity, 
the balance between order and fairness as well as the real and 
substantial connection, in respect of enforcing default judgments 
obtained in foreign courts. 
These defences were developed by the common law courts to 
guard against potential unfairness unforeseen in the drafting of the 
test for the recognition and enforcement of judgments. The existing 
defences are narrow in application. They are the most recognizable 
situations in which an injustice may arise but are not exhaustive.” 
With respect to the defence of fraud, Major J. noted at paragraph 43 
that “as a general but qualified statement, neither foreign nor domestic 
judgments will be enforced if obtained by fraud”. He went on at paragraph 
51 to draw a distinction between fraud going to jurisdiction and fraud 
going to the merits of the foreign judgment: 
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“... fraud going to jurisdiction can always be raised before a 
domestic court to challenge the judgment. On the other hand, the 
merits of a foreign judgment can be challenged for fraud only 
where the allegations are new and not the subject of prior 
adjudication. Where material facts not previously discoverable 
arise that potentially challenge the evidence that was before the 
foreign court, the domestic court can decline recognition of the 
judgment.” 
With respect to the defence of natural justice, Major J. stated the 
following at paragraph 59: 
“As previously stated, the denial of natural justice can be the basis 
of a challenge to a foreign judgment and, if proven, will allow the 
domestic court to refuse enforcement. A condition precedent to 
that defence is that the party seeking to impugn the judgment 
prove, to the civil standard, that the foreign proceedings were 
contrary to Canadian notions of fundamental justice.” 
Finally, with respect to the defence of public policy, the majority of 
the Supreme Court noted that “this defence prevents the enforcement of a 
foreign judgment which is contrary to the Canadian concept of justice.” 
The Supreme Court then noted at paragraphs 75-76 that this defence is 
narrow in application: 
“The use of the defence of public policy to challenge the 
enforcement of a foreign judgment involves impeachment of that 
judgment by condemning the foreign law on which the judgment is 
based. It is not a remedy to be used lightly. The expansion of this 
defence to include perceived injustices that do not offend our sense 
of morality is unwarranted. The defence of public policy should 
continue to have a narrow application. 
The award of damages by the Florida jury does not violate our 
principles of morality. The sums involved, although they have 
grown large, are not by themselves a basis to refuse enforcement of 
the foreign judgment in Canada. Even if it could be argued in 
another case that the arbitrariness of the award can properly fit into 
a public policy argument, the record here does not provide any 
basis allowing the Canadian court to re-evaluate the amount of the 
award. The public policy defence is not meant to bar enforcement 
of a judgment rendered by a foreign court with a real and 
substantial connection to the cause of action for the sole reason 
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that the claim in that foreign jurisdiction would not yield 
comparable damages in Canada.” 
Lastly, at paragraph 78, the Supreme Court considered and rejected the 
argument that enforcement of the foreign judgment in question in Beals 
violated of section 7 of the Charter: 
“The appellants submitted that the Florida judgment cannot be 
enforced because its enforcement would force them into 
bankruptcy. It was argued that the recognition and enforcement of 
that judgment by a Canadian court would constitute a violation of 
section 7 of the Charter. The appellants submitted that a Charter 
remedy should be recognized to the effect that, before a domestic 
court enforces a foreign judgment which would result in the 
defendant’s bankruptcy, the court must be satisfied that the foreign 
judgment has been rendered in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. No authority is offered for that proposition 
with which I disagree but, in any event, the Florida proceedings 
were conducted in conformity with fundamental justice. The 
obligation of a domestic court to recognize and enforce a foreign 
judgment cannot depend on the financial ability of the defendant to 
pay that judgment. As section 7 of the Charter does not shield a 
Canadian resident from the financial effects of the enforcement of 
a judgment rendered by a Canadian court, I have difficulty 
accepting that section 7 should shield a Canadian defendant from 
the enforcement of a foreign judgment.” 
2. Unilateral Legislation for Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments 
The Uniform Law Conference of Canada (U.L.C.C.), at its annual 
meeting on August 12, 2003, adopted the draft Uniform Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA) as a Uniform Act and resolved that it be 
recommended to the jurisdictions for enactment3. The UEFJA was 
                   
3  See http://www.ulcc.ca/en/poam – Proceedings of Annual Meetings, 2003, 
Fredericton, N.B. Civil Section Documents, Working Group on Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments—Report and Revised Final Draft and Commentary as at July 22, 
2004. 
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presented to the U.L.C.C. by the coordinator of the 1999-2000 Working 
Group, Kathryn Sabo4. 
The following policy choices with respect to foreign judgments are 
embodied in the UEFJA5: 
• A specific uniform Act should apply to the enforcement of 
foreign judgments rendered in countries with which Canada 
has not concluded a treaty or convention on recognition and 
enforcement of judgments. 
• The proposed uniform Act applies to money judgments as well 
as to those ordering something to be done or not to be done. 
• The proposed uniform Act applies to provisional orders as well 
as to final judgments. 
• The proposed uniform Act rejects the “full faith and credit” 
policy applicable to Canadian judgments under the Uniform 
Enforcement of Canadian Judgments (UECJA). 
• The proposed uniform Act identifies the conditions for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Canada. 
These conditions are largely based on well-accepted and long-
established defences or exceptions to the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in Canada. 
• Following on the heels of Morguard, the proposed uniform Act 
adopts as a condition for recognition and enforcement of a 
foreign judgment that the jurisdiction of the foreign court 
which has rendered the judgment was based on a real and 
substantial connection between the country of origin and the 
action against the defendant. 
                   
4  General Counsel, Private International Law Team, Department of Justice, GOC. 
5  http://www.ulcc.ca/en/cls/ – Commercial Law Strategy, Enforcement Law Projects as 
of June 24, 2003. 
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3.  Multilateral Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
Canada currently has two multilateral treaties in place that govern 
recognition and enforcement of judgments between Canada and the United 
Kingdom and Canada and France. Most provinces have embodied these 
and multilateral and uniform legislation now exist between the provinces 
and France and the UK. For example, in Alberta, the International 
Conventions Implementation Act, Part 3, adopts the Convention Between 
Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain. 
However, there are interesting developments under way. In accordance 
with the Decision of Commission I of the 19th Session of the Hague 
Conference, an informal working group was set up to prepare a text on 
jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in 
civil and commercial matters to be submitted to a special commission. 
Subsequently, the informal working group proposed that the objective be 
scaled down to a convention on choice of court agreements in business-to-
business cases and prepared a draft which was discussed by the Special 
Commission at a meeting in December, 2003. This meeting was a multi-
day negotiating session of member states at which each member state’s 
formal position on each of the proposed articles of the draft convention 
was put forward, the purpose of the session being to further refine the draft 
text. The result of this meeting was a preliminary draft convention put 
forward in March, 2004 followed by a more recent draft in May, 20046. A 
diplomatic conference will be held at some future date to put the draft text 
to a vote and possibly produce a final text, which would then form a treaty 
or convention open for signature and ratification. If Canada ratifies the 
final convention, the U.L.C.C. likely will recommend that uniform 
legislation be adopted by the provinces. 
II. LARGE-SCALE LITIGATION 
A. Different Types of Large-scale Litigation 
Large-scale litigation (many like claims by similarly situated plaintiffs 
arising from a similar or common cause of action) is often erroneously 
thought to be synonymous with class action litigation. However, there are 
                   
6  See http://www.hcch.net/doc/jdgm_wd110_e.pdf. 
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three methods (with slight variations on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction 
basis) by which such large-scale litigation can originate: 
1. individual actions whereby multiple plaintiff litigants file 
claims severally or jointly in either single or multiple jurisdictions, 
which are then consolidated either by the Court pursuant to their 
respective procedural rules or by agreement of the parties; 
2. representative actions including those where a non-profit 
organization is formed, named as plaintiff, and then brings the 
action on behalf of the members of the non-profit. Membership to 
the organization is usually by subscription, which is often solicited 
by advertisement; and 
3. class actions where a representative plaintiff is appointed by the 
Court to represent members of a defined class. 
All of these methods tend to avoid a multiplicity of actions (post-
consolidation), they streamline discovery, they generally allow a single 
court to hear, acquire the necessary expertise, and adjudicate a matter, and 
they frequently result in settlements. Unless the details of a case are 
reviewed, it is often difficult to distinguish between the methods that were 
originally used to bring the matter before the courts. 
There are clearly differences between the three methods: the first 
requires that all plaintiffs be both known and named as parties to the 
action; the second allows potential “plaintiffs” with a common cause to 
join the named group plaintiff once the action is underway; whereas the 
third requires a class or subclass with common issues to be certified and 
very specifically defined, and not every plaintiff in a class action needs to 
be known or named. In other words, under the first two options, plaintiffs 
must take proactive steps to join the cause, whereas under a class action, 
once a plaintiff is by definition part of the certified class, they must take 
proactive steps to opt out of the class if they do not wish to be bound by 
the decision or the settlement. 
A second major difference is the flexibility with which settlements 
may be made and how damages may be awarded. The first option allows 
the parties to settle pursuant to their agreement and individual plaintiffs to 
be awarded damages specific to their circumstances. Class actions 
generally result in a fixed amount of damages for each class or subclass of 
plaintiff, and the court must approve any settlement. Of course, there are 
exceptions to these generalities. 
498  THE NEW RULE OF LAW / LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
 
An additional misconception is that class actions are usually mass tort 
claims. In the United States, where mass tort class action litigation is 
thought to be rampant, only one of 55 class action litigation cases between 
1966 and 1997 before the United States Supreme Court was a mass tort 
class action (Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) an asbestos-related 
claim)7. The other class action cases were securities and consumer cases 
related to financial losses as a result of unfair business practices, deceptive 
advertising, etc., employees’ rights violations, other civil rights violations, 
and actions against the Government8. 
B.  Are Class Actions Necessary? 
1. The Canadian Perspective 
In 2001, the Supreme Court discussed the history and function of class 
actions in Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 
S.C.R. 534, 2001 SCC 46 (“Dutton”). McLachlin C.J.C. described the 
general rule in equity that all like persons be joined as parties but 
concluded that this may not be practical or viable when the number of 
parties affected is very large. In such cases, the Courts of Equity have long 
recognized that the right of one or a few persons to sue for themselves and 
others similarly situated was permitted. She then continues at pages 548-
549: 
“The class action plays an important role in today’s world. The rise 
of mass production, the diversification of corporate ownership, the 
advent of the mega-corporation, and the recognition of environ-
mental wrongs have all contributed to its growth. A faulty product 
may be sold to numerous consumers. Corporate mismanagement 
may bring loss to a large number of shareholders. Discriminatory 
policies may affect entire categories of employees. Environmental 
pollution may have consequences for citizens all over the country. 
Conflicts like these pit a large group of complainants against the 
alleged wrongdoer. Sometimes, the complainants are identically 
situated vis-à-vis the defendants. In other cases, an important 
aspect of their claim is common to all complainants. The class 
                   
7  D.R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action, 11 
Duke J. of Comp. & Int’l L. 179 at 180. 
8  Ibid. at 185. 
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action offers a means of efficiently resolving such disputes in a 
manner that is fair to all parties.” 
2. The American Perspective 
In July 2000, the Duke University School of Law and the University of 
Geneva Faculty of Law held a conference titled: “Debates over Group 
Litigation in Comparative Perspective: What Can We Learn From Each 
Other?” (“Duke/Geneva Conference”). About 90 lawyers, academics, 
judges and law students from over twenty nations participated. Several of 
the papers given at the conference formed the basis of the Spring/Summer 
2001 issue of the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 
volume 11, number 2 (11 Duke J. of Comp. & Int’l L. 157). 
In the foreword to that issue, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.9, wrote: 
“The sources of injury or threat [to large numbers of people] can 
vary greatly—a tragedy such as a hotel fire or airplane crash; 
widespread distribution and use of a drug or other product such as 
asbestos, tobacco, or Fen-phen; claimed violations of civil or 
human rights; environmental pollution; and business practices such 
as alleged price-fixing, misleading statements affecting values of 
publicly held securities, insurance overcharges, and violation of 
consumer protection laws.  
However parallel the problems, the responses of different legal 
systems have varied widely among nations, with varying emphases 
on class actions, group litigation by associations or unions, 
regulatory enforcement, social compensation schemes, and other 
approaches. In the United States the class action has for the last 
third of a century been the most prominent but by no means 
exclusive mode—and has been a focus of much controversy. Only 
a few other nations have adopted the class action device even to a 
limited extent; and in many countries, particularly the civil law 
systems of continental Europe, resistance to the class action is 
strong, and responses to widespread-injury problems are 
sometimes limited. [footnotes omitted]” 
                   
9  Elvin R. Latty Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
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In his keynote address to the Duke/Geneva Conference, titled 
“Compensating Large Numbers of People for Inflicted Harms”10, Senior 
United States District Judge Weinstein states that United States courts tend 
to attract global disputes for four reasons: procedural and jurisdictional 
rules helpful to plaintiffs, high money judgments, substantive law that 
favours plaintiffs, and a powerful plaintiffs’ bar capable of financing and 
prosecuting such cases.  
3. The European Perspective 
In “Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach”11, Christopher 
Hodges notes that the usual justifications for the necessity of class actions, 
e.g., deterring harmful corporate acts, fairly compensating victims for 
damages, etc., have never been empirically validated in Europe. He claims 
that European consumer legislation serves a similar purpose and that US-
style class actions are simply used to: 
“... leverage large sums of money from a corporation to claimant 
attorneys through contingency fees “earned” in return for settling a 
large number of claims of speculative value. Such a settlement 
may be in the corporation’s commercial interests in the United 
States context as it achieves closure on the potential for multiple 
individual claims arising over many states for an uncertain period, 
each with a cost and drain on resources and the risk of maverick 
jury awards.” 
Hodges concludes that there is clear disdain for what “many 
Europeans view as a grossly overheated litigation market” based on 
“unpredictable potential for arbitrary variation in liability decisions, the 
potential for very large (again unpredictable and arbitrary) damages 
awards, and the disproportionate size of the commercial incentive to the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.” 
                   
10  11 Duke J. of Comp. And Int’l L. 165 at p. 167. 
11  11 Duke J. of Comp. & Int’l L. 321 at 322. 
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4. The United Kingdom Perspective 
As I will discuss later, the United Kingdom has adopted a hybrid 
approach, called group litigation, which straddles the European and 
US/Canadian positions. It recognizes the need for improving accessibility 
to, and efficiency of, claims by a large number of similarly situated 
plaintiffs, but its processes for dealing with these give the managing court 
much more latitude, because as Lord Steyn of the House of Lords noted at 
the Duke/Geneva conference12, “we do not want a litigation-driven 
society.”  
C. Class Action Legislation in Canada 
In Dutton, the Supreme Court cited three important advantages that 
class actions have over a multiplicity of individual suits: judicial economy 
by avoiding unnecessary duplication of fact-finding and legal analysis 
which benefits both plaintiffs and defendants; fixed litigation costs which 
can be divided among a large number of plaintiffs, which means that the 
doors of justice do not remain closed to plaintiffs; and efficiency and 
justice by ensuring that actual and potential wrongdoers do not ignore 
their obligations to the public. 
There is currently class action legislation in British Columbia13, 
Saskatchewan14, Manitoba15, Newfoundland16, Ontario17, Quebec18 and 
Alberta19. Additionally, as the Supreme Court noted in Dutton, there is 
common law authority for class action suits.  
                   
12  Ibid. at 344. 
13  Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50. 
14  The Class Actions Act, S.S. 2001, c. C-12.01. 
15  Class Proceedings Act, C.C.S.M., c. C-130. 
16  Class Actions Act, S.N. 2001, c. C-18.1. 
17  Class Proceedings Act, S.O. 1992, c. 6. 
18  Code of Civil Procedure. 
19  Class Proceedings Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-16.5m as am. by S.A. 2003, c. 42, s. 4. 
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Plaintiffs in Canada also have the ability to seek joinder and 
consolidation of litigation. 
1. Class Certification 
It seems that the most difficult hurdle (and most litigated) that a 
potential class in Canada has to overcome is obtaining the court’s 
certification of the class. The specific requirements pertaining to 
certification of a class vary between the various statutory instruments. 
There are also significant differences between them. For example: 
1. a defendant in an action in Ontario and BC may only apply to 
have a class of plaintiffs certified if that defendant is involved in 
two or more actions. In Alberta, the defendant in any proceeding 
may do so; 
2. a plaintiff may apply to have a class of defendants certified in 
Ontario, but neither BC or AB plaintiffs have the option of doing 
so. In effect, this means that a potential litigant may have to 
proceed against multiple defendants by name; and  
3. in AB and BC, residents and non-residents are automatically 
divided into subclasses on the basis of residency. This is not the 
case in Ontario. As subclasses may opt out or opt in to the class in 
a different manner than members of a class, this has different 
ramifications.  
For comparative purposes, Appendix 1 outlines the requirements for 
class certification under the Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta 
statutes. There are numerous differences between the various Acts as it 
pertains to how a class action proceeding may commence, who it includes, 
how residents and non-residents are treated, what the opt-in and opt-out 
provisions are, etc. 
What impact do these differences have? They may create personal or 
jurisdictional advantages for both plaintiffs and defendants depending on 
their specific circumstances. This may drive “forum shopping,” although it 
is unlikely that forum shopping within Canada would have the advantages 
of, for example, different damages quanta. 
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D. Class/Group Action Legislation Internationally 
1. In the United States 
The United States has had class action legislation in the form of Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 28 U.S.C.A. since 1966. 
However, more than 50 sovereign jurisdictions (federal and state) result in 
complexities in mass adjudication. There is a constitutional requirement 
for a jury in class actions20.  
Multi-district litigation can be consolidated pursuant to statute (28 
U.S.C. §1407) by either party. This allows lawsuits which originated in 
both federal and state courts to be collected and assigned to a single court 
and judge where there are similarly situated plaintiffs. However, this only 
applies to pre-trial activity, which in most cases is enough, as there is a 
significant chance of pre-trial settlement. 
2. In the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has no class action legislation, but litigants are 
permitted to undertake group litigation. As the House of Lords noted in 
Lubbe, supra at page 280, “the conduct of group actions is governed by a 
recently-developed but now tried and established framework of rules, 
practice directions and subordinate legislation.” Part 19.III of the Civil 
Procedure Rules (Amendment No. 2) 2003 (2003 No. 1242 (L.26)) and the 
two accompanying Practice Directions (19 and 19B) outline the specific 
requirements associated with the application of the Rule.  
A Group Litigation Order (“GLO”) may be made by a court when 
there is or is likely to be a number of claims giving rise to the GLO issues: 
Rule 19.11(1). These orders must be approved at the highest level. For 
example, a Queen’s Bench GLO must be approved by the Lord Chief 
Justice: Practice Direction 19B s. 3.3(1). A group register is then 
established on which the claims managed under the GLO will be entered: 
Rule 19.11(2). A single court and judge will “assume overall 
responsibility for the management of the claims and will generally hear 
the GLO issues”: Practice Direction 19B, section 8. 
                   
20  11 Duke J. of Comp. & Int’l L. 165 at 172. 
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United Kingdom group litigation actions differ from class actions in 
that plaintiffs must affirmatively opt in to the cause (as opposed to opt out 
in class actions) and in doing so they agree to be bound by the result 
(although there are provisions for appeal). Joinder can be accomplished in 
varying ways, including membership in an association named as the 
representative group plaintiff. Naming an association as plaintiff means 
that not each and every member of the affected group/class need be known 
or named, so this circumvents the opt in requirements for individual 
plaintiffs. 
Group actions have been widely used in medical litigation (blood 
products, intrauterine devices, human growth vaccine, tobacco, etc.), other 
personal injury cases, financial cases and environmental cases. 
3. In Europe 
In the rest of Europe (excluding the U.K.), large-scale consumer 
disputes are settled differently. In “Multi-Party Actions: A European 
Approach”21, Christopher Hodges notes that member states facilitate 
large-scale consumer disputes by either instituting out-of-court procedures 
or by creating joint representation action, in which a consumer 
organization takes action on behalf of consumers who have suffered 
individual harm caused by the same entity and having a common origin. 
Further, Directive 98/27/EC permits consumer organizations to apply 
to courts in fellow member states for an injunction against infringements 
of consumer trading Directives. Additionally, there are multiple 
conventions which govern intra-EU issues pertaining to jurisdiction and 
the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. 
The author concludes at page 327 that:  
“European access to justice and dispute resolution mechanisms 
represent an approach to economic and social policy that rejects an 
adversarial approach and excessive or unnecessary transactional 
costs but favors conciliation at proportionate costs. European 
policy emphasizes social cohesion rather than an approach 
stressing the individualistic vindication of personal rights.” 
                   
21  11 Duke J. of Comp. & Int’l L. 321 at 322. 
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E. Class Action/Group Litigation and Conflict of Laws 
Interrelationships 
There is a strong interrelationship between class or group litigation and 
conflict of laws jurisprudence whenever plaintiffs or defendants are 
located in different jurisdictions. In Canada, the United States and the 
United Kingdom, case law and legislation supports the availability of a 
domestic forum for members of the class or group that are non-nationals. 
1. In Canada 
The three major class action-related cases that have been heard by the 
Supreme Court are Dutton, which involved non-resident foreign investors 
who suffered damages as a result of debentures purchased to facilitate 
their immigration application, Hollick v. City of Toronto, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 
158, 2001 SCC 68, which involved damages to Canadian residents 
allegedly caused by a waste disposal site and Rumley v. British Columbia, 
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 184, 2001 SCC 69, which involved residential schools. 
All of these cases dealt with issues pertaining to the certification of a class, 
so the relationship between class actions and conflicts of laws cannot be 
examined in these cases. 
The Ontario and BC courts have had occasion to decide cases where 
the relationship between class actions and conflict of laws was material, 
however these were in the context of mostly Canadian resident class 
members. The defendants have been both Canadian and non-Canadian 
foreign persons. 
In Carom v. Bre-X Minerals (2000), 1 C.P.C. (5th) 62 (Ont. C.A.), 
leave to appeal refused (2001), 283 N.R. 399 (S.C.C.), the Court held that 
Ontario’s real and substantial connection with the subject matter of the 
action allowed the Court to take jurisdiction over the matter on behalf of 
non-resident class members. Further, its class action legislation permitted 
any person with the right of action regardless of residence to be included 
as a member of a class. 
In Harrington v. Dow Corning Corp (2000), 193 D.L.R. (4th) 67, 
2000 BCCA 605, a case dealing with silicone breast implants, non-
resident members formed a subclass. The defendants argued that British 
Columbia courts could not take jurisdiction over these non-residents 
because there was no real and substantial connection between them and 
the forum. For example, they were not resident in British Columbia and 
they did not receive their implants in British Columbia or from British 
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Columbia doctors. However, the Court of Appeal concluded that there was 
a real and substantial connection that allowed the British Columbia court 
to assume jurisdiction because of the existence of a common issue 
between the residents and the non-residents.  
This was also the finding in Wilson v. Servier Canada Inc., (2000), 50 
O.R. (3d) 219 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), leave to appeal refused (2000), 52 O.R. (3d) 
20 (Ont. Div. Ct.), leave to appeal refused (2001), 276 N.R. 197 (S.C.C.). 
That case dealt with the drug fenfluramine, which allegedly caused heart 
problems in those that used it for dieting. Class action proceedings 
included Canadian plaintiffs in all provinces and one of the defendants 
was a French corporation. That defendant argued that French law would 
not enforce the Canadian judgment because France had “blocking 
legislation” and because it did not recognize class actions. Despite that 
argument, the Court held that it was up to the plaintiffs to decide where to 
bring their action and that it had jurisdiction as long as Ontario had a real 
and substantial connection to the matter. Further, if French law required a 
retrial of the action in France, this was not a matter with which the Court 
need concern itself, because it was up to the plaintiffs to weigh the 
disadvantages thereof. 
The Ontario court stressed that the opt-out provisions in their 
legislation allowed members of a class to opt out so the Ontario courts 
would not be imposing its jurisdiction on unwilling plaintiffs, whether 
they are Canadians or foreign nationals: Wilson, Cheung v. Kings Land 
Development Inc. (2001), 14 C.P.C (5th) 374 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), leave to 
appeal refused (2002), 156 O.A.C. 73 (Ont. Div. Ct.). 
In summary, it seems that in Canada (or at minimum in Ontario and 
B.C.), once jurisdiction simpliciter over the matter has been established 
(and forum non conveniens declined, if it is raised), then non-resident 
plaintiffs can be included in the class or subclass if they have a common 
issue with resident members of the certified class. This probably applies to 
both Canadian residents and to non-Canadian residents. Whether the non-
resident class member’s country of residence or citizenship allows class 
actions seems to be irrelevant. 
As discussed earlier, there are two parts to the application of conflicts 
of law: assuming jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of 
judgments. As it pertains to assuming jurisdiction, it seems that the 
treatment of class actions and individual plaintiffs’ actions do not differ in 
their application of conflict of laws jurisprudence. Recognition and 
CONFLICTS, CHOICE OF FORUM, COORDINATION AND OTHER ISSUES 507  
 
enforcement of another jurisdiction’s class action judgment would follow 
the same process outlined in Section II, Part C, above. 
2. In the United Kingdom 
As noted above, group litigation actions are available in the United 
Kingdom. In Lubbe, supra, over 3,000 claimants participated in an action 
against Cape Plc., an asbestos mining company, alleging that their 
exposure to asbestos caused them personal injury, and in some cases, 
death. 
The ability of non-residents to be parties to group litigation is similar 
to that which exists in class actions in Canada and the United States. 
Lubbe dealt with the issue of whether lower courts were correct in their 
refusal to decline jurisdiction over the matter on the basis of the 
defendants’ forum non conveniens argument. It was the defendant’s 
position that South Africa was clearly the forum conveniens. It argued that 
despite the fact that the initial plaintiff was a British citizen resident in 
England, all of the other 3000 plaintiffs were South Africans citizens 
resident in South Africa, South Africa was where all of the alleged 
asbestos exposure occurred, the wholly owned subsidiary that ran the 
asbestos facilities was resident there, all of the evidence and the witnesses 
were located there. It is instructive to follow the case through its various 
proceedings because it deals with both group and the conflict of laws.  
In response to the defendants’ application for a stay of proceedings of 
Lubbe’s22 claim, the Queen’s Bench judge agreed that South Africa was 
the natural forum for the trial of the action, and the proceedings were 
stayed pursuant to his exercise of discretion using the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens. An appeal by the plaintiffs was allowed. The Court of 
Appeal found that the defendants had not shown that South Africa was 
“clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum” (also the Canadian test 
for forum non conveniens). Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was 
refused. Hundreds of new claims by South Africans using British 
solicitors poured in.  
                   
22  A British citizen and resident. 
508  THE NEW RULE OF LAW / LA NOUVELLE RÈGLE DE DROIT  
 
The defendant applied to stay all of the proceedings, including that of 
the original plaintiff, on the grounds of forum non conveniens. The lower 
court gave direction to consolidate the proceedings into a group litigation 
action. The stay was heard and the lower court again concluded that South 
Africa was clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum. A second 
appeal was launched and this time the Court of Appeal agreed and 
described the factors that pointed to South Africa as the appropriate forum 
as “overwhelming.” It concluded that South Africa had both the real and 
substantial connection23 between the claim and the forum and that public 
interest and group litigation action considerations including expense and 
convenience also pointed to South Africa. Further, the Court of Appeal 
noted that despite the fact that legal aid and contingency fee arrangements 
might not be available as the plaintiffs’ had argued, the South African 
courts are held in high repute and that legal aid may become available. 
Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was allowed. 
How then did the House of Lords justify its conclusion that the forum 
conveniens was England? The Court held that Spiliada applied, i.e., the 
defendant’s proposed forum be clearly and distinctly more appropriate 
than England, and that the court must be satisfied that there is another 
forum of competent jurisdiction and that the case may be tried more 
suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice in that 
jurisdiction. 
It also held that the plaintiff’s allegations about the absence of legal 
aid or other form of financial assistance, including the availability of 
contingency fee arrangements, was not determinative. The House of Lords 
concluded that [at pages 286-287]: 
“The proper approach therefore is to start from the proposition that 
a claimant who is able to establish jurisdiction against the 
defendant as of right is entitled to call upon the courts of this 
country to exercise that jurisdiction. So, if the plea of forum non 
conveniens cannot be sustained on the ground that the case may be 
tried more suitably in the other forum ... the jurisdiction must be 
exercised—however desirable it may be on grounds of public 
interest or public policy that the litigation be conducted elsewhere 
and not in the English Courts.” 
                   
23  The Canadian test for jurisdiction simpliciter. 
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In summary, the presence of non-resident plaintiffs in a United 
Kingdom group litigation action does not alter the conflict of laws rules 
that exist in England; as long as a single plaintiff is a resident citizen that 
is entitled to bring an action in England as of right and there is no clearly 
and distinctly more suitable forum elsewhere (and this seems to be a 
difficult hurdle to overcome), then a group litigation may be heard in 
England. 
3. In the United States 
A well-known United States case that involved non-resident class 
litigants arose when over 2000 residents of Bhopal, India lost their lives 
and over 200,000 were injured as a result of a lethal gas leak from a 
chemical plant operated by Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) and the 
Union of India (India). There has been individual and class action 
litigation underway since the 1984 disaster occurred. 
The first big wave of class action litigation was consolidated in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York; there 
were 145 claims representing about 200,000 plaintiffs. The defendant, 
UCC, had argued that the United States court should stay the consolidated 
action on the grounds of forum non conveniens. 
In a 63 pages opinion, District Judge Keenan’s judgment (Re Union 
Carbide Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 634 F.Supp. 842 
(S.D. N.Y., 1986)) agreed with the defendant and dismissed the lawsuits 
before him on three conditions: that UCC consent to the jurisdiction of the 
courts in India, that it would satisfy any judgment ordered by those courts 
provided that they “comport with the minimal requirements of due 
process, and that the UCC be subject to discovery under United States 
civil procedure legislation. UCC appealed the conditions attached to the 
dismissal of the law suit and succeeded: Re Union Carbide Corporation 
Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, (1987), 809 F.2d 195 (C.A.) (“Re Bhopal”). 
An action was then brought by India in the District Court of Bhopal and 
the Supreme Court of India approved the settlement agreement in 1991.  
District Judge Keenan’s judgment [at page 845] considered the 
doctrine of forum conveniens and the “touchstone” cases of Gulf Oil v. 
Gilbert (330 U.S. 501, a 1947 decision of the United States Supreme 
Court) and Piper Aircraft v. Reynolds (454 U.S. 235, a 1981 decision of 
the United States Supreme Court). He notes that Piper established that the 
Court is advised to determine first whether the proposed alternative forum 
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is “adequate,” and it should then consider relevant public and private 
interest factors. In Piper, the court concluded that the presumption that a 
plaintiff’s choice of forum was entitled to great deference was decreased 
when the plaintiff was foreign. This was the footing upon which the Court 
then proceeded. The fact that 9 of approximately 200,000 plaintiffs were 
United States citizens was determined by the Court to be insignificant. 
The adequacy of the alternative forum comprises a number of factors, 
including the defendant’s amenability to the alternate forum. The relative 
attractiveness of the United States system to foreign plaintiffs is not a 
factor unless the alternative forum’s remedy would likely be so “clearly 
inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all” [page 846]. The 
Court concluded that the defendant was amenable to the alternate forum 
and that India’s legal system did not constitute a much less adequate 
system. 
Having met the first part of the test, the Court then turned to the 
consideration of the private interest considerations, which include sources 
of proof, access to witnesses, possibility of view. All of these factors 
weighed heavily in favor of India as the preferred forum. In its 
consideration of the public interest concerns, the Court considered the 
administrative burden that would arise if litigation were handled at places 
other than their place of origin, that jury duty should not be imposed on 
people in a community that has no relation to the litigation and that there 
is a public interest in having localized controversies decided at home. 
Again, the Court held the public interest balance was heavily in favor of 
India as the proper forum. It considered both the sheer size of the 
proceedings, which it concluded would unfairly tax the American legal 
system, and the interests of the Indian government and its citizens were 
significantly greater than those of the United States.  
4. Comparing Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
Assuming that there are resident national plaintiffs living in each of 
Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, where could or should 
a class or group litigation action be undertaken? Should there be a single 
action worldwide or should each country’s plaintiffs bring an action in 
their own courts? 
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i. Inclusion of Non-resident Plaintiffs 
There is a paucity of Canadian cases that have expressly dealt with the 
issue of whether to hear a class or representative matter where the majority 
of the plaintiff class members are non-residents. In Interclaim Holdings 
Ltd. v. Down, [1999] 253 A.R. 119, 1999 ABQB 892, Kent J. of the 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench struck the representative portions of a 
Statement of Claim in a class action decision on the grounds that 
judgment, if granted, would not be binding on the foreign parties, because 
all of the named and unnamed plaintiffs were not residents of Alberta. 
This, she reasoned, would mean that the principle of res judicata may not 
apply and that such a plaintiff could then sue elsewhere. This decision was 
appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal, which decided on February 4, 
2004, in light of certain factual changes and of the Supreme Court’s 
intervening decision in Dutton, that the matter should be reheard by the 
Court of Queen’s Bench24. 
It is interesting to compare Lubbe and Re Bhopal, in which forum non 
conveniens was argued, with differing outcomes. In both cases, virtually 
all of the plaintiffs were non-resident citizens, the cause of action occurred 
abroad, the facilities were run by local nationals, and the witnesses, etc. 
were located abroad. What then accounts for the different outcomes? 
The House of Lords declined to follow Re Bhopal in Lubbe stating at 
page 287 that determining “where a case ought to be tried on broad 
grounds of public policy” is not a factor for consideration in the United 
Kingdom because the court “is not equipped to conduct the kind of inquiry 
and assessment ... that would be needed if it were to follow that approach” 
and because these interests are not determinative of whether justice will be 
better served in one forum over the other. As noted previously, public 
policy factors figured prominently in the United States Court’s decision.  
The other determining factor seems to have been that the role of the 
parent company was much more significant in the view of the English 
court than in the view of the United States court. In Re Bhopal, the United 
States Court agreed with defendant UCC’s submission that their role as 
the United States parent company was minor, and that in all respects it had 
distanced itself from the Indian operation. Although this was also the case 
                   
24  (2004), 44 C.P.C. (5th) 42, 2004 ABCA 60. 
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in Lubbe, the House of Lords still attached great weight to the parent 
company’s duty vis-à-vis the plaintiffs. 
In Wilson, supra, the Ontario Supreme Court opined on whether the 
corporate veil should be pierced and the parent company held directly 
responsible for the actions of its subsidiary company in a class action suit. 
The Court held that the usual stringent test of piercing the corporate veil 
would apply, but that the protection provided by the corporate veil was not 
absolute [paragraphs 21-22].  
ii. Plaintiff Compensation Comparisons 
It is very difficult to empirically compare plaintiff compensation 
across jurisdictions, even where the plaintiffs are seemingly similarly 
situated. For example, in a mass tort class action, the precise facts that 
gave rise to the cause of action are often different, the tort systems, while 
similar, are not identical, there are differences in the plaintiffs’ countries 
delivery and payment for medical services, there are different costs of 
living which affect the amount of settlement, there are different fee 
structures for counsel, etc. However, there is one example of very recent 
class action litigation that may be used for comparison purposes; diet 
drugs containing fenfluramine. 
In the United States, about 4 million potential class members existed, 
and a court-approved settlement was reached in Brown v. American Home 
Products Corporation Diet Drugs, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1227525.  
The comparable class action in Canada is Knowles v. Wyeth-Ayerst 
Canada Inc., (2001) 16 C.P.C. (5th) 330; online: QL (OJ) (Ont. Sup. Ct.). 
The Court there also approved a proposed settlement. In that decision 
Cumming J. discussed the settlement agreement in the context of the 
already agreed upon United States settlement agreement. 
He noted at paragraphs 38-39: 
“[the United States decision] provides one standard by which to 
measure the proposed settlement of the Canadian class action at 
hand… There are, of course, significant differences in the sizes of 
the class in each country, the delivery of and payment for medical 
                   
25  An appeal from that decision was dismissed at 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23717. 
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services, and in respect of the two tort systems (for example, there 
is the potential for adverse cost awards in Canada, there is a cap on 
general damages in Canada and there is a greater risk of punitive 
damage awards in the United States).” 
Justice Cummings then outlined additional factors which meant that 
the settlement amounts could not be readily compared. These factors 
included differences in the costs of notice and administration being 
handled differently, the different treatments of the settlement trusts, 
secondary opt-provisions which only exist in the United States, and the 
respective finality of the settlements. In summary, he concluded at § 
paragraph 48 that: “Considering the totality of the respective settlements, 
in my view the Canadian settlement is comparable to the settlement in the 
United States.”  
As these are very recent cases and one of the few instances where the 
facts are somewhat comparable, it might be possible to conclude from 
them that settlements which, in the case of class actions must be approved 
by the Court, will be comparable between Canada and the United States, 
as the criteria used by both courts is that the settlement must be fair, 
reasonable and in the best interests of the class.  
Despite the fact that these diet drugs were sold worldwide, I was 
unable to find any litigation underway in other countries, including the 
United Kingdom. 
iii. Global Class Action vs. Country-by-Country Class Action or 
Group Litigation 
Although it seems that truly global class actions are possible (see for 
example, holocaust victims access to compensation funds established by 
Germany, Austria, Swiss banks, etc.), most class actions seem to be 
brought by plaintiffs on a country-by-country basis, even where the 
plaintiffs are seemingly similarly situated, for example, blood products, 
silicone breast implants, and fenfluramine drugs. 
Perhaps this is explained by the differences that were outlined above. 
For example, there is different legislation and common law pertaining to 
tort actions and environmental legislation varies from country to country 
as does securities legislation. Damages awards, which are generally 
awarded to members of a class do not generally account for the differences 
that would exist in the cost of living, medical care, etc., that plaintiffs 
residing in different countries would enjoy. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
As borders become less of an impediment to the conduct of business 
and personal affairs, there is a recognition by governments and courts that 
there needs to be standardized doctrines for the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments. The Supreme Court of Canada in Beals 
is the most recent Canadian example. The forward movement of the 
Hague Conference is another. In the realm of class actions, for some time 
now there has been a propensity to settle large-scale class actions. While 
in Canada this does not stem from a concern about the unpredictability of 
jury awards as it does in the United States, there is a significant cost to 
massive class action litigation which itself can be daunting. Secondly, 
class actions are being used as a vehicle to correct or regulate apparently 
abusive behaviour by multinational corporations or lax regulation of those 
corporations by government. 
There are some concerns that these trends raise. How does large-scale 
international litigation affect the relationship that each citizen has with the 
administration of justice in his or her country? Although it is not a subject 
for discussion every day, people still assume that there will be a strong 
system of dispute adjudication when it is needed. Indeed, it is the certainty 
that such a system exists that comforts the business community and the 
public. One of the biggest problems that most judicial systems are strug-
gling with is the rising costs of taking a case before a judge for 
adjudication. That problem is magnified in complicated medical malprac-
tice or environmental cases where the technical nature of the evidence and 
the likely involvement of multinational corporations result in vast pretrial 
document and oral discovery. For that reason, large, multijurisdictional 
class actions seem like the answer. However, what effect does that have 
upon the person who may be a party to such an action? Take a father in a 
small town in Alberta who was prescribed a drug which has caused him 
serious and permanent health problems. As a result, his family is suffering 
significant emotional and financial strain. A class action is commenced in 
Toronto. For one reason or another, the action is unsuccessful and there is 
no recovery. The family who has been counting upon the action is not in 
the courtroom to see how the case is proceeding. They have no realistic 
contact with their lawyer. All they know is that this is part of the “justice 
system” and that justice system has done them wrong. Would it not have 
been preferable to have the trial in Edmonton or Calgary? The connection 
with the lawsuit would have been real and their understanding of why the 
action was unsuccessful would have been more informed. Remoteness 
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may result in a loss in a citizen’s connection with the justice system which 
in turn becomes disdain for the judicial system. Surely, it is necessary for 
a strong judicial system that people feel that they are a part of that system. 
I am not suggesting that this is a reason to avoid or abandon multijuris-
dictional actions. It is a cautionary note that the judges and others must 
keep in mind in managing and trying such cases. 
The second concern is the potential devaluation of the class action. 
According to the Rand Institute for Civil Justice, a survey of over 1000 
class actions in the United States in the late 1990s showed that the average 
compensation received by members of a class ranged from $6 to $1500 in 
consumer actions and $6400 to $100,000 in mass tort actions26. Are big 
class actions being seen by members of the public as a way to make a few 
dollars rather than to redress real wrongs? 
Finally, to the extent that class actions try to change regulatory policy, 
is that really the role of the courts? To take an extreme example, an article 
by Adam Liptak in the New York Times27 talks about recently successful 
actions and the concern it raised with the Bush administration. One of the 
examples was an order by a judge in New York that Iraq pay $1 billion to 
soldiers captured and tortured in the first Gulf War. The article quotes a 
State Department lawyer, William H. Taft IV, as saying that such orders 
are not only costly but potentially damaging to American foreign policy. 
Who is right or wrong in that case is not the point. It raises the question of 
whether the courts should be regulating (or, in the example, arguably 
setting foreign policy) when this is properly the role of city councils, 
legislatures and parliaments. Or, is the court obliged to do so in the 
absence of governmental action? 
                   
26  “Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain”. 
27  August 3, 2003. 
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Appendix 1 – Class Action Summary 
Requirement Ontario 
Class Proceedings 
Act, S.O. 1992, c. 6 
B.C. 
Class Proceedings 




Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-
16.5, as am. by S.A. 
2003, c. 42, s. 4 





One member of the 
class may commence 
a proceeding on 
behalf of the 
members of the class 
(s. 2(1)). 
Any party to a 
proceeding against 
two or more 
defendants may make 
application for a class 
of defendants (s. 4) 
 
One member of a 
class resident in BC 
may commence a 
proceeding on behalf 
of a class (s. 2(1)). 
One member of a 
plaintiff’s class may 
commence a 
proceeding on behalf 
of the class (s. 2(1)) 
and request 
certification of the 
class (s. 2(2)). 
A representative 
plaintiff is appointed 
by the applicant (s. 
2(2)) or by the Court 
(s. 2(4)) and is 
certified. That 
plaintiff may be a 
non-profit 
organization (s. 2(6)). 





A defendant to two or 
more proceedings 
may, at any stage of 
the proceedings, 
make an application 
for certification of a 
class and a 
representative 
plaintiff (s. 3) 
A defendant to two or 
more proceedings 
may, at any stage of 
the proceedings, 
make an application 
for certification of a 
class and a 
representative 
plaintiff (s. 3) 
A defendant may, at 
any stage of the 
proceedings, make an 
application for 
certification of a class 
and of a 
representative 
plaintiff (s. 3(1)). 




Act, S.O. 1992, c. 6 
B.C. 
Class Proceedings 




Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-
16.5, as am. by S.A. 




The Court shall 
certify if: the 
pleadings or notice of 
application disclose a 
cause of action; there 
is an identifiable class 
of two or more that 
comprise a class of 
plaintiffs or 
defendants; the 
claims or defences 
raise common issues; 
a class procedure is 
preferable for 
resolving the 
common issue and 
there is a 
representative 
plaintiff or defendant 
who would fairly 
represent the class 
(s. 5(1)) 
The Court must 
certify the class if the 
conditions are met: 
the pleadings must 
disclose a cause of 
action; there is an 
identifiable class of 
2+ persons, whose 
claims raise a 
common issue; the 
class proceeding is 
preferable for the fair 
and efficient 
resolution of common 
issues; a 
representative 
plaintiff exists to 
fairly and adequately 
represent the class 
(s. 4(1)). 
Before certifying a 
class, the Court must 
be satisfied that: the 
pleadings must 
disclose a cause of 
action; there is an 
identifiable class of 
2+ persons, whose 
claims raise a 
common issue; the 
class proceeding is 
preferable for the fair 
and efficient 
resolution of common 
issues; a 
representative 
plaintiff exists to 
fairly and adequately 




Where the class 
includes members 
have claims or 
defences that are not 
shared by all class 
members and the 
court determines that 
these interests should 
be separately 
represented, then a 
representative 
plaintiff or defendant 
of that subclass may 
be certified (s. 5(2)). 
 Where there are 
subclasses (class 
members who, in 
addition to the 
common issues 
shared with all 
members of the class 
also have unique 
common issues with 
other members), a 
representative 
plaintiff of the 
subclass may also be 
certified (s. 7(1)). 




Act, S.O. 1992, c. 6 
B.C. 
Class Proceedings 




Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-
16.5, as am. by S.A. 
2003, c. 42, s. 4 
Non-residents N/A Class comprised of 
BC residents and 
non-residents must be 
divided into 
subclasses along 
those lines (s. 6(2)). 
Where a class 
comprises residents 
and non-residents, 





Any member of a 
class may opt out of 
the proceeding in the 
manner specified in 
the certification 
order: s. 9. [There are 
no special provisions 
for foreign residents]. 
A resident of BC may 
opt out of the class: 
s. 16(1) 
A non-resident of BC 
may opt into the 
subclass that exists 
for non-residents: 
s. 16(2) 
A resident of Alberta 
may opt out of the 
class: s. 17(1)(a). 
A non-AB resident 
must opt into the 
subclass that exists 
for non-residents: 
s. 17(1)(b), (d) and 
s. 7(3). 
Persons that have 
been granted leave to 
opt out may conduct 
their own case: 
s. 17(4). 










N/A Whether the question 
of law or fact that is 
common 
predominates over 
the questions that 
affect only individual 
members of the class; 
whether class 





Whether the question 
of law or fact that is 
common 
predominates over 
the questions that 
affect only individual 
members of the class; 
whether class 









Act, S.O. 1992, c. 6 
B.C. 
Class Proceedings 




Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-
16.5, as am. by S.A. 
2003, c. 42, s. 4 
claims have been the 
subject of other 
proceedings and 
whether other means 
to resolve them are 
less practical and 
efficient; and whether 
there would be 
greater administrative 
difficulties in a class 
than would exist 
otherwise (s. 4(1)). 
claims have been the 
subject of other 
proceedings and 
whether other means 
to resolve them are 
less practical and 
efficient; and whether 
there would be 
greater administrative 
difficulties in a class 
than would exist 
otherwise (s. 5(2)).  
 
 
 
 
 
